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THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND JAPANS DEFENSE POLICY
Yoshihisa Nakamura
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past decade U.S. -Japan security relations have been
debated in both countries. That debate has produced progress in
some areas and less progress in other areas. This mixed degree of
progress is well illustrated by U.S. -Japan interaction over The
Maritime Strategy which is the topic of this paper.
In the past several years Japanese defense policymakers have
heatedly debated their defense strategy in the 1990s. This debate
was provoked by the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Initiative
(Rikuji Shorai Koso) in which the JGSDF insisted that Northern Japan,
especially the south side of the Soya Strait and both sides of the
Tsugaru Strait, should be defended strongly. Presently, however,
these Initiatives are confronted with several difficulties; first, the
strategic thinking gaps between the U.S. Maritime Strategy and the
National Defense Policy Outline (Boei Taiko) established in 1976;
second, the different interpretations of the U.S. Maritime Strategy
among its sister services; finally, the public apprehension about the
question of whether "to be involved in the U.S. -Soviet war." The
purpose of this paper is, therefore, to clarify those difficulties and to
propose an idea for conquering them.
II. WHAT IS THE JAPANESE GROUND SELF-DEFENSE
FORCE INITIATIVE?
After careful research about the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the
JGSDF determined to take the initiative to make a new Japanese
military strategy in the 1990s, and proposed the JGSDF Initiative to
the Defense Agency in 1985 as a working paper to integrate the
three service strategies. The first initiative in the JGSDF paper was
to create a consensus on the Soviet motives to attack Japan. The
JGSDF Initiative estimated that the Japanese islands per se,
geopolitically and strategically, might be a menace to the Soviet
Union under a certain situation. The Initiative postulated that
Soviet adoption of the so-called "bastion for the bear" strategy will
lead Hokkaido to be a threat to the Soviets. According to this
strategy, the Soviet Union would attempt to keep its submarines out
of harm's way by having them patrol in Soviet home waters—the
Sea of Okhotsk--away from Western ASW forces. The Soviets also
would envision that their sanctuary-based SSBNs will be protected
by a portion of their general purpose naval and land-based air
forces. However, they would see Hokkaido as an unsinkable aircraft
carrier for U.S. -Japan military operations in and around Soviet home
waters. Furthermore, their SLOC posture toward these forces
around the bastion could be cut easily by U.S. -Japan forces at the
Soya Strait.
In short, the Soviet motives to attack Japan are based upon
strategic interests: to eliminate the potential military threats
against its strategically important area. However, in that situation
the USSR would try to eliminate these potential military threats.
The second initiative of the JGSDF, therefore, was to describe
the most likely international situation under which Japan would be
attacked by the Soviet military forces. The initiative supported
implicitly the global war scenario. Once war between the U.S. and
the USSR breaks out in other areas such as in the European theater
or in the Middle Eastern theater, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would have
two kinds of military goals. Its first would be to secure the bastion
for SLBM forces (the Sea of Okhotsk) from U.S. offensive operations.
Its second would be to interdict the SLOC between the continental
U.S. and the Middle East. In order to achieve these missions, it is
logical that the Soviets would be induced to occupy at least the
coastal areas of Soya and Tugaru Straits and to insure free passage
through these straits.
The final initiative was to emphasize the role of the JSDF as a
deterrent rather than a defense force. According to the JGSDF
initiative, a war will arise out of a crisis. Therefore, the very
important role of the JSDF during that crisis would be to deter a
Soviet military attack. Although the Northeast Asian role of the U.S.
military forces is a very important aspect of U.S. military strategy,
the JSDF has hardly tackled its interaction with this role. Japan's
future strategy, the JGSDF initiatives urge, must be triggered by the
recognition of a general crisis and must focus on controlling the
crisis, deterring Soviet escalation to an actual attack against Japan,
and preparing for the possible transition to war.
During a crisis the JGSDF will change the deployment of its
forces from all over Japan to the northern part of Japan, especially
at the southern area of the Soya Strait and around the Tsugaru
Strait. More than two thirds of the JGSDF troops will be redeployed
in northern Japan during such a crisis.
Moreover, in order to deter a Soviet invasion the GSDF will
strengthen its function to repel the enemy from Japanese territory.
For example, the GSDF will use anti-tank helicopters (AH-ls),
domestically-produced SSM-1 missiles, and long range Multiple
Rocket Launchers. According to GSDF analysis, the forward defense
strategy, to engage the enemy offshore, is favorable for Japan in
terms of being a deterrent rather than defense, because Japan will
try to be involved in the war, hoping to end it in a modus vivendi.
The strategists in the JGSDF are very afraid that the enemy could
occupy a limited area around a strategically important strait with a
surprise assault, and enforce a quick cease-fire upon Japan. If the
expected outcome of the war is a final victory, it would be possible
to lose a part of Japanese territory because such a loss would
eventually be recovered by a decisive counter-offensive operation.
Thus, such a Japanese defense could be based upon the "win the
war strategy." On the contrary, the JGSDF estimates that a cease-
fire would be more probable than a decisive engagement and that
the loss of territory around the straits would give Japan's enemy a
potential bargaining asset. Thus, the JGSDF urges, Japan's strategy
should seek to deter the military aggression by means of a modus
vivendi.
The initiatives expect that the JMSDF will possess the capability
to play the roles of strait blockade, which would bottle up the Soviet
Pacific Fleet, and of escorting the U.S. CVBGs, which would move
rapidly to forward positions. Especially, its escort of the U.S. CVBGs
would be more important than the protection of 1000 miles of sea
lanes, because such a movement of the U.S. CVBGs, during the crisis
phase, will force the Soviets to move their SSBNs into their bastion
(The Sea of Okhotsk) and protect them with SSN and other forces.
There is no doubt that the air defense capability over the
northern part of Japan must be enhanced. It is often said that the
JASDF plans to withdraw its forces from Hokkaido once the Soviets
indicate their determination to invade there. The range of the F-
15s which are stationed in central Japan, therefore, should be
extended to provide air cover over the northern part of Hokkaido
rather than over the 1000 miles of sea lanes south of Japan.
In addition to these defensive capabilities developed by the
JSDF, the offensive nature of the U.S. Maritime Strategy will
contribute to our deterrence in the northern Pacific. Especially, the
JGSDF expects that Soviet air power in the Far East will be diffused
by the amphibious operations of both the 7th and 3rd Fleets against
the Kurile Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Therefore, the
JSDF can gain air superiority, at least for a while, over the northern
part of Japan. In other words, Japan's strategy, integrated with the
U.S. Maritime Strategy, will provide a strong deterrent, because it
would require the Soviets to not only invade Hokkaido forcefully
but also defend its flank, the Kurile Islands and the Kamchatka
Peninsula. In short, it can be safely concluded that the JGSDF
initiatives sought to design the Japanese defense strategy in the
1990s in line with the U.S. Maritime Strategy.
HI. STRATEGIC THINKING GAPS BETWEEN THE
NDPO AND THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY
The JGSDF Initiative may be a bolt from the blue for the NDPO
proponents. Indeed, there are several strategic thinking gaps
between the NDPO and the U.S. Maritime Strategy. One of the gaps
is how to evaluate the strategic relationship between Japan and
NATO or the Middle East. The NDPO is based upon the assumption
that any Soviet attack will be carried out against Japan alone,
independent of conflict in other areas such as in the European
theater, or in the Middle Eastern theater. On the contrary, the
Maritime Strategy assumes a global conventional war: the Soviet
Union will initiate global conventional war simultaneously in two or
three theaters.
The second strategic thinking gap between the U.S. and Japan is
related to the differences in our perception of Soviet motives to
attack Japan. According to Taiko proponents, the Soviet motive for
attacking Japan may be political: to coerce Japan into
estrangement from the United States. How will the Soviet Union
blackmail Japan? The Taiko proponents expect, first, a small scale
and limited invasion of Japan: the occupation of the northern and
eastern part of Hokkaido, and several islands along the coast of the
Japan Sea and Noto Peninsula. Second, they foresee the Soviets
attacking the sea lanes, regarding this as an easy and effective way
to convert military power into political influence against Japan.
Finally, Soviet bombardment of Japanese cities is estimated to be an
effective military operation to blackmail Japan. In short, the Boei
Taiko assumes that the goal of the Soviet military forces in East Asia
will be the Finlandization of Japan.
According to the scenario of the U.S. Maritime Strategy, the aim
of a Soviet conventional attack against Japan may be to establish a
geographic foothold which will, first, guarantee its strategic nuclear
superiority in a future nuclear war, and second, will weaken U.S.
war efforts in the Middle East. If the Soviet Union could occupy
Hokkaido, the Soviet Far East Fleet would possess a free hand to
deploy its forces in the Northwest Pacific. The high
maneuverability of its navy and air force in the Northwest Pacific
would strengthen the bastion for the bear in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Such maneuverability will also contribute to the interdiction of the
SLOC between the U.S. and the Middle East in war time.
Third, the strategic thinking gap can be seen in respect to the
so-called 1000 miles sea lane protection. Since Prime Minister
Suzuki announced this concept in Washington in 1981, the
ambiguity which is inherent in it has been gradually removed. First
of all, the Tokyo government disclosed to the National Diet that,
although the National Defense Program Outline did not mention this
concept explicitly, it had been underlying the Outline.
Moreover, at the beginning, the 1000 miles sea lane protection
was regarded as the peace time mission of the JSDF: to secure the
transportation of resources and goods to sustain Japanese modern
life. Sea lane protection proponents anticipated that our potential
enemy will attempt to cut the sea lanes before it embarks upon
military invasion of Japanese territory because sea lane interdiction
will be a very effective way to coerce Japan without triggering U.S.
military commitments to Japan under the U.S. -Japan security treaty.
However, Prime Minister Nakasone revised this interpretation.
While the sea lane defense still meant the protection of cargo boats
and oil tankers for Japan, not military supply ships, it would also be
a JSDF mission in war time, he said.
Although the tactics of protecting civilian ships is still
ambiguous under the 1000 miles sea lanes protection concept, many
Japanese envision that the SLOC will be defended with either
convoy protection such as the escort of Japanese cargo boats under
the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces. For more strategically
oriented Japanese, sea lane protection means the protection of
corridors, within which the merchant marine can sail freely because
the JMSDF defends them from the Soviet submarine threat.
On the contrary, the U.S. looks upon the sea lane protection
strategy as a deterrent rather than solely for war fighting. It is
meant as a deterrent insofar as its intention is the following:
(1) The U.S. Navy tries to protect the SLOC through
military threats against the Soviet Navy; to attack
Soviet naval bases, to blockade the strategically
important straits, and to detect, pursue and destroy
Soviet submarines. In this view, the aggressiveness of
the U.S. Navy is the greatest deterrent.
(2) The various U.S. options make the Soviet naval war
plans more complicated and more uncertain. Soviet
war planners presumably are compelled to consider a
variety of threats with which they must cope.
(3) The U.S. concept is based upon the assumption that
the possession of "capability" is different from the
execution of its "capability." For example, although
the U.S. can destroy Valdivostok and blockade Soya
Strait in war time, it may or may not carry out such
kinds of operations.
(4) The U.S. Navy plays a very important role during
crises; the movement of U.S. CVBGs to forward
positions during a crisis moves the Soviet SSN and
other forces to defensive position of its bastion.
In summary, there have been three kinds of strategic thinking
gaps between the NDPO and the U.S. Maritime Strategy: first,
political interests vs. strategic interests in terms of the Soviet
motive to attack Japan; second, the local war vs. the global war in
terms of the war scenario in which Japan will be involved; and
third, defense vs. deterrence in terms of the strategic concept to
protect the Japanese sea lanes.
IV. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE U.S. MARITIME
STRATEGY AMONG THE JGSDFS SISTER SERVICES
Other difficulties which the JGSDF initiatives have met are the
different interpretations of the U.S. Maritime Strategy among its
sister services. The JMSDF does not estimate the Soviet military
strategy in the same way as the United States. The primary mission
of the Soviet navy in the Far East, according to its view, may still be
to interdict the sea lanes of Japan, not to defend the "bastion for the
bear."
Moreover, the JMSDF regards the Maritime Strategy as a
traditional U.S. strategy rather than the unique product of the
Reagan Administration and its first Secretary of the Navy, John
Lehman. In other words, the Maritime Strategy is to reassert the
presence of the U.S. Navy as the "senior service" in line with
Mahanism. As a result, the JMSDF insists that its primary mission
is, and will be, the protection of the 1000 miles sea lanes, not the
strait blockade and/or the escort of the U.S. CVBGs.
Furthermore, the JMSDF cannot declare that the escort of the
U.S. CVBGs is its mission during a crisis because of the Japanese
Constitution which prohibits collective defense. Indeed, Prime
Minister Nakasone said in the National Diet that the escort of the
U.S. fleet will be carried out only in a wartime situation such as a
military attack against Japanese territory and/or against the
Japanese sea lanes.
As for the straits blockade mission, it wants to control the
straits with the combination of its submarine and surface ships
rather than by laying mines. It points out two reasons why it does
not want mine operation. One of them is that, once the mines are
laid, the Japanese fleet can not enter the Sea of Japan either. It is
not surprising that the JMSDF wants to enter there and would
attempt to attack the Soviet amphibious ships which support the
landing of troops.
The other reason is that mining the straits is an unrealistic
operation. It is true that Japan cannot mine the straits during a
crisis because it is formal Japanese policy that the straits blockade
must be carried out only after Japan would be attacked militarily.
Therefore, the straits would be mined only after Soviet submarines
go out to the Pacific and sink Japanese ships.
It seems that there is a consensus among the SDF officers in
respect to Soviet motives to attack Japan. The strategic value of the
Japanese islands may be more attractive for Soviet decision-makers
than their political interests. However, there is a big difference
among the three Japanese services in terms of how to attack the
strategically important island, Hokkaido. The JGSDF officers are
very afraid of a Soviet amphibious operation against northern
Hokkaido and both sides of Tsugaru Strait.
From the viewpoint of the Japanese officers, the sea lanes
between Japan and the Middle East will be interdicted first, and
only after that will the Soviets begin to invade Hokkaido. The
JMSDF suggests that a Soviet attack on Hokkaido will be infeasible
because of the limited amphibious capability of the Soviet Far East
Fleet.
The attitude of the JASDF is ambiguous. It insists that Soviet
air power would attempt to destroy the military facilities at the
northern part of Japan before they begin to invade Hokkaido.
Nevertheless, it does not worry about air superiority over Hokkaido,
except for its northern part, because the U.S. will strike back at the
Soviet air force bases (at least in Sakhalin) and will be able to
neutralize their function.
It is worth noting that the JASDF hardly evaluates the strategic
value of Hokkaido in the context of the U.S. Maritime Strategy. As a
result, it underestimates the strategic value of northern Hokkaido to
blockade the Soya Strait. Rather, it emphasizes the value of
southern Hokkaido. If the Soviets would occupy there, they could
menace directly the U.S. Air Force at Misawa, which might be able
to neutralize the Soviet air force bases in the Maritime Provinces
and Sakhalin. The JASDF, therefore, suggests the JGSDF not redeploy
its troops in northern Hokkaido.
The more serious threat, from the viewpoint of the JASDF, with
which it must cope, is the Soviet bombers which fly down the
Pacific outside the range of its F-15s to attack Japan's sea lanes.
Therefore, the JASDF devotes itself to extending the range of its F-
15s as well as to possessing AWACS.
IV. THE JAPANESE PUBLIC'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY
Although the three services of the JSDF appear to support the
U.S. global conventional war scenario, it is not surprising that the
Japanese public will be reluctant to accept such a war scenario
because of the "being involved in the war" syndrome. Since the
U.S. -Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951, the Japanese public
has been very sensitive to being involved in any type of U.S. -Soviet
military confrontation which develops outside of Japanese soil.
Although such a sensitivity was dormant after the U.S. withdrawal
from Vietnam, it awoke with the pronouncement of the Horizontal
Escalation Strategy in the U.S. DOD Annual Report, FY 1983.
Furthermore, senior U.S. officials at a recent forum on Pacific
Maritime Strategy said that the U.S. will seek to end any Soviet
aggression in Europe with a second front in the Pacific. Due to their
remarks, the Japanese public is very sensitive again to strategic
integration between the U.S. and Japan, especially with regard to a
global war scenario.
It seems to the Japanese public that U.S. naval exercises
support the Second Front Strategy. Since the Maritime Strategy was
publicized, the 7th Fleet has often entered not only the Sea of Japan
but also the Sea of Okhotsk and simulated attacks against
Vladivostok.
Furthermore, during U.S. -Japan amphibious operation exercises,
it was reported, there was a big discrepancy between the U.S. and
Japan regarding the exercise scenario. The JMSDF exercise was
based upon a scenario of amphibious operation to recapture
Hokkaido. On the contrary, the U.S. fleet exercised within the Sea of
Okhotsk under the scenario of an amphibious operation to occupy
the Kurile Islands. One leading Japanese newspaper wrote: "the
JSDF were entrapped by the U.S." In short, the Japanese regard
strategy based upon the global war scenarios as very risky, rather
than very sound, because the U.S. might attack the Soviet Union
before the USSR attacks Hokkaido.
In addition to Japanese apprehensions about horizontal
escalation, vertical escalation issues should be examined here.
Although many U.S. security experts criticize operations against
Soviet SSBNs as a means to changing the nuclear balance through
conventional means, it is not a controversial issue among the
Japanese public and even defense policymakers, so far. The
Japanese people often discuss the horror of nuclear war but hardly
examine the other aspects of nuclear war. It appears that its horror
stops them from thinking about nuclear war and its strategy. Even
Japanese defense experts are prone to compartmentalize the
strategic issues into two categories, nuclear and conventional
strategy, and to disregard the nuclear issues because Japan's non-
nuclear policies permeate them. They may be satisfied with their
rhetoric about the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In short, there is a
threshold between their nuclear and conventional thinking.
On the contrary, the issue of straits blockade is very
controversial. As long as the straits blockade is a pillar of the
Maritime Strategy in the Pacific, it seems to the Japanese public that
this strategy is too provocative to the Soviet Union. Some
strategists in Tokyo point out that, once a U.S. -Soviet war breaks out
in Europe or the Middle East, the Soviet Union likely would try to
occupy the northern part of Hokkaido, and the southern side of the
Soya Strait, regardless of carrying out the straits blockade
operation. The Japanese public, however, seems to support the
argument that the Soviet military commander will decide to invade
Hokkaido mainly if his forces were to be bottled up in the Sea of
Japan.
There is another problem highlighted by the recent elaboration
of the Maritime Strategy in the Pacific: proposals to occupy the
Kurile Islands and to use them as bargaining chips at the war
termination table. First of all, although with respect to the future
U.S. -Soviet strategic posture the Kurile Islands may have value
equal to Hokkaido, these islands are not worth even a part of
Hokkaido from the Japanese viewpoint. It is worth noting that most
Japanese regard General MacArthur's refusal to accept Stalin's
demand for a cession of the northern part of Hokkaido, as his
greatest contribution to Japan.
Finally, it would not be so difficult for the Soviets to find an
alternative to the bastion of the Okhotsk Sea. If they could occupy
even a part of Hokkaido, the Soviets could create a bastion in
between its upper jaw, Hokkaido, and its lower jaw, the Korean
Peninsula. As a result we should be alert for more aggressive
movements on the Korean Peninsula. Soviet military approaches to
North Korea may indicate the search for such an alternative bastion.
Ironically, the JGSDF initiatives do not allow Japan to deploy its
forces in the southern part of Japan.
V. CONCLUSION
U.S. strategic experts must bear in mind that there are various
interpretations of the U.S. Maritime Strategy among the Japanese.
Some urge integration between a future Japanese strategy and the
U.S. Maritime Strategy. Others insist "no." The Japanese Ground
Self-Defense Forces initiatives seem to support integration between
the Japanese defense strategy in the 1990s and the U.S. Maritime
Strategy, and among the JSDF service strategies along the line of
that strategy.
It is not clear so far how much the impact of those
interpretations will damage the JGSDF initiatives. It would not be
surprising if the Japanese public demands revision of the global war
scenario. The JMSDF may continue to emphasize the sea lane
protection: either through convoy or corridor protection. There is
a view, it is said, that those advocating the importance of the 1000
miles sea lanes protection aim to get as large an appropriation as
possible for the JMSDF. The JASDF may show its interests in
extending its air defense area to the Pacific rather than to the north.
Nevertheless, if the Maritime Strategy is properly explained to
the Japanese public and its defense experts, its defense strategy in
the 1990s must be strategically more sound than in the 1980s. The
point is: What should the U.S. and Japanese elites do to facilitate
the Japanese understanding of the Maritime Strategy?
There is no doubt that recent development of the U.S. -Japan
relationship has promoted significant dialogue between the two
countries on political and tactical aspects of national security. The
SDI and issues are symbolic. However, both people, especially
officials (including the military), have not discussed the key
strategic concepts: the strategic implications for Japan of the
Soviet Union, the viability of the conventional global war scenario,
and the differentiation between deterrence and defense.
In order to facilitate Japanese understanding of the Maritime
Strategy, a U.S. -Japan joint research project on the strategic concept
should be established. Moreover, both countries should hold U.S.-
Japan joint crisis gaming, as well as war gaming, on the politico-
military level, not tactical level. These joint gaming efforts will
contribute to the professional understanding of the Maritime
Strategy. In short, a U.S. -Japan integrated strategy along the line of
the Maritime Strategy, if such an integration is desirable for both
countries, can be created through a dialogue between the two
countries about the strategic concept underlying this strategy.
U.S. AND ITS PACIFIC ALLIES: MARITIME INTERDEPENDENCE
Robert J. Hanks
Since the end of World War II, U.S. defense concerns
have been focused primarily on Western Europe, Washington
consistently viewing NATO as the lynchpin of American
security. By contrast, the Pacific Far East has, until
quite recently, generally been ignored. This strategic
myopia has, at last, come to be recognized for what it
really is. Today, it is clear to even the most casual
observer that the nations along the so-called Pacific Rim
are just as important to U.S. national security as are those
of Western Europe.
Parenthetically, one is compelled to note that the term
"Pacific Rim" connotates all those nations which front on
the waters of the Pacific Ocean. All too often, when that
phrase is used, the vision invoked is limited to the
littoral countries of the East Asian mainland along with
nearby island states. Nothing, of course, could be further
from reality. Canada, the United States, and nations in
Central and South America are just as much a part of the
Pacific Rim as are the mainland and island nations of the
Western, South, and Central Pacific. Of prime importance,
economic and national security imperatives—emergent during
the past four decades—have rendered this entire portion of
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the globe one of growing interdependence. The maritime
nature of that interdependence is most clearly revealed by a
glance at a regional map.
The Pacific Far East
This is not to say that NATO Europe is no longer an
essential element of U.S. security. Clearly, it is.
Nevertheless, other portions of the world also play impor-
tant— in some instances vital—roles. At this moment, for
example, the Persian Gulf occupies center stage in the
crucial and continuing Free World search for energy.
Still, the impact of Far Eastern countries on U.S.
national security is scarcely of less importance than this
nation's ties to Western Europe. Trade, alone, reveals that
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this part of the globe is of growing significance to
American welfare. In recent years, commercial intercourse
between Far Eastern nations and the United States has
expanded to the point that it now surpasses the total which
America conducts with its European allies. Moreover, the
United States and Japan today boast the highest Gross
National Products (GNPs) in the world. Trade, however, is
not the only measure of this region's importance to the
United States. There also is the fundamental matter of
mutual security.
In the latter instance, it is becoming evident that the
Soviet Union is increasingly capable of presenting
challenges to the Free World in the Far East which are
potentially as dangerous as those they currently pose to
Western Europe. For example, the West has long harbored a
fear that Soviet seizure of West Germany's industrial
heartland would constitute a disaster of major proportions.
Soviet seizure of Japan would visit the same sort of
catastrophe on the Free World. Only during the past few
years, however, has any serious American attention been paid
to such developing menaces in the Far East.
Myriad questions promptly come to mind. How grave are
perils confronting the West in the Pacific Far East? How
should the Free World deal with them? Absent a NATO-like
organization in the region, what sorts of military
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cooperation could be fashioned to supplement economic,
diplomatic, and other, less violent, initiatives?
One has only to glance at this area's history since the
end of the Second World war to perceive the profound changes
which have occurred. In 1945, following defeat of the
Japanese Empire, the United States essentially stood supreme
in the Western Pacific. With the exception of a few
residual European colonial holdings, countries throughout
the Far East were not only clear of occupation forces but
free to direct their own destinies. U.S. military forces
—
particularly men-o'-war of the United States Navy—were
present in strength, extending a protective security
umbrella over the region.
Although internal political dissidence was abroad at
various locations
—
particularly in China, Indo-China, and
Indonesia—the domestic environment in other countries was
relatively quiescent. Moreover, no overt threat of
international aggression loomed on the horizon.
Conditions remained so until 1949 when the Communist
revolution in mainland China culminated in the overthrow of
Chiang Kai Shek and the Koumintang. That event was
accompanied by two major changes: the Communist triumph in
China drastically altered the area's balance of power, and
political turmoil suddenly became the Pacific Rim's
hallmark. Subsequently, significant additional changes have
occurred. Beijing, for example, following its historic
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split with Moscow and the chaotic upheaval accompanying the
infamous Cultural Revolution, has become something of a
positive contributor to regional political stability.
Then, the end of the Vietnam war terminated direct U.S.
military involvement in Southeast Asia. Ultimately,
however, that retreat led to extension of Soviet military
power to the South China Sea, an unprecedented development.
With Russian warships and aircraft presently operating from
former American military bases in Vietnam, the entire
strategic mosaic in Southeast Asia, again, underwent a
remarkable transformation. Furthermore, the Far Eastern
security vista has been considerably altered by a progres-
sive unraveling of post-World War II Western solidarity.
Years of discontent in the Republic of the Philippines
eventually resulted in the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos and
the rise to power of Corazon Aquino. While this change
offered the Filipino people hope for genuine political
freedom and increased economic well being, it simultaneously
cast a dark cloud over the future of two major American
military installations in the Philippines: the U.S. naval
base at Subic Bay and the U.S. air base at Clark Field.
Loss of access to these facilities manifestly would
inflict irreparable harm on the ability of the United States
to maintain a meaningful military presence in Southeast Asia
and, thereby, to cooperate with allies and friends by
augmenting their defenses. Quite simply, there are no
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comparably viable alternatives available. At this time, it
is not altogether clear what position the Aquino government
will take when the leases for these facilities come up for
renewal
.
To the south, New Zealand's stand against visits of
nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships to its ports has
decimated the ANZUS Alliance. If not dead, that compact is
certainly almost moribund. Of supreme significance,
Aukland's position has seriously weakened U.S. ability to
sustain a meaningful naval presence in the South Pacific.
Additionally, strong pressure to establish a nuclear-free
zone in the Southwest Pacific Ocean area is generating
further problems for the United States. These developments
are particularly significant in light of the determined
Soviet campaign to establish footholds throughout the
region.
As for nuclear-free zone issues, nuclear-powered
warships are universally recognized and, therefore, readily
identifiable. Under the New Zealand strictures and the
provisions of the proposed agreement, Western and Soviet
nuclear-powered warships alike would be banned from entering
area ports.
On the other hand, given the U.S. policy of neither
confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons
aboard its warships—whether those ships are nuclear or
conventionally powered—all American men-o'-war would be
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barred from calling at any port throughout the region should
a nuclear-free zone be established. When seeking entry
clearance, however, the Soviets would find themselves
subject to no such constraint since they invariably deny the
presence of nuclear weapons aboard their warships. Thus,
despite the provisions of any nuclear-free zone agreement,
men-o'-war wearing the Hammer and Sickle would continue to
be able to sail these seas and put into ports throughout the
South Pacific, as long as they obviously are conventionally
powered.
More recently to the north, political unrest in the
Republic of Korea has threatened to bring down the regime of
President Chun Doo Hwan. In this case, fundamental issues
center on the form of government the peoples of South Korea
desire and whether they will be able to obtain it. At the
moment, answers to these questions remain very large
unknowns. From a Free World vantage point, the Korean
problem is twofold. First, as domestic political clashes
multiply, the defense of the country against obvious threats
posed by North Korea are certain to be neglected.
Complicating the overall picture is the age of North
Korea's venerable dictator, Kim II Sung, and the question of
succession. It is not altogether certain that he might not
undertake one last, desperate effort to unify the peninsula
under the Red Banner before his death. Nor is there any
assurance that his son—the most likely successor—will not
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move to do so immediately after coming to power. Secondly,
since the ultimate outcome of the current unrest in South
Korea is so uncertain, the nature of the government which
could eventually emerge from the current turmoil in that
portion of the peninsula might prove to be inimical to
Western interests.
Collapse of the South Korean Government would expose the
eastern flank of one country not yet examined but upon which
free world security in the Pacific Far East is substantially
contingent: Japan. Defeated primarily by the United States
during World War II, Japan's governing pacifist constitu-
tion was dictated by General Douglas MacArthur. In that
document, Tokyo renounced armed conflict as a means of
achieving national objectives. During the decades since the
end of the war, its peoples have refused to spend a
reasonable portion of their GNP on defense. As a matter of
fact, in the early postwar years, Japan was racked by
continuing debate over any expenditures for military forces.
The umbrella of American protection, implicit in Japan's
U.S. -imposed constitution, provided a facile excuse for many
Japanese to insist that their attention and efforts should
be devoted exclusively to the nation's economic and social
development. Today, these same people are sufficiently
confident that the United States is powerful enough and
adequately determined to defend their island nation against
externally mounted dangers that they remain fairly sanguine
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with respect to military threats, despite the huge Soviet
buildup in the Far East.
Provisions of this constitution notwithstanding, the
|
Japanese Government eventually won the day with respect to
acquiring a modicum of military power but consistently
refused to dedicate more than one percent of the nation's
Gross National Product to the military. Moreover, to
reinforce the notion that Tokyo harbors no predatory aims in
East Asia, the Japanese armed services—army, navy, and air
—are characterized as "self-defense" forces. Not until
1987 was the defense spending cap breached and, then, not by
very much. It is abundantly evident that the Japanese are
far more concerned with economic threats than with national
security.
It is only fair to them to note that, given the robust
nature of the nation's economy, Japanese military expendi-
tures as a percentage of GNP amount, in real terms, to
greater spending than that being made by most of America's
European allies. Nevertheless, the total still leaves a
good deal to be desired in funding a reasonable national
defense posture, one capable of making a proportionate
contribution to collective security in the Pacific Far East.
For instance, the average Japanese citizen seems to be
singularly unconcerned about continuing Soviet occupation of
a group of islands—the so-called Northern Territories
—
seized during the closing days of the Second World War and
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never returned, or frequent Soviet amphibious exercises
clearly aimed at seizure of Northern Hokkaido which
dominates one of the important straits--Soya--Tokyo pledged
to close in the event of war with the USSR.
It is in the foregoing overall context that one must
consider the degree to which maritime interdependence
permeates relationships between the United States and its
Far Eastern allies and, indeed, between those nations
themselves. After all, the Western Pacific is just as
surely a maritime-oriented region as is the Northern
Atlantic Ocean area from whence NATO takes its name. And,
just as certainly, the security of the United States today
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depends, as much or perhaps more, on events transpiring in
the Pacific Far East as it does on those occurring in
Western Europe. The issue, of course, is how best to;
protect American and other interests throughout the region.
The first thing which strikes anyone perusing a map of
the area is the extent to which salt water dominates its
geography. From the Asian mainland to the myriad islands
dotting the outlying sea areas, connecting distances are
vast. Moreover, if one surveys the trade routes—not only
in the Western Pacific but those entering and lacing the
Indian Ocean— it becomes painfully clear that Western
economic well-being and mutual security depend critically on
the Free World's ability to use those sea lanes, in peace as
well as in war.
When one considers peacetime transport of normal trade
—
food, fuel, and raw materials— it is evident that Western
control of sea routes throughout the Western Pacific and
Indian Ocean regions is mandatory. Once the focus is
shifted to wartime requirements, including the indispensable
flow of strategic cargoes, the imperatives undergirding such
control expand geometrically.
If there is any important lesson to be learned from the
carnage accompanying the Second World War, it is that
nations which control the oceans, command their destinies.
The most quoted international strategic theorists—Admiral
Alfred Thayer Mahan (maritime) and Sir Halford Mackinder
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(continental) notwithstanding, an earlier realist put it
very well. Sir Walter Raleigh observed that whosoever
commands the sea, commands the trade of the world; whosoever
commands the trade of the world, commands the riches of the
world and, consequently, the world itself. One would be
well advised to keep these words of that famed sea captain
in mind, even in the world which exists several centuries
after his death.
In more recent times, it was the ability of the United
States to supply West European nations with the wherewithal
—American army, navy, and air units, together with weapons
and supplies to sustain hard-pressed Allied forces—which
ultimately brought about the defeat of Hitler's Nazi legions
and produced victory in Europe. Of even greater signifi-
cance, insofar as present-day conditions in the Western
Pacific are concerned, were the spectacular American naval
campaigns of World War II which led to the demise of the
Japanese Empire. The maritime imperatives which obtained
then, are equally operative in present-day Pacific Far
Eastern waters.
Even a cursory glance at a map of the region, one
depicting the sea lanes and so-called shipping choke points,
can leave little doubt that maritime interdependence is a
fact of modern day life in the Western Pacific. Although
this strategic equation continues to govern throughout the
region, there have been major changes since the days
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immediately following World War II. The most important is
that the United States no longer, alone, disposes suffi-
cient military power to police all of the waters of the
Pacific Far East. Recognition of this reality led, in 1969,
to enunciation of the "Guam Doctrine." In a speech on that
island, former President Richard Nixon set forth its basic
premises.
In essence, he announced that the United States no
longer possessed the military power to predominant in areas
around the globe where forces opposed to freedom were then
operating. As a consequence, regional and national defense
would, henceforth, be primarily the responsibility of
countries involved. The United States would not do the job
for them.
President Nixon hastened to add that Washington stood
ready to assist its allies and friends in a number of ways.
Where a nation could afford to purchase the means to defend
itself, the United States would sell it the weapons required
to do so. In those cases where nations could not afford to
buy the requisite weaponry, the U.S. Government would
provide it at minimal or no cost. Moreover, all countries
could call on the United States for additional assistance in
the form of training and military advice.
Finally, if any external jeopardy proved to be so great
that, absent any further assistance from the United States,
defeat appeared to be likely, Washington would consider
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military intervention. Initially, such American participa-
tion would take the form of committing naval and air forces
which constitute the high technology spectrum of defense
investment— in money and trained manpower—that many nations
cannot afford. Also implicit in this doctrine was the
notion that, if necessary, American ground power ultimately
would be placed on the balance scales to avert complete
defeat and subsequent subjugation of friendly or allied
states. Even given the recent buildup of the U.S. armed
services under the Reagan Administration, these principles
still govern global American military commitments.
So where does all of this leave us? Returning to the
previously mentioned map, it is obvious that solutions to
ongoing security problems in the Pacific Far East hinge on
the fact that the region is almost totally maritime in
nature. Moreover, it is essential to recall that Japanese
naval forces sealed off allied access to China, the
Philippines, and island areas of the South China Sea during
the opening months of the Second World War, and they did so
almost exclusively with sea power.
George Santayana, the Spanish-born American philosopher
observed that those who ignore history are condemned to live
it again. Are we now, during these closing years of the
twentieth century, to be so doomed? Are we to ignore the
growing Soviet naval capability to do what the Japanese
accomplished nearly five decades ago? The USSR's military
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possession of former American naval and air bases in
Vietnam, coupled with the expanded reach of Moscow's Far
Eastern military forces based in Northeast Asia present the
same sort of challenges the Japanese were able to mount in
the opening years of the 1940s. Today, however, these
challenges also include the manifest advances in military
technology which have taken place since 1941.
Just as it did in the early 1940s, this area extends not
only along the far eastern portion of the Pacific Ocean but
through the Strait of Malacca and companion Indonesian
maritime passages into and throughout the Indian Ocean.
Whether it be oil from the Persian gulf fueling American
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military forces in the Pacific Far East—stationed in Guam,
Okinawa, the Philippines, Japan, and Korea—or strategic
cargoes required to keep friendly and allied economies
running, the aforementioned sea-lanes crisscrossing these
two great bodies of water constitute jugular veins insofar
as the Free World is concerned. While this fact strongly
affects the advanced industrial nations of Europe and North
America, its impact is critical with respect to countries
along the Western Pacific littoral.
The foregoing reality alone suggests that Soviet acqui-
sition of former American naval and air facilities in
Vietnam—overlooking sea routes throughout Southeast Asian
waters
—
presents dangers which the West will ignore only at
its peril.
There are two critical aspects to these latter-day
developments. In peacetime, Soviet political influence
throughout the region, stemming from its unprecedented
military presence in Southeast Asia—air and naval—will
almost certainly increase by an order of magnitude. Of even
more critical significance, that Soviet presence could, in
wartime, spell defeat for the West all along the western
reaches of the Pacific Rim.
If one accepts the foregoing evaluation, the basic
question which then surfaces is: What can be done about the
threats and challenges thereby confronting freedom-loving
peoples who populate nations of the Pacific Far East? This
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is, perhaps, the most difficult question of all. A cursory
glance at the region reveals that, unlike Western Europe,
which was terrified by events stemming from the Second World
War, many nations in East Asia believe that they are
generally insulated from the ongoing struggle between the
two postwar superpowers. Nothing could be farther from the
truth
.
The notion that the Pacific Far East is a region of
profound maritime interdependence can elicit little
argument. Just as Japan was the last major nation to be
addressed in the wake of such an assessment, so must it be
the first looked to in the search for appropriate answers to
regional security.
Manifestly the Far East's economic giant, Japan—except-
ing an enigmatic People's Republic of China, essentially a
land power—must be considered the one nation capable of
doing the most to promote regional maritime security. In
this regard, one is constrained to note that a good deal of
scar tissue remains from Tokyo's World War II attempt to
fashion a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Most
other states in the Far East harbor deep suspicions about
any buildup in the Japanese armed services.
Defense against threats to freedom in East Asia does
not, however, require any Japanese capability for so-called
power projection. That is to say, carrier strike and
amphibious assault forces are neither needed nor desired.
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uch acquisition would only fan extant fears stemming from
ai Nippon's World War II conquests.
Japanese protection of waters within a thousand-mile
adius of the archipelago's shores—recently agreed to by
'okyo and Washington— is merely a beginning. Air and sea
lefense of these areas against marauding Soviet submarines
ind aircraft is essential, but much more is needed,
rapanese naval and air forces, in conjunction with those of
;he United States and with cooperation from intervening
.ittoral states, must be capable of protecting not only
jeacetime but wartime shipping all the way south to the
Indonesian archipelago.
This, of course, brings one to ASEAN, including the
Republic of the Philippines. Here one finds a plethora of
lations economically and politically dependent upon free use
Df surrounding international waters. A few of them possess
some capability to police their own adjacent seas against
noderate threats. None, however, has the capability to
defend against major predatory thrusts emanating from the
sea, nor can they make substantial contributions upon which
their wartime security would inevitably depend. Without
meaningful assistance from major seafaring powers, these
nations are almost universally exposed.
Still, they all have an important role to play, not only
in preserving their own security, but in collective defense
of their region. For example, each can grant access to its
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harbors, airfields, and repair facilities thereby aiding
those nations who do possess the naval and air forces neces-
sary to provide the necessary maritime shield. It is in
this context that the future of the present American bases
at Subic Bay and Clark Field should be viewed by the
Philippine Government as well as by the leaders of other
area countries.
Whether ASEAn will ever transform itself from a
political and economic compact into a regional military
alliance, is highly uncertain. That its member states would
require major help in protecting the vast expanses of water
which surround and separate them is clearly evident. Still,
these nations could make a notable contribution to Free
World security in Southeast Asia by employing their own
limited assets in cooperation with friendly naval and air
forces as well as providing the above-cited facilities
access.
Looking farther south, one finds two nations saved from
Imperial Japan's expansionist designs by American's ability
to resurrect its fleet from the mud of Pearl Harbor and then
project its rapidly expanding naval power across the vast
reaches of the Pacific Ocean. The peoples of Australia
—
adhering to the ANZUS pact—clearly have not forgotten that
lesson. Their counterparts in New Zealand apparently have.
One could reasonably conclude that recent Soviet infestation
of former U.S. naval and air installations in Vietnam, and
the overtures Moscow continues to make to mini-states
throughout the South Pacific, would have alerted New
Zealanders to a menace strikingly similar to that which
confronted them in the late 1930s as Japan began to give
substance to its emerging ambitions.
It seems, however, that the relative remoteness inherent
in its geographic position has lulled the New Zealand
Government into the altogether unjustified belief that it is
immune to events transpiring throughout this segment of the
globe. The vision of a huge, black Russian bear
—
poised to
spring from Southeast Asia—seems to have escaped the New
Zealanders. What they need to realize that, today, the
developing Soviet menace is potentially greater than that
which they faced from the Japanese four decades ago.
Moreover, the perils stem from the expanding seaborne reach
of a prospective enemy, just as they did from that of a
different antagonist beginning in 1941.
Two strategic realities must always be borne in mind
when considering the Pacific Far East. First of all, the
crucial dependence of regional nations on use of the seas is
indisputable. From ancient times through the present,
waterborne links have played a pivotal role in the history
of all nations in and around the Western Pacific Ocean. In
recent decades, these links have grown immeasurably in
importance as global and regional interdependence have
increased at an almost geometric rate. Moreover, this trend
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will assuredly continue. Thus, control of the seas will
remain a fundamental element of national and collective
security, whether it be economic or military in nature.
Secondly, Japan proved during the opening phases of
World War II that a dominant naval power can cordon off the
East Asian littoral and adjacent waters all the way from the
Pacific Arctic to the Indian subcontinent. Furthermore, the
post-World War II technological revolution has altered air
and naval force capabilities sufficiently to permit such
denial to far greater distances than was possible at the
height of Imperial Japan's power. It is therefore obvious
that efforts to penetrate such a barrier and reestablish
access today would be a far more costly endeavor than it was
in the early 1940s.
Altogether, one is forced to the conclusion that,
despite stunning advances in air transport, the Pacific Far
East remains hostage to maritime imperatives. Inasmuch as




power to insure regional security in
this part of the world, cooperative efforts on the part of
all Free World nations is mandatory is individual and
collective security is to be preserved. As a famed American
sage—Benjamin Franklin—said at the signing of the
Declaration of Independence, "We must all hang together,
assuredly we shall hang separately." This succinct message
should be prominently displayed in the office of every
political leader in the Pacific Far East.
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THE ORIGINS OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
Roger W. Barnett
Thus, the resources which a service is able to obtain in a
democratic society are a function of the public support of
that service. The service has the responsibility to
develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if
it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates
its relationship to the national security. 1
Consider the following strawman: 2 The maritime strategy
was composed by a small coterie of naval officers in the
grade of commander and lieutenant commander serving on the
staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. These officers,
members of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) of the
Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division (OP-60) labored through
the fall and into the spring of 1981-82. The effort was
mounted in response to a request from the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations to write a strategic story for the Navy
that would provide the necessary link between policy, plans,
and programs. The product-zero-based and woven from whole
cloth, was to provide a justification for the 600-ship Navy
and for a force level of 15 aircraft carrier battle groups.
The intention was to articulate a new, aggressive,
forward warfighting policy that would be championed by an
aggressive Secretary of the Navy. Anticipated approval by a
wholly sympathetic Reagan Administration would thereby
capture a larger budget share for the Navy. Portions of the
strategy in particular were targeted at the Reagan defense
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team—especially the emphasis on direct attacks on the Kola
Peninsula from carriers, anti-ballistic missile submarine
actions, and the Navy's participation in "horizontal
escalation.
"
The time looked right to distance the Navy as far as
possible from the Euro-centric approach of the Carter
Administration, and to part company boldly with the notion
that all the Navy does is "haul ash and trash." That is,
the Navy did not want to be stuck with the essentially
unglamorous job of defending the sea lanes to Europe. it
had more stimulating, risky tasks in mind for itself.
Because this was an inside-the-Pentagon job, because it was
pointed at the budget process primarily and not toward
establishing warplanning guidance for the fleets, and
because it called for actions not in accordance with current
doctrine approved by the Department of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and U.S. alliances, the strategy had to be
written without reference to either the U.S. operating
forces or to U.S. allies. Secrecy and compartmentation of
the process were essential to its success.
In order to make its case, moreover, the strategy would
be required, subtly, to whitewash certain issues—especially
the questions of nuclear war at sea, of how the central
oceanic sea lanes would be controlled, and of Soviet
strategy. Finally, the maritime strategy was carefully
crafted to ensure that the Navy's historical Pacific bias
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would be perpetuated. The break with the Carterites would
facilitate longstanding Navy preference and provide a shrews
cover for it.
The strategy succeeded in a way that astonished even its
most enthusiastic supporters. It captured the Administra-
tion, was used to great effect by the Secretary of the Navy
to support and rationalize a large navy program that
included two additional large aircraft carriers, converted
many critics to the Navy's point of view, captured a much
larger budget share for the Department of the Navy, and for
all these reasons—especially the last—outraged the other
services.
The facts, contrary to the outrageous fiction
constructed above, reveal that indeed "the maritime
strategy" 3 was authored by a group of mid-grade officers on
the staff in response to a reguest from the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations. There much of the similarity to the
strawman ends, however plausible it might sound. In order
to trace the conceptual background of the maritime strategy,
and what its architects sought to accomplish, it is neces-
sary first to establish a clear understanding of the ele-
ments of strategic thought that inform the strategy, for it
is those elements that constitute the true roots of the
strategy.
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I. ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT
The basic principles around which the maritime strategy
is organized are straightforward. The level of specificity
with which they are expressed, however, has provided a
source of contention from time to time with a variety of
critics and supporters alike. This is because it does not
offer detail sufficient for critics to home in powerfully
with counter-arguments. Moreover, its guidance does not
tell programmers precisely how to program, or warfighters
how to draw up an operation order.
This is, as the Russians are fond of saying, "not by
accident." Strategic guidance must be broad, and it must be
presented in simple terms so that it is easy both to compre-
hend and to recall. The purpose of strategic guidance is to
provide a context into which other activities are placed.
Criticizing strategy for failing to provide the necessary
information to decide among two new competing torpedoes is
as improper as carping about a toy manufacturer's instruc-
tions for failing to provide information on where to
purchase a screwdriver to assemble the toy. The framers of
the maritime strategy intended only that their words evoke a
very particular image; to wit, when military people-espec-
ially naval officers—heard the term they would instinctive-
ly know precisely what was intended.
In the final analysis there are six organizing princi-
ples for the maritime strategy. First, the strategy would
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be subordinate to and an integral part of the national
strategy. National strategy documents establishing national
strategic policy, classified and unclassified, were drawn
upon both to provide a solid foundation for the strategy and
to ensure that there were no strategic disconnects. Never
was there an intention to create a go-it-alone, independent
strategy at sea. National objectives and the means
expressed by national policy to attain them were kept firmly
in mind throughout the process.
Second, this was to be a forward strategy. Sound
strategic policy dictates that the defense of the United
States take place as far from U.S. borders as feasible, and
the Navy must support the implementation of that far-forward
policy. To address adequately the problems traditionally
experienced by seapowers in their ability to grapple with
powerful adversaries whose strength is on the land, the
strategy would require strong support of allies on the
continent or its offshore islands. 4 Accordingly, this would
clearly be a coalition strategy.
Third, it would be an all-arms strategy. While allies
are fundamental to a forward strategy that must deal with a
landpower located on another continent, the contributions of
sister services are necessary to take advantage of the
maximum capabilities that can be realized from the
interworking of a variety of armed forces. In this regard,
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the participation of the U.S. Air Force was of special value
and was to be actively sought and developed.
Fourth, the strategy was to emphasize tactical and
theater-level offensives within the context of—at least
initially—a strategic defensive war. The coalitions in
which the United States is involved are all defensive coali-
tions. It is a central assumption in U.S. alliance strate-
gy, therefore, that our side will not strike the first blow
in a war and will, as a consequence, begin a conflict on the
defensive. Nevertheless, as the recent works of Colin Gray
and Wayne Hughes 5 serve to remind their readers, the
offensive at sea is the stronger form of warfare. Taking
advantage of the offensive— in a prudent, not a reckless,
way—marks another of the important elements of the maritime
strategy.
Fifth, the Soviet Union is the adversary against which
the strategy must be developed. Strategy requires more than
one actor; it is not solitaire. For strategy to be meaning-
ful it must be devised to accomplish specific objectives in
the face of concrete opposition. To the extent that the
objectives and the opposition are not made explicit, the
strategy will be flawed. The maritime strategy deals solely
and exclusively with combatting the Soviet Union in a future
war. Sideshows siphon effort from the accomplishment of
central objectives. The strategy recognizes this and avoids
it.
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Since the Soviet Union is a global power, its continen-
tal expanse alone stretching across 11 time zones, since the
United States maintains alliances and forces on both the,
European and Asiatic land masses, and since U.S. and Soviet
forces are routinely within close range of one another in
the various maritime areas of the world on a daily basis, a
reasonable assumption for the strategy must be that a war
between the United States and the Soviet Union would neces-
sarily be global in scope. Stated slightly differently,
over time one side or the other in such a conflict would
most likely find that its interests would be better served
by expanding the geographic scope of the war.
Finally, the strategy recognized that uncertainties and
risks must be considered inherent and inevitable. Some
matters, of necessity, must be set aside to be dealt with
within the specific context of the pre-war or wartime
situation. To do so, however, does mean neither that they
are unimportant nor that they are overlooked in strategic
conceptualization. Some examples of what lies in this cate-
gory—set forth as a sampler, not an exhaustive listing
—
are:
* Warning (Will it be adequate to permit effective execu-
tion of the strategy? Will decisions be taken in time
to take advantage of the warning that is present?)
;
* Training and morale (Have personnel been adequately
trained to execute the strategy? Will morale support
the requisite levels of fighting intensity?)
;
* Length of the conflict (Should the strategy be aimed at
a short, a prolonged, or a long war?)
;
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* Nuclear weapons (Will nuclear weapons be used? When?
Where—on land or sea? By which side? Why?) ; and
* Surprise (Will the strategy be sturdy enough to
withstand operational, technical, or other forms of
surprise?)
These, then, form the central tenets of the maritime
strategy. It is with them always and firmly in mind that
one must trace the strategy's roots.
A. THE ROOTS OF THE STRATEGY
While many of the precepts of the maritime strategy can
be traced, not surprisingly, to a writer who was first
interested in the interplay between maritime and land-based
forces, Thucydides, today's strategy takes root, also not
surprisingly, in the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Yet,
Mahan ' s most famous work, The Influence of Sea Power on
History 1660-1783 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957, original
copyright 1890) is not as rich in those specific features of
the maritime strategy as is his The Problem of Asia and Its
Effect upon International Policies . 6 In this work, written
just after the turn of the century, Mahan demonstrated his
strategic prescience in a different way than in his earlier,
more famous book; and he provided an explicit backdrop to
many of the fundamental elements of the maritime strategy.
His words are quoted at some length because they are pivotal
to support the contention that his is the seminal input to
the strategy.
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Russia... is working, geographically, to the southward in
Asia by both flanks, her centre covered by the mountains
of Afghanistan and the deserts of eastern Turkestan and
Mongolia. Nor is it possible, even if it were desired, to
interfere with... this extended line... for the Russian!
centre cannot be broken. It is upon, and from, the flanks
of this great line that restraint, if needed, must
come ; . . .
It is... the interest of Russia not merely to reach the sea
at more points, and more independently, but to acquire
...the returns from which shall redound to the general
prosperity of the entire empire. 8
...the struggle as arrayed will be between land power and
sea power. The recognition that these two are the primary
contestants does not ignore the circumstance that... the
land power will try to reach the sea and to utilize it for
its own ends, while the sea power must obtain support on
land. .. .Hence ensures solidarity of interest between
Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States.
[France was noted as the "conspicuous artificial
exception," owing to her alliance with Russia] which bids
fair to be more than momentary, because the conditions
seem to be relatively permanent. 9
Upon one flank of the Russian line lies the army of Japan;
upon the other, five thousand miles away, that of Germany
....The two extremes of the Russian line, thus open to
attack, are most inadequately connected by rail. 10
From the conditions, we must be in effective naval force
in the Pacific. We must similarly be in effective force
on the Atlantic; not for the defence of our coasts primar-
ily, or immediately, as is commonly thought, —for in
wartime, however much in defence of right, the navy is not
immediately an instrument of defence but of offence.... 11
From these few excerpts one can recognize the sinews of
the maritime strategy as it was articulated much later.
Mahan establishes that Russia, even before the Soviet
revolution, will be the primary adversary, that it must be
opposed by coalitions of forces in both the Atlantic and
Pacific, 12 that the U.S. navy must take forward positions in
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ocean areas contiguous to Russia, and that strategy to
oppose Russia from the sea must be offensive in nature.
Through the years the vision of Mahan has waxed and
waned, but the central tenets reappear frequently, a
testimony to their timelessness. In 1939, for example, one
Lieutenant E.M. Eller wrote in the Proceedings .
A fleet exists to fight in order to further strategy.
Accordingly, no defensive action should be more than a
delaying action until the offensive may be undertaken....
Overboldness has not led to a single fleet disaster,
whereas with overcaution the number is appalling:
Rozhdestvenski, Cervera, Villeneuve, Graves, Degrasse are
the names of but a few leaders who lost through
timidity. 13
The 1973 "Comment" on the Eller article, stated: "People
like Eller in the 1920s and 1930s, by their speech and
writings, never permitted the Service to forget this atti-
tude of carrying the war to the enemy . Consequently, the
Navy was morally ready when the strenuous test of World War
II arrived." 14
It should be noted at this point that the words "carry-
ing the war to the enemy," are used in all versions of the
maritime strategy to describe phase three of a three-phased
strategic operation. Phase one is called 15 "Deterrence or
the Transition to War"; phase two, "Seizing the Initiative,"
and phase three, "Carrying the Fight to the Enemy." Even
the terminology adopted by the maritime strategy has its own
heritage.
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B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF FORREST SHERMAN
To underscore the notion that while the fabric appeared
to be new the threads are truly not of recent origin, one
can cite the efforts by Admiral Forrest Sherman in the years
immediately following World War Two to articulate a strategy
for the country as a whole and for the navy in particular.
The briefing provided President Truman by Admiral Sherman in
January 1947 stands as a very important historical milestone
in the development of the current maritime strategy.
Discussing the probable character of a major war in the next
few years and on navy tasks in such a war Admiral Sherman
stated:
We envisage that from the naval point of view such a war
would have four distinct phases. The first phase would be
one of initial operations by our existing forces, of
stabilization of the Soviet offensive, and of mobilization
and preparation of additional forces, and of expansion of
production of war material. The nation would be on the
strategic defensive but our naval and air forces should
assume the offensive immediately in order to secure our
own sea communications, support our forces overseas,
disrupt enemy operations, and force dissipation of enemy
strength. In this phase the navy would have a tremendous
initial responsibility. Early offensive blows would be of
extreme importance in shortening the war.
Strong submarine forces would be required for such tasks
as destruction of enemy controlled shipping, reconnais-
sance, and inshore work, sea-air rescue, patrol of
advanced areas and bottling up the Russian Navy.
Specific targets for early carrier attacks might include
objectives in Manchuria, North Korea and Siberia to cover
withdrawal of our forces from Korea and North China; and
objectives in northwest Germany and in northern Italy to
cover the retirement of our occupation forces.
Our submarines would be deployed promptly to bottle up the
Russian forces in the Far East, the White Sea, the Baltic
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and the Black Sea and to patrol the approaches to Alaska
and the Aleutians.
The second phase would be one of progressive reduction of
Soviet war potential and build-up of our own. Operations
would be characterized first by increased offensive action
by naval and air forces and by joint forces, and subse-
quently by general advancement of our base areas as our
military power permits. During this phase, large elements
of all services would be moved overseas; advanced bases
would be established and stocked; and requirements for
shipping of all sorts and for naval escorts would increase
rapidly.
The third phase would involve continued and sustained
bombing offensive. Naval activity would consist of main-
taining our overseas lines of communications, protection
of troop movements, gunfire support for amphibious
landings, carrier action against appropriate objectives,
and submarine operations to prevent enemy use of coastal
waters.
The final phase would comprise the systematic destruction
of Soviet industry, internal transportation systems, and
general war potential. As naval targets disappeared, our
naval operations would become more thoroughly integrated
with ground and air operations, the need for maintenance
of heavy carrier striking forces would decrease; while the
need for ships for transporting forces and supplies, and
for close-in escort and support would remain high. 16
II. THE '5 OS AND THE '60S
The 1950' s were a time to fight the Korean War, build
aircraft carriers, and implement the "New Look" strategy
—
turning away from "massive retaliation" and narrowing the
focus to theorizing about limited war. The Navy first
sought to cement its role in strategic warfare in the early
and mid 1950' s by procuring large aircraft carriers of the
Forrestal and Kitty Hawk classes and long-range carrier-
based aircraft designed to deliver nuclear payloads. Later
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in the decade the idea was born to place ballistic missiles
in submarines that could launch them from submerged posi-
tions in a broad expanse of ocean area. Scant attention was
paid to maritime strategy per se except to support strategic
strikes from the sea against landward targets.
One might offer the not implausible rationale that the
high level of attention paid to the strategic arena
reflected the Navy's insecurity about the strength of its
foothold there, while the relative paucity of discussion of
how the navy might operate at levels of warfare below the
strategic reflected the Navy's confidence that it could
prevail with little difficulty in that arena. The Soviet
nay, after all, was a disadvantaged stepchild in the scheme
of Soviet security programs, and the Soviet Union was
struggling throughout this time frame to recover from the
devastation of World War II. Although the Soviet navy was
large in numbers and submarine-heavy, although it began to
develop ship-launched cruise missiles in the 1950 's, and
although it counted anti-carrier warfare among its primary
missions, it was not considered to be an important threat to
the vastly superior U.S. (and allied) navies. Accordingly,
the level of development and articulation of maritime
strategy for the U.S. Navy during this period was low.
When Admiral Arleigh Burke was the Chief of Naval
Operations (1955-1961) , he sought vigorously to awaken the
U.S. security establishment to the burgeoning power of the
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Soviet navy and the threat it posed for the conduct of U.S.
maritime operations. Even though by the end of his tour in
1961 the attack carrier force was large and healthy, fleet
ballistic missile submarines were being produced at an
unprecedented rate, a large dedicated anti-submarine warfare
force was in place to defend the sea lanes to U.S. allies
abroad, and amphibious forces were the cutting edge of U.S.
policy in remote areas of the world, Burke had largely not
been successful in convincing the administrations under
which he served to support naval programs in the manner he
believed they warranted support. Nevertheless, one observer
of the scene reported at the time:
Between 1956 and 1960, the navy added its considerable
influence to the intellectual campaign within the national
defense community for a reorientation in strategic policy
....The idea that future wars would be limited in scope
and duration gained rather general acceptance during this
time, partly through the efforts of top naval leaders and
strategic thinkers. Concurrently, the idea took hold that
strong conventional forces deployed forward stood the best
chance of deterring Communist attacks or of defeating them
in a manner dictated by U.S. decision-makers. The Navy's
advocacy of flexible response concept did much to estab-
lish it as a tool of U.S. policymaking. 17
Obviously, the general principles that would form the
backbone of the maritime strategy of the 1980s were already
fixed in the minds of the naval strategists of the immediate
postwar decades. Just as obviously, moreover, questions of
limited war, not a war with the Soviet Union, dominated
strategic thought during the 1960s.
One does not require extensive research to demonstrate
that the concepts of the time are also reflected in the
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language used to describe them, nor to find much that is
congenial to the maritime strategy of today. Two excellent
examples should suffice to undergird the point. The first
is from Arleigh Burke in 1961; the second, Vice Chief of
Naval Operations Claude Ricketts in 1963:
POLARIS is not our only seagoing asset for nuclear war.
In addition, one powerful, versatile attack carriers
contribute to our country's retaliatory capability. These
carriers and their aircraft from the backbone of our naval
striking power: power that can be projected overseas,
power that can carry the fight to the enemy , power that
can be used in wars of every kind.... 18
The primary role of sea power in our national military
strategy is to contribute to our national readiness to
project U.S. power overseas. Sea areas lie between us and
any prospective allies. Extensive use of the seas is
necessary for support of our allies and for the support of
our own military forces on their soil ... .These factors
dictate an offensive naval strategy . Our Navy must be
designed to carry the war to the enemy , both at sea and on
land. .. .Technological advances since have reinforced the
validity of this offensive strategical concept. No weapon
is foreseen that will change that philosophy in the future
. . . .When force is needed, prompt action is most important,
because timely action by comparatively small forces
usually precludes the need for larger forces later. By
exploiting the quick reaction capability of naval forces,
we can either prevent hostilities or contribute greatly to
keeping them confined. 19
In the case of Admirals McDonald and Moorer, Chiefs of
Naval Operations during the time frames (1963 to 1970) major
funding was devoted to procuring escorts for the carriers,
to complete the modest carrier replacement program (three
carriers were authorized between 1963 and 1970, John F.
Kennedy
. Nimitz . and Eisenhower ) and to fight the war in
Vietnam. Relatively speaking, however, the decade of the
1960's represented the high water mark for the post-war U.S.
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Navy. The legacy of maritime forces from World War II had
been spent, and the navy found itself embroiled in a war in
Southeast Asia for much of which it was ill-prepared.
Perhaps, with the benefit of long-range retrospect, an
argument might be made that 1962 marked the turning point.
Carriers were at their zenith, the Soviet Navy had not yet
emerged from its short-range coastal employment. 20 At the
time the U.S. Navy, Burke's difficulties notwithstanding,
appears in historical perspective to be at the zenith of its
powers. Yet, in 1962 the aircraft carrier was removed from
a principal role in the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan
(SIOP) ; the Cuban missile crisis both demonstrated the
overwhelming superiority at sea of the U.S. Navy and
stimulated the Kremlin to take bold steps to offset that
superiority; and the U.S. Navy's participation in the
Vietnam War was beginning to accelerate.
By the end of the decade the focus was on the obsoles-
cence of a U.S. fleet that, while still very large—almost
900 ships—was old and had received significant wear and
tear in Vietnam. Almost two-thirds of the ships were
approaching the twentieth anniversary of their commission-
ing. The downward trend in numbers of battle force ships
that started in the late 60 's accelerated breathtakingly in
the 70 's, as Figure 1 portrays graphically:
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Figure 1. Battle Forces 1962-1987
In 1968 the inventory of battle force ships stood at
957; a decade later it had fallen precipitously to 468. As
one might imagine, this halving of the fleet size had a
truly riveting effect on the naval leadership of the time.
To add to its despair, the Navy enjoyed little success in
drumming up support for its programs. From 1967 through
1971, right at the time when ships were being retired in
droves, the Navy stood last among the three services in
claiming a share of the defense budget. Across those same
years, an average of eight ships was authorized annually21—
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enough over the long term to support a fleet of fewer than
200 ships.
Although the U.S. blue-water fleet was obsolescent, it
proved capable and proficient enough to support the land war
in Vietnam. Strategy for use of the seas was virtually non-
existent in this war because, even though an attack at sea
(the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964) triggered greatly
increased U.S. involvement in the war, there was essentially
no opposition at sea. Vietnam military presence peaked in
April 1969.
The 1960's also witnessed a new emphasis on rationaliz-
ing and analyzing defense programs rather than on formulat-
ing and articulating the strategic use of military forces.
"In my mind, I equate planning and budgeting and consider
the terms almost synonymous," Secretary of Defense McNamara
testified before the Congress in 1961. Consumed by a war
that struck hard both at morale and at force structure, and
forced to meet analysts of the office of the Secretary of
Defense in pitched battle on the budgetary front, maritime
strategists in the United States retreated into almost total
silence for better than a decade.
III. THE 1970S
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. , became the youngest Chief
of Naval Operations in the summer of 1970. Zumwalt had been
schooled in systems analysis, and understood the techniques
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that had been in vogue under the McNamara stewardship of the
Department of Defense. As one of his first acts, Zumwalt
commissioned a comprehensive plan for his four years as CNO,
which was to be accomplished within two months of the time
he was sworn into office. "Project 60" as it became known,
suggested that the best way to corner additional funding for
the navy was to use a "four missions" approach:
* Strategic Deterrence,
* Sea Control,
* Projection of Power, and
* Naval Presence.
Acknowledging that the strategic mission was in good shape
across the board, and likewise forces for power projection
appeared relatively well off, Zumwalt opted to emphasize the
sea control mission. Zumwalt was unequivocal:
I feel that the sea control mission has now become para-
mount more than the projection mission of the carrier,
because the power of the Soviet Navy has grown so dramati-
cally. . . .They have a very believable prospect of severing
our sea lines of communication. Therefore, the first
mission and role of the carrier must be to try to keep
open the sea lanes to the United States and to our
allies. 22
Power projection was rarely discussed as pertaining to
conflict with the Soviet Union. It was to be used in other
areas of the world in support of the Nixon Doctrine.
Meanwhile, the decline in fleet size, especially in
light of concurrent increases in Soviet battle forces, was
not far from the central concerns of the leadership. In an
extraordinary memorandum, Admiral Zumwalt wrote to Secretary
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of Defense Laird in 1971, with respect to the Fiscal Year
1973 budget then in preparation:
I have informed you repeatedly of my concern for the
continuing degradation of naval capabilities. In my
judgment, the end-FY '70 forces gave us a 55 percent
probability of success if we became involved in a conflict
at sea with the Soviet Union. Since that time, naval
forces have been reduced for fiscal reasons by 111 ships
including four carriers; the FY '73 Base Case [the Five-
Year Plan] requires a reduction of twenty-eight ships and
the decrement [the billion-dollar cut] a cut of thirty-six
to seventy-three ships including four to five carriers.
While I judge our naval forces today have only a 35
percent chance in an engagement with the Soviet Union,
that level of confidence is reduced to 20 percent based on
the potential consequences of the Tentative Fiscal
Guidance. It is perfectly clear that we are unable to
support the fighting of a war overseas by the U.S. or
allied forces should the Soviet Union challenge the U.S.
for control of the seas.... The decremented forces would,
for all practical purposes, constitute a one-ocean navy. 2 ^
The memorandum is extraordinary for several reasons— its
emphasis on quantitative measures, its pessimism about the
navy's capability vis-a-vis the Soviet navy, and also for
its absence of context. This is a noteworthy example of how
military judgments should not be rendered.
The next milestone worthy of mention in tracing the
evolution of the maritime strategy was a January 1977
classified study undertaken by the National Security Council
staff as the Ford Administration was drawing to a close.
The study highlighted many issues about the navy's roles and
missions, and the subsequent Comptroller General's report
and commentary to the Congress on the NSC study underscored
the fundamental differences in the way contributions of the
navy to national security were perceived. The NSC study
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presaged many of the bedrock concepts present in today's
maritime strategy. According to the GAO report:
The NSC study presents a position on the future military;
environment, foundations for U.S. defense policies,
maritime implications of the Soviet challenge, factors in
developing a U.S. maritime program, and general Navy force
requirements. Within this framework it then presents (1)
five future ship force levels, (2) each levels' capability
to perform the sea control and power projection functions,
and (3) the likelihood of defeating the Soviet threat....
By fall 1976 these five force levels were refined into
three future force level options. In January 1977 the
President decided on a fiscal year 1978 5-Year Shipbuild-
ing Program that was drawn from these options....
The NSC study judged issues, such as Soviet strategy,
length of war, results of campaign analyses, and use of
future forces as currently programmed, to influence its
recommended shipbuilding program and the future Navy
size. 24
Not surprisingly, the Comptroller General's Report was
critical of the NSC study. Its critique indicated that
certain important issues were left unresolved. Echoes of
the GAO list of "unresolved issues" can be heard in contem-
porary critiques of the maritime strategy. GAO asked, for
example:
—Should the Navy continue to rely on the carrier for its
offensive capability in view of its high cost and vulnera-
bility to antiship cruise missile attacks?...
—Could forward deployment of high-value forces be accom-
plished with less valuable assets, both monetarily and
militarily?. .
.
—Why are general-purpose forces being sized and struc-
tured for conventional warfare even though the Soviet
Union can, and possibly intends to, conduct a tactical
nuclear war? . .
.
GAO concluded: "In effect, the NSC study recommends a ship-
building program that may not meet the future threat in a
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cost-effective manner. The study depicts a future Navy
still centered around carrier task groups, despite the
admission of the high cost and vulnerability of carriers." 25
Admiral James Holloway succeeded Admiral Zumwalt as
Chief of Naval Operations, and set about to redefine ques-
tions about the navy's missions, functions, and tasks. In
1978 Holloway signed Naval Warfare Publication 1 (NWP-1,
Rev. A) , Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Naw . in which the
relationship of the Navy's mission to national military
strategy was detailed, and the navy's "functions" were
clearly spelled out. Holloway 's construct diverged markedly
from that of his predecessor. Here is an excerpt:
3.1 U.S. NAVY FUNCTIONS...
Briefly, the navy's two basic functions are sea control
and power protection. The ability to perform these
functions is a requirement if the U.S. is to utilize the
seas to support its national policies and to defeat the
forces of any state that would deny such use. The func-
tions of sea control and power protection are closely
interrelated. Some degree of a sea control is necessary
in the sea area from which the power is to be projected,
depending on the type of force to be employed. Converse-
ly, the capability to project naval power was developed in
naval forces largely as one means of achieving or
supporting sea control....
3.2.1 Sea Control. Sea control is the fundamental func-
tion of the U.S. Navy and connotes control of designated
air areas and the associated air space and underwater
volume. It does not imply simultaneous control of all the
earth's ocean area, but is a selective function exercised
only when and where needed. Sea control is achieved by
the engagement and destruction of hostile aircraft, ships,
and submarines at sea, or by the deterrence of hostile
action through the threat of destruction. Sea control is
a requirement for most naval operations. It is required
so that the U.S. Navy may have operating areas that are
secure for the projection of power, such as carrier strike
or amphibious assault, and sea lines of communication that
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assure buildup and resupply of allied forces in the
theater of operations, and free flow of strategic
resources. Effective sea control also enhances security
for the nation's sea-based strategic deterrent.
i
3.2.1.1 Prerequisite. Sea control is a prerequisite to
;
the conduct of sustained overseas operations by U.S. Army
and U.S. Air Force general purpose forces. Modern land
warfare generates logistic requirements of such propor-
tions that the overwhelming amount of material needed must
be supplied by sea.
3.2.1.2 Implementation. Sea control is achieved by the
destruction or neutralization of hostile aircraft, surface
ships and submarines which, by their presence, threaten
U.S. or friendly forces operating in those maritime areas
which the United States must use. Sea control can also be
effected by deterring the intrusion of hostile forces into
those areas. However, deterrence is less effective than
destruction in that it permits the enemy to retain a
threatening force in being. . .
.
3.2.1.3 Application. .. .Sea control can be achieved or
supported in several ways:
1. Sea control is primarily effected by operations
designed to locate and destroy hostile naval combat units
on the high seas. . .
.
3.2.1.4 Power Projection as a Part of Sea Control. The
use of carrier and marine amphibious forces in the projec-
tion of military power can be an absolute necessity to
ensure control and continued safe use of the high seas and
contiguous land areas essential to control of the seas.
This entails destruction of enemy naval forces at their
home bases or en route to those ocean areas which the
United States desires to protect, destroying their
logistic support, or preventing the approach of enemy
forces within range from which their weapons can be
employed against U.S. forces....
3.3 U.S. NAVY ROLES IN THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
In the functional exercise of its mission responsibili-
ties within the national military strategy, the U.S. Navy
has three main roles: strategic nuclear deterrence, to
provide overseas-deployed forces, and security of the sea
lines of communication (SLOCs)
.
3.3.1 Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. The effectiveness of
the submarine launched ballistic missile combined with the
virtual invulnerability of the SSBN provides the strongest
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deterrent in our strategic nuclear forces, and thus a
stabilizing factor in the strategic nuclear balance.
3.3.2 Overseas Deployed Forces. The navy provides opera-
tionally ready naval components of overseas deployed U.S.
forces to support allies and protect U.S. interests.
These fleet elements are deployed to locations where they
can engage hostile forces at the outbreak of hostilities
and rapidly support forward-positioned U.S. ground air
forces, as well as U.S. allies.
3.3.3 Security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)
.
The success of a forward military strategy depends upon
the navy's ability to maintain the integrity of the sea
lines of communication between the United States and its
forward deployed forces, its allies, and those areas of
the world essential for the supply of imports. The most
vulnerable segments of these SLOCs are the overseas
portions lying closest to potential hostile bases and
farthest from friendly territory where land-based air and
control combatant craft can assist in the protection of
shipping. The protection of these most vulnerable sea
areas requires that U.S. Navy forces be present in suffi-
cient strength to defeat hostile air, surface, and
submarine threats....
The contrast between the Holloway and Zumwalt approaches
manifests itself most evidently in the clarity with which
Holloway' s NWP-1 sought to come to grips with strategic
issues and relationships in a way Zumwalt had not.
Admiral Holloway* s contributions in returning the navy
to its more traditional concepts and reducing the central
focus of guarding the Atlantic sea lanes, noteworthy as they
were, did not hold sway in an administration in which
Department of Defense officials were not at all sympathetic
to the navy and its strategic rationale. In the interest of
forging a coherent navy position for use in strategy and
budgetary battles with the Carter Administration, a broad-
gauged study entitled SEA PLAN 2 000 was undertaken by the
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navy. Although the study remains classified, an unclassi-
fied executive summary was produced and disseminated. SEA
PLAN 2000 considered three national security objectives
—
which it explicitly declined to prioritize—against which
were arrayed seven missions for the navy.
OBJECTIVES AND MISSIONS
Security Objective Naval Mission
—Maintenance of Stability —Forward deployments
—Containment of Crises —Calibrated use of force
against the shore
—Superiority at sea in a
crisis setting





ties of the distant
future
SEA PLAN 2000 then presented three options based upon
budgetary growth rates of 1%, 3%, and 4% greater than the
rate of inflation. 26 The options were said to be balanced
so that no mission would be neglected; they differed in
degrees of risk and versatility as well as cost. The
options are of interest in light of the force goals
subsequently adopted by the navy:
OPTION 1 (1% real growth), called for 11 large aircraft
carriers and a total active force level of 474 ships. It
was "judged to be a high risk option with a low degree of
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flexibility, with minimal capability across the range of
naval tasks."
OPTION 2 (3% real growth) , listed 13 large aircraft
carriers and 579 ships in the inventory. It "hovers at the
threshold of naval capability across the spectrum of possi-
ble uses, given the risks associated with technical and
tactical uncertainties."
OPTION 3 (4% real growth) , showed 15 large aircraft
carriers, 631 total ships (585 active) , and was said to
provide "a high degree of versatility in the form of a wider
range of military and political actions at a moderate
increase over Option 2."
Freguently advocates and critics alike point to SEA PLAN
2000 as the true foundation from which the maritime strategy
sprang. The unclassified executive summary, however,
reveals nothing that is truly unique. Rather, SEA PLAN 2000
acts as a data point which happens to be precisely on the
curve leading from the intellectual beginnings of the U.S.
maritime strategy—with Mahan, as has been argued here—to
the present day.
The next Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B.
Hayward, began his term in early 1979 with optimism about
the state of the navy and for the near future, and set forth
his "Fundamental Principles of Naval Strategy":
...I am pleased to report that there is agreement within
the U.S. government today on the proposition that maritime
superiority must be the foundation of our national naval
policy. . . .
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In conjunction with allies maritime forces and facilities,
our capabilities must be sufficient to put at risk the
survivability of Soviet maritime forces even in their
coastal waters and bases . . .
.
Fundamental to current naval strategy is the principle
j
that U.S. Navv forces must be offensively capable . The
]
geographic range of the Navy's responsibilities is too
broad, and its forces too small, to adopt a defensive,
reactive posture in a worldwide conflict with the Soviet
Union. We must fight on the terms which are most advan-
tageous to us. This would require taking the war to the
enemy's naval forces with the objective of achieving the
earliest possible destruction of his capability to
interfere with our use of the sea areas essential for
support of our overseas forces and allies. In this sense,
sea control is an offensive rather than a defensive func-
tion. The prompt destruction of opposing naval forces is
the most economical and effective means to assure control
of those sea areas required for successful prosecution of
the war and support of the U.S. and allied war
economies. . .
.
It is important that we make the Soviets understand that
in war there will be no sanctuaries for their forces. We
cannot allow them to exploit asymmetries in force struc-
tures by, for example, attacking our carriers with land-
based air in the expectation that we will not respond with
strikes against the aircrafts' bases. Keeping the Soviets
preoccupied with defensive concerns locks up Soviet naval
forces in areas close to the USSR, limiting their availa-
bility for campaigns against the SLOCs, or for operations
in support of offensive thrusts on the flanks of NATO, or
elsewhere such as in the Middle East or in Asia.
Every major naval engagement must, therefore, be regarded
as potentially decisive in terms of its impact on the
naval balance, and every U.S. naval unit must have the
maximum offensive capability we can build into it consis-
tent with its mission.... 27
The record thus confirms that the preferred strategy for
the U.S. Navy since the time of the Second World War has
been one that emphasizes deterrence, and if deterrence
should fail, fighting far forward with the assistance of
allies. The need for continental allies was envisioned by
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Mahan, who realized and articulated how critical they would
be for engaging a continental land power.
IV. THE WATKINS/LEHMAN MARITIME STRATEGY
When the Reagan Administration was installed in early
1981, its new Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr.,
sought to implement the Republican platform for the 1980
elections that stipulated:
Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of
U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet
to 600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned
by President Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers,
submarines, and amphibious ships. 28
Secretary Lehman entered office vowing to revitalize
strategic thought in the Navy and to establish firm links
between strategy and programs.
Efforts within the navy staff culminated in briefings by
the principals, Admiral Watkins and Secretary Lehman, of the
Congress and subsequently in the publication by the U.S.
Naval Institute of a supplement to its Proceedings in
January 1986 that was described as "the most definitive and
authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are
available in unclassified form." The Watkins article,
accompanied by companionpieces authored by Secretary Lehman
and Commandant of the Marine Corps, General P.X. Kelley
(with Major Hugh K. O'Donnell, Jr.) is striking not for its
unique approach but for its broad, long-term continuity with
navy thinking illustrated throughout this report.
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The more stable the international environment, the lowe:
the probability that the Soviets will risk war with th<
West. Thus our peacetime strategy must support U.S
alliances and friendships. We accomplish this through <
variety of peacetime operations including naval shij
visits to foreign ports and training and exercises witlj
foreign naval forces....
The heart of our evolving Maritime Strategy is crisis
response. If war with the Soviets ever comes, it will
probably result from a crisis that escalates out of con-
trol. Our ability to contain and control crises is an
important factor in our ability to prevent global
conflict. . .
.
* Naval forces maintain consistently high states of
readiness because of forward deployments, ensuring opera-
tional expertise and day-to-day preparedness.
* Naval forces increasingly operate with friendly and
allied armed forces and sister services.
* Naval forces can be sustained indefinitely at distant
locations, with logistics support relatively independent
of foreign basing or overflight rights....
* Perhaps most importantly, naval forces have unique
escalation control characteristics that contribute to
effective crisis control....
If our peacetime presence and crisis response tasks are
done well, deterrence is far less likely to fail.
Deterrence can fail, however, and we must consider how the
navy would be used in a global war against the Soviets....
Should war come, the Soviets would prefer to use their
massive ground force advantage against Europe without
having to concern themselves with a global conflict or
with actions on their flanks. It is this preferred Soviet
strategy that the United States must counter. The key to
doing so is to ensure that they will have to face the
prospect of prolonged global conflict. Maritime forces
have a major role to play in this regard. The strategy
setting forth their contribution consists of three phases:
deterrence or the transition to war; seizing the initia-
tive; and carrying the fight to the enemy....
Phase I: Deterrence or the Transition to War: The
initial phase of the Maritime Strategy would be triggered
by recognition that a specific international situation has
the potential to grow to a global superpower
confrontation. Such a confrontation may come because an
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extra-European crisis escalated or because of problems in
Europe. . .
.
The goal of this phase is deterrence. Through early,
worldwide, decisive use of sea power we—along with sister
services and allies as appropriate—would seek to win the
crisis, to control escalation, and, by the global nature
of our operations, to make clear our intention to cede no
area to the Soviets and to deny them the option to engage
in hostilities on their terms. While seeking to enhance
deterrence at the brink of war, we must also consider that
deterrence may fail. Thus preparing for the transition to
war, specifically to global war, is an integral aspect of
this phase. . .
.
The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where
the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be
prepared to fight....
Forward deployment must be global as well as early.
Deployments to the Western Pacific directly enhance
deterrence, including deterrence of an attack in Europe,
by providing a clear indication that, should war come, the
Soviets will not be able to ignore any region of the
globe. . .
.
Phase II: Seizing the Initiative: We cannot predict
where the first shot will be fired should deterrence fail,
but almost certainly the conflict will involve Europe. If
war comes, we will move into the second phase of the
strategy in which the navy will seize the initiative as
far forward as possible. Naval forces will destroy Soviet
forces in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and other
forward areas, neutralize Soviet clients if required, and
fight our way toward Soviet home waters....
The Soviets will probably focus their offensive on Central
Europe, while attempting to maintain a defensive posture
elsewhere. Instead, we must dilute their effort, divert
their attention, and force them to divide their forces.
We must control the type and tempo of conflict, making
sure the Soviets understand that they can take no area for
granted. . .
.
Phase III: Carrying the Fight to the Enemy: The tasks in
this phase are similar to those of earlier phases, but
must be more aggressively applied as we seek war
termination on terms favorable to the United States and
its allies. Our goal would be to complete the destruction
of all the Soviet fleets which was begun in Phase II.
This destruction allows us to threaten the bases and
support structure of the Soviet Navy in all theaters, with
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both air and amphibious power. Such threats are quite
credible to the Soviets. At the same time, antisubmarine
warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submar-
ines, including ballistic missile submarines, thus
reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by
changing the nuclear balance in our favor.
During this final phase the United States and its allies
would press home the initiative worldwide, while continu-
ing to support air and land campaigns, maintaining
sealift, and keeping sea lines of communication open. . .
.
The goal of the overall Maritime Strategy, particularly of
Phase III, is to use maritime power, in combination with
the efforts of our sister services and forces of our




The authors of the strategy described by Admiral
Watkins, had drawn it from national objectives and state-
ments of national strategy, compared it carefully to joint
documents and plans, checked it against the concepts of
operations and war plans of the unified commanders, and
ensured its faithfulness to the national intelligence
estimates. Grounded in this way, and staffed and briefed
extensively in and out of the Pentagon, the strategy enjoyed
widespread acceptance. As has been demonstrated, moreover,
it could rest on a foundation of strong historical
precedent, which provided subtle but genuine intellectual
integrity and cohesiveness.
A. THE 600-SHIP NAVY
With the roots of the conceptual features of the
strategy firmly in mind, a few other topics can be swept
from the agenda with some dispatch. First, the question of
the 600-ship navy. It seems reasonable to assert that the
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maritime strategy would not have enjoyed such widespread
appeal and approval if it had been used as justification for
a particular force level for the navy. Some have contended
that the strategy was concocted specifically to rationalize
what has become known as Secretary Lehman's 600-ship navy,
but in fact the maritime strategy was developed apart from,
without reference to, and with no intention of an explicit
linkage to the 600-ship navy—or any other force level for
that matter.
The roots of the 600-ship navy lead back to testimony
before the congress and to public statements by the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. To quote
the Secretary:
The Navy's solution to this critical issue is a balanced
objective force level of 600 active ships... this active
fleet is built around 13 to 15 aircraft carriers and 190
to 220 surface combatants.
The following considerations are relevant in determining
the composition of a 600-ship force level:
1. With a balanced fleet of 600 active ships and their
aircraft, supplemented by reserve forces, the U.S. Navy
can with greater confidence carry out its most important
tasks in the event of conflict with any potential
adversary.
2. The U.S. Navy presently maintains four to five contin-
ually deployed task groups and Marine Amphibious Units
required to support our overseas national policy. With
the reduction of overseas base structures coupled with
regional uncertainties, it is unlikely that the Navy's
forward-deployment responsibilities will diminish.
3. The Navy must have the flexibility for operational
fleet response to reinforce deployed ships and have the
capability to meet—simultaneously—more than one situa-
tion of potential conflict. 30
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According to the CNO: "Where about 500 ships provides
us with a slim margin of superiority now, it is my opinion
that we should have about 600 active ships... in order to
maintain this slim margin of superiority." 31 The footnotes
affirm what the sharp-eyed have already observed: the
Secretary and the CNO cited are not Lehman and Watkins in
1986, but, respectively, Middendorf and Holloway a decade
earlier. Harking back to Figure 1, it is not difficult to
reason that navy officials who have in the inventory about
480 ships would undoubtedly not be interested in arguing for
a force level of, say, 500 ships—an increase of less than
five percent. While almost any number between 480 and 600
might have been chosen, the appeal of round numbers must
have played a part in their decision to opt for an ultimate
goal of 600. Evidently, and for good reason, the number 600
as a fleet force goal had its genesis just about the time
the fleet size dipped below 500, and, in point of fact,
antedated the Reagan Administration rather than being a
creature of it.
B. FIFTEEN CARRIER BATTLEGROUPS
Since the turn of the twentieth century, 2 or fewer has
typically been the number of capital ships the major sea-
powers of the world have maintained in their inventories. 32
More than 2 capital ships—battleships and aircraft
carriers—has been rare in this century. As with the number
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600, 15 seems to be one that has intrinsic appeal. Ten
seems anemic; 20, on the other hand, seems excessive.
Thus, at the outbreak of World War I the aggressor,
Germany, had 15 capital ships. The United States had 17
"first line" battleships; the British, 22. The Washington
Conference of 1922 resulted in a treaty under which the
United States would maintain 15 capital ships, i.e.,
battleships. The United States entered World War II with 15
battleships (and six aircraft carriers) , the number of
battleships having been constant since 1931.
In the forward to the prestigious Jane's Fighting Ships .
1967-1968 edition, one finds the assertion that the United
States is building to a force level of 15 large carriers,
which is "long considered the minimum operational require-




Fifteen aircraft carriers of modern design have been
determined as the minimum number needed for peacetime for
limited engagements since World War II ... .Whether 15
carriers is an adequate number under wartime conditions is
open to question. 3 -*
It is unusual to find a CNO for a particular force level
in order to satisfy peacetime operational demands. In
general, critics of the 15-carrier battlegroup force level
have tended to take the position that the navy needs 12 or
13, based on forward deployment of four carriers. This
would allow four battlegroups to be forward deployed in
peacetime, four having recently returned, and four working
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up to replace the deployers. 34 It is equally unusual,
however, to hear navy officials claim that a force level of
15 carrier battlegroups would be sufficient in time of war.
In any event, the navy has over the past two and a half
decades never been very far from a 15 carrier force level,
as Figure 2 shows.
Figure 2. U.S. Attack Aircraft Carriers
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C. DOES THE NAVY HAVE A PACIFIC BIAS?
Down until World War I the United States was about equally
concerned with the threats presented by the Japanese and
German navies. The fleet was kept concentrated on the
Atlantic coast—this was the location of most of the ship-
yards and the Navy's most consistent public support—and
the Isthmus canal was rushed to completion. With the des-
truction of German surface power the fleet was shifted to
the Pacific, and throughout the following two decades
American naval thought was oriented almost exclusively
towards the possibility of a war with Japan. 35
It has been a matter of "common knowledge" among defense
analysts that the Navy has long had a love affair with the
Pacific and that the Pacific strongly influences U.S. naval
policy. 36 While it is certainly true, as Professor
Huntington observed in the quotation just above, that in the
intrawar period the navy focused on the threat from Japan,
once the second World War had been concluded the navy was
quick to move back into the Atlantic in force. Ever since,
moreover, the emphasis has been toward the Atlantic, not the
Pacific.
Rather than following some irrational proclivity for a
particular geographic area, the navy has, quite sensibly,
looked most carefully to the area of the primary threat.
The postwar concentration was in the Atlantic, where the
strategic tasks to attack the Soviet Union and the Soviet
navy lay. Professor Huntington, again, is right on the
mark:
In the event of a major war with Russia, the Mediterranean
would be the base from which the knock-out punch could be
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launched into the heart of Russia: the industrial-
agricultural Ukraine and the Caucasus oil fields. It is
consequently hardly surprising to find that the Mediter-
ranean has not replaced the Pacific as the geographical
focus of attention for the American Navy. 37
Aircraft carriers were first deployed to the Mediterran-
ean in 1946, and acquired a nuclear strike capability in the
Sixth Fleet in 1951. The Atlantic/Mediterranean bias,
moreover, was not altered even by the war in Korea. For
example, the battleships that were removed from mothballs
were not assigned to the Pacific, and none of the navy's
large-deck, newest, Midway-class carriers saw action in the
Pacific. 38
In 1959 the cruise missile submarines that had operated
on patrol in the Atlantic since 1956 were reassigned to the
Pacific, anticipating the deployment of the new Polaris-
class submarines in the Atlantic. Although the strategic
ballistic missile submarine inventory was 12 in 1963, the
first Pacific patrol did not take place until 1964, at which
time the Regulus, cruise-missile submarines were relieved of
their primary responsibility in the strategic realm.
It is possible that those who fault the navy for a
Pacific bias were unduly swayed by the navy's long, unbroken
opposition to the so-called "swing" strategy, which called
for carrier battlegroups to be rotated from the Pacific to
the Atlantic in the event of a war in Europe. By almost any
measure, however, it is very difficult to sustain an argu-
ment that there is a Pacific tilt to navy policy. Neither
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total battle forces (as Figure 3 demonstrates)
,
nor the
percentage of battle forces (Figure 4) , nor aircraft
carriers (Figure 5) can be used to support such a
contention.
Figure 3. Battle Forces—Atlantic & Pacific
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Figure 4. Percentage of Battleforces in PacFleet
Figure 5. Attack Carrier LANT/PAC Split
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The maritime strategy is not a fresh, original approach
to the strategic employment of the navy, nor is it justifi-
cation or rationale for navy force levels. Instead, its
principles are rooted deeply in geopolitical realities and
principles that have been recognized for decades. The
strawman, for the most part, is incorrect.
To those who are concerned about what they perceive to
be an independent, dangerous course being set and followed
intransigently by the navy, it is important to note that the
navy concedes that sea control has always been a central
function. During those periods of time when the navy was
clearly preponderant at sea, or when it was on the upswing,
it has emphasized both forward offensive operations to
secure control of the seas and power projection operations
against enemy forces or territory. At times when interna-
tional and budgetary climates were not favorable for sea
power, the navy leadership retrenched. In those latter
situations it appears that the navy has either been forced
to adopt a less aggressive strategy, or the leadership
decided that in view of the forces available and the
prevailing threat the best it would be able to do would be
to forego—or at least to de-emphasize—forward offensive
operations. What is most striking, in the final analysis,
is the similarity between the strategic visions of James
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Watkins, Arleigh Burke, Forrest Sherman, and Alfred Mahan
—
not the differences.
The maritime strategy was conceived, and takes its place
appropriately, as a planning document, not as an operational
document. Clearly and correctly, the Unified Commanders
shoulder the responsibility for operational planning. The
maritime strategy in contrast, as it states, considers the
ideal: that is, given the forces, given expectations about
how those forces will perform, given alliances functioning
as they were designed, given domestic political will, given
Soviet force actions in accordance with intelligence
estimates— in short, given that all the uncertainties will
turn out not to be wholly unfavorable—the strategy still
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ASIAN-PACIFIC REACTIONS TO U.S. STRATEGY
Sheldon W. Simon
I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that the father of the Navy's
1980' s Maritime Strategy, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, was
heavily influenced by his experiences as CINCPAC in the
post-Vietnam period. Searching for an approach to naval
warfare which would reverse the 1970' s decline of U.S.
maritime strength, Admiral Hayward focused on power projec-
tion through carrier battle groups. These would capitalize
on the Soviet Union's geostrategic weakness by bottling up
their surface ships, SSNs and SSBNs in Soviet home waters
before they were able to transit straits and other choke
points to the open ocean. 1
Because the maritime strategy seems to require a concen-
tration of forward deployed U.S. naval forces in the North
Pacific and Sea of Japan, naval strategists have also empha-
sized the important role America's Pacific allies should
play in implementing the strategy. That role would be
twofold: (1) the provision of bases for American naval and
air forces; and (2) direct cooperation through their own air
and naval assets to monitor regions adjacent to their terri-




Therein lurks one of the unresolved issues of the mari-
time strategy. Although it requires allied cooperation to
be fully effective in both deterrent and war-fighting modes,
it is essentially unilateralist. Decisions ranging from
probing Soviet defenses in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk to
actual hostilities would be made by the United States.
Allies would be expected to fall in line behind these deci-
sions regardless of their own foreign and security policies.
Exacerbating the prospect of differing policy interests for
Washington's Asian allies was former Secretary of the Navy
John Lehman's concept of horizontal escalation . Because the
Maritime Strategy is directed primarily to the central
European front, Asia is seen as a secondary battlefield
which would be opened to force the Soviets to contemplate a
two-front war. 2 U.S. allies presumably would provide bases
and logistic centers in exchange for American protection and
the maintenance of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
.
According to U.S. strategic thinking, horizontal escala-
tion would not be as threatening to the Pacific allies as it
initially appears. Because the Soviet navy would be primar-
ily concerned with protecting its SSBNs, the bulk of its air
and naval forces would be concentrated around Vladivostok
and Petropavlovsk. A prompt deployment of American anti-
submarine (ASW) forces would also precipitate a Soviet
submarine retreat to home waters to protect the SSBNs. This
would leave only residual Soviet forces in Southeast Asia,
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the eastern Indian Ocean, and the South pacific which could
be neutralized at choke points such as the Strait of Malacca
by American and allied forces. 3 Besides, the navy argues,
the enhanced threat of a two-front war strengthens
deterrence and, therefore, reduces the probability of war's
occurrence in the first place. 4
As Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations,
has stated: "The idea is to counter the launch platform.
To shoot the archer before he releases the arrows is very
important because that cuts down on the magnitude of the
defensive problem." 5 Where Admiral Watkins foresees the
importance of a preemptive strike in a Soviet-American
confrontation, Vice Admiral James A. Lyons, the Commander-
in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, sees the role of U.S.
Pacific Forces as sea control: to insure that Soviet forces
in Asia cannot be shifted to Europe. 6 Each of these
strategies portends different roles for Asian allies—the
former as passive supporter and provider of bases, the
latter as active contributor to a conventional armada whose
task is to constrain a Soviet breakout from its home bases
or an attack on the U.S. fleet.
II. AMERICA'S ASIA STRATEGY AND CAPACITY
The importance of American air and sea power to Asian-
Pacific security has been acknowledged since the end of
World War II. Initially, they formed the basis for an
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island cordon sanitaire approach to protect the chain of
islands from Japan through the Philippines against continen-
tal-based Sino-Soviet power. 7 Advocates of this strategy
opposed efforts to fight on the mainland where U.S. manpower
would be at a great comparative disadvantage against Asia's
huge populations. The Vietnam War's outcome strengthened
the argument behind the cordon sanitaire . It became the
1969 Guam Doctrine under which U.S. allies were expected to
take primary responsibility for their own defense, but, if
attacked, could expect American assistance through its air
and sea power.
While the Seventh and Third Fleets combined deploy 220
combat ships and auxiliaries and the U.S. Pacific Air Force
has approximately 500 bombers and fighters, they are all
part of a global strategy, tasked with monitoring develop-
ments all the way from the Persian Gulf to the eastern
Pacific. This wide dispersal means that in any given con-
flict situation, the U.S. must depend on the capabilities of
allied and friendly states to augment American force
projection.
Secretary of Defense Weinberger articulated the Reagan
administration's approach to Pacific security in 1982 when
he distinguished between the U.S. roles in the Northwest
Pacific and the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean. For the
former the United States would provide the nuclear umbrella,
offensive force projection, and aid for the defense of South
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Korea. For the latter, there would be the nuclear umbrella,
projection forces, and sea lane protection. 8 Missing, of
course, was sea lane protection for the Northwest Pacific, a
task the United States urged Japan to accept so that U.S.
forces could be moved further south and west without
exposing the sea lanes from Hawaii to Japan.
The need for allied ships and planes is further under-
scored by examining the kinds of ships the U.S. Navy is
building to effect its surface and air strike missions.
Shipbuilding plans through the remainder of this decade to
safeguard the projected 12 to 15 carrier groups include
enormously expensive Los Angeles-class attack submarines, 38
high-cost cruisers, and 14 destroyers. 9 The high price of
these ships means that they will not be produced in suffi-
cient numbers to replace their predecessors unit for unit.
The far-flung SLOCs will either be less frequently
patrolled, or the United States must rely increasingly on
other navies.
A. THE NEED FOR BURDEN-SHARING
High technology warfare has driven the costs of modern
navies and air forces so high that alliances between major
powers and smaller allies are being reassessed. The
military guarantees of 20 years ago are no longer absolute.
They have become limited and conditional, reflecting the
economic burdens they entail. As Robert Scalapino has
noted, it is more appropriate in the 1980s to speak of
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alignments rather than alliances. The former are vastly
more complex, the reciprocal benefits more fluid and open to
regular renegotiation. "It requires a capacity for compro-
mise, an acceptance of difference, and, above all, a
willingness to consult and to develop genuinely collective
policies." 10 This means a shift away from unilateralism in
the determination of alliance policies.
Critics of the U.S. defense burdens inherent in alliance
arrangements point to this country's unprecedented global
indebtedness which, by 1990, is expected to be half a
trillion dollars. They note that by that time, Washington
will be paying tens of billions to foreign creditors merely
in servicing costs. Because these creditors are also U.S.
allies (Japan and ROK) , the following questions arise: (1)
can the United States continue to lead allies to which it
owes a huge debt? (2) If the United States tries to
control the debt through protectionism, will the allies
continue to rely on America for security when Washington is
disrupting the economic system on which their prosperity is
based? And finally, (3) will American public opinion
support paying for the defense of countries richer than the
United States? 11 With respect to the last question, Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations polls of over 2500 national
respondents in 1978 and 1982 reveal diminishing support for
expanded military spending even among those who were classi-
fied as military "hardliners" (from 47 to 34 percent). 12
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The United States could afford the commitments it estab-
lished along the Pacific rim in the 1950s and 1960s when
domestic social programs absorbed a smaller percentage of
U.S. national product and the American economy dominated the
globe, producing over 40 percent of the world's goods and
services. That era has passed. If containment is to remain
viable, then the United States needs the assistance of
allies and friends not only through passive provision of
bases but also through positive cooperation in force deploy-
ments. Such cooperation, in turn, depends on a change in
U.S. attitudes towards its Pacific partners from unilateral-
ism to joint planning. If American protection is simply
viewed by the allies as payment for services rendered rather
than as a product of common interests, then the longevity
and reliability of such arrangements are questionable. 13
(This is one part of the problem in negotiating a new agree-
ment for the Philippine bases.)
What roles can allies with limited navies perform in the
Pacific? Are joint operations feasible? Have they been
conducted in the past? Can they be improved in the future?
The remainder of this chapter addresses these questions and,
equally important, the compatibility of security interests
in whose absence cooperation would be chimerical.
Allies, with even modest naval and air forces, could
engage in defensive sea control. Indeed, with the declara-
tion of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the 1982
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Law of the Sea Treaty, most littoral states have begun to
acquire ships for the purpose of enforcing their jurisdic-
tions. These include attack submarines, land-based patrol
aircraft, fast attack craft, destroyers, and frigates.
These systems can engage in straits control, convoying, and
ASW operations. 14 The question arises—will states which
are developing capabilities to defend their territorial
waters and economic zones view cooperation with the U.S.
Navy as a means of enhancing their own security? Or
conversely and ominously for U.S. (and Soviet) naval
strategies, will those states signing the Law of the Sea
Treaty increasingly oppose the deployment of all warships as
incompatible with the "peaceful purposes" language of the
Treaty? While the latter interpretation need not inhibit
U.S. deployments, it could still obstruct the kind of allied
cooperation necessary for a truly effective U.S. naval
strategy. 15
III. JAPAN: AMERICA'S MAJOR PACIFIC ALLY
Japan's strategic situation can only be understood in
light of its close proximity to the Eurasian land mass. A
series of islands enclosing the Sea of Japan, the country is
only a short distance from the coasts of China, Korea, and
the Soviet Union. The latter' s major Pacific naval base,
Vladivostok, lies only 107 kilometers from Tokyo. Access
to and from the Sea of Japan is controlled by three straits:
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Tsushima which separates the Korean peninsula from Honshu,
Tsugaru which separates the Japanese islands of Honshu and
Hokkaido, and Soya which separates Hokkaido from the heavily
fortified Soviet island of Sakhalin. The Soviets also
occupy the Kurile islands which stretch from the northern
tip of Hokkaido to the Kamchatka peninsula, forming a
barrier between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific. Ships
traveling to and from Vladivostok must transmit straits
potentially controllable by U.S. allies: the ROK and Japan.
While the Japanese archipelago is a natural barrier
constraining Soviet Pacific Fleet operations, Japan's
cooperation is essential to control the apertures in that
barrier in the event of a confrontation. Japanese military
planners display a certain reticence, however, over the
prospect of closing the straits. A Soviet belief that Japan
was about to blockade or mine them could trigger a
preemptive strike against Japanese bases and the occupation
of northern Hokkaido. Indeed, until the 1979 Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, Japanese officials did not develop
scenarios in which a military conflict would occur around
the home islands. The 1976 National Defense Program Outline
(NDPO) foresaw a low probability for Soviet-American
conflict; a low probability for East Asian hostilities; and
expressed confidence in the deterrent value of U.S. -Japan
security arrangements. 16 Nevertheless, Japanese planners
realize that in a global or major East Asian confrontation,
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Japan's involvement could not be avoided. The Japanese
straits would be either blockaded by the Americans and
Japanese or controlled by the Soviets. Thus, recent joint
exercises have focused on repelling a Soviet attack on
Hokkaido. Keen Edge 87-1 was the largest American-Japanese
exercise held to date with 10,000 personnel from all three
services. Interestingly, Keen Edge included U.S. aircraft
stationed in South Korea for the first time, implying
Japanese acceptance of a security link among the three
countries (discussed further below). 17
Soviet intransigence over negotiations for return of the
northern islands is related to its naval strategy. The
archipelago north of Hokkaido (Habomai, Kunashiri, Shikotan,
and Etorofu) commands the most readily usable exits to the
Pacific Ocean which, unlike the straits, could not be easily
obstructed. By fortifying the two Kurile islands closest to
Japan—Kunashiri and Etorofu—Moscow hopes to turn the Sea
of Okhotsk into a Soviet lake for the protection of its
SSBNs. Moreover, the Soviets have approximately one
division deployed on the southernmost Kuriles, equipped with
long-range artillery, Mi-24 helicopters, and some 40 Mig-23
fighters—a significant concentration of force if the goal
is to seize northern Hokkaido. 18
The 1987 Defense White Paper for the first time stresses
"air defense on the mainland," a reference to preparation
for the defense of northern Hokkaido from a Soviet invasion
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effort to secure the southern side of the Soya strait. Sea
land defense is seen as an integral part of this new concen-
tration on northern Japan for the MSDF would be tasked with
securing a route for U.S. forces to come to Japan's aid.
The White Paper does not, however, outline any arrangement
for a readiness system under which U.S. forces would jointly
assist in Japan's defense. Nor has the United States
prepositioned supplies to Hokkaido to repel an invasion
force. Indeed, neither logistics, labor, land nor transpor-
tation are currently available to the U.S. military in
Hokkaido in the event of an emergency requiring a rapid
buildup. 19
Washington's aims for Japan include: (1) the develop-
ment of a capability to control the sea lanes 1000 miles
from Honshu, in particular the area south to the Bashi
channel north of Taiwan and east of Guam. This would
require that the Maritime Self-Defense Force develop
capabilities against Soviet surface vessels and submarines
as well as long-range patrol aircraft; (2) mining and
blockading the straits discussed above; (3) the establish-
ment of an air defense screen around the home islands that
could inflict heavy losses on Soviet bombers and fighters
and therefore facilitate sea control. 20
Japan possesses most of the systems necessary to imple-
ment these tasks, though it needs more of each (F-15
fighters, JE-2C ASWCs, P3-C ASW aircraft) . It currently
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lacks airborne refueling capacity (KC-135s) , however,
because the Diet has viewed these as potentially providing
an offensive as distinct from defensive capability according
to Article 9 of Japan's Constitution. This policy must
change if Japan is to be able to sustain air combat and
patrol over time and space. U.S. Assistant Secretary of
Defense Richard Armitage has praised the JSDF Midterm
Defense Plan which by the early 1990s will yield 60
destroyers—two with Aegis defense systems, 100 P-3Cs
deployed in Hokkaido, 100 F-4s and 100 F-15s. These systems
far outnumber their counterparts in the U.S. Seventh Fleet
and Fifth Air Force. 21 The United States has also pressed
Japan to set up Over the Horizon Radar (OTH) which would
provide early warning of aircraft flying from Siberian bases
toward the Pacific. Washington would link a Japanese system
into a planned chain of OTH sites stretching from Alaska to
the Philippines. 22
America's hope, then, is not that Japan becomes an
independent regional military power—anathema to such
neighbors as China, the Philippines, and Korea—but that
Tokyo develop the capacity to fulfill its pledge to defend
the surrounding sea lanes "for 300 miles to the frigid north
[and] to the south for over 1000 miles." 23 Japan would not
"stand in" for the United States in this region. Rather,
its forces would augment the Seventh Fleet by subjecting
Soviet naval and air movements to close surveillance. The
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concept of Japanese forces being additive to American
implies, of course, that the United States has abandoned its
"swing strategy" to Europe in the event of a crisis.
Reassurance of America's Pacific allies, including Japan,
that the ASDF and MSDF will not be primarily responsible for
western Pacific defense is essential if an expanded role for
these forces is to be politically acceptable in Asia.
U.S. -Japan joint exercises are increasing in scope and
number with the biannual RIMPAC'86 also involving the
Australian, Canadian, and British navies. Nevertheless,
unlike NATO, the United States still has no joint command
structure with Japan. Current plans state that in the event
of imminent attack on Japan, the two governments will
conduct closer liaison, but no joint command is planned
—
even for air defense where rapid task coordination would be
essential. The reason for this anomaly is Article IX'
s
prohibition on collective self-defense. Thus, joint defense
beyond territorial waters and air space is problematical.
Within Japanese air and sea space, however, the LDP govern-
ment interprets the Constitution in a manner that permits
Japan to respond to an attack on U.S. forces, arguing that
such a response falls within individual or national self-
defense. Thus, Japanese ships can protect U.S. ships within
Japanese waters, though the chain of command would be
through the MSDF and not the U.S. fleet. 24
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Basically, the JSDF, while desiring full participation
with American forces in Japan, hopes to avoid having to
justify that participation in the Diet. Hence, the ambi-
guity surrounding the Japanese commitment to defend U.S.
forces and the insistence that Japanese and U.S. forces are
not integrated. The JSDF has been more concerned with
defusing joint defense as an issue in domestic politics than
with devising more effective security arrangements.
Obstacles to sea lane defense for Japan include the
deployment of some 80 TU-22N Backfire bombers in the Soviet
Far East. With a combat radius of over 2000 miles
unrefueled, these supersonic aircraft are believed to be
tasked with attacking the Seventh Fleet. Backfires . Bears ,
and Badgers all regularly fly over the Sea of Japan testing
ASDF defense systems. Neither the MSDF nor ASDF possess the
capability to oppose the Backfires . Combined operations
with the United States would be the only effective defense.
Yet, at Japan's current rate of procurement, the MSDF
capability to mount an effective SLOC defense will probably
not be realized until the mid-1990s. At that time, Japan's
new FSX fighter—an upscale version of the F-16—will be
deployed. Capable of flying to the Kuriles and Vladivostok
with state-of-the-art avionics, the FSX will give the ASDF a
strike capability against the Soviet mainland. 25
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A. THE JAPAN-KOREA NEXUS
Because both South Korea and Japan have security
treaties with the United States and each patrols its
respective side of the Tsushima Straits, it is at least
theoretically possible that three-way defense cooperation
could emerge. The U.S. Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet
treat South Korea and Japan as one region. For example, the
Fifth Air Force has one air division in each country.
Recent exercises in Japan included the deployment of U.S. F-
16s from Korea. A JSDF official even offered an opinion in
the Diet in 1980 that joint exercises with ROK forces would
be legal. This idea was reinforced by Undersecretary of
Defense Fred Ikle in 1983 when he urged tripartite exercises
among Japan, South Korea and the United States to control
the Tsushima Straits. 26
Nevertheless, the ROK has displayed ambivalence toward
Japan's military growth and rejected the idea of direct
military cooperation with an historical enemy. On the one
hand, Seoul has requested as much as $6 billion in aid from
Japan on the grounds that ROK defense on the peninsula
contributes to Japan's safety. Yet, at the same time, South
Korea fears that too extensive a Japanese naval and air
buildup will lead to a reduction of U.S. forces in the
vicinity as well as a reactive Soviet buildup of North
Korea. To a certain extent these concerns appear justified.
The Soviets accelerated arms transfers to the DPRK in 1986,
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including Mig-23s, though these were provided only after the
United States sold F-16s to the ROK. More ominously, Soviet
Pacific Fleet vessels are not calling at both Nampo on the
west coast of the DPRK and Nanj in on the east coast. Though
neither of these ports could remotely be termed a Soviet
base such as Cam Ranh Bay, if the Soviets could deploy ships
there permanently, blockade of the Tsushima strait would be
more difficult.
The ROK has certainly developed the economic capacity to
play a greater role in the maritime defense of its vicinity.
It already provides offset payments of $1.2 billion annually
to help defray the maintenance costs of 38,000 U.S. forces
on the peninsula. Given Seoul's rapid economic growth rate
and some $8 billion in foreign exchange reserves, Seoul
could significantly increase its defense role without
harming its economy. 27 Additional frigates and minelaying
capacity could make the ROK navy a formidable ally in
defending and/or blockading its side of the Tsushima Straits
while the MSDF performs the same role to the east. The
Seventh Fleet could coordinate these efforts while maintain-
ing the political and legal fiction that Seoul and Tokyo do
not exercise together.
Overt defense cooperation may still be a decade away. 28
Yet, its occurrence seems inevitable, especially given the
continued up-grading of North Korea's armed forces and the
prospect of the Soviet Union using northern harbors. Seoul
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already acknowledges the vital importance of U.S. bases in
Japan for the ROK's defense. At the same time, Japan should
encourage North Korean economic and political reforms which
emulate those of the PRC. A more economically outward-
looking Pyongyang could well move the foreign policy of a
successor regime in a more moderate direction. This, in
turn, could lead to tension reduction around the peninsula
and a greater willingness on the ROK's part to see Soviet
military growth in East Asia as a primary concern. Unless
the North Korean threat is reduced, however, problems of
threat perception compatibility between Tokyo and Seoul will
persist. Japan does not see Pyongyang so much as a threat
than as an economic opportunity which Seoul continues to
obstruct. Over the long run, both countries depend on
maritime freedom and their security concerns are similar;
but at present, Seoul's fear of the North precludes a
broader regional view.
IV. SOUTHEAST ASIA: PHILIPPINE BASES AND ASEAN
Beginning well before World War II, the American naval
presence in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean has
depended on the base in Subic Bay in the Philippines.
Unlike Japan and Korea whose armed forces provide an active
contribution to the U.S. maritime presence, the Philippines
is a politically more difficult situation. It is a passive
provider of strategic location. Neither its small coastal
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defense navy nor minimal air force possess a capacity for
sustained sea lane patrol. The bulk of the country's
military budget, moreover, is committed to the army to fight
Southeast Asia's only significant communist and Moslem
insurgencies. Because the Philippines is not actively
involved in regional defense and because the bases are so
important for both U.S. conventional and nuclear support,
they have become a focus of controversy for the Aquino
government and a rallying cry for those groups who see the
bases as an affront to Philippine autonomy. 29
U.S. officials insist that the bases are crucial for
operations in three regions: the Indian Ocean, Southeast
Asia, and Northeast Asia. They demonstrate America's
commitment to regional naval preeminence, particularly in
light of Soviet deployments at Cam Ranh Bay, which, by 1987,
totalled some 25-30 ships at seven docks, tripling the
capacity the Americans had built during the Vietnam War.
All other U.S. Pacific allies, the ASEAN states, and even
China have indicated to U.S. authorities that they prefer to
see the Seventh Fleet and 13th Air Force remain in the
Philippines, though none has offered to provide substitute
facilities should the U.S. be asked to leave.
The capabilities of Clark Airbase and Subic Bay are
comprehensively detailed elsewhere. 30 Suffice it to say
that Subic performs 65 percent of the Seventh Fleet's
repairs and that the nearest alternative facility is 1400
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miles east in Guam, while Clark is the only regional staging
point from which C-5As can fly nonstop to Diego Garcia, the
U.S. Central Command's primary staging point for the Middle
East.
The Aquino administration is keeping its options open
with respect to the renewal of the bases agreement in 1991.
It does not want to give the anti-bases opposition politi-
cal grist during negotiations which begin in 1988. Never-
theless, most observers believe a new agreement will be
reached because the economic benefits are so great. The
bases employ 40,000 Filipinos and directly contribute over
five percent to the country's GNP. This total is further
enhanced by the spending of 60,000 U.S. military and
civilian personnel and their 25,000 dependents. 31
A new treaty will undoubtedly cost the United States
considerably more than the current $900 million and will be
subject to more stringent criteria of Philippines use to
demonstrate that the bases are more than just nominally
owned by Manila. In all probability a new treaty will be
submitted to a popular referendum, the approval of which
will serve to solidify U.S. -Philippine security ties. At
the same time, the United States must be prepared to see the
bases become targets for guerrilla attacks after 1991 if the
Communist New Peoples Army can rally nationalist sentiment
against this continued "imperialist encroachment." 32
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The bases have also become an issue in ASEAN diplomacy.
In 1987, Philippine Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus
attempted to solicit a formal statement of regional support
for the bases in hopes of defusing their renewal as an issue
in Philippine domestic politics. Affirmation of the bases
importance for regional security could be used to appeal to
the Philippine electorate that their renegotiation was not
simply a manifestation of the country's subordination to
U.S. strategic interests. 33 Manglapus 1 appeal to ASEAN
members was not accepted, however. Rather than relieving
the Philippines of sole political responsibility for the
bases, ASEAN members insisted that the bases' renewal was a
bilateral issue between Manila and Washington. To endorse
their continuation would be a particular affront to
Indonesia and the logic of the Zone of Peace Freedom and
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) , even though privately ASEAN members are
eager to see U.S. forces remain in the region.
Even if the bases are renewed, problems concerning the
presence of nuclear weapons could arise. As the Seventh
Fleet deploys more vessels with such dual-capable missile
systems as the Tomahawk . anti-nuclear concerns in the
Philippines have become a political issue. The new Consti-
tution, for example, declares the Philippines a nuclear-free
territory "consistent with the national interest." This
latter phrase could provide a loophole for the government if
it decided the presence of nuclear weapons was necessary for
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the country's security. 34 A public statement to that effect
would be unlikely, however.
Indonesia's desire for a more prominent role in
Southeast Asian affairs was demonstrated during the 1987
Manila Summit in the ASEAN statement urging efforts toward
the early establishment of a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (SEANFZ) . Modelled after the Treaty of Roratonga
for the Southwest Pacific, Indonesia has argued that SEANFZ
is a logical expansion of ZOPFAN. Its purpose, from
Indonesia's perspective, would be to reduce regional depen-
dence on external powers. As with the ZOPFAN declaration,
however, ASEAN members realize that SEANFZ is also nonself-
implementing. So long as Soviet and U.S. navies continue to
ply the waters of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean,
neither ZOPFAN nor SEANFZ will go beyond a rhetorical
challenge. In contrast to the United States, though, the
Soviet Union has endorsed SEANFZ. Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze suggested to Indonesian Foreign Minister
Mochtar that the USSR might be willing to open Cam Ranh Bay
for inspection as an assurance that no nuclear weapons are
deployed there. 35 A Soviet offer of this nature could
provide the anti-bases and anti-nuclear movements in the
Philippines with political ammunition unless the Americans
were willing to reciprocate. For Washington to do so seems
improbable, however, since opening the bases for inspection
would violate the longstanding American policy of neither
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confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons at
overseas locations.
Soviet concern about the Philippine bases is regularly
expressed. General Secretary Gorbachev, in his wide-ranging
July 1986 Vladivostok address, hinted at the possibility of
reducing the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in exchange
for an American military exist from the Philippines. That
offer could resurface during the bases renegotiations. High
level Soviet visitors to the Philippines have warned that
the bases put the country at risk and could involve it in
war. 36
On balance, cautious optimism over the future of the
bases appears warranted. Their continued importance for
monitoring and protecting the sea lanes through the straits
of Southeast Asia makes the facilities a net asset for
regional security. That asset could be further enhanced, in
the author's view, if the United States and the Philippines
expanded the multilateral use of such facilities as the Crow
Valley Gunnery Range for ASEAN navies and air forces. Joint
use would facilitate the development of common doctrine
among friendly armed services and help dissipate the
negative image of the bases as exclusively in America's
strategic interests. 37
108
V. ASEAN AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY
Although ASEAN is not allied to the United States, two
of its members have security treaties (Thailand and the
Philippines) with the U.S. and three others (Malaysia,
Singapore, and Brunei) are linked to other U.S. allies
(Britain and Australia) . ASEAN defense activities could
contribute to the maintenance of SLOC freedom in Southeast
Asia and the eastern Indian Ocean.
ASEAN security cooperation with the United States is
problematic, however. First and foremost, open
collaboration would violate ASEAN' s primary foreign policy
goal: the creation of ZOPFAN. The Zone concept serves
several political purposes: (a) it sustains ASEAN *s credi-
bility within the Nonaligned Movement despite most of its
members' ties to Western powers; (b) it posits a long term
goal for Southeast Asia free of all great power encroach-
ments, including the American, Soviet, and potentially
Chinese, and (c) it provides a politically acceptable way of
satisfying Indonesia's desire to be the security policy
leader for ASEAN without requiring that other Western-
aligned members sacrifice their security links to outsiders.
ZOPFAN, then, is a vague umbrella under which many different
national security policies find shelter. They range from
Indonesia's desire to establish an exclusionary zone to
Singapore's belief that security lies in a balance of power,
including a strong American presence and even that of Japan.
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In fact, the Singaporean view most closely represents the
prevailing situation (minus Japan) while the Indonesian
preference would require evolution toward a future setting
in which the major powers would mutually agree to withdraw
their forces from the region. Given the current trends of
both Soviet and American naval expansion, Indonesia's
version of ZOPFAN seems further away than ever.
In general, the U.S. naval and air presence in Southeast
Asia is welcomed by ASEAN. Not only does it counter the
Soviet buildup in Vietnam but it also insures that Japanese
rearmament will proceed slowly and in conjunction with
American plans. A U.S. presence could also insure against
any future Chinese designs for the region. Moreover, if
Japan was to add its ships to those of the Seventh Fleet in
Southeast Asia, some ASEAN officials fear the exacerbation
of a Soviet-Western naval arms race in its vicinity. 38
In fact, most ASEAN armed services currently engage in
various kinds of cooperation with their U.S. counterparts. 39
Singapore and Thailand provide access for U.S. ships and
planes to ports and airbases in their countries. The
Seventh Fleet conducts passing exercises with ASEAN states'
ships. Officers from ASEAN states comprise 16 percent of
all foreign military students at U.S. service colleges; and
the USPACOM organizes annual maritime and logistics confer-
ences attended by defense officials from ASEAN. Combined
naval amphibious and air exercises between individual ASEAN
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states and the Seventh Fleet were initiated in the early
1980s. Only Indonesia and Brunei have not participated.
U.S. Navy P3 Prions regularly stop at U Tapao and Don Muong
airports in Thailand on their way from the Philippines to
Diego Garcia.
The ASEAN states are less concerned, however, about the
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia than are the Americans.
They foresee no direct threat to themselves from the USSR.
Rather, the Soviet presence is seen as: (1) part of the
global superpower confrontation; (2) the exertion of its
role as an Asian power; (3) necessary both to support and
exert leverage on Vietnam; (4) an effort to surround China;
and (5) the deployment of sufficient capability to protect
its own SLOCs to Vladivostok.
The United States should encourage the ASEAN states to
develop greater security cooperation, particularly the
ability to monitor and control their coastal seas. Some
ASEAN military analysts have suggested a division of labor
emphasizing each member's strengths. Thus, Singapore could
stress air surveillance, the Malaysian navy could concen-
trate on mine countermeasures to keep the Strait of Malacca
open, and Thailand would build up its armor and ground
forces along the Indochina border. While such a degree of
specialization may seem cost-effective, it is politically
unacceptable. No ASEAN state is yet prepared to rely on its
neighbors for important components of its own defense.
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Moreover, an ASEAN formal military pact would violate the
,
Association's hope that Southeast Asia will not be divided
into two hostile blocs (ASEAn versus Indochina) . An ASEAN
i
military pact, they fear, would only encourage closer ties
between Vietnam and the USSR. 40
ASEAN could take a number of steps toward defense
cooperation without entering a formal pact, however.
Presently, all states (except for the Philippines and
Malaysia because of the Sabah dispute) are willing to
exercise with each other. These exercises could work toward
the creation of standard C3 procedures. Singapore's
purchase of E-2C AEW aircraft could be tied into ground
radar systems in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, thus
providing all with a significant regional surveillance
capability.
The ASEAN states are now responsible for their respec-
tive 200-mile EEZs. Joint patrol of these zones could be
highly cost-effective, especially considering their
overlapping jurisdictions, the presence of hundreds of
offshore drilling sites, and the fact that the ASEAN mari-
time region encompasses some of the most vital SLOCs in the
world. The Thai naval air wing, for example, because of
Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, is currently conducting
intensive surveillance for PAVN naval craft along the Thai-
Cambodian coast and into the Gulf of Thailand.
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ASEAN MARITIME AIRCRAFT INVENTORY
Type: Boeing-737 C-130H/MP F-27M F-27M-2 Nomad
Country:
Indonesia* 3 1 - - 17
**
(11 B; 6 L)
Malaysia - 1
Thailand - 3 1 (+2) 8
Philippines - 3
Singapore (non-dedicated types, incl. 2 E-2C and C-130B/H)
Brunei (non-dedicated types, incl. Bell 206/212 helos)
* Indonesia ordered six IPTN CN-235 MPAs in mid-1986.
**Some sources indicate three (IISS) ; however, two are
thought to be C-130H transport versions and not
specialized C-130H/MP modified aircraft.
Source: Pacific Defence Reporter , June 1987
VI. AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. PACIFIC SECURITY
An Australian defense debate has persisted since the
early 1970s. A vast country with armed services of less
than 100,000 and 12,000 miles of nautical coastline,
Australians have long asked themselves whether a continua-
tion of the U. S . -oriented forward defense policy of the
Korea and Vietnam War periods was either practical or
affordable. The Dibb Report, tabled as an advisory to the
Labor Government in 1986, suggested that the answer should
be a qualified "no." That is, vital American defense ties
should be maintained, but Australia should create a force
structure designed not to fight alongside U.S. forces
thousands of miles away from the continent but rather to
defend against contingencies in its own vicinity. 41
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Premised on land-based air defense, the strategy would be
activated by an imminent invasion threat (an admittedly
improbable contingency) and would apparently pose no
deterrent to other challenges such as threats to SLOCs or
attacks on allies. Strikes against a potential adversary's
bases also seemed ruled out in favor of a strategy of
attrition against enemy forces enroute to Australia.
Sharing intelligence with friendly Southeast Asian states,
such as Singapore and Malaysia, would provide Canberra with
sufficient early warning of enemy moves. Along with over-
the-horizon radar to be expanded in the north, Australia's
F-llls and 75 newly acquired F/A18s would provide a formida-
ble defense against surface vessels by the early 1990s.
While much of the Dibb Report's emphasis on airpower was
incorporated in the Labor Government's 1987 Defense White
paper, Dibb's "fortress Australia" emphasis was reduced.
Defense Minister Kim Beazly chose to underline the
importance of Australia's contribution to America's
strategic strength. 42 The White Paper also stressed the
country's responsibilities for strengthening common
interests in its regional environment—Southeast Asia and
the Southwest Pacific. For the latter, Canberra will
increase air and naval deployments. For Southeast Asia,
Australia will rotate F/A18 and F-lll aircraft to
Butterworth as well as operate P3 surveillance flights over
the eastern Indian Ocean and South China Sea.
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From the perspective of U.S. naval strategy, the White
Paper's plan to expand the RAN is particularly welcome. To
a current complement of 12 major surface combatants and
aging submarines, Australia will add a fleet of 17 surface
vessels (guided-missile destroyers, guided-missile frigates,
and destroyer escorts) and six new Australian-built
submarines. Most interesting of all, for the first time in
its history, the Navy will be split. Half will be based in
New South Wales and half in Western Australia at Cockburn
Sound to provide a Southeast Asia/Indian Ocean capability in
addition to the traditional Southwest Pacific orientation.
By 1990, two submarines and four destroyers would form the
nucleus of the western fleet. The new frigates will have an
operational range of 300 nautical miles, extending surface
patrols well into the Indian Ocean and insular Southeast
Asia.
The White Paper reaffirmed the importance of the
American communications facilities at the Northwest Cape and
Nurrangar for mutual security. To insure Australian
knowledge about the facilities' use in communicating with
American SSBNs, new links are being built between the joint
facilities and Canberra. 43 These links should help diffuse
some of the arguments against the facilities as existing
exclusively for American strategic needs.
Australia also plans to contribute to Southwest Pacific
maritime security through a multi-million dollar defense
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assistance program to the South Pacific islands. In
addition to providing coastal patrol craft to Papua New
Guinea, Fiji, the Solomons, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, and the
Cook islands, Canberra will increase its own ship visits in
the region and deploy long-range patrol aircraft. In fact,
the Australian government has chosen to emphasize its South
Pacific role over its contribution to Southeast Asian
defense, since the ASEAN states have not sufficiently
matured to meet their own needs. 44
Nevertheless, in some respects, Australian defense
activities in Southeast Asia will actually be enhanced. A
RAN submarine will deploy from Malaysia for continuous
patrol of Southeast Asian waters. Combined exercises will
now be held with Thailand as well as Malaysia and Singapore,
although defense cooperation with Indonesia has been on the
decline for over a decade because of Australian press criti-
cism of the Suharto regime. 45
With the break in U.S. -New Zealand defense ties over the
Lange government's refusal to permit nuclear ship visits,
Australia has stepped in to provide some supplementary
assistance to partly compensate for the material and
intelligence losses that will be suffered by Wellington.
Australia will design and build frigates that will be used
by both countries' navies, providing a greater range and
endurance than New Zealand currently possesses. 46 Australia
has also increased binational naval exercises with New
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Zealand, although these cannot substitute for the training
previously provided in the RIMPAC exercises which had
created a more realistic, and therefore, more expensive,
combat environment. 47
One cloud on the U.S. -Australian naval security horizon
is the Treaty of Raratonga which took effect in December
1986. This treaty, supported by both Canberra and
Wellington, has declared a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.
Although Australia negotiated within the South pacific Forum
to insure that the treaty would not affect the movement of
American ships and planes that might be nuclear-armed
through the region, the United States has rejected it on the
grounds that it only benefits Soviet global strategy. 48
Unfortunately, the United States was caught in the backwash
of a treaty that was directed primarily at France for its
continued nuclear-testing program around New Caledonia. The
Soviet Union and China have both signed the document.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this chapter a distinction was made
between active and passive allied contributions to U.S.
naval missions in the Pacific. Generally, it has been the
latter which have created greater political difficulties in
countries which are sensitive to nationalist strains and
whose leaders do not want to be seen as subordinates to
American command. Complaints about U.S. bases in the
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Philippines and Korea fit this interpretation as does New
Zealand's rejection of U.S. port calls.
The Soviets have attempted to play upon this combination
of nationalist and anti-nuclear opinion. Both General
Secretary Gorbachev's major address on Asia in July 1986 and
his lengthy interview with Merdeka in July 1987 emphasized
the need to denuclearize armed forces in the region. In his
Merdeka interview, Gorbachev explicitly countered the
Maritime Strategy by calling for a navigational limit on
ships with nuclear weapons so that "they could not approach
the coast of any side to within the range of operation of
their on-board nuclear systems." 49 This, of course, would
remove the U.S. fleet from the northern Sea of Japan. In
fact, it appears that the active cooperation of American and
Japanese forces in the Sea of Japan where exercises emphas-
size choke point control may be keeping the Soviet Pacific
Fleet closer to home. The U.S. Defense Department has noted
a decline of Soviet deployments into the Indian Ocean. 50
Similarly, Japan's active 1000-mile sea lane defense
plans have not disturbed ASEAN leaders. Philippine and
Indonesian officials, who had earlier expressed concern
about the movement of Japanese forces away from the home
islands, now seem to accept Japan's need for limited SLOC
protection. 51
Problems attendant upon the lease renewals for the
Philippine bases are partly a product of a Filipino
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indifference to the American argument that the bases are
important for regional security. If the leases are renewed,
the argument that will sell in Manila is their economic
importance for the country's reconstruction. Even the
former Philippine Defense Secretary, Rafael Ileto, argues
for the bases' continuation on the grounds that the Philip-
pines armed forces could not afford to maintain the
facilities and spend more for external defense if the
Americans left. 52
As an Asian-Pacific naval power, the United States
relies more on its fleet to project power and cover vast
ocean stretches than does the USSR which still essentially
follows a continental strategy. Because the Soviet need for
overseas bases is limited in the Asian-Pacific, Gorbachev
can play to the nationalist predilections of the several
countries in which the U.S. maintains base facilities. The
Soviets can also support nuclear-free zone declarations
since the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear-capable ships
is an integral part of the U.S. strategy, while the Soviets
retain most of their SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Frictions with allied and friendly countries along the
Asian-Pacific rim will undoubtedly persist for Washington.
Optimists, however, believe that the necessity for allied
passive and active maritime cooperation with the United
States against growing Soviet, Vietnamese, and North Korean
navies will outweigh both anti-nuclear dispositions and the
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belief that cooperation with a superpower means dependency
upon it. The evidence suggests, however, that active
cooperation leads to a more stable alliance relationship
than the mere passive provision of facilities. An active
relationship entails mutuality and joint planning. The
United States should encourage a shift from passive to
active cooperation where feasible if Asian-Pacific security
is to be enhanced.
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THE PACIFIC RIM AS AN ECONOMIC DYNAMO:
IMPLICATION FOR THE MARITIME STRATEGY*
Edward A. Olsen
The maritime interests of the United States in the Asia-
Pacific region are of long standing. The purpose of this
study is to survey the economic and strategic roots of those
interests, with special reference to "The Maritime Strategy,"
and to assess the potential impact of the region's economic
dynamism on the future of U.S. maritime interests and
strategy. "The Maritime Strategy"' is a well-known approach
to U.S. strategy which has generated considerable
controversy. Only some of that debate will be evaluated
here. The primary foci of this analysis are the contemporary
impact of The Maritime Strategy on the Western Pacific and
the potential impact of the Pacific rim's economic dynamos on
maritime strategy. Before addressing the realities and
prospects of that strategic perspective's place in Asian-
Pacific affairs, it is necessary to establish an analytical
context by briefly reviewing the evolution of maritime
strategic affairs from traditional to modern Asia.
*This paper is a revised and expanded version of a paper
prepared for the 1987 International Studies Association
annual meeting entitled "The Maritime Strategy in the Western
Pacific." That earlier version was published in the Autumn
r
1987 edition of the Naval Wa r College Review .
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The Western Pacific is a maritime zone that encompasses
the coastal waters of two sub-regions of Asia that increas-
ingly are recognized as dynamic areas of the world.
Clearly, Northeast Asia fits this description. Japan,
China, and the two Koreas loom large in Asian affairs by any
measure. Japan's economic power and China's gargantuan
proportions loom large in world affairs, though experts
differ over whether both truly deserve the prominence they
receive. The Korean peninsula is a nexus of international
tensions. Further south, Southeast Asia—led by the ASEAN
states— is being transformed into a new center of economic
importance. Both subregions have earned strategic value in
the eyes of major regional powers and the superpowers by
virtue of the capabilities, potentials, and geographic
configurations of its states. In addition, far offshore the
Asian continent lay the large Oceanic states of Australia
and New Zealand and numerous slowly developing island mini-
states. Much of Oceania had, until the early 1980s, been
widely considered utterly remote from world centers of
power, but the changing nature of the larger Pacific rim
economic and strategic balances has sharply boosted
perceptions of this still distant and dispersed sub-region
of the Western Pacific.
The concept of "maritime strategy" is not new in the
Western Pacific whether considered indigenously or from
external perspectives. Except for continental China, with
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its broad cross-regional access (it borders Northeast,
Southeast, Central, and South Asia), all the littoral states
of Asia have relied to a considerable extent on seaborne
communication. Though few of these states developed a major
maritime tradition, most have been cognizant of its impor-
tance throughout their histories and have an appreciation
for such traditions. While several ancient Asian kingdoms
and dynasties cultivated the strategic aspects of maritime
affairs for trade, colonial expansion, and exporting culture
and religion, in only one—Japan—did that perspective
remain viable into the modern era. As Western culture
produced Mahan and other maritime-oriented geopolitical
thinkers, the Japanese evolved independently their own
counterparts—Sato Nobuhiro (1769-1850) being the most
notable. However, with these exceptions, Asian strategic
affairs remained over the ages primarily continental.
Asia's martial and diplomatic traditions clearly are
stronger than its naval traditions. Whether in the Sinic or
Indie cultural realms, the intellectual descendents
respectively of Sun Tzu and Kautilya had little to learn
from Clausewitz, a decided latecomer from their perspective.
It was left to seafaring Western imperialists to remind
the land-oriented Asians of their sea-borne vulnerabilities.
Nearly all expansionist Europeans and Americans came to Asia
by sea. Only the Czarist Russians traversed the broad
Eurasian landmass overland to challenge Asia from the rear,
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using seaborne avenues as a flanking approach and to compete
with the other imperialists. The maritime assaults on
Asia's largely unprepared nations produced an era of Western
dominance. An important facet of that domination was its
commercial roots. Initially most Western powers established
a maritime presence in Asia for the sake of fostering and
then preserving commercial ventures. The role of Western
navies in such enterprises is well reflected in the infamous
phrase "gunboat diplomacy." That clearly remained true of
the United States and its maritime presence well into the
pre-World War Two era. The American fleet routinely backed
commercial national interests, making U.S. strategic inter-
ests derivative of those more mundane affairs.
Except for the Japanese, who speedily learned to play
the imperialists' game by imperialists' rules, Asia
succumbed to colonial subjugation or semi-colonial intimida-
tion. Imperial Japan's rise to a position as prewar Asia's
leading indigenous power and its disastrous fall in World
War II, is the story of two successful but rivalrous
services: the army and the navy. That story is important
because it is symbolic of much of modern Asia's strategic
dichotomy. Japan's army succeeded beyond the wildest hopes
of most Japanese. Its navy was, if anything, even more
successful. However, they could not cooperate very well
strategically or politically. In effect, Japan had two
strategies, one for land, one for sea. Had Japan's seaborne
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strategy been able to dominate its continental strategy,
especially in Tokyo's policymaking councils, a plausible
argument can be made that Japan's prewar and wartime
aggressive exploits would have had better prospects. Japan
suffered from a lack of coordination, compounded by the
army's tendency to rashness. While the details of Japan's
successes and failures are not particularly pertinent to the
experiences of other powers, the principles entailed are
very relevant. Without knowing it, Japan was exemplifying,
in Asia, the geopolitical principles and tensions embodied
in Mackinder's heartland doctrine, Spykman ' s rimland
doctrine, and Mahan's ideas of seapower as a controlling
factor. The key question inherent in this mix of ideas is
whether one approach can dominate another?
In the course of WWII the U.S. tacitly faced up to this
guestion in the form of General MacArthur's leadership of a
two-pronged campaign in the Central and Southwest Pacific.
Partly as a result of U.S. Army and Marine Corps' early
experiences with land combat in Asia (China, the Philip-
pines, and Siberia) and partly as a result of Japan's bitter
experiences in trying to conquer China in the 1930s, a deep-
seated apprehension about, and aversion to, land wars in
Asia entered into the U.S. military mindset. The longstand-
ing interest of the U.S. Navy in Pacific affairs and logical
naval arguments about the advantages of mobility reinforced
Army views in Asia. Against this background the emergence
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of the flexible island-hopping approach of MacArthur and the
Pacific Fleet underscored a lesson that contemporary
American strategic thinkers would do well to recall; namely
that the concept of maritime strategy is not synonymous with
naval strategy. At its best, maritime strategy should not
be considered parochially naval because it necessarily
includes naval, air, and ground combat and support forces
operating in a maritime context. For all of MacArthur'
s
reputation as a parochial glory-seeker, he nonetheless
produced in WWII and Korea a strong maritime paradigm of
flexible and far flung air, ground, amphibious and naval
operations. His approach to war in the Pacific set him
apart from most of his European theater contemporaries who
displayed less understanding of such combined operations.
In the Pacific the U.S. clearly came down on the side of the
Rimland-Seapower approaches to geopolitics and strategy.
In the postwar period the emergence of global superpower
bipolarity and decline of indigenous Asian seats of mili-
tary, political, and economic power reinforced those tenden-
cies. This juxtaposition contributed to a very different
U.S. orientation toward Asia. Commercial interests no
longer set the pace, requiring the fleet to protect them.
Instead, militarily-defined strategic interests became
dominant, calling upon commercial interests to reinvigorate
new regional allies so that they could bolster the United
States' strategic posture versus the Soviet Union. This was
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a reversal of U.S. priorities in the region, leading to
,
trade following the flag rather than the other way around.
Despite the growth of strong continental commitments in
Western Europe and Asia, the U.S. approach remained primar- !
ily one of control of, or influence over, the Eurasian
rimland and the waters surrounding it. That is the essence
of the whole exercise in postwar "containment" policy. The
linkages and coordination between diverse global U.S.
commitments since 1945 have been profoundly "maritime" in
its best eclectic sense. Postwar U.S. strategic policy has
been the joint legacy of Mahan and Spykman in response to
fears that a Eurasian land power might achieve the continen-
tal dominance described by Mackinder. The fact that Soviet
strategists had relocated the center of the "heartland" far
to the east of Mackinder' s locus is irrelevant, for the
danger remained intact.
Gradually several changes occurred in U.S. and Soviet
strategic thinking. Partly as a result of the juxtaposition
of the U.S. Army's successes in Europe via deterring a war
with the help of its NATO allies and its reverses in Asia
(Korea and Vietnam), the ground elements of U.S. grand
strategy began to dominate the European theater and to be
reduced in the Asia-Pacific region. The result in the
former was an entrenched continentalism and in the latter
was a reinforcement of the aversion to Asian land wars.
Except for the unique circumstances in South Korea, where
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the continentalism of NATO doctrines are faintly echoed, the
U.S. presence in the Western Pacific has intensified its
maritime orientation. For a time in the mid-1970s that
regional orientation assumed an even more fluid aspect as
notions of a so-called "swing strategy" were bruited about
as though the Asia-Pacific theater were merely a corollary
of the Atlantic-European theater. Many Eurocentric
Americans often have made such implicit assumptions,
resulting in a renewal of the sorts of priorities with which
MacArthur had to contend in WWII, though they supposedly had
been obviated during the 1960s and 1970s by the growth of
worldwide U.S. commitments. Two things altered this
resurgence of such cavalier U.S. attitudes toward the Asia-
Pacific region. Most basic was the belated recognition by
the U.S. of the intrinsic importance of certain big
countries in the region, notably Japan but increasingly the
"new Japans," which clearly are as important as the United
States' European allies. The shift in U.S. world trade
patters from the Atlantic to the Pacific during the 1970s
underscored the new realities. More narrowly, the U.S.
found itself facing a newly reoriented Soviet Union that was
shifting its emphasis economically and strategically toward
Asia.
Despite the far more profound significance of the shift
toward what many have taken to calling the birth of a "Paci-
fic century," it was the Soviet responses to the emergent
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realities that sparked a U.S. strategic reassessment. The
wisdom of these U.S. priorities may have been questionable,
but the results were positive nonetheless because they led
the U.S. to pay proper attention to an increasingly crucial
region of the world. Out of this larger U.S. response has
grown "The Maritime Strategy" which is, in large part, the
focus of this conference. But why "maritime?" Was it
because of the long local antecedents cited above? In part
it was, of course, but in equal measure the nature of the
U.S. response in both the Pacific and world at large is
attributable to the newly maritime nature of the Soviet
strategic buildup in the region and globally. Under the
leadership of the USSR's loose equivalent of Mahan, Admiral
Sergei Gorshkov, Moscow had been building its own blue water
navy with a vengeance. That buildup had been occurring for
years. 1 Despite that lengthy development process, non-
Soviet experts in the Soviet navy remained divided over its
purposes. Uncertainties focused on whether Moscow had a
clear-cut intention for its new naval forces and precisely
how those forces related to Soviet grand strategy. Many
U.S. specialists in the field remain doubtful whether it is
proper to even speak of Soviet naval strategy in the way
that phrase often is applied discretely to western navies.
Complicating these uncertainties are the disputes among
western Soviet watchers and defense analysts over the
ability of the USSR to sustain a continued military buildup,
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the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy in the
midst of Gorbachev's "reformist" measures, and the extent to
which such measures are true "reforms" or are merely window
dressing. 2 Security analysts should be prudent in
evaluating these variables. 3 Be that as it may, it remains
clear that the Soviet Navy is a much more formidable force
than it was in the past.
Most important for the Asia-Pacific region is the
greatly increased presence of the Soviet Navy in the Western
Pacific. 4 Coming from virtually nowhere, relative to the
postwar U.S. naval presence in the Pacific, Moscow has
created a Pacific fleet with over 800 vessels of all types.
This fleet, the USSR's largest, clearly has some purpose,
whether that purpose is a relatively benign effort to show
the flag or a precursor of more ominous plans, it marks a
major change in Soviet deployments. No longer largely a
global ground and air power, the USSR—despite its limita-
tions— is now a world class naval power. If it has not been
Moscow's intention all along, it seems only a matter of time
before the USSR will try to take simultaneous advantage of
being the Eurasian continent's dominant land power and its
largest naval power. The USSR inherited from Czarist Russia
a fixation with the insecurity of its borders. This
accounts for its almost paranoid preoccupation with
security. If the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific
presages an active effort to secure its far flung interests
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in that region of the world, the U.S. and its allies in the
Western Pacific may be in for a new round of tensions.
Clearly the Pacific is no longer an American "lake."
Characterization of the Pacific as a U.S. "lake" has
been so widespread in the postwar period that Americans and
our allies have grown accustomed to it. A large degree of
complacency evolved in that era. All that was shocked
severely in the wake of the Vietnam War. Within a decade
the Soviet Navy mushroomed in numbers and access to bases.
It now enjoys first-rate sovereign facilities on its Japan
Sea, Okhotsk Sea, and Pacific coasts. It also enjoys
substantial access to former U.S. facilities in Cam Ranh,
Vietnam, that allow the USSR to engage in a limited version
of a "swing strategy" by deploying to both the Pacific and
Indian Oceans. The still uncertain durability of U.S.
access to its Philippine bases makes the USSR's Southeast
Asian presence potentially that much more important. Moscow
appears on the verge of obtaining new access in North Korea
too. To date, however, the expanded Soviet naval presence
in the Asia-Pacific region has not been used in an overt
military fashion. At most it has been used as a relatively
discreet form of gunboat diplomacy, hoping to influence
states in the region in Moscow's favor. However, the naval
potentials for active intimidation, intervention, and inter-
diction are very real. While all this has proved upsetting
to U.S. strategists and helped cause a reappraisal of U.S.
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policy, U.S. allies and non-aligned states have accepted the
changes with greater equanimity. Unlike American leaders
who often have short historical memories, most Asian leaders
have never assumed that the USSR deserves no legitimate
place in Asian affairs. That difference in perspective has
some major implications for U.S. policy in Asia that shall
be addressed below. For now, however, we shall examine what
the U.S. response to the Soviet naval buildup means for the
Western Pacific.
Many experts have dissected the specifics of "Maritime
Strategy" and there is no need to reinvent that wheel here.
Most important for a regional affairs analyst is that the
approach remains controversial. Precisely what "The Mari-
time Strategy" is (and is not) remains remarkably ambiguous
for something which has been around for some time now. As
noted, the U.S. long has had a maritime strategy, but what
is referred to as "The Maritime Strategy" is a product of
the Reagan administration and its outspoken first Secretary
of the Navy, John Lehman. He was the most prominent propon-
ent of this latest version of U.S. maritime strategy. 5
Under Lehman's direction this version of the maritime
strategy was brought to center stage and fleshed out
considerably. 6
This strategy probably has generated more controversy
for the administration's defense policies than anything
except for its arms control policy. The controversy has
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centered on critics 1 perceptions of The Maritime Strategy as
either a unilateralist military manifestation of a more
assertive "Reagan Doctrine" out to engage the "evil empire"
or merely a rationale for the U.S. Navy to grow to a 600-
ship abstraction and reassert its presence as the "senior
service." Some critics have been extreme, 7 while others are
more balanced and judicious in their statements, 8 but both
have been critical. What most critics and even some propon-
ents of the Maritime Strategy do not adequately convey in
their writings is that this latest version and aspect of
U.S. strategy is part of an evolving process. It has a
strong past from which it is a lineal descendent. 9 More
important, in terms of countering premature criticism of the
current version of U.S. maritime strategy, it is not a
finished doctrine yet. As a strategy it is an evolutionary
process, not a definitive document. Though it is often
treated as a final product in the media, it remains in flux.
There is no strategic cookbook labeled "The Maritime Strate-
gy" on the bridge of every U.S. Navy warship that its
captain can consult to tell him what to do in the event of
war; nor is there likely to be one any time soon. This is
important to bear in mind as one evaluates the role of
critics and supporters alike. While the maritime strategy
clearly has many supporters among the blue suiters who will
carry on the naval cause long after the Reagan-Lehman team
are history, it also has some blue suit doubters 10 who share
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some of the concerns of vocal civilian, army, and air force
strategic kibitzers.
Actually, most of these concerns focus on the issue of
the Maritime Strategy as an excessively "unilateralist" and
excessively "naval" approach. Anyone who delves into the
broad implications of The Maritime Strategy should be able
to discover for themselves that such concerns need not be
debilitating. As noted earlier, no maritime strategy can be
solely naval. By definition it embodies all service
branches. The key question causing difficulties seems to be
one of inter-service rivalry. Though that may never be
eliminated, it should not be insurmountable. After all, the
various branches all serve the same national interests. As
long as parochialism is sublimated for the national inter-
est, there is no reason a (or "the") maritime strategy
cannot be the coordinating core of U.S. strategy. Postulat-
ing such a role in no way diminishes the fundamental contri-
butions of ground or air power, it merely admits the
necessity of providing flexibility and speed in the United
States' ability to respond to crises. Since the oceans of
the world are the only continuous links operationally tying
together far flung regions in which the U.S. has commitments
(and some where it does not but where conflicts could emerge
unexpectedly)
, it is not unreasonable to think of grand
strategy in maritime terms. None of this impunes the
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interdependence of all the U.S. services or the principle of
" jointness.
"
The question of unilateralism is a serious one, but, in
many cases, it should be seen as a straw-man. While U.S.
rhetorical flourishes about "standing tall" in the face of
aggressive Soviet behavior and its arms buildup has
generated much criticism of the Reagan administration for
allegedly aspiring to a "Rambo" style, macho unilateralism,
any close examination of existing U.S. strategy, and the
foreign policy behind it, clearly shows that U.S. "unilater-
alism" is profoundly dependent upon the collective security
arrangements Washington has fostered since 1945. Regardless
of what ostensibly unilateralist labels are attached to U.S.
foreign and defense policies, Washington's options are
sharply constrained by the willingness of friends, allies,
and neutrals to behave the way U.S. planners and policy-
makers assume they will. While the U.S. can do, and has a
perfect right to do, virtually whatever it wants in unilat-
eral defense of the homeland, there is very little the U.S.
can do in defense of overseas interests without the active
cooperation of the country or countries whose territories
are the locale of some proposed armed action. Absent such
cooperation, the states concerned become either passive or
active partners of the United States' adversary. Conse-
quently, arguments over collective defense versus
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unilateralism cannot have much meaning for other than very
short term actions of a relatively small scale. Since the
principle behind contemporary maritime strategy entails a
forward deployment of U.S. forces ready to take the battle
to the Soviet homeland and its offshore deployments, it is
difficult to imagine this in terms of narrowly defined
limited war. At the least, such a prospective armed
engagement would tread near the threshold of a theater
nuclear war, if not WWIII. The whole point of engaging in
such forward deployments is to be capable of reacting in
ways that would minimize having to cross that threshold. By
no known definition can any conceivable resort to combat
based on the maritime strategy as it is presently config-
ured, qualify as "short term actions of a relatively small
scale." Consequently, there are always some U.S. assump-
tions about the ability and willingness of allies to either
lend a helping hand or not impede U.S. actions.
The probabilities of such maritime and political cooper-
ation in the Atlantic, while somewhat more certain than
those for Asia, are beyond the purview of this analysis.
The naval capabilities of U.S. friends and allies in Asia
are relatively easy to ascertain. 11 No country in the
Western Pacific possesses major naval forces yet. Japan's
are the most important and its potential for creating truly
major naval forces is enormous. However, unlike the
Atlantic-NATO theatre, the U.S. does not have as much need,
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yet, in the Pacific for overt assistance, though that, too,
may change if the USSR manages to free itself from the con-
straints of the Japan and Okhotsk seas. 12 If this occurs,
the U.S. clearly will need overt assistance from Asia- ;
Pacific supporters as it now does for the defense of Western
Europe and the northeastern Atlantic. Because this
strategic breakout by the USSR is a real possibility, U.S.
allies ought to be encouraged to create such capabilities.
The problem associated with getting allies to build such
capabilities is the same problem that causes a political
dilemma for forward deployed U.S. forces with an assertive
strategic mission: U.S. and allied threat perceptions do
not necessarily coincide or even overlap to a sufficient
degree. Compounding this problem is the trouble caused by
foreign confusion over precisely what an assertive strategy-
-such as the maritime strategy—really means.
Given the wide array of U.S. opinion about the maritime
strategy, it is no surprise that allied and friendly states
might not be certain about what the U.S. intends to do and
what such actions might mean for them. Some U.S. observers
have expressed concern about the inadequacies of U.S. prep-
arations for third world contingencies in a strategic
environment that focuses so heavily on the Soviet threat. 13 .
I think that concern should be expanded to examine all
contingencies because the role of potential supporting
actors in U.S. actions against the USSR or any other state
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is inadequately considered. It is my experience that
strategic planners and war gamers often make decidedly shaky
assumptions that allies will see adversaries the way
Americans do and will react the way we expect them to.
Their assumptions may be most seriously flawed in terms of
unwarranted expectations about the automaticity of allies
granting access to their territory for U.S. use or transit
in actions against the Soviet Union. There are a number of
examples of such divergence of views, 14 but the case of
Japan provides egregious instances of unrealistic assump-
tions. If countries like the PRC and ROK, which harbor
strong reasons to follow anti-Soviet postures, do not
actually pursue overtly such policies and cannot be counted
on to automatically rally to the U.S.' side in armed
struggle against the USSR, it does not take much imagination
to discern that Japan—which is not disposed to pursue anti-
Soviet policies—may be even less responsive.
As noted above, many Asian states are more willing than
the U.S. to accept the USSR as a legitimate participant in
Asian-Pacific affairs. That is profoundly true of Japan.
This is not to suggest that Japan likes or desires a major
Soviet role in the region. Most Japanese are well aware of
the problems the USSR and its Czarist predecessor have
caused for Japan. Similarly, most Japanese are even more
aware than most Americans of a palpable offshore Soviet
threat. There is a great deal if ill-will in Japan-Soviet
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relations. Moreover, Japan has taken a number of concrete
steps to build up its self-defense capabilities, largely in
response to U.S. urging that Japan more squarely confront
the Soviet challenge. Tokyo's latest defense white paper
was more explicit in that regard than most of its predeces-
sors. 15 In the face of well-known opposition to SDI,
Tokyo's decision to cooperate with the U.S. in SDI research
sent a major signal to Moscow. 16 Furthermore, the Gorbachev
regime's decision to upgrade its diplomatic overtures to
Tokyo in the wake of his July 1986 Vladivostok speech that
attempted to put a new veneer on Soviet policy so far has
received a lukewarm reception from most Japanese. 17 Despite
all this, Japan's view of the Soviet threat is very differ-
ent from that of most Americans and not truly in harmony
with the Reagan administration's worldview that gave birth
to, and nurtures, the maritime strategy.
There is not intrinsic reason that the maritime strategy
cannot obtain allied understanding and support, if it is
properly explained to those allies. Much more effort should
be expended in that regard. Moreover, that effort cannot be
relegated solely to a strategic sales pitch by the U.S.
because the product almost certainly would not sell if
handled that way. The U.S. is engaged in a diversified
competition with the USSR in the Asia-Pacific region and the
U.S. strategic message must be integrated into a broader
context if it is to be believable and persuasive. If the
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U.S. does not believably mesh its strategic message into a
broader context, and the Soviet Union does so, Washington's
policies may appear more threatening than Moscow's. As
noted, the post-Vladivostok speech era in Asia has opened a
new round of "peace offensives" from a more sophisticated
Gorbachev regime. Sino-Soviet ties are improving in fits
and starts, but the trends are upbeat. 18 U.S. naval access
to PRC ports, 19 a graphic symbol of improved U.S.-PRC
strategic cooperation, needs to be kept in perspective.
None of that cooperation means that Beijing is necessarily
in any greater harmony with Washington's views of the Soviet
Union's threat potential than is Tokyo. We should not, as
we are prone to, make premature assumptions about the exis-
tence of "common" security interests in U.S.-PRC strategic
relations. 20 They will not come into existence merely
because they are logical or because some Americans desire
them. Actually, a better case can be made for incremental
U. S. -Japanese strategic convergence vis-a-vis a Soviet
adversary than for any sort of U.S.-PRC convergence. The
latter seems non-existent, with poor prospects. 21 U.S.-PRC
parallelism is a more appropriate way to conceptualize what
exists and is likely to remain in our strategic relations.
If the U.S. has problems in convincing its major ally,
Japan, and its major defacto quasi-ally, the PRC, that
Washington's view of Soviet intentions in Asia and the
Pacific is a sound and prudent viewpoint, it has even
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greater problems in Southeast Asia and Oceania. When
Washington tries to stress strategic affairs with East Asian
states it gets a somewhat sympathetic hearing if one that is
tinged with overt displays of tolerance for American
ideological preoccupation with Moscow's sinister qualities.
These states can grasp that the USSR might do what Washing-
ton suggests it is preparing to do, but they often do not
see the threat as being quite so imminent. They clearly
require much more convincing about the threat, before the
U.S. can rely on them to respond as we often assume they
will.
The non-communist states of Southeast Asia and Oceania
generally are even less disposed to see the world as
Washington does. In both sub-regions the U.S. is engaged in
a far more complex, and nuanced, contest with the USSR. In
Southeast Asia, Moscow, Beijing, 22 Tokyo, and Washington are
all seen as major influences that need to be kept in rough
balance. Most pointedly, Washington is not considered any
more virtuous than Moscow. Both are seen in terms of assets
and liabilities that should be balanced to local advantage.
As much as Washington might like to portray Moscow's
ambitions in the larger region in ways that would arouse
support for U.S. positions, strengthen the durability of the
U.S. presence in the Philippines, and bolster the ASEAN
states' defense consciousness, that line is rarely persua-
sive. Consequently, the selling of the maritime strategy in
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Southeast Asia is vastly complicated by inherent customer
resistance on the part of the majority of Southeast Asians
who seek non-alignment and freedom from superpower conflict.
What is true of Southeast Asian reluctance to be
entangled can be multiplied for much of Oceania. This
probably is the most vulnerable subregion in the Western
Pacific. Since the area is the epitome of "maritime," being
overwhelmingly water, the relevance of a. maritime strategy
is unquestioned. However, the maritime strategy as a
forward deployed assertive display of U.S. armed forces
represents something anathema to many people in these small
states which harbor profoundly non-aligned sympathies.
Clearly, their pace setter has become New Zealand.
Wellington's anti-nuclear positions regarding the U.S. navy
have seriously disrupted the once quintessential tranquility
of the ANZUS pact. The Kiwi's policy may be a matter of
"stop the world, I want to get off," but it remains intact
despite U.S. pressures. 23 Though Canberra has been far more
supportive of ANZUS, Australia, too, has demonstrated
serious doubts about the immediacy of the Vietnam-linked
Soviet threat to Southeast Asia and Oceania and about the
U.S. naval responses to that perceived threat. 24 Against
this background, there is little sympathy or readiness to
understand the maritime strategy in those quarters. Hence,
in an area essential for U.S. maritime operations, there is
little willingness to sanction the longstanding notion that
147
the Pacific is some sort of American "lake" where U.S.
forces can operate freely. As a result, the vast stretches
of the central and south Pacific are increasingly attractive
for Soviet activism of the post-Vladivostok speech variety.
Washington, Tokyo, and other concerned Pacific rim states
are concerned about these regional dynamics, 25 but much
remains to be done to bring this region even up to the
limited levels of understanding displayed in East Asia much
less to attain the degree of empathy and cooperation that
are desirable region-wide.
Lest the levels of understanding of, and cooperation
with, the maritime strategy among Asian-Pacific states be
seen as uniquely poor, one should recall that West European
enthusiasm for U.S. strategic assertiveness toward the USSR
has been markedly restrained. The concept of "Atlanticism"
has been shaken severely in recent years, putting NATO into
some jeopardy from within. 26 If it were not for post-
Reykjavik fears among the NATO allies about a U.S. nuclear
policy shift that could leave Western Europe less protected
from the USSR than it is accustomed to being, 27 NATO
probably would be more troubled today than it is. Clearly,
Atlanticism needs shoring up and U.S. explanations of the
common interests served by the maritime strategy could help
that process as well as aid understanding of U.S. purposes.
In the Asia-Pacific region, however, Washington starts much
further back. There is no Pacificism to equate to
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Atlanticism. Even a weakened Atlanticism is way ahead of
its Pacific counterpart. Hence the U.S. can only hope to
explain its strategic purposes in the Western Pacific and
Asia (via the maritime strategy or anything else) if it
first builds a more cohesive set of common perceptions of
shared interests and Soviet threats to those interests.
Such perceptions are what are required for Pacificism to
emerge. Without it, U.S. assumptions about allies, friends,
and neutrals will remain flawed by a large degree of
unreality and wishful thinking. 28 The cultivation of such
perceptions would not necessarily be difficult, but it would
require more attention than now is paid to the problem.
This task should be given a much higher priority than it now
enjoys.
If the U.S. has problems today in fashioning a coordi-
nated approach to Pacific defense with which its friends and
allies can wholeheartedly subscribe, the future is even more
uncertain. Americans tend to see the future of the Pacific
region, and the U.S. role in that area, as on a linear
continuum with the present. In terms of economic growth,
political development, and the superpower rivalry, the
future seems likely to be rather like today just more
intense. This gives rise to U.S. calls for increased Asian-
Pacific cooperation for the common good in the face of a
growing Soviet-led presence in the region. 29 For present
purposes the marked growth of the Soviet naval presence in
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the Pacific since the mid-1970s may be seen as a paradigm of
the tide most Americans seem intent upon reversing in the
Pacific. It is interesting to note Soviet responses to U.S.
warnings about this real and/or symbolic Soviet threat.
Soviet officials routinely dismiss U.S. warnings as paranoid
overreaction on the part of Americans, saying there is
nothing sinister about the Soviet Union as the other super-
power being in Asia just like the U.S. 30 While Americans
can as easily dismiss alarmist Soviet counterreactions as a
form of paranoia, it is not so easy to discount the Soviet
Union—with its Asian landmass and population—as a legiti-
mate Asian power. Nonetheless, in many American writings on
the superpower confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region,
there are strong suggestions that the Soviet Union is an
interloper in the area whose presence must be minimized if
the U.S. and its friends/allies are to retain the sort of
mutually beneficial relationships which have grown out of
the post-WWIl era. 31
If the future of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific
region is, indeed, one marked by confrontation and hostility
with the U.S. and the area's non-communist states, then much
of the contemporary prognostications about a more intense
version of the contemporary status quo are likely to be
realized. A quality of U.S. -Soviet self-fulfilling prophecy
may enhance that prospect, if both sides act on their
assumptions. However, because the intensification school of
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lineal futurology has such a poor track record, it is worth-
while examining how the future of the region may differ from
today and cause significant changes in the area's strategic
equation. Though other factors (political, cultural,
ideological, etc.) might be capable of inducing major
changes in the area, the most likely candidates for bringing
about changes are the economic factors.
Today it is easiest (and most comforting to Americans)
to assume that economic growth and progress will bring the
U.S. and its allies closer together and increase the chances
that our allies will become more capable of assisting the
U.S. as it copes with the Soviet Union. The country which
looms largest in that regard is Asia's (and the world's) new
economic superpower: Japan. It clearly has great geopo-
litical and military/naval potentials. 32 Other Asian-
Pacific states, notably the PRC and South Korea, are often
seen as also possessing geopolitical growth potentials
because of their economic accomplishments. If the strategic
future does become a more intense version of the present,
then the realization of those allied potentials will be part
of the process. Changes of that sort almost certainly will
have to be predicated on two things, the Soviet Union
persisting as a threatening power and our allies sharing
U.S. perceptions of that threat (or vice versa) . If neither
occurs, the intensity factor may be nullified. The economic
progress now anticipated for the Asia-Pacific region clearly
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would be affected by such an era of lessened tension, though
forecasting precisely how would require a crystal ball. Far
less problematical is an assertion that the renowned
economic dynamism of Asia could create conditions drawing
the Soviet Union into a non-threatening relationship with
its Asia-Pacific neighbors.
The notion that the Soviet Union might become neighborly
to the Asian states which encircle it undoubtedly is
unsettling for Western lineal forecasters. Moreover, there
are many issues that hinder these geographic and ethnic
neighbors from behaving neighborly. Despite all that, the
winds of reformist change that are blowing through the
Soviet Union under Gorbachev make it far more likely today
than a few years ago that Moscow is capable of improving its
relations in the Asia-Pacific region. As signalled boldly
in Gorbachev's July 1986 speech in Vladivostok, in which he
expressed Moscow's desire to participate in the Pacific's
economic dynamism, 33 in his July 1987 "double zero" Asia-
oriented nuclear arms control proposal, 34 and by his
domestic economic reforms, the Soviet Union seems ready to
play the game by the rules of the Asia-Pacific players.
Judging from General Secretary Gorbachev's Vladivostok
speech and double-zero overture almost exactly a year later,
the Soviets are well disposed to such broadening of the
competitive arena. Those approaches clearly were primarily
designed to soften up Asian resistance to Soviet "peaceful"
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overtures. As such, they are follow-ups to Gorbachev's past
calls for an "All Asia Forum" and talks on nuclear and naval
reductions in the Pacific. These have a history going back
to 1969. Though pleasant sounding, they are somewhat decep-
tive and must be dealt with carefully. Clearly, there is no
reason for the U.S. or its Asian allies to gratuitously
provide the Soviet Union with a credible platform to expound
its views and exert influence.
However, the Vladivostok speech's references to intensi-
fied economic and technological exchanges with advanced and
newly industrializing Pacific states conveys several
messages. To anti-Soviet hardliners in the West it will
reinforce their notions of imminent economic problems in the
Soviet Union that reguire outside solutions. To arch-
hardliners any such cooperation would amount to a rescue of
the Soviet Union from the dire fate that awaits it. Less
severe critics of the USSR still will see danger signals in
the Vladivostok speech, namely that the Soviet Union is
trying to worm its way into a pro-Western system, benefit
from it to the extent it can, and divide that system's
loyalties as opportunities present themselves. Only the
terminally naive can see such Soviet overtures as anything
other than self-serving. Nonetheless, free world recogni-
tion of Soviet ulterior motives should not deter the U.S. or
its Asian allies from cautiously responding to Moscow's
moves.
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An excellent way to coopt these moves would be to base
Western responses on an assumption that the Soviet Union is
playing "catch up" on two fronts with long range objectives.
Moscow clearly is trying via Gorbachev's domestic exhorta-
tions and marginal reforms, plus external initiatives such
as at Vladivostok, to shape up the Soviet economy. This
would be valuable for Moscow intrinsically and for what it
could mean for its military-industrial complex's ability to
meet the strategic demands placed on it. If the West
sincerely believed Moscow could succeed in this two-fold
effort, arch-hardliners ought to be heeded. However, this
view gives too much credence to Moscow's competence. The
Soviet Union's ability to compete with the West is abysmal.
The USSR is only truly competent in military affairs; it is
inept in nearly everything else. The West— far from fearing
Soviet entry into the larger competition for its own poorly
concealed ulterior motives—should welcome the challenge
because the USSR is unlikely to achieve the successes for
which it hopes.
Anyone who is familiar with the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan and compares them with the Soviet Union's
nonmilitary accomplishments should readily realize that
there is no contest. The Soviet Union is not a competitive
state; it is not in the same league with the leading Western
states other than in military terms. The risk that the USSR
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might make some short run gains ought to be more than
compensated for by the long run setbacks almost certainly in
store for a Soviet Union thus engaged. Needless to say, the
West should not engage the USSR blindly in such expanded
activities. Were it feasible, we might consider borrowing
the cautious phrase "constructive engagement" for applica-
tion to the Soviet Union now that it will not be used much
in Africa. In any event, strategic considerations must
prevail in Western economic relations with the USSR. We do
not want to sell the hangman the noose to slip around our
necks. Moreover, we must remember that a USSR that tries
and fails on a second catch-up front still will be a danger-
ous state possessing formidable weapons and an expansionist
philosophy. In fact, as two Soviet-born specialists,
Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, correctly and
succinctly put it, in Russian history "expansion has always
been a substitute for inner vigor." 35 Whether or not Moscow
is able to expand its second catch-up front, it ultimately
promises to end up in approximately the same relative place:
behind the West in military and economic terms precisely
because it lacks an "inner vigor." In these circumstances
the advantages for the West of a second front economic
detour by the USSR are two-fold: it could underscore Soviet
nonmilitary noncompetitiveness for all to see and it would
allow more time for the West's various correlations of
forces to strengthen their cooperation. This is likely to
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be particularly important in Asia, especially in Northeast
Asia, for this is the region which promises to be the most
decisive in the direct and indirect competitive race between
the superpowers and their associates.
Though prudence dictates waiting to see whether
Gorbachev can deliver results to match his words, should
this convergence actually happen, Moscow's relations with
the Asia-Pacific region may be in for a sea-change. One can
imagine what goes through the minds of Kremlin leaders as
they see the United States and Western Europe being chal-
lenged, and sometimes overtaken, by Asian economic leaders.
Even as the USSR struggles to catch up to the West, the West
is being outcompeted by the other "East." If the USSR does
not get its act together rapidly, it risks falling into
third place among global centers of power. In economic
terms it already is there.
As the Soviet Union faces its future in the Asia-
Pacific, three basic alternatives loom. It can: (1) remain
at arms length as a minimal participation, seen as an adver-
sary of both the U.S. and many of its allies; (2) remain a
strategic adversary of the U.S., but not its allies; and (3)
become an important trade partner of the Asia-Pacific states
(aside from the U.S.). The worst choice for it is the first
one because it leaves the USSR essentially behind the curve
of progress. Moscow hopes it can achieve the second option,
implying a decoupling of the U.S. from its strategic ties in
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Asia. The double-zero approach is partially aimed at that
end. Achieving number two is dependent on how successful
Moscow's diplomacy can be and, conversely, how inept the
U.S. may be as it copes with Soviet diplomatic campaigns in
Asia that have already begun in earnest. Achieving this
goal will be difficult, but not impossible, for the Soviet
Union because thee exists a reservoir of sentiment in the
region to treat the Soviet Union on a rough par with the
United States. Least controllable by Washington is Moscow's
prospects for ingratiating the Soviet Union into Pacific
economic dynamism. The Soviet Union is nearby, has
resources Asia needs, has market needs Asians could fulfill,
and—under Gorbachev—appears ready to mesh all three
criteria into a package that is sellable to Asia. If the
leading states of Asia perceive the USSR as a willing and
dependable trade partner, location for investment, and not
necessarily a threat to the vital interests of Asian-Pacific
states, there is little the U.S. could do to block such
rapport without appearing to be disruptive to regional peace
and harmony.
In short, no one in the West can safely assume the USSR
will play into the United States' hands by perpetuating an
ogre's image. On the contrary, Moscow is rapidly changing
its image in the eyes of many third world states. If Soviet
realities seriously start to converge with that softened
image, the U.S. will confront a different superpower
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challenge in the Asia-Pacific area. Notions of the region
being an "American Lake" will become anachronistic. Under
those circumstances the U.S. would be compelled to compete
with the USSR under far more equal circumstances for
influence in the region than it has had to since postwar
superpower tensions emerged. As if that prospect were not
troubling enough for Washington, Americans also need to
reconsider the changing nature of U.S. relations with its
Asian-Pacific trade partners. The once almost sacrosanct
verities of those ties are being rapidly transformed before
our eyes, threatening to do damage to U.S. prospects in the
region.
American officials normally stress the positive side of
greatly increased U.S. economic relations with Asia.
Stemming from these relations, the American public is
routinely told that U.S. economic, political, and strategic
interests in the Asia-Pacific area are ever more vital.
While true, this does not tell the whole story. Trade fric-
tions have become rampant. U.S. economic nationalism arises
to question the wisdom of Asian financial, investment, and
trade practices. Though U.S. economic interests in the
region are much more important than formerly, the region
also is seen as a competitive "threat." Also negatively,
the danger of an economic downturn in Asia
—
possibly precip-
itated by a 1929-style crash of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
—
could be disastrous for the entire West. These two sides of
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the coin also have implications for U.S. strategic policy
toward the region. Persuasive arguments can be made that
U.S. strategic interests which developed while the region
was not very important in economic terms, are growing apace
with its economic interests in the region, but a counter
argument also holds that the wealthier states in the region
no longer require as much armed assistance from the United
States. Those states should be able to fend for themselves
and help the U.S. preserve regional security. Is it wise
for the U.S. to underwrite the economic competition from the
region which threatens certain facets of U.S. economic well
being by providing a defense subsidy to those same competi-
tors? There is no easy answer to this dilemma, but posing
it suggests the sorts of problems Washington must address in
the future
.
As Americans contemplate that future and the possible
role we may ask our armed forces (and for present purposes,
especially the Navy) to play in the Asia-Pacific region, we
need to remain flexible and adaptable. The meaning of
"security" in the region might well be altered by the
changing relationships between the U.S., the USSR, and Asia
—with Japan in the forefront. It is legitimate to ask
whether the U.S. can adjust in time and effectively? If
—
over the long run—the economic dynamism of Asia makes the
economic costs of the superpower arms race too high for
either the U.S. or the USSR to bear and still keep up with
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their Asian challengers, what policy mechanisms can be
devised to compensate? Can the U.S. adapt while the USSR
persists in adhering to older policies? Conversely, can the
Soviet Union adapt while the U.S. does not? Clearly,
continued Soviet "socialist imperialism" would perpetuate
lineal thinking about the future and U.S. problems, but— if
Moscow is able to adapt its brand of Marxism-Leninism to the
future being shaped by Asian-Pacific economic dynamism
—
Soviet policy in the region will pose a very different style
of much broader challenge to U.S. interests.
This does not mean that U.S. military forces will neces-
sarily be scaled down, but—under those circumstances—they
would play a much more symbolic and diplomatic role
alongside the forces of other nations striving to maintain a
more multi-laterally balances status quo. Should this
future materialize, the nature of U.S. maritime strategy in
the region could change significantly, tending toward the
maritime orientations of the 19th century which were predi-
cated on commercial interests. However, new stabilization
maintenance roles necessarily will have to be devised for
the U.S. and other major country navies to replace former
"gunboat diplomacy" activities. The United States' strate-
gic interests in the Pacific of the 1940s, 50s, 60s, and
70s—which were almost independent of economic interests
may well be overcome by the commercial factors of the 21st
century, redefining why and how the U.S. will stay involved
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in the Asia-Pacific region. In these terms, the period from
1945 through the 1970s and 1980s, during which Asia quietly
reemerged as the economic magnet and model it once was for
earlier generations of Westerners, may be seen as an
aberration in the long continuum in which the flag and fleet
followed trade instead of setting the pace. Because the
second wave of Western attraction to Asia (in the 19th
century) proved to be such a disappointment, that legacy
obscures the potential of today's third wave of Asian
attractiveness for Westerners to be just as real and far
more pervasive than the first wave was. Though contemporary
Americans, who often have a poor understanding of the United
States' earlier attraction to, and minor status in, the
Asia-Pacific region, are likely to see the transition phase
we now are entering as an unsettling setback, the U.S.
actually may be on the verge of settling back into more
normal conditions. If so, our most prudent option will be
to develop mutually beneficial cooperative partnerships in
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CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON THE MARITIME STRATEGY
June Teufel Dreyer
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Chinese government has no publicly articulated
position on the Maritime Strategy. This is in itself
remarkable, and it is worth speculating on the reasons why.
Certainly neither lack of information nor reticence to
comment on American actions can be factors. During January
and February of 1986, while debate raged in the U.S. media
on the Maritime Strategy and its implications, China
- chided the United States and Israel for threatening
military action against a sovereign Arab state (Libya)
"under the pretext of combatting terrorism"
;
- commented on the progress of U.S. /Soviet talks on
chemical warfare;
- hinted that U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
was exaggerating the threat of Soviet SS-25 missiles in
order to justify a larger budget for his department;
- predicted that the protectionist trend in U.S. economic
policy "could plunge the capitalist world trading system
into jeopardy";
- advised the U.S. to thoroughly overhaul its fiscal and
monetary policies;
- characterized a U.S. -Republic of Korea joint military
exercise as "a frontal challenge to all Korean people";
- commemorated Martin Luther King's birthday with an essay
on the disproportionate unemployment and income levels
between whites and blacks; and
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- described Soviet-American relations as entering a new
stage of "limited easing of tension while an increasing-
ly multipolar world continued to develop. m1
Nor can lack of interest in matters strategic be a
factor: Party and government have for the past several
years sanctioned the existence of a military "salon" at
which junior and mid-ranking officers of the People's
Liberation Army (PLA; includes navy, marine, and air force
components as well as ground forces) are encouraged to
freely discuss questions of strategy and tactics. 2 Several
visiting U.S. delegations were asked by the military
organizations that hosted them to discuss the AirLand
Battle, whose details they were already well acquainted
with. 3 And the Chinese media have commented knowledgeably
and at some length on the strategic implications of, for
example, the deployment of the Midgetman missile and of
various different arms reduction proposals being discussed
by the United States and the Soviet Union. 4
There has been an indication that at least one member of
the PRC leadership has indeed considered the Maritime
Strategy and considers it risky. A senior Chinese official,
speaking with a staff member of the U.S. National Security
Council, characterized the strategy's plans to pursue Soviet
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into the Sea of Okhotsk
as dangerously provocative. He believed that such actions
would certainly cause the war to escalate into a nuclear
phase. 5 On being told the arguments to the contrary— i.e.,
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first, that the loss of a few SSBNs over a period of days or
weeks would not strike the Soviet leadership as sufficient
to warrant escalation to nuclear weapons, second, that
Soviet leaders are aware of the practical difficulties of
distinguishing between types of submarines in a wartime
environment, and third, that the Soviet Union has long
believed that SSBNs are militarily legitimate targets, 6 he
remained profoundly skeptical. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to say whether this official's views are represen-
tative of a broader consensus within the PRC leadership. It
is possible to speculate that one reason the Chinese have
not spoken out is because there is no consensus within the
leadership on the Maritime Strategy, though the probability
of strongly opposed opinions on this issue does not seem
high.
Consensus or dissensus, the Maritime Strategy, or at the
very least the Pacific aspects of the Maritime Strategy,
have to have been carefully considered by China's defense
and foreign policy planners. Here we may find another
reason for the PRC's failure to comment on the Maritime
Strategy: it has not seemed necessary to do so, given the
fact that the strategy's Asian aspects are mentioned only in
very general terms—i.e., the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay
and the arc of Soviet exercises that passes by Japan. The
classic statement of the Maritime Strategy by then-Chief of
Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins does not mention
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China at all. 7 As the managing editor of the Proceedings of
the U.S. Naval Institute commented in a recent interview
with Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral
James Lyons, " [d]espite a respectful tip of the hat to other
theaters, most of the strategy discussion seems to center on
the North Atlantic and the G-I-UK Gap." 8 Admiral Lyons,
while agreeing with the statement, pointed out that it is in
the Pacific that the Maritime Strategy can make the greatest
difference in the U.S. -Soviet confrontation because "we have
the wherewithal in the Pacific to take the Soviets out of
the equation." 9
Clearly the role that China plays in the Pacific while
the United States attempts to take the Soviets out of the
equation is of utmost importance, both to the PRC's planners
and to our own. One must therefore address the matter of
Chinese perceptions of what the Maritime Strategy means for
China, and how this might affect the U.S. Navy's ability to
pursue operations in the Pacific.
A fundamental consideration here is the state of Sino-
Soviet relations: how close are the ties between the two,
vis-a-vis Chinese ties with the United States, and what are
the consequences apt to be should there be a U.S. -Soviet
confrontation in the Pacific.
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II. CHINA. THE SOVIET UNION. AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY
Unquestionably Sino-Soviet relations have experienced a
warming trend since 1981. Chinese motives for this
rapprochement are believed to be:
1. a genuine desire to implement an independent foreign
policy, based on perceptions that China had moved too
close to the United States in the previous several
years;
2. a strongly felt need for peace on the PRC's borders in
order to effect China's principal goal of economic
modernization.
The rapprochement is not believed to stem from any fundamen-
tal reevaluation of the Soviet Union as a benign or peace-
loving power, nor is the USSR's attitude toward China
considered to have undergone any basic change.
Pragmatic though the motivations may have been, there
are numerous manifestations of the improvement in relations.
Delegations of scientists, sports teams, and scholars have
visited back and forth. Trade has risen each year by large
percentages, though the apparently startling increases look
less impressive when one notes that they are calculated from
a very low base figure. Trade is conducted in barter,
calculated in Swiss francs, and reportedly involves many
substandard goods which each side knows it would have
difficulty marketing elsewhere. 10 Hence, economic relations
between the two have been singularly free of the frictions
that have troubled the PRC's relations with many other
countries.
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The relative politeness of Sino-Soviet relations
notwithstanding, Chines leaders are aware that the USSR is
the only country presently capable of, and conceivably
interested in, threatening the PRC. They are acutely
conscious of the growth of Soviet strength in the Pacific
over the past decade. Chinese media regularly report on the
progress of the Soviet buildup at Cam Ranh Bay. Though the
official position has been that the USSR's presence in Cam
Ranh is a threat to the United States rather than to the
PRC, even the most cursory glance at a globe would indicate
otherwise. Moreover, a Soviet buildup directed against the
United States would not exclude operations against China as
well. Chinese leaders are aware that Soviet-Vietnamese
naval maneuvers conducted from Cam Ranh have immediate
applications against the PRC, and that they serve to
strengthen Vietnam's ability to support its claim of
sovereignty over the Spratley Islands vis-a-vis China's
contention that the oil-rich area belongs to the PRC.
PRC publications also report in detail, and with thinly
disguised apprehension, on Soviet activities in the South
Pacific and on developments internal to that area that might
facilitate Soviet penetration. China maintains important
trade relations with both Australia and New Zealand. The
former was the PRC ' s number one supplier of wheat for more
than a decade, and continues to ship grain, other primary
products, and farm machinery to China. Australia also
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provides China with more tourists than any other country in
the world save the United States and Japan. In 1986, China
was Australia's third largest export market, and Australia
regularly ranks approximately fifth as a source of China's!
imports. 11 New Zealand sends much-needed meat and dairy
products in China, which is its fifth largest market. 12 The
PRC's own navy would be powerless to prevent Soviet efforts
to interdict this trade.
The progress of the New Zealand Labour Party's efforts
to ban nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships from its
ports received regular attention from the Chinese media.
The tone was scrupulously neutral. 13 While generally
supportive of New Zealand's right as a sovereign state to
take such actions, the Chinese were plainly not pleased with
the disarray in the Australia-New Zealand-United States
(ANZUS) Alliance that the ban caused.
To its credit, the PRC became interested in developments
in the small island states of the South Pacific several
years before the United States began to pay serious atten-
tion to the situation there. In April 1985 Hu Yaobang, then
the highest-ranking person in the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)
,
accompanied by his protege Hu Qili, paid a visit to
the area, stopping at Western Samoa, Fiji, and Papua-New
Guinea as well as Australia and New Zealand. One of the
PRC's most skilled diplomats, Ji Chaozhu, was posted to
Suva, Fiji being generally considered the most important of
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the South Pacific island states. Ji, Harvard-educated and a
former interpreter for Mao Zedong, seemed such an unusual
choice for what seemed a minor post that Western opinion at
first vacillated between whether the appointment signalled
his fall from grace for some still-secret offense, or
whether it represented a growing Chinese interest in the
South Pacific. Analysts soon concluded that it was the
latter.
The PRC buys Fijian sugar at prices somewhat above world
market rates, and purchases timber from Western Samoa and
copper from Papua-New Guinea. It has given sports stadia
and provided training programs of various sorts--for
example, in paddy rice cultivation and rattan weaving--to
various island states. China also maintains a small aid
program in the South Pacific. Although the amounts involved
are modest (Hu Yaobang, during his 1985 trip, gave US$
800,000 each to Fiji and Papua-New Guinea, and US$ 500,000
to the substantially smaller Western Samoa 14 ), they loom
large in the budgets of these impoverished states. As a
case in point, the US$ 1.7 million that the Soviet Union
paid to Kiribati in 1985 in exchange for fishing rights
represented an estimate 12% of that nation's gross national
product (GNP) . Additionally, of course, the money the
Chinese spent on grants would have had important alterna-
tive uses in fostering the PRC's efforts to raise living
standards for its own impoverished citizenry.
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Chinese diplomats were active in warning leaders of the
several Pacific states that had been approached by the USSR
for various treaties—involving hydrographic research,
i
fishing rights, port calls, and the like—of the dangers;
inherent therein. There were also rumors—unfortunately
uncorroborated—that China was engaged in a bidding war with
the Soviet Union to prevent the latter signing the above-
mentioned treaty with Kiribati.
China, though expressing both public and private reser-
vations about the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
(SPNFZ) , was generally supportive thereof. It would seem
that the motivation was more to express solidarity with, and
maintain the good will of, the South Pacific States than
because the PRC felt that SPNFZ would strengthen the
defenses of the area. China's official Xinhua news agency
commented that,
Although it is not a perfect treaty, it does however
express the Oceanian countries' and their peoples' desires
for peace and their aversion to the use of nuclear
weapons, the nuclear arms race, and the anti-nuclear
movement. 15
In February 1987 China, in the person of Ji Chaozhu,
signed protocols two and three of SPNFZ, though accompanying
the signature with an official statement stipulating that,
...the Chinese government reserves its right to reconsider
these obligations if other nuclear weapons states of the
contracting parties to the treaty take any action in gross
violation of the treaty and its attached protocols, thus
changing the status of the nuclear free zone and endanger-
ing the security interests of China. 16
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The PRC's 1985 decision to establish an Antarctic research
station is also believed to have been guided by a desire to
counteract growing Soviet interest in that area. 17
While professing a foreign policy of equidistance
between the United States and the Soviet Union, China
appears to perceive the greater threat to its interests as
coining from the Soviet Union. This perception has not been
appreciably altered since Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev's conciliatory speech at Vladivostok in July 1986.
To the exte that America's Maritime Strategy can contain
Soviet expansionism and keep the sea lines of communication
(SLOCs) open for Chinese commerce, the PRC can only be in
favor of it. To the extent that,
- its forward aspects seem provocative;
- its plans to pursue Soviet SSBNs into waters near the
Chinese mainland seem apt to bring nuclear war to the
PRC ; and
- its specific scenarios threaten to involve China in a
U.S. -Soviet confrontation;
the Chinese will be distrustful of the Maritime Strategy.
While triangular-power analyses of international
behavior seem less popular in the West than was the case
several years ago, the triangular methodology is alive and
well among Chinese analysts, and the PRC, though reacting
very sharply to any suggestions that it is playing an
American or a Soviet "card," 18 has in fact managed with
great skill to balance one side against the other to China's
benefit. To the extent that the Maritime Strategy presents
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opportunities to do this, the Chinese will favor it. To the
extent that the PRC's own peace and stability may be compro-
mised, they will distrust it.
i
In sum, the PRC's reticence to speak out on the Maritime;
Strategy may reflect the conviction that it is simply not
necessary to take a stand in a situation where any position
would be likely to provoke either the United States or the
Soviet Union, and on a strategy which has, overtly, at
least, little to say about Asia and nothing at all about
China.
III. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY
Japan is the only other country in Asia besides the
Soviet Union that the PRC has apprehensions about. Although
perceptions of a threat from Japan are of a magnitude far
below those of the threat from the USSR, there is a bitter
legacy of past history and, many Chinese feel, disquieting
signs that history may be about to repeat itself.
Japanese pirates terrorized coastal China during the
Ming dynasty, and the forces of the Meiji Emperor easily
bested Japan's much larger neighbor in the Sino-Japanese War
of 1894-95. China again proved no match for Japan during
World War II. This latter war was prosecuted with great
cruelty, including grisly medical experiments performed on
Chinese prisoners and savage attacks on civilians, as
epitomized in the infamous Rape of Nanjing. Recollections
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of the Japanese occupation are vivid in the minds of the
many Chinese leaders who lived through them.
While Japan is admired for its economic success and
valued as a source of technical expertise and foreign
investment, many Chinese also worry about a revival of
Japanese militarism and/or a renewed Japanese desire to make
China an economic colony in an updated version of the
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of World War II.
These intertwined and mutually reinforcing fears were
exacerbated by the increased defense role Japan began taking
on in the 1980s, and by the increasingly larger imbalances
in Sino-Japanese trade that characterized the same period.
Japan's agreement in principle to assume responsibility
for the defense of an area 1000 miles from its home islands,
and including the strategically important straits of Soya,
Tsugaru, and Tsushima, was clearly aimed at containing the
expansion of Soviet naval power. It is difficult to imagine
any Japanese motivation at all with regard to the PRC. How-
ever, the decision aroused Chinese apprehensions
nonetheless.
These apprehensions were increased by certain other
events which happened at approximately the same time. The
Japanese Ministry of Education had in 1981 quietly moved to
revise history textbooks so as to portray the country's
behavior during World War II in a better light, provoking
protests from a number of Asian states. China's voice was
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the loudest and its protest the most sustained. Another,
similarly disquieting hint that Japanese militarism might be
reviving was the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone and
several members of his cabinet to the Yasukuni Shrine. ',
Though it commemorates the souls of the Japanese soldiers
who died in all wars, the shrine is the resting place of
several of Japan's leading World War II militarists whose
memories are particularly repugnant to the Chinese. As if
calculated to underscore the insult, the Nakasone group made
its visit on the fortieth anniversary of the end of that
war. 19
Chinese annoyance over both trade issues and a perceived
revival of militarism in Japan boiled over in a series of
anti-Japanese demonstrations during the fall and early
winter of 1985. Several Japanese businessmen were reported-
ly beaten in the northwestern city of Xian, 20 and students
in several different cities took to the streets protesting
what they perceived as Japan's economic stranglehold over
China as well as its rearmament. 21 While allowing the
demonstrations to take place, the government seemed to be
trying to keep them within bounds. There was speculation
that certain elements of the Chinese leadership had even
colluded in the demonstrations, as a hint to the Nakasone
government of what might happen if present trends
continued. 22
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Chinese protests have had some positive results. The
textbooks were eventually reworded in a manner less offen-
sive to the PRC, and Prime Minister Nakasone cancelled a
planned return visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, though several
of his ministers did not. From the PRC ' s point of view,
these have been small victories which are far outweighed by
more ominous developments.
Within the space of a few months in 1987, several events
occurred that were enormously upsetting to Chinese leaders.
The Osaka Higher Court handed down a decision which seemed
to imply that Japan recognized the sovereignty of the PRC's
archrival, the Republic of China on Taiwan. Tokyo refused
the PRC's request to intervene, arguing that Japan's system
of separation of powers precluded the executive branch of
the government from telling the judiciary what it should
do. 23
China's remonstrations to Japan on these and other
issues provoked an almost inevitable backlash. An anti-PRC
demonstration was held in front of the Chinese embassy in
Tokyo. Most unusual, and perhaps even unprecedented among
Japanese demonstrations, the protestors represented both
left-wing and right-wing causes. 24 And in Kyoto, a monument
inscribed with a poem by the late and much-loved Chinese
premier Zhou Enlai was splashed with red paint and
surrounded with handbills denouncing the PRC for interfering
in Japan's internal affairs. 25 Shortly thereafter, a senior
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official in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused
Deng Ziaoping of, among other things, not understanding the
real situation of Sino-Japanese relations and "having his
head in the clouds." 26
Worst of all from the PRC's point of view, Japan in 1987
abandoned its "traditional" practice of limiting defense
spending to 1% of GNP. Renmin Ribao . official organ of the
CCP, rejected arguments that the actual change, to 1.004% of
GNP, was negligible, countering that "given the first
•break' [in the 1% limit] it is unavoidable that the second
and third 'breaks' will follow, and the state of affairs
will get out of control." 27 This and many other statements
in the Chinese press blamed the United States for unleashing
forces which might have disastrous consequences. The
Beijing-published bi-monthly Banvue Tan 's comment is
representative
:
...Internationally, the United States, proceeding from its
own interests and for the sake of carrying out its global
strategy, as well as reducing its economic burden, has
strongly demanded that Japan increase its defense spending
in an attempt to expand its armaments without limit.
Regarding the neighboring countries which suffered from
Japanese military aggression, it is quite natural for them
to feel anxious to be against their guard against Japan's
increased defense spending. 28
Thus, to the extent that the PRC's leaders perceive the
Maritime Strategy as encouraging the growth of Japanese
military capabilities—which they appear unwilling to
distinguish from a growth in militarism—they will find the
strategy distasteful. Though it is possible to argue, and
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this author would agree, that the issue of strengthening
Japanese defense capabilities is separate from that of the
Maritime Strategy, Chinese leaders are apt to reject the
argument. Indeed, they could point to Admiral Watkins'
definition of the strategy as "emphasizing coalition warfare
and the criticality of allies 29 ... naval forces [will]
increasingly operate with friendly and allied armed forces
and sister services." 30
IV. CHINA'S MARITIME FORCES AND THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The Chinese navy (PLAN) has 350,000 members, including
coast guard, marine, and naval air units. 31 It is thus the
world's third largest maritime force, after the United
States and the Soviet Union. Until recently, however, the
PLAN was exclusively a coastal defense force, with anti-
quated ships, little anti-submarine or electronic warfare
capability, and outmoded shipboard command and control
systems. Missiles and other naval ordnance also were
generally behind the levels of capability of advanced
navies.
This situation has begun to improve. 32 A combination of
indigenously developed and foreign technology has led to
somewhat enhanced capabilities. In 1980, an 18-ship task
force undertook a 35-day, 8000 nautical mile mission into
the South Pacific to police the target zone for the PRC's
intercontinental ballistic missile test. The flotilla also
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recovered the rockets' instrument modules and, not inciden-
tally, showed the flag. This deployment was made possible
by the PLAN'S acquisition of ocean-going supply ships to
sustain its warships at sea. The successful completion of
this mission led some observers to conclude that the PLAN
would rapidly develop a blue-water capability. 33
Indeed there has been some progress in this direction,
though it has proceeded very slowly. In November 1985, the
PRC sent a guided missile destroyer and a supply ship on a
two-month Indian Ocean "good-will voyage." Their calls in
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka represented the first
visits by Chinese Navy vessels to foreign ports since
1949,34 while the voyage unquestionably demonstrated the
PLAN'S increased capacity to operate, there have been no
port calls since then.
A combination of limited funds and technological
problems have interacted to impede the PLAN'S development.
China can justly take pride in having produced both nuclear
ballistic missile (Xia class) and nuclear attack (Han class)
submarines, but both have suffered from design and mainte-
nance problems. Foreign procurements have been relatively
few and beset by other problems. For example, the Chinese
apparently entered into a co-production agreement with
France for the Dauphine helicopter before realizing that the
vehicle was too small for its intended purpose— i.e.,
carrying torpedoes as well as a dipping sonar. The PRC has
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also purchased five (four and a spare) LM 2500 gas turbine
engines from General Electric for what was supposed to be a
new class of destroyers. It now appears that they will be
used on the older Luda class instead. An agreement with the
United States to produce the Mark 4 6 Mod 2 torpedo, many
years in the process of negotiation, has apparently fallen
through as well.
Even assuming the PRC wished to support the United
States in a Soviet-American confrontation, its navy could do
no more than inflict minimal losses on attacking Soviet
naval forces. However, despite the disappointments
mentioned elsewhere in this section, even the modest
improvements in the PLAN'S operational capabilities appre-
ciably enhance China's ability to use its naval assets in
various regional roles. As a case in point, the recent
circumnavigation of the Spratleys by a Chinese naval task
force aroused consternation and ire in Hanoi 36—as, no
doubt, the mission's planners in Beijing intended that it
should.
V. CONCLUSIONS
China has said nothing publicly about the Maritime
Strategy, perhaps because its leadership has concluded that
any statement might damage the PRC's carefully-crafted
attempts at establishing a policy of nominal eguidistance
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The
183
decision to avoid overt commentary on the strategy has been
made easier by the fact that the Maritime Strategy seems to
concentrate on the European theater, saying little
explicitly about Asia and nothing at all about the PRC.
Implicitly, of course, Asia looms much larger in the
Maritime Strategy, and one must assume that the Chinese
leadership has thought very carefully about these aspects.
The PRC has important and growing commercial interests in
Asia and the Pacific as well as strategic concerns in the
area. Its own navy is at present unable to defend these
interests to any significant degree. Despite a force
modernization program, this is likely to remain the case for
the foreseeable future.
To the extent that the Maritime Strategy keeps the SLOCs
open for Chinese vessels and contains the growth of Soviet
influence in Asia and the Pacific, the Chinese are likely to
favor it. To the extent that they consider it provocative
to the Soviet Union, likely to escalate into nuclear war in
Asia, or lend encouragement to the growth of militarism in
Japan, they will tend to oppose it.
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LESSONS OF WAR PLAN ORANGE FOR MARITIME STRATEGISTS
Edward S. Miller
War Plan Orange, the U.S. strategy to beat Japan, was
the greatest war plan ever written. It was developed by the
Navy during 3 5 years before Pearl Harbor and it won the war
in the Pacific. Maritime Strategists of the 1980s can
benefit from studying the experience.
I've researched the Orange Plan in formerly classified
archives over 15 years for a forthcoming book. I relish the
historian's advantage of knowing the outcome of the Plan.
As to the Maritime Strategy, I'm aware only of what's in the
press; I'm not an armchair expert on it.
Orange was the code name for Japan in the "color" plans
of the first 40 years of this century. The U.S. was called
Blue. World War II had so many players that the final pre-
war strategies were called Rainbow Plans. I assume you're
broadly familiar with the history of the war itself, which
I'll discuss later to show hoe prewar plans were
implemented.
This has been a neglected subject. There is no book
about Plan Orange, just a few articles and chapters. (About
a hundred books have been written on Pearl Harbor.) The
supposedly definitive piece was written in 1959 by an Army
historian who focused on the controversies between the Army
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and Navy. They were important, but he missed the main
story: the tremendous planning effort within the Navy.
Let's start at the beginning. As early as 1897 the Navy
wrote some minor plans in case Japan tried to grab Hawaii
before we did. But the real account begins with the San
Francisco earthquake in the spring of 1906. Amidst the
debris, bigots and vigilantes began to abuse, mistreat and
segregate Oriental immigrants. The "yellow" press here and
in Japan rattled the sabers. Japan seemed militarily
invincible after trouncing Russia the year before. The flap
unnerved Teddy Roosevelt, which is ironic because he had
mediated the treaty ending the war, earning the gratitude of
Japan and the Nobel Peace Prize.
Roosevelt turned to George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy,
who headed the General Board, an advisory planning agency.
Dewey was no strategic genius, but he had immense prestige
and picked good subordinates. He also drew on the thinking
of the six-man staff and some students of the Naval War
College in Newport. There was also a Joint Board where the
Army and navy considered plans together. It did little
strategizing until a Planning Committee was formed in 1919;
thereafter it sponsored spectacularly bad Orange Plans, at
least until 1935. Also in 1919 a War Plans Division of
about a dozen officers was formed in the office of the CNO.
Known as OP-12, it directed naval planning until World War
II. The U.S. Fleet, which contained nearly all the naval
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combat forces, obtained a single war planning officer in
1935 and had only four in 1941.
Anyway, Dewey told the President he had a war plan. It
was primitive, four pages long, but it launched the Navy on
a quest for a winning Pacific strategy.
Let's jump about to March 1914. After eight years, the
Navy had worked out the basics of a grand strategy to defeat
Japan. The principles remained remarkably unchanged until
the surrender in Tokyo Bay.
The saying, "Geography is the bones of strategy," was
certainly true of a conflict that would span the widest
ocean. The planners predicted the war would unfold in three
geography-driven Phases. In Phase I Japan would take
advantage of its remoteness to strike without warning, seize
the Philippines and Guam and demolish Blue's weak forces in
the Western Pacific. It might dare to carry the war to the
Eastern Pacific—to occupy Hawaii or even strike at the
mainland—but probably not.
In Phase II, the U.S. would transfer its battle fleet
from the Atlantic, where it was always stationed to protect
the Monroe Doctrine against European incursions. Advancing
via the Straits of Magellan, California and Hawaii, it would
conduct a 20,000 mile counterattack to regain the Philip-
pines. The geographical problems of Phase II were immense:
sheer distance, and an empty sea with only minor islands on
the dangerous 5000 mile final leg. An Atlantic-Indian Ocean
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route, though shorter, was rejected because of bad logis-
tics, uncertain European amities, the shallowness of Suez,
and continuous exposure of the Eastern Pacific to Orange
depredations. The westbound route was validated by comple-
tion of the Panama Canal in 1914, transfer of the Fleet to
the West Coast in the '20s, and its relocation to Hawaii in
1940.
Phase II was the heart of the Orange Plan. However, the
timing, the route, the bases, and the resupply of the offen-
sive were not resolved in the early years. The general
scheme of 1914 was to advance via Guam to Manila, but other
versions flowered over the years. (I'll return to them
later.) Japan would respond with an attrition strategem of
harassment with torpedoes, cruisers, mines, and later air-
planes. Sometime during Phase II or II the navies would
clash in a titanic gunnery battle, probably in the Philip-
pines-Formosa-Ryukyus area, which the superior U.S. Fleet
expected to win.
Phase III was to be an amphibious advance from Luzon up
the stepladder of Japanese islands offshore Asia to Okinawa
and beyond, ever closer to the Home Islands. The object was
to gain bases for a tight blockade to strangle the Japanese
economy. Geography would at last be a friend to Blue, for
Japan was a resource-poor island group intensely vulnerable
to blockade. This was a world-class insight, but familiar
to a few aging admirals who had served in the Civil War
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blockade. Shelling of Orange seaports was investigated, but
from the late 192 0s, aerial bombing was deemed more effec-
tive. The finale of the war would thus be a siege of
i
blockade and bombardment. Under no circumstances would a'
major ground campaign be fought, not on the mainland nor in
Japan itself. Sea power would defeat the enemy's awesome
land power.
My selection of the 1914 Plan as a baseline has been
made for good reasons. Most of the strategic principles
were fixed by then. We can judge the planners 1 foresighted-
ness because the way lay far in the future. Finally, the
years from 1914 to 1941 were an age of campaign planning.
The grand strategy didn't vary much, after due allowance for
political and technological changes.
The Maritime Strategy is also about eight years old, a
wonderful coincidence that lets us compare two efforts of
similar age. Some say its birthdate was Admiral Hayward's
1979 policy, or Secretary Lehman's adoption of it in 1981.
It flowered in OP-06 in the early '80s and went public in
1986. Today it seems to be considered fairly mature, though
still evolving.
CNO Watkins described the Maritime Strategy in three
phases:
- Phase I. Deterrence, or the Transition to War. Mainly
a deployment.
- Phase II. Seize the Initiative. This includes neutral-
izing the Soviet naval threat, gaining naval superiority
and seizing advanced bases.
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- Phase III. Carry the Fight to the Enemy. This includes
a naval offensive and assaults on enemy territory and
ports.
A three-act scenario may be inevitable for any situation
where the bad guys strike first, the good guys recover, and
then go on to win. The most controversial public aspect of
the Maritime Strategy is the taking out of Soviet missile
submarines in Phase II. In the Orange Plan, Phase II was
also the most contentious and difficult.
Current strategic problems are vastly different than in
1914. Table 1 compares them, showing that nearly all
aspects today are the opposite of the Orange situation. Of
course, there were a few similarities, for example, surprise
attack by the enemy, technologies untested in battle and the
tyranny of geography. Still, differences dominate the
comparison. Where, then, is the lesson for today? Not in
Table 1, but in the evolution of the process of planning,
where human behavior is more universal. For example, who
planned? Why did they adopt or reject certain principles?
Which were readily adopted, which were settled by debate and
which were never resolved? There was an American way of
naval planning. It worked then. It ought to work again.
Let's examine the early issues of Orange strategy, from
j
fundamentals to specifics. The first question was, why
would the two countries fight? They surely wouldn't take up
arms over immigrant abuse, which soon cooled down anyway.
The real clash of interest lay between Japan's desire to
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control East Asia and America's foreign policy of the Open
Door (free trade and the integrity of China) which required
a balance of power in the Orient. The situation got
unbalanced after Japan whipped Russia and European Navies
went home for World War I. How could we block Japan's
expansionism in Asia? The U.S. would never fight a land war
in Manchuria. The Imperial Army was an awesome fighting
machine, ours was a minor constabulary. Nor would we form
an entangling alliance to conduct land warfare.
Naval officers first saw the answer. Captain James H.
Oliver, at the War College in 1911, reckoned that Japan
would some day try to expel us, the strongest power, from
the Far East, and especially from the Philippines which
blocked the sea route to conquest. That would be a blunder
affording us an opportunity for naval war, a war we could
win. It was very Mahanian. Sea power would beat land
power. The Navy thus defined itself as the premier national
military instrument and took control of war planning. No
other agency, civilian or uniformed, ever proposed a viable
alternative approach. The Army traditionally planned for
mobilization and perhaps the opening battles, but never for
the final outcome. The Navy felt the Army's function was to
help procure bases, particularly in Phase III. Later, Air
Corps planning was equally sparse.
Today grand strategy is set by higher authorities. The
Navy, however, is faithful to tradition. By writing the
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Maritime Strategy it has again formulated its own role.
Even its function is roughly similar: frustration of
continental expansion by sea power, although its role today
must be supporting, not primary.
i
When the purpose and start of a war have been doped out,
planners normally turn to its conclusion. War termination
on satisfactory terms is the aim of strategy; planners work
backward from the desired goal. Japan aimed to fight a
limited war to gain territory, to weary us and settle by
negotiation. The Blue Navy didn't buy this. It believed
America's proper objective was total victory: "submission
of Japan to our will," they phrased it, or "the overthrow of
Japanese power." It wasn't exactly unconditional surrender,
but neither was it limited war. American goals were to
strip Japan of its conquests, annihilate its Fleet and
merchant marine, inflict severe economic pain, and procure
peace on our terms. A potent Navy could achieve these ends
with modest Army support.
Nowadays the U.S. and its allies would probably seek a
more confined outcome, say a rollback of Soviet conquest to
the prewar status quo. Within such stringent political con-
straints the Navy's aggressive spirit lives on. The Mari-
time Strategy pursues the achievement of peace by inflicting
serious pain through intensive offensive pressures, like
destroying the Soviet Navy and its bases.
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Usually strategists can be classified as offensivists or
defensivists but the old Navy had no defensivists nor even
advocates of limited war. Yet there were two schools of
thought among the "blue suits." As Morris Janowitz has
said,
The history of the modern military establishment can be
described as a struggle between heroic leaders, who embody
traditionalism and glory, and military "managers," who are
concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war.
One naval group, which I call the "thrusters," believed in a
slashing counterattack in Phase II, an instantaneous charge
across the Pacific in about 60 days to rescue the beleaguer-
ed garrison of Luzon, sink the Orange Navy, impose the
blockade, and win a short war by gallantry and daring.
Their plan was known as the Through Ticket to Manila. They
pointed with pride to the round-the-world voyage of
America's Great White Fleet, which fueled and maintained
itself in excellent order. This proved, they said, that
the Fleet could steam across the Pacific and clobber the
enemy. In their scenario America's ten-fold industrial
superiority counted for little since it took three years to
build a capital ship. The old salts of the Navy were often
thrusters; damn the torpedoes, and all that.
The other group, which I call the "cautionaries, " advo-
cated a gradual, step-by-step offensive by way of island
oases while building strength for a long war. They drew
dour comparisons to the Russian Baltic Squadron of 1905, the
Black Fleet which cruised to destruction at Tsushima. It
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was insane, they said, to rush straight across, suffering
casualties en route, to meet the Orange Fleet fresh from
home bases. The cautionaries tended to be younger, War
College-trained officers, familiar with new attrition ;
weapons like submarines and given to systematic homework on
logistics.
The two schools should be thought of as hares vs. tor-
toises, not operators vs. intellectuals. All war planners
achieved senior responsibility after full and active careers
of command at sea and in shore billets. However, there was
a rising tendency to recruit superior minds, for example a
distinct upward tilt in the Academy class standings of
planners as the war approached.
Plan Orange developed through an interplay between the
two groups whose influence ebbed and flowed. The cautionar-
ies had the better idea; they gradually came to dominate
planning, especially in the 1930s when the intensity of
modern was better appreciated.
A prime example of the thruster-vs. -cautionary hassle
was the Far Eastern base argument. Early in the century
thrusters lobbied for a great dockyard and arsenal at
Olongapo to await the Fleet. The Army squelched it because
Subic Bay was indefensible against overland attack; the
troops could at best defend Bataan and Corregidor, terrible
places for a naval base. Theodore Roosevelt wisely selected
Pearl Harbor, the cautionaries 1 choice, as the main outlying
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base. The thrusters tried for a grand base on Guam in the
early 1920s and again in 1939 but failed because they
misread the country's isolationist mood. Mahan called Guam
the Gibraltar of the pacific but without improvement its
harbor could hold a dozen ships. If the thrusters had
gotten their base the Orange Plan might have evolved like
the British Singapore strategy, with the same disastrous
outcome. But the cautionaries won; the Fleet would carry
mobile bases when it voyaged west of Hawaii.
On the other hand, the thrusters were more insightful
about the security of the Eastern Pacific. Cautionaries
worried that the U.S. or Panama might be attacked, but above
all they feared losing Hawaii. In the end, despite the
momentary disaster of 7 December, 1941, Hawaii remained the
launching pad for the offensive. There may be a parallel
attitude today since security of the American home bastion
is a tenet of the Maritime Strategy. Incidentally, the
General Board long ago predicted that an attack on Hawaii
would arouse "a greater spirit of resentment" and determined
prosecution of the war, a good prognosis since Yamamoto '
s
attack fatally inflamed American passions.
The most long-lasting dispute raged over the campaign to
reach the Far East. Early cautionaries preferred a safe
route below the Eguator, far from Japan, approaching Luzon
from the south. Thrusters favored the direct advance from
hawaii to Guam and Manila, sometimes modified by cautionary
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insistence on secret coaling stops in neutral islands.,
Nobody cared for a movement via Alaska, with its atrocious
weather and isolation from trade routes—except Mahan, who
urged a devil-may-care descent from the Aleutians to the;
Ryukyus across the face of Japan with a coaling stop on the
enemy coast!
Plans for the Phase II advance were plagued by
logistical problems, especially the supply of coal. In
1898, coal was transferred in raw harbors by shovel and sack
at the rate of ten tons an hour. To deal with Orange the
Navy ordered giant colliers, bigger than battleships,
spending 59% of its 1908 appropriations on them. By 1914
their mechanized rigs cold load 1000 tons per hour. Later,
of course, oil transfer on the move was a splendid
improvement.
Since a Fleet couldn't coal in the open seas, the cau-
tionaries jealously eyed the huge lagoons of Micronesia that
could hold an entire Fleet. They belonged to Germany, but
Japan seized them in World War I and retained them under a
League of Nations Mandate prohibiting military use. The
thrusters were dismayed, seeing a barrier that would derail
a fast offensive. The cautionaries were delighted; they
persuaded Wilson to support the Mandate award which afforded
Blue an undefended ocean highway.
The following are a few post-1914 examples of thrusting
and cautionary Phase II campaigns. After Guam was
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demilitarized by the Washington Conference of 1922 (which
also fixed battleship tonnages at a 5:3 ratio), Rear Admiral
Clarance S. Williams, my favorite war planner, worked out a
superb cautionary plan adapted from suggestions of Admiral
William S. Sims, then President of the War College. The
Fleet would advance to Eniwetok and Truk, positioning itself
to descend on any target in a huge arc from the Philippines
to Okinawa. To reach and develop a base at Truk required 18
months, dooming the Philippine garrison which could survive
only six months. Williams was done dirty by General Leonard
Wood, former Army Chief of Staff and political bigwig of the
Harding administration. Wood sermonized that forfeiture of
Manila would be an affront to American prestige, the white
race and God Almighty. Admiral Robert E. Coontz dumped his
planner and reestablished the Through Ticket to Manila as a
wild non-stop "Rambo" thrust on Day 14, of 554 vessels with
a huge army and air complement, steaming right under the
enemy's nose.
The next chief of the War Plans Division, a logistics
expert, couldn't dissuade the thrusters. Rear Admiral Frank
Schofield, in 1928 managed to delay the sortie to Day 30 and
aim it toward the Southern Philippines, a marginally saner
gambit. In 1934 CNO William Standley and WPD Director
Samuel Bryant linked William's cautionary approach to
Schofield 's destination into a march through the Mandated
Islands to Mindanao, cheerfully dubbed "The Royal Road." As
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refined over the next few years, it stressed island air-,
fields, amphibious assault tactics and the bypassing of
unneeded strongholds.
New weapons were changing naval warfare. Evolution of;
the aircraft carrier is too well known to bear repeating.
Often overlooked are long range patrol seaplanes, ideal for
a Central Pacific War, which according to Rear Admiral
Ernest J. King could also perform as a striking force. The
thrusters encouraged the building of Clipper stations by Pan
American Airways on American atolls like Midway and
especially Wake island, and later military bases there, to
provide air cover for a fast lunge into the Marshalls and
Carolinas. The Army, however, fearing a war in Europe and
perhaps a Nazi attack on Latin America, turned defensive in
1938. It urged the Navy not to venture beyond Hawaii lest
it couldn't be recalled.
In 1940 and 1941 cautionaries rallied to the cause of
wariness in the Pacific and a priority of beating Germany
first. Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark and OP-12
Director "Terrible" Turner handed Pacific campaign planning
back to the Fleet. Thus the final prewar plan was developed
by the CINCPac, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, under the Rainbow
5 Plan. He was told to make a noisy diversion to distract
Orange forces from Malaysia but not to invade the Mandate
for six months. Officially, he planned a carrier raid on
the Marshalls. There is a possibility, overlooked by
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historians, that he and his rapidly thrusting war planner
Captain "Soc" (for Socrates) McMorris were slyly setting the
stage for a battleship slugfest in mid-Pacific when they got
caught flatfooted at Pearl Harbor.
To return to the process of planning, a useful under-
standing can be reached by classifying elements of Plan
Orange according to how decisions were made. There were
three broad categories:
1. Concepts enjoying unanimous consensus, decided early
and rarely revised: the three-Phase war, helplessness
in Phase I, rebound in Phase II, reliance on superior
naval power, the decisive battle, the Phase III siege,
and the goal of total victory.
2. Issues resolved by debate, often acrimonious and
sometimes extending over decades: the dream of a
prepared Western Pacific base, the sanctity of Hawaii,
the theater of attack, logistical requirements, mobile
advanced bases, and gradual acknowledgment of a longer
war stretching out from six or 12 months to two or
three years.
3. Matters unresolved before the war, mainly the particu-
lars of the offensive: the launch date, speed of
advance, exact route, and destination. However, the
many studies of Phase II provided wartime commanders a
menu of choices from which to pick and choose.
World War II certainly differed from the anticipated
conflict. To play devil's advocate, if the Orange Plan had
been irrelevant or wrong it would have been replaced and
. .
...historians could relegate it to a cemetery of curiosities or
damn it as counterproductive. In truth, it met the test of
war. I will argue that its principles were sound because
they adapted flexibly to the real war and were not jettison-
ed for a contrary principle. Let's examine some of the
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war's surprises and see whether the prewar strategies still
fit.
The Orange planners, until 1939, figured on a two-party
war. America had no alliances and Japan had always fought
alone. World War II turned out to be a struggle of coali-
tions. However, the contributions of allies were relatively
modest and their weight was more than offset by the commit-
ment of U.S. power to Europe. The Pacific war remained,
fundamentally, Blue vs. Orange and the Plan remained
applicable.
How about the Eastern Pacific bastion? The old planners
knew Hawaii was vulnerable to a raid but believed it would
be held. Pearl Harbor was indeed the great launching pad of
the Blue offensive. Japan's only other sallys across the
international dateline ended in disaster at Midway. Even
Kimmel's bootleg dream of a mid-Pacific engagement wasn't
far off the mark.
The war spread to allied territory on the Asian mainland
and in the South Pacific. The extended Japanese perimeter
provided a second front for Blue, the MacArthur drive, which
followed the route of some early Orange studies. The
Japanese attrition campaign switched to the South Pacific
for a while, but we overcame it as predicted. When the time
was ripe, the main Blue advance was directed through the
Central Pacific islands. The Orange route was supplemented,
never displaced, by MacArthur 's campaign.
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Blue didn't open the Central Pacific offensive in two
weeks or six months due to early setbacks and the Atlantic
war. It waited two years. The delay underscores the genius
of the choice, for there was plenty of time to devise a
better alternative if one existed. The campaign seemed like
running a movie backward. Nimitz leapfrogged through the
Marshall Islands as in the 1930s Plans. Although he
bypassed the Carolines, he arrived in the Souther
Philippines as in the 1920s plans. Guam and the Marianas
were strategically pivotal in the Orange Plans of 1911-1921;
when they fell, the Tojo Government fell, and Japan began a
desperate search for a way out. The seizure of Okinawa as
the final siege position had been identified as early as
1906.
Did new weapons and tactics mesh with Plan Orange? Con-
sider the submarine and the bomber. We had renounced
unrestricted torpedoing of merchantmen, while city-bashing
was unimaginable. Nevertheless, the siege was so firmly
rooted in our military psyche that we unhesitatingly applied
these weapons with deadly efficiency. (The Japanese, having
no counterpart of the siege strategy, failed to develop
either weapon effectively.) Aviation fit the Orange Plan in
every way. The aircraft carrier and long-legged shore-based
air were ideal for the open waters of the Pacific. They
multiplied the effectiveness of the dominant side—Orange in
Phase I, Blue in Phases II and III.
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Logistical planners provided ample recognition of the
need for mobile service bases, portable drydocks and fueling
at sea.
The Plan called for storming defended beaches for which
the Marine Corps developed amphibious doctrine and
specialized craft. The General Board long ago predicted
small islands would always fall to the force controlling the
sea. The cautionary island-hopping advance allowed defeat
in detail of small Orange ground units. The national armies
never met en masse. The Japanese Army was intact at the end
of the war.
What about the great fleet battle? The war wasn't
decided in an afternoon by a gunnery Trafalgar. There were
a dozen major battles in which the carrier was often the
capital ship. But the strategic principle was sound: the
Orange Navy had to be destroyed in battle. If it remained a
fleet in being, the Plan would fail. The planners predicted
Blue could win battles in waters favorable to the enemy.
Japan did resort to attrition, including Kamikazes, but Blue
was able to absorb the losses and win.
What about the atomic bomb? Truman said he dropped it
to avoid the casualties of invading Japan. The Army
persuaded him that invasion was necessary, for it had no
institutional commitment to the siege concept. The Navy and
Air Force maintained faith in the siege while going along
with invasion planning. In the end, Truman validated the
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Orange strategy by employing the ultimate siege weapon.
(Roosevelt, I imagine, would have dropped the bomb, but in
direct fulfillment of Plans he had studied since 1913.)
Was the potency of the Orange Plan due to genius or was
it simply the obvious choice? There were, in fact, other
proposals. The Army in the '30s advocated a cheap economic
war: abandon the Orient, destroy Japan's credit and long
range trade and hope for a negotiated peace. We might have
built a Far Eastern base. We might have stationed the Fleet
in Singapore as the British beseeched. We might have forged
a coalition to fight on the mainland. A successful plan
merely looks obvious in hindsight.
Von Moltke the elder said, "No plan survives contact
with the enemy." Indeed, new plans were improvised after
Pearl Harbor while old ones were rarely dug out of the
files. But the concepts of Plan Orange were in the heads of
the admirals. For example, Nimitz studied at the War
College under Williams. King's determination to go for the
Marianas in 1944 was prompted by a game he played there in
1933.
Peacetime plans are often criticized as ploys to get
money for the service. The incredibly cautionary Admiral
J.O. Richardson, Commander-in-Chief in 1940, despised the
Orange Plan and called it "chiefly useful... for asking for
appropriations...." A 600-ship Navy of the 1980s was
presumably easier to obtain by linkage to a war plan. (The
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ploy doesn't always work. During the depression the Navy
was getting scarce dollars. The Army desperately cooked up
War Plan Red, a conflict with the British Empire featuring a
I
massive attack on Canada. War with Britain was far-fetched
and, as the Navy pointed out, Canada would choose neutrali-
ty. Congress declined the funds.) The Orange Plan was
indeed a framework for spending money on a Navy to fight a
very specific and plausible war. When it came, the Navy was
ready with doctrines and plans, even though not fully
prepared materially.
To wrap up, the prewar Navy was extremely good at
planning in the Pacific. The experience should offer
Maritime Strategists comfort as they examine a more complex
and dangerous situation. Here are ten observations about
the old planners that are worth reflection.
1. They clearly articulated the goal of the war and the
strategy for achieving it.
2. They analyzed what the enemy would do and devised a
response flexible enough to survive setbacks and
surprises
.
3. They got the strategic principles right. That took
about eight years. Later planners fine-tuned but
didn't abandon them.
4. They structured the war in phases, a very useful
concept.
5. They placed the decisive theater where the aggressor
was strong: near his homeland.
6. They identified their own bastion and provided for its
permanent security.
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7. Although they didn't settle the contentious details of
the Phase II offensive (except for the theater) , they
turned out a fine menu of campaign ideas.
8. They showed that good naval war plans are most likely
to emanate from uniformed professionals, officers of
high intellect and wide experience working dedicatedly
over spans measured in years. Clever strategists and
hard-headed logisticians supplemented each other.
Good naval war plans did not emerge from a joint or
civilian body.
9. They won service-wide commitment to the strategy, so
the Navy was designed to implement it long after they
were gone.
10. They demonstrated that an excellent plan can be so
enduring as to be timeless. This is reassuring in a
century of continuous change.
In closing, I offer observations by naval officers of
three generations. First. Lieutenant Commander Clarence
Williams in 1909 as he set in motion the first comprehen-
sive Orange Plan:
Complete war plans must come from a national body and they
require cooperation with the Army. But national policy is
rather predictable, and the strategic situation reasonably
clear, so we are able to outline the best Navy line of
action. Preparing such naval plans of campaign is our
most important duty. We must decide now, to save time at
the outset of hostilities. The strategic plan should lay
down general means to injure the enemy and prevent him
injuring us. The questions to address are the probable
theater of war, the enemy's objectives, our objectives,
bases, advanced bases and actions to deny them, logistics,
and the safe convoy of military strength overseas. The
most critical question is, "Will our fleet be strong
enough to [take] the offensive?" We can amend the plan
later, if necessary. Alternative plans offer us good
choices.
Chester Nimitz, who studied under Williams in 1923,
said, "I was asked once how we were able to fight the war in
the Pacific, and I said we fought it as we had fought it all
on paper. ..."
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Finally, CNO James D. Watkins understood that linkage of
history with current planning provides valuable parallels
and pride of institution:
i
The most far-reaching trend in recent years has been the ;
emphasis on strategy as the focus of naval thought. Naval
officers are again at the forefront of developing strate-
gic concepts. I'm confident in the Maritime Strategy
because it represents the collective judgment of the best
thinkers. The competition of ideas has made for a robust
strategy that recognizes the complexity of issues. The
process may be untidy, but it is distinctly American. It
works. The process represents a continuation of the
customs of... the past. Continuity and stability are
important to us. We depend on the legacy of our naval
tradition to provide us perspective.
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THE MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE PACIFIC, 1946-1955
Michael Palmer
The strategic concept we term the Maritime Strategy was
originally developed not in the early 1980s, nor in the late
1970s, but during the first postwar decade. The defeat of
Japan in September 1945 marked the end of the Mahanian era,
a half-century Samuel Huntington termed the "Oceanic" period
—an age when nations constructed navies to engage and
destroy enemy fleets in a guest for command of the sea. 1 In
the postwar world, the United States Navy no longer faced an
"Oceanic" challenge; the Navy commanded the sea. The
question became: how could that command be put to use in
the geopolitical struggles being waged around the Eurasian
periphery. The "Transoceanic" era had begun and the Navy,
principally through the leadership of Admiral Forrest
Percival Sherman, devised a new strategic concept that
resembled today's Maritime Strategy. And just as one can
find the immediate origins of the current Maritime Strategy
in the Pacific— in Admiral Thomas Hayward • s SEASTRIKE
concept for CINCPACFLT— it was in that ocean that the Navy
first reached a full conceptualization of its initial
postwar strategy. 2
The Navy could very well consider 6 June 194 6 the birth
date of the Maritime Strategy. In the old Navy building in
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Washington that day, the OP-30 Strategic Plans Division
staff met with their boss, OP-03, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, for Operations, Vice Admiral Forrest P.
Sherman. 3 The topic of discussion that day was PINCHER
planning, a series of studies initiated in December 1945 by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) meant ultimately to support
the development of a joint strategic plan for a war with the
Soviet Union. 4 Sherman considered that task OP-30' s top
priority. He was not there that day, however, to be updated
on his planners' work. He was there to insure that they
incorporated in the service plans, and the joint plans for
which many of them were also responsible, Sherman's views on
how a Soviet-American war would be fought.
Sherman expected that such a conflict would be a
protracted, global, primarily conventional struggle. In the
initial stages the United States would be on the strategic
defensive. The Navy's missions would be many: supporting
American occupation forces in Europe and Asia, that is
covering the Dunkirk-like evacuations envisioned for
American ground troops in Northwest and Southern Europe,
North China, and South Korea; shielding American forward
bases and allies—Iceland, the Azores, the British Isles,
the Suez-Cairo area, and the island chain in the Western
Pacific, the Aleutians, Japan, Ryukus, and the Philippines
—
from which our eventual counterattack would be launched; and
keeping open the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) to
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these bases by maintaining control of the North Atlantic,
the Mediterranean, and the Pacific.
To carry out such a variety of tasks with forces much
reduced in the aftermath of World War II, Sherman called for
forward, offensive operations, whatever the overall strate-
gic posture of the United States and its allies. He circum-
navigated the periphery of the Soviet Union for his
planners. They were to resist getting "up into the ice,"
for Sherman believed the Navy's carrier and submarine forces
were about three or four years short of being prepared to
operate in Arctic conditions, and he ruled out operations in
the Baltic. 5 Sherman saw the Mediterranean as the major
theater for naval operations, a sea passageway penetrating
the Eurasian landmass. The Navy would have to cover the
strategic Cairo-Suez area by conducting offensive strikes in
the Eastern Mediterranean against Soviet forces attempting
to move southward through the Balkan and Anatolian
peninsulas.
Sherman's examination of the Pacific, a secondary
theater, notes special attention. Only in the Far East
could the Navy strike directly at the Soviet Union,
unhindered by either climatic or geographical bulwarks. 6 It
is in Sherman's scheme for the Pacific that we see most
clearly the direction he wanted Navy plans to take. The
carrier task force in the Western Pacific, he expected,
would "wipe up" Russian bases in short order, before
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swinging, a strategy now passe of course, around to the
Atlantic. Thus it was in the Pacific that Sherman and the
Navy first contemplated direct attacks on Soviet bases, just
j
as it was in the Pacific in the late 1970s that we saw the !
genesis of the Maritime Strategy in Admiral Hayward's
SEASTRIKE!
Over the following year and a half, Sherman and OP-30
further developed and refined this strategic concept. In
early 1947 Sherman began making presentations, first to
President Truman in January, and later of revised versions
to various Congressional committees and other official
groups. These presentations, conducted by Sherman, not only
resembled the Maritime Strategy in their content, but also
took on its form. They relied increasingly on graphs and
charts, with overlays showing critical lines of communica-
tions, the radii of Soviet air and subsurface operations,
and the directions that an American naval offensive would
follow. Carrier silhouettes, from which American radii of
action extended, appeared in the Norwegian and Barents Seas,
the Eastern Mediterranean, and the North Pacific off Japan.
The effectiveness of the German U-Boat campaign of the
Battle of the Atlantic was used as an example of what the
Soviets might be able to accomplish, although OP-30 had yet
to develop a graphic--a "Measles Chart"—to demonstrate the
effect. The presentations read like the Maritime Strategy. 7
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By early 1948, and Sherman's departure from Washington
for command in the Mediterranean, the Navy had a fully
developed strategic concept— a Maritime Strategy. In peace-
time the Navy operated forward in support of American
policy, offering a visible show of force for allies and
enemies alike, inducing the former to resist Soviet threats,
and to deter aggression by the latter and their allies. 8 In
the event of war the Navy would go on the offensive with the
forces at hand, striking primarily in the Mediterranean,
which would remain the primary operational area until the
mid-1950s, with increasing attention paid to operations in
the Barents and Norwegian Seas, and, with tertiary forces in
the Pacific. 9
The strategic problems facing the United States in 1946-
1948 differ, of course, from those facing the nation today.
The United States in the late 1940s possessed a nuclear
monopoly. No Soviet surface navy capable of contesting
command of the sea existed. The United States had no NATO
alliance, no pool of European manpower, to help fend off a
Soviet ground attack and had little choice but to pursue a
maritime-based strategy. Nevertheless, limited weapon
availability made the American nuclear monopoly of little
practical use. The nation's plans, even the Air Force's
service plans for strategic air warfare, envisioned a
primarily conventional conflict. And while we know now that
no Soviet surface challenge then existed, at the time
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intelligence on the Soviet Navy was scarce and there was
constant speculation, and concern, that they possessed, or
were building, both carriers and battleships. Moreover, in
Sherman's view, American national strategy would be best;
served by a strong NATO. The prospects of a long war
concerned Sherman. He favored policies intended to prevent
the overrunning of Western Europe by the Soviets, for their
use of the French Breton bases used by German's U-Waffe
during the Second World War would undermine the Navy's
strategy. To Sherman, the strategic dilemma facing him
looked much like that facing the Navy's leaders in the 1970s
and 1980s. 10
*****
Many historians have addressed the changed circumstances
facing the Navy in the post-1945 world. 11 The Mahanian era
was indeed over. But the Navy made a much more rapid and
effective transition than the work of most historians would
lead one to believe. When they wrote, of course, the Navy's
strategy was secret; silence became confused with nescience.
Critics assumed that the absence of a publicly stated
strategic concept indicated the lack of one, which was far
from the truth, and which is why it is so important that the
Maritime Strategy be widely debated in public forums today.
The Navy's collective wartime experience and the
personal background of Forrest Sherman enabled it to make
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this relatively quick transition from Huntington's "Oceanic"
to the "Transoceanic" period.
During the Second World War the Navy fought and won two
great campaigns, the Battle of the Atlantic, and, for mere
symmetry in terms, the Battle of the Pacific. Each of these
tremendous campaigns could be divided into several major
phases. Historians have tended to focus on the early and
middle periods of both.
In the Atlantic, the early phases were distinguished by
the struggle of the Allies to secure a technological
advantage over the U-Boat, culminating in the sudden turn of
the tide in the Atlantic in the Spring of 1943. But it was
from the final stage of the Atlantic campaign, which gener-
ally receives cursory treatment, that the postwar Navy drew
its lessons. German technological developments late in the
war, the Schnorkel, the Type XXI boats, the Walter boats,
all gave submarines the edge, one, thankfully, not transla-
table late in the war to operational success.
The Navy's comprehension of the lessons of the final
stage of the Battle of the Atlantic is evident in the
proceedings of the first ASW conference held in Washington
in 1946, a conference attended by Forrest Sherman as DCNO. 12
The Americans had received as reparations two Germany Type-
XXIs and exercises indicated that the Navy possessed no
counter. Since the Soviets also had received Type XXIs, and
had overrun the yards and factories where the boats had been
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produced and assembled, Americans expected that the Russians
,
would manufacture similar boats themselves.
Sherman, after listening to this doleful testimony,
interjected that the strategic counter to the Type XXI was
to destroy it at its bases with forward, offensive carrier,
submarine, and surface operations. Thus in June 194 6, the
Navy's ASW concerns drove it to plan offensive operations
against Soviet submarine bases in the Kola, the Black Sea,
and the Far East. Appropriate target lists were prepared. 13
In the Pacific, the great carrier battles such as the
Coral Sea, Midway, and others characterized the early phases
of the war. In these campaigns between 1942 and 1944 the
Navy advanced across the Pacific seeking decisive battle
with the Japanese fleet. By the end of 1944, and the
successes of the Philippines campaign, that objective had
been secured. The menace was no longer the Japanese fleet,
the remnants of which were not holed up in Japanese ports,
but perils emanating from Japan itself. The remaining
Japanese threat took the form of land-based air attack and
submarine operations.
The Pacific war entered its final phase: one epitomized
by the Kamikaze, the first precision guided bomb, a cruise
missile in which the Kamikaze volunteer's brain substituted
for the yet to be developed silicon chip. In the Okinawa
campaign the Navy took a beating, but learned that the
proper way to deal with the suicide threat was not only to
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establish early warning and interception capability for the
carrier task force, but also to conduct mobile offensive
operations: to strike at the source of the threat, the air
bases in Japan itself, and to destroy the Japanese planes on
the ground, where one always destroys an enemy air force.
In the final stage of the war, the Navy operated not against
the Japanese Navy, but against Japan itself, ranging along
the coast, knocking out thousands of planes on the ground,
and with light losses, compared to those suffered during the
Okinawa campaign. 14
The man who planned many of these operations was
Nimitz's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Forrest Sherman. 15
If anyone understood the lessons of the latter stages of the
Pacific was it was Sherman. His wartime experience
certainly prepared him for his role in the postwar Navy.
But his prewar thought also played an important part in
making him the right man, in the right place, at the right
time in OPNAV in 1946-47.
Writing in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings
between 1926 and 1934, Sherman addressed many issues that he
would later face in the postwar years, such as unification
and the establishment of an independent air force. Given
proper conditions, conditions met by 1946, Sherman favored
both. It was no accident that he became the Navy's
architect of unification. 16
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Of the most direct significance to this paper, however,
is Sherman's June 1932 critical review of Admiral Sir
Herbert Richmond's Economy and Naval Security . 17 Shermar
saw Richmond as a hide-bound navalist, concerned primarily
with the interests of Great Britain, rather than
annunciating any universal truths about sea power. He
considered Richmond's discussion of aircraft carriers
particularly weak.
With respect to aircraft carriers the author takes an
attitude somewhat similar to that of the sailing-ship
officers who deplored the advent of steam. He doubts the
necessity for taking aircraft to sea and holds that "if
both powers possess these vessels, neither is at an
advantage over the other, and if neither has them, neither
is at a disadvantage." He ignores the fact that fighting
aircraft are an accepted part of the armament of nations
and the fact that fleets must be able to operate within
aircraft radius of enemy coasts, where if neither power
has ship-based aircraft the enemy shore-based aircraft may
dominate the situation. He ignores the ability of ship-
based aircraft to operate against shore objectives with a
degree of success which ships' guns could not possibly
match.
One can find in Sherman's early writings in the Proceed -
ings the origins of the strategic concepts he laid before
his OP-30 planners in June 1946. His knowledge of naval
history, particularly that of Great Britain, and his
experience as a naval aviator, led Sherman to reject the
notion that sea-borne air was unimportant for a naval power
—Britain— facing a land power—Germany. One need only
substitute the United States for Britain, and the Soviet
Union for Germany in Sherman's equation, and one can see in
outline form his strategic concept of the postwar period.
220
He believed that carriers could play a role in applying sea
power ashore, with force far greater than that projected
from the guns of dreadnoughts, and that the offensive was
central to that mission. While as a professional naval
officer Sherman's focus had been on the Pacific during the
interwar years, Sherman the amateur historian had a European
concentration that would stand him in good stead at the end
of the Second World War and enable him to make a rapid
transition from one ocean of destiny to another.
*****
Strategic concepts, of course, must be tempered by the
practical understandings of the operator who bases his own
conceptions on experience. Exercises and staff studies
conducted during 1948 and 1949 both in the Mediterranean and
the Pacific qualified the Navy's strategic concept developed
during 1946 and 1947. 18
In the Pacific, a CINCPACFLT staff study— "Brightness
—
introduced a note of circumspection. The study called for
forward offensive operations on the outbreak of hostilities
"against Soviet air, submarine, and other important bases in
the KURILES, southern KAMCHATKA, including PETROPAVLOSK, and
southern SAKHALIN...." But far from Sherman's June 1946
estimate that the Navy's Pacific force could "wipe up"
Soviet Far Eastern assets in a short time, "Brightness,"
like the CINCNELM study, was a cautious document. It
221
suggested that consideration be given to sending Eastern
Pacific task groups earmarked to reinforce European forces
(the swing strategy) "by way of Japan, assisting hard-
pressed Far East Command forces by carrier strikes of
several days duration." The study called for prudent,
surprise strikes, in and out operations, against Russian
bases to avoid allowing the Soviets to concentrate any land-
based air against what would be a weak force of carriers.
Thus as early as 1948 CINCPACFLT had begun to question the
wisdom, and executability of the "swing strategy."
The CINCNELM study, completed late in 1948, concluded
that a Mediterranean offensive against Soviet bases might
have to be preceded by a preliminary stage of air-to-air
defense. Convoys and the carrier task forces would act as
"magnets" and draw upon themselves Soviet air attacks. Far
from using the final stage of the war against Japan as its
model, the CINCNELM study envisioned initial operations akin
to the battle of the Philippine Sea—a "Turkey Shoot" in
which the Soviets would destroy their air power in attacks
against American carriers. The study concluded:
Since it is not envisaged that the supply of fast
carriers, carrier aircraft, and pilots will increase as
rapidly as the demand, it is necessary to avoid bulling
our way into a shore-based air "hornets nest" until such
time as we are confident we can do so and come out the
winner. This can only be determined by experience. IN
OTHER WORDS, INITIALLY PROBE: DETERMINE REACTION: AND
THEN OPERATE ACCORDINGLY.
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As an examination of Mediterranean operations, the study
drew heavily on the experience of the American naval
commander in that sea—Forrest Sherman. Having supplied the
Navy with a strategic concept as a planner, Sherman now
tempered that strategy based on his experience as an
operator.
It was from the Mediterranean in November 1949 that
Sherman was recalled to become Chief of Naval Operations.
As CNO Sherman reiterated those principles he had first
called for in his 6 June 1946 conference with his OP-30
planners and battled for and achieved increased force levels
in both peacetime, and in the projected wartime force tabs.
Sherman, after reviewing the United States' emergency
strategic war plan then in force--OFFTACKLE—addressed the
JCS for the record, noting many deficiencies. He disliked
the priority given the defense of Great Britain and
Scandinavia, at the expense of offensive carrier operations
in the Mediterranean. He also noted presciently, on the eve
of the Korean War:
There is likely to be need for deployment of a small
carrier task force in the Pacific. As a matter of fact I
am concerned over the current situation in the Pacific
where the FY 1951 force level will be inadeguate to cope
with situations which may develop very soon. The security
of Alaska and the Japan-Okinawa-Philippine line reguires
naval support. 19
Sherman consistently argued within the JCS and before
Congress for an increase in naval forces, including a super-
carrier, and a bolstering of forces committed to the
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Pacific. 20 At the time of his death, the Navy's carrier
strength under the United States' emergency war plan had
been increased at D-day plus 12 months from eight to 12, and
the maximum to be mobilized from ten to 16. The four
additional D+12 carriers were all to be employed in the
Pacific. Construction of the Forrestal had been approved. 21
Sherman's consistency, and his preference for forward,
offensive operations, is apparent in an interview he gave to
U.S. News & World Report in February 1951. Asked about the
air and submarine threats posed by the Soviets, Sherman
responded:
In that connection, the air-defense problem, and the
anti-submarine problem have certain points of similarity.
The worst place to protect a ship is where the ship is.
The worst place to protect a convoy is at the convoy. The
worst place to protect a city from air attack is at the
city. The best place is at the bases from which the air-
plane or submarine comes. The next best place is en route
—the worst place is at the target. 22
*****
During 1946 and 1947 the Navy developed a strategic
concept that resembled the Maritime Strategy. The Navy
would operate forward, in support of American national
policy in peacetime, offensively in time of war. The Navy
would fight what we term today the "come as you are war,"
taking the offensive with the forces at hand in what was
expected to be a global, protracted conflict. Carrier task
groups, built up to four carrier strength as soon as
224
possible, would move forward, ultimately applying their
power against Soviet naval and air bases in the Kola, the
Black Sea, and the Far East. Offensive mine warfare would
be waged off the harbors of the Soviet Union. Killer
submarines would hunt their Soviet opposite numbers off the
North Cape and in the straits in the Northwestern Pacific.
The Soviets would be led to disperse their forces around
their enormous periphery. Amphibious forces would threaten
and execute raids and invasions. And ultimately, the United
States and its allies would wrest the initiative from
Russian hands.
The Navy based its strategy on wartime experience and a
faith, reinforced by postwar study after postwar study, in
the survivability of the carrier task force employed in
mobile, forward, offensive operations.
And it was Forrest Sherman who gave shape so quickly
after the Second World War to the strategy for the post-
Mahanian era. Perhaps Sherman should be considered "The
Father of the Maritime Strategy" for his contributions to
its development in the postwar world. For it is the legacy
of Sherman that Admiral Trost saw as the "unwritten"
strategy that he compares to the British Constitution; a
strategy being lost, unfortunately, just as Admiral Trost
graduated from the Naval Academy in 1953. 23
The causes of that loss were many. The Navy's strategic
concept, its Maritime Strategy if you will, existed only in
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the joint and service plans, top secret documents seen by
few even within the Navy. Lacking an existence of its own,
unlike its modern-day counterpart, the Navy's postwar
strategy met its demise when the format in which the plans >
had been prepared changed, following DOD and JCS reorganiza-
tion in 1953. 24 The Joint Staff "dictated" the adoption of
a new format for plans, at all levels, a development that
"screwed up," in Admiral Wylie's view, the very sensible
planning structure developed by the Navy during the interwar
years. 25 A comparison of plans completed before 1951, such
as DROPSHOT and OFFTACKLE, with those completed after 1954,
reveals the impact of the format change on the presentation
of the Navy's concept of naval warfare. References to
service tasks yielded to those assigned unified commanders.
The post-1953 generation of war plans "diluted" the Navy's
vision of how it would fight a war, dispersing those
elements of the Navy's concept of operations among myriad
tasks to be performed by all three services. Service rolls
and missions, evident in pre-1953 plans, gave way to tasks
allocated unified commanders. The Navy's concept of
operations became so diluted that it was unrecognizable.
The preoccupation with nuclear warfare inherent in Eisen-
hower's "New Look" and "Massive Retaliation" eroded the
importance of many principles central to Sherman's strategy.
And the development of SCSUS led to the advance of a "SOSUS-
mentality" that affects many today. SOSUS, as conceived,
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was not intended to be a primary line of defense. Like most
fixed defenses, it was meant to economize forces for forward
operations north of the G-I-UK Gap. But throughout military
history, walls once built became shields behind which
nations gravitate.
And a final reason: the "loss" of China in 1949 tremen-
dously expanded the area of potential operations for the
Navy in the Pacific. Decades of crisis in Southeast Asia
and fear of China prevented a naval focus on the Soviet Far
East. Perhaps it is fitting that the renaissance of the
Maritime Strategy came in the Pacific in the late 1970s,
with our China relations restored, and the Navy able to
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Welcome: Rear Admiral Robert C. Austin, Superintendent,
Naval Postgraduate School
... in what portends for the future. And it is in this
r.erest that the department had thought about this conference.
rl we have had the support of the CNO staff and the Secretariat
r putting it together and so we are very pleased to do it. I
ifss if you are in Monterey, Monterey Bay, you'd like to think
1 yourself on the Pacific Rim and we can probably think of no
>a of the world in areas of economics, in terms of evolving
c itical thought, in terms of military and national security
nlications that's any more important to the United States'
r.erests. And putting all that together, it seemed very logical
c this effort, for this department, for this period of time. I
i i ss it's sort of like a polaroid picture. You take a picture,
snapshot, and you think you understand all that's in that
::ture. Add especially in an academic framework where you're
c.ng back and teaching and repeating your teaching. And you
Ink that it's current and it's up to date and it really
oresents a now- ins tan taneous picture. But all of a sudden you
;ce a look at it and you realize that the colors have faded a
itle bit. So in talking to Jim Tritten about what we were
;<.ng to, I said, "it's time to take a look at the wake. It's
ne to look at where the rudder is. It's time to look at how
'> head is f al 1 ing--which way it's falling off--and are we
Ming the course good. Or do we understand the track that we're
:/ing to proceed on?" And I think that we have assembled here,
: my e s t i mation--from what I know in my experience— a very very
' ie body of thoughts on this. And we expect the school, and we
I
ie you all as participants, will take away from these two days
Monterey a very fresh snapshot, a very fresh polaroid picture.
And even beyond that, maybe a little insight as to what the besi
thought is as to the future of our interests in the Pacific. Sc
with that, Jim, let me turn over the podium and the discussant?
to you.
Session I (AM) Chair: Dr. James Tritten, Chairman
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Well again, I'd like to second Admiral Austin, and welcome
i to the Naval Postgraduate School. I've got a few administra-
'2 details I've been asked to take care of. First of all, to
it out to you that there's a tour of the school--an optional
of the schoo 1 - - wh i ch will be available to you, commencing at
'clock this afternoon for about half an hour. For those of
who've never been to the Naval Postgraduate School, it would
i good opportunity to see our historic site and would ask you
;neet in the lobby of Hermann Hall. Hermann Hall is the
Lest building on the campus, with the tower. There will be
i?one there from the Public Affairs Office, to take you around.
ondly, just so that everybody understands the seating here,
^e's a lot of students who are going to be coming and going,
'iuse they have tc go to class and can't stay the whole time.
the students will be moving in and out. Please don't be
tracted by that. The first two rows will be reserved for the
ticipants in the conference. Is there anything else you want
to cover 9 I guess not. Well we'll get on with it.
The first panel this morning is "The Evolution of the
itime Strategy." We have some very distinguished panelists
3. The first that will be speaking is Dr. Michael Palmer,
n the Naval Historical Center. Michael completed his Ph.D.
m Temple University in 1981. He's published a number of
icles in historical magazines, journals, as well as a
thcoming article on Lord Nelson in The Navy War College Review
a forthcoming book from the Government Printing Office on The
gins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the
st Post-War Decade .
To speak second will Dr. Roger Barnett, who completed his
D. from a rather small, obscure Southern California school
ch I also attended- -the University of Southern California.
He's a retired Navy Captain, who at the time when he was serving
as OP-603, was responsible for the penning of the maritime
strategy--a cooperative effort and we're going to learn more
about that effort and very good to have Roger here. He's
currently at National Security Research where he works with Colin
Gray--the Director of Maritime Research there.
Third, we'll have Commander Cort Wagner, giving us a
presentation on the views from the Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Fleet. He's one of the strategic planning officers
that's attached to that command. And for the students in the
audience, this is the billet that you're, hopefully, going to be
occupying in the future when you complete our studies.
Fourth, we'll have Captain Peter Swartz , who is assigned--
he ' s en route to the U.S. Mission at NATO. He just completed a
year as a Federal Executive Fellow at CSIS at Georgetown
University. It's very fortunate that we have both Roger Barnett
and Peter Swartz here because, when Roger was the Branch Head,
Peter was the Action Officer who put all of this to paper. We're
most fortunate in having both of them here.
And, finally, our discussant is from USCINCPAC, Colonel
Robert Molyneaux, U.S. Marine Corps. He's going to give us the
views on what we are about to say, from the perspective of the
Joint CINC in Hawaii.
With that introduction, I'll turn it over to Mike Palmer to
start out with the background.
The Maritime Strategy and the Pacific, 1946-1955
Dr. Michael Palmer - Naval Historical Center
Heard about thinking on one's feet so long, it's hard to
ik sitting down. So if you don't mind, I'll use the podium.
:like to begin by calling your attention to my topic--"The
l.time Strategy and the Pacific, 1946-1955," and asking you to
|i that I'm not just talking about maritime strategy, naval
•itegy in general — I'm talking about the maritime strategy.
:iuse I think the strategic concept that today we label the
itime strategy was, in fact, developed 40 years ago in OPNAV
,he years immediately following the Second World War.
And I'd like to begin on the 6th of June, 1946--2nd
versary of D-Day certainly. But the day I think the Navy
d very well consider the birthdate of the maritime strategy.
•e was a conference in the All-Navy Building, with the OP-30
.tegic Plans Division staff and their boss, OP-03, Deputy
•f of Naval Operations for Operations, Vice Admiral Forrest
"ival Sherman. The topic of discussion that day was "Pmcher
:ining"--a series of studies initiated by the Joint Chiefs of
if in December of 1945 aimed ultimately at the development of
|>int Strategic Plan for a U.S. -Soviet war. It was a task that
"man considered the top priority of the OP-30 staff. He
It ' t there, however, that day, to get an update on their work.
yas there to ensure that they worked into the service plans
the joint plans for which they were responsible. Those
lents that he considered essential to a U.S. -Soviet war plan.
In Sherman's mind, a U.S. -Soviet war would be a global war
it would be a protracted war. Initially the United States
d find itself on the strategic defensive. The missions for
Navy would be many. They would have to support American
ipation Forces overseas- -essential ly that meant covering the
•irk-like withdrawals planned for American troops from
hwest Europe, Southern Europe, North China and South Korea.
Navy would have to cover the forward bases of operations in
the allied nations from which an American comeback would be
staged--the Azores, Iceland, British Isles--what they called the
strategic Cairo-Suez area at that point--and the Ion chains in:
the Pacific— the Aleutians, Japan, Ryukyu and the Philippines.
The Navy would also have to maintain the sea lines of
communications— the slots--to these bases. And essentially that
meant that the Navy would have control of the North Atlantic, the
Mediterranean and the Western Paci f i c- - indeed the entire Pacific.
How was one to do that at a time when Congress and the
President were cutting back the size of the Navy'' Every year the
Navy was getting smaller and smaller. To Sherman the solution
was obvious. Conduct forward offensive operations and try to
disrupt the Soviet offensive and eventually to seize the
ini t iat lve- -whatever the overall posture of the United States and
its allies. He then proceeded to work his way around the
periphery of the Soviet Union. He told his planners to resist
efforts to get the Navy up into the 1 ce
-
-essential ly operating in
the Norwegian or Berent Sea. He considered that a long-term
necessity. But in the short term he believed that the United
States Navy's carrier and submarine forces weren't quite
prepared. And in fact he was right--they wouldn't be for another
three or four years.
The Baltic was an area that Sherman ruled out for major
American Naval operations and as far as I know, it's still ruled
out. The Mediterranean, to Sherman, was the major theater. He
saw it as a seaway into the heart of Eurasia which the Navy could
use to get at the heartland of the Soviet Union. To him, again,
it was the principal and primary theater. The Pacific was a
secondary theater. Nevertheless, it's interesting to note his
view of the Pacific. Because it's there that you can first see
Sherman coming to terms with what he wants to do with the Navy
against the Soviet Union. That is, to apply naval power directly
against the Soviet state. So even though the Pacific is a
secondary theater, it's there that the Navy can operate
unimpeded, by either climactic bulwarks that you would see in the
:ic or the geographic bulwarks that you would have in the
>ern Mediterranean— the Balkan and Anatolean Peninsulas.
He tells his planners that he expects that the carrier task
be in the Western Pacific at the outbreak of war could wipe
to use his words, Soviet bases in the Far East before
iging around to the Atlantic, which makes also Sherman the
ler of the Swing Strategy, something that's obviously now
se. But again, even though this is the secondary theater,
3 in the Pacific that Sherman first comes to grips with how
3 going to use the Navy against the Soviet Union. And I think
b's interesting because it's in the Pacific in the later
)'s that the Navy first comes to grip in Admiral Heywood
i3tripe with using the Navy in a conventional sense directly
inst the Soviet Union, leading to the development of what we
ly term "The Maritime Strategy."
In the following 18 months after this June 6 conference,
"man and the OP-30 staff continued to develop more fully this
itegic concept. January 1947 they take the show on the road,
mng for President Truman in the White House. What you see,
they followed that with other presentations to various House
nittees and other interested par t l es -- these were all top-
-et presentations, which was a long-term problem because the
i was simply not getting out. What you see in these
ferences, again, is further refinement of "The Strategic
rept." It begins to read more and more like 'The Maritime
ategy" today. It also begins to look more and more like the
itime strategy. They start using, increasingly, graphs and
nts
,
polar projections of the northern hemisphere which show
3r allied lines of communications in wartime, radii and area
operations of Soviet arm and submarine forces as an overlay,
i over this. Following that, another layer showing the
actions of an American counter-strike in the early part of the
,
with submarines, carrier task forces, and also eventually,
strategic placed in the Berent Sea, Norwegian Sea, Eastern
iterranean, North Pacific, with little lines stretching into
the Soviet Union, showing how far bombers can strike. These an
midway-class sowats--had they been Nimitz class sowats , it woulc
obviously pass for something that even looked identical to somi
of the presentations to the maritime strategy. So what you'n
getting is essentially, the maritime strategy--not only ii
content but in form.
How had all this come to pass? Now there's a great deal oi
literature out there which portrays the Navy as sort of stumbling
around in the post-war period, searching for a new strategic
concept for what Samuel Huntington terms, "The Transoceanic Age."
The oceanic age, the age when navies fought navies having come to
an end in 1945. Actually the problem with this literature is, it
was written when all these things were top secret. The Navy ver>
quickly developed a workable strategic concept. They had a
maritime strategy as early as mid-1946 and certainly by mid-1947.
This was done primarily because of the Navy's corporate
experience during the Second World War and I believe the personal
experience of Forrest Sherman.
For the corporate exper 1 ence- - the Navy had fought and won
two great campaigns in the Second World War--the Battle of the
Atlantic and what I'll term, for just mere symmetry- - the Battle
of the Pacific. Each of these were campaigns which had gone
through various phases- -ear ly , middle, late. And historians tend
to focus on the early and middle periods. It was from the last
stages of each of these campaigns that the Navy had drawn its
most important lessons. In the Atlantic, that lesson was the
scare that the Navy had suffered with the shift in the
technological balance to the Germans at the end of the war--with
the Type 21 U-Boat
, the Snorkel and other boats that were on the
way. This was a technological shift that fortunately the Germans
had not been able to translate into an operational shift. It had
occurred too late in the war. Nevertheless you can see the
extent to which the Navy was concerned about it, if you look at
the minutes of the first ASW conference held in June 1946, which
survive. It's really a doleful presen tat ion- - the Navy was trying
8
bsorb the lessons that it had gotten out of exercises with
two type 21 's it had received as reparations. And the Navy
<ly had no technological counter to that.
Sherman, who attended the conference, was the senior officer
e from the CNO ' s o f f ice- - in ter j ects during the conference and
--ok, the strategic counter to the type 21 is to destroy them
heir bases and to destroy their bases, and to use a carrier
force to go and out, along with offensive mining and hunter-
er operations with submarines. And this, of course, leads to
development of the nautilus program which has other
cedents as we 1 1 .
In the Pacific, the Navy had also drawn important lessons
i the last stage of the war. Essentially the Okinawa Campaign
what had followed. It's nice to focus on the Coral Sea and
>ay--but it's really the last stage of the war that the Navy
;s its lessons. And the lessons were threefold: one, that
Navy needed better early warning to defeat the kamikaze and
Navy also needed better combat air patrol systems to defat
kaze, and the kamikaze was, after all, essentially a cruise
lie. It's the first pr ec l s l on- gui ded munition with the
kaze volunteers bring and substitutes for the silicon chip,
printed c l rcui t - - wh l ch guides guided bombs today. These are
,n cruise missiles.
The second lesson the Navy draws from this campaign is that
.proper use of a carrier task force is not to tie it to an
,.nd--that is what makes it a sitting duck. And what you do
you operate mobi lely- -of f ens
i
vely and forward. And you see
And the third lesson--the way you do this--you go and you
,ke at the bases of the kamikazes where you destroy any air
;
'e--good air f orce- -destroyed on the ground. And after
iawa was secure, the Navy was able to cut loose with its
ier task forces--they start ranging up and down the coast of
n
, raiding the air bases - -des troy l ng hundreds -- thousands of
nese planes on the ground- -wi thout much loss to themselves,
compared to the Okinawa Campaign. These are the lessons of th«
Pacific Campaign. And these are the lessons that certainlj
nobody understood better than Forrest Sherman, who had beer
Nimitiz's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and who had planned
most of these campaigns, starting late in 1943.
As far as Sherman's personal experience, I think, again,
that's important. Sherman was an amateur histor ian--probably the
best-read CNO we've ever had as far as history goes, at the time
he took office. Arley Burke may know more history now, but I
don't think he knew more in 1955. Sherman had no retirement tc
bone up on his history, having died in office in '51. Shermar
wrote quite a bit in The Naval Institute Proceedings 1926-about
1934. You can see here his view on issues on such as the
independence of strategic air force and the uni f icat ion- -as early
as the late 1920's. But I would point to a review of Admiral Sir
Herbert Richmond's Economy and Sea Power
,
which he wrote in 1932,
I believe--in which he took Richmond to task, primarily for his
lack of understanding of how to use aircraft carriers. Richmond
had argued that a naval power like Great Britain, couldn't make
much use of aircraft carriers in a war against a land power like
Germany. Sherman said that's ridiculous. There's lots of things
you can do with an aircraft carrier in the hands of a sea power
fighting a land power. And, in fact, you couldn't operate naval
forces m the vicinity of a land power unless you had carriers
because their land-based air would dominate. All you need to do,
looking at this review, is substitute United States for Great
Britain and the Soviet Union for Germany, and you have Sherman's
position on the use of the Navy in the post-war world. Sherman
had a very European orientation in his history. And Sherman is,
I believe, in combination with his practical wartime experience
and his own personal theoretical experience-- that
'
8 what makes
him the right man at the right place at the right time as the CNO
for Operations in 1946.
Now, any strategy needs to be tempered by experience.
During 1948 and 1949 in both the Pacific and the Mediterranean,
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e Navy conducts exercises and studies which sort of temper the
iitegy. And generally, it brings into the plans, or at least
-,ries to--caution. And you start seeing the possibility of an
;ial air-to-air phase where it's sort of like a Marianas
icey shoot--where American carrier task forces would act as
pets, drawing in Soviet air, where they'd be destroyed in the
ij like a Marianas turkey shoot--and then in which the carriers
id start pushing in towards the Soviet bases.
The Mediterranean study called for, and this is a quote, "in
l»r words, initially, probe determined reaction and operate
:;rdingly." Now Sherman's in the Mediterranean at this time as
mander of 6th Task Fleet--and of course this is to a great
?nt as the operator, he's now tempering his own strategy.
ijrtheless you see in that study, still, cal 1 to get at
iet bases. If you can't do it directly with the carriers, by
sloping bases in Turkey--the staging areas with pre-pos 1
t
loned
plies so they could fly off the carriers, land in Turkey, re-
!;L
,
re-arm, and then go in and hit the Soviet Black Sea ports
: then bounce their way back to the carrier. In the Pacific,
i start getting challenges to the swing strategy. Staff Study
Jhtness starts ask ing- -perhaps the carriers are swinging
:;und from the West Coast around to Europe might be left in the
';'.fic for 90 days until the Pacific Fleet is able to complete
i tasks . So, again, you start seeing erosion of the idea of a
ig strategy as early as late 1947.
Sherman's in the Mediterranean of course when he's recalled
?N0 in November 1949. He returns to Washington. And when
s in Washington, he continues to push for these types of
;LCies. And there's a great consistency in Sherman as CNO in
ideas and his strategic concepts of Sherman as the CNO.
Jntially now they're even more firm because he's been out
j?e and he's been trying them out in the Mediterranean in
-am studies and exercises. He pushes for more carriers. But
'-
'
s interesting is the increase in carriers and the peacetime
the planned increase in carriers in wartime all go to the
11
Pacific, even though it's a secondary theater- - there ' s nc
increase in the Atlantic allowances.
You can see Sherman's consistency in an interview he gav«
The U.S. News & World Report in February of 1951. And he wai
asked a question about the threat posed by the Soviets--th«
submarine threat and the air threat. And I think his response is
interesting. It sorts of sums up his basic ideas. "In that
connection, the air defense problem and the anti-submarine
problem at certain points a similarity. The worst place tc
protect a ship is where the ship is. The worst place to protect
a convoy is at the convoy. The best place is at the bases frorr
which the airplane or the submarine comes. The next best place
is on route, the worst place is at the target. " Sherman dies in
July of 1951. His strategic concept-- what I think is basically a
maritime strategy-was in place. It remained in place at least
until 1953. Why it's lost is another ques t i on- -maybe we can
answer that in the question and answer period--! don't have time
to go into that. But I think that if you look at the period of
1946-1953, the Navy has a post-war strategic concept-
-
i t ' s very
well developed. It essentially resembles the maritime strategy
and the man whose imprint is all over it, in the records and in
the ideas and in the conceptions is Forrest Sherman, who I think
perhaps we could very well consider the Father of The Maritime
Strategy. Thank you.
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Origins of the Maritime Strategy
Dr. Roger Barne t t- -Nat lonal Security Research
Good morning. Thought I'd change the tempo a little bit and
pt you off with perhaps a little apocryphal story. It's a
iwman and like all strawmen, it's also a bit of a caricature.
;oes like this. The maritime strategy was first composed by
» commanders and Lt . Commanders down in OP-603 in the fall and
Lng of 1981-82. Their effort was in response to a question of
) to write a strategic story for the Navy that would provide
necessary link between policy, plans and programs. The
iuct , zero-based and woven from whole cloth, was designed to
/ide a justification for the 600 ship Navy and for a force
;1 of 15 aircraft carrier battle groups. The intention was to
Lculate a new, aggressive, forward war-fighting policy that
id be well received by the Reagan Administration and thereby
:ure a larger budget share for the Navy. Portions of the
itegy in particular were targeted at the Reagan defense team,
;cially the e mp hasis on direct attacks on the Koala Peninsula
n carriers, anti-ballistic missile submarine actions and the
/'s part in horizontal escalation. The time looked right to
i as much distance as possible from the Eurocentric approach
;he Carter Administration and part company boldly with the
ion that all the Navy does is haul, ash and trash. That is,
Navy did not want to be stuck with the unglamorous solely of
;nding the sea lines to Europe, and some peacekeeping and
sis work. It had more interesting and risky tasks in mind for
Jlf. Because this was essentially an in- the-Pentagon job
luse it was pointed at the budget process primarily and not
ird establishing war planning guidance for the fleets and
luse it called for actions that were not in accordance with
"ent guidance or with allied doctrine, the strategy had to be
'-ten without reference either to U.S. operating forces or to
allies. In order to make the case it wanted to make,
iover, the strategy had to whitewash certain issues,
13
especially the questions of nuclear war at sea and Sovie
strategy. Finally, the strategy was carefully crafted to ensun
the Navy's historic Pacific bias would be perpetuated. The brea!
with the Carterites would facilitate this and provide a subtly
cover for it. The strategy succeeded in a way that surprise!
even its most enthusiastic supporters. It captured th<
administration, was used with great effort by a very vigorous anc
active Secretary of the Navy, to support and rationalize a larg«
Navy program that included additional aircraft carriers
converted many critics to the Navy's point of view, captured c
much larger budget share and for all these reasons, especially
the last, outraged the other services.
Now I'm going to--from this point- -proceed as George Will
once said about one of his cri tics-- " 1 ike a pyromaniac in a fielc
of straw men. " The facts of the situation are that the maritime
strategy in all capital letters, as you see it in slick
publication from the Naval Institute and in internal documents
that was put down on paper about 1981, did in fact originate ir
OP-603 with a bunch of guys. And it was, in fact, in response tc
a request from the VCNO at the time, and unknown how much farther
the up- the-reques t went--but it probably it was with Admiral
Small and there most of the similarity with the strawman ends.
Most of the rest of that is strictly strawman that I threw at
you, that had a ring of something that seemed to make a lot of
sense. And I can walk through and talk about each and every one
of the things that were in the strawmen. But I'll be selective
about it and I'll pick some, because my job here is to really
trace the roots of the maritime strategy.
First of all, I think to trace the roots of the maritime
strategy, you have to set forth its most important elements. And
the most important elements of the maritime strategy, as it
exists in people's heads--and let me say, as a digression, but a
small and important di gress i on- - that what Pete Swartz and I set
out to do was to put the maritime strategy in such a form and to
publicize it in such a way that when someone said to a Naval
14
cer--mari time strategy- -an image popped into his head and he
i--yeah I know what that is. And that's all we intended to
I understand now from my friends in the Pentagon and the
n that if you say maritime strategy to the Army, something
into their head too. But that was a byproduct-
- 1 1 wasn't
intention. We wanted to standardize some thinking about
time strategy and to have a common image throughout the
i orm serv 1 ces
.
So let me then set forth the things that I believe are
ossary
,
to trace the roots of the strategy. It has to be
r^ard strategy. It has to operate on the basis of a theater
tactical offensive, from seaward axis, in the context, at
t initially, of a strategic defensive war. That is,
:>nsive operations from the sea, but the war strategy,
tially at least, has to be defensive, by the nature of our
utry and our coalitions. The Soviet Union is the enemy. And
:, sideshows ciphon effort from central objectives. This will
i coalition war in concert with allies abroad who help occupy
li purchases or land anchors to operate maritime forces from
! to increase the leverage of maritime forces. Coalitions are
13 necessary and important to share burdens and to allow some
fent of specialization. And the strategy intends to use all
KS of U.S. Naval service, to best advantage, in coordination
i all U.S. sister services. And finally, that within the
ategy, and with all strategies, uncertainties and risks are
5rent and inevitable and the important thing to do about
ertainties and risks is that you make them as explicit as you
sibly can, to demonstrate your recognition and understanding
them. Risks are absolutely necessary. I spend a lot of time
";he Washington area and in talking with students and friends
people who don't themselves spend a lot of time thinking
lit these things--that there are no really important successful
k-free strategies. Strategies have to have elements of risk.
then the question is--how much risk do you want to accept?
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Now, at this juncture, I'm going to part company--but really
only brief ly--wi th Mike Palmer's analysis of where the routes in
the maritime strategy go. Because they really go back to Mahan-
yes. Now I say Mahan--and I look out and I see yet amigo--my
eyes glaze over--no, it's not all that bad because I'm talking
about a different Mahon than most of you now. I'm talking about
the Mahon who wrote The Problems of Asia . Now people say--but
that's not his most important work. Well maybe it is his most
important work because in a lot of ways the problems of Asia
tends to satisfy and rebut many of Mahon ' s critics. And you can
find lots and lots of the roots and the elements of the maritime
strategy in Mahon's Problems of Asia , published in 1905.
Let me give you just a few excerpts because the flavor of
them is very nice. These are quotes, and with some ellipses
which I won't point out. But I haven't destroyed the sense by
being e 1 1 ip t i cal - - f or anyone who has read The Problems of Asia --
you have to be elliptical because it's almost impossible to read,
but it certainly is, I think important for this conference to
know, that Mahon is, I think, the genuine Father of the Maritime
Strategy and was writing and thinking about the problem of Asia
when he did so. And this is a conference on Asia. Of course,
Mahon believed that the problem of Asia was Russia and he said,
"Russia is working geographically to the southward in Asia by
both flanks--her center covered with the mountains of Afghanistan
and the desserts of Eastern Turkistan and Mongolia. Nor is it
possible, even if it were desired, to interfere with this
extended line. For the Russian center cannot be broken. It is
upon and from the flanks of this great line that restraint upon
Russia, if needed, must come. It is the interests of Russia not
merely to reach the sea at more points and more independently,'
but to acquire extensive maritime regions, the returns of which
shall rebound to the general prosperity of the entire empire,
[that is, the Russian empire]. The struggle as a raid will be
i
between land power and sea power. The recognition that these two
are the primary constants does not ignore the circumstance that
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h land power will try to reach the sea and utilize it for its
\f. ends while the sea power must obtain support on land. Henson
i ws solidarity of interest between Germany, Great Britain,
a an and the United S tates " -
-
thi s is in 1905 I need to remind
Hi. Now why did he leave out France'' France is explicitly
x luded and he calls a conspicuous artificial exception because
t the time she was allied with Russia. "Upon one flank of the
isian line lies the army of Japan. Upon the other 5000 miles
Y.y , that of Germany. The two extremes of the Russian line thus
pn to attack are most inadequately connected by rail. And
Bally, from the conditions, we must be an effective Naval force
r the Pacific. We must similarly be an effective Naval force in
i Atlanti c- - there ' s a global view. Not for the defense of our
ttist, primarily, but immediately as is commonly thought, for m
s'fare however, much in defense of right the Navy is not
Mediately an instrument of defense but of offense. " Now this
s Mahon ' s way of saying--you have to have allies, you have to
i r e them on both sides of the Soviet Union, you have to have a
cward strategy and it has to be offensive. Now where are the
ots of the maritime strategy"7 They're in Mahon ' s Problems of
;_a in straightforward. And I agree with Mike Palmer--I was
nught on also to the Forrest Sherman works and particularly his
:'.efing of President Truman in 1947, which is a classic and has
the various elements including breaking the war down into
iises .
Now, to sort of hopscotch Mike Palmer's area and to say, for
part, I think that Mahon was really the Father--and Mahon
so, you realize, writing in 1905, antedated
<inder in a very geopolitical vision and a very deep
ierstanding of the offset between land power and sea power. He
iedates McKinder's address before the World Geographic Society
Great Britain. And is really the Father of that geopolitical
ige as we 1 1 .
Now I will bracket Mike Palmer's period and come up to the
[*ly 60's. By the early 60 ' s , the Navy's missions were pretty
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well defined. The fleet ballistic missile submarine force was
coming into effect and was going to be responsible for a
(
strategic deterrence. There were ASW carriers and escort ships :
and nuclear attack submarines that were primarily for the defense'
of the sea lanes from attack by Soviet submarines. And the
attack carrying amphibious forces were to be the cutting edge in
fighting limited wars and a principle agent for deterring the
Soviets and their proxies from initiating conventional
aggression. Burke, of course, was the first CNO to articulate
great concern over the growing nature of the Soviet threat at
sea. But he was basically unable to convince the Eisenhower or
Kennedy Administrations or the Congress to support what he
regarded as minimum essential funding for the Navy. The bulk of
the ship-bui lding funds went to the Polaris program and the new
attack carriers. So in the case of CNO's McDonald and Moorer,
funds were diverted primarily for large modern escorts for the
carriers, that were required under Burke in the 50 ' s , to complete
the carrier replacement program and very importantly, to fight
the war in Vietnam.
All the polaris submarines of course were constructed in the
1960's. The heavy aircraft carrier was relieved of its primary
nuclear attack role in 1962 which freed the aircraft carriers for
what the Navy might have called more agreeable tasks, since its
strategic flanks were covered by the polaris force. But thej
language- -even the language of the maritime strategy- -you can
extend back and find throughout- - for example, Arley Burke wrote
that the carriers and their aircraft are the backbone of our
Naval striking power that can be projected overseas and carry the
fight to the enemy. The same language that you find appearing in
the maritime strategy. The same from Vice CNO RickettS in the
early 60 ' s as well. But for the Navy, there was an important 1
turning point in the 60's in which the carriers were at their
zenith but phased out of the primary nuclear role. 1962 saw the
Cuban Missile Crisis--the greater emergence of the Soviet Navy in
Vietnam and so forth. But by the end of the decade of the 60's,
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< focus was really very tightly laid on the obsolescence of the
5. fleet. And about 2/3 of the ships toward the end of the
m were approaching their 20th anniversary.
1968, the Navy numbered 957 battle forces. For 1978, it was
i(--less than half. This has kind of a capturing effect on
n's mind and you can see through this per l od- -be ing preoccupied
m by the Vietnam War and by the terrible shrinkage of the
<st. There's sort of a hole in at least articulated strategy.
» that period is just about coming to light in the declassified
laments so the question of what was going on in the classified
:ne remains to be studied by the Navy Historical Center and
fjers . But in the open literature which I've surveyed fairly
lefully, there isn't an awful lot of discussion of strategy.
ire is a lot of discussion of force sizing, however, and while
iral Zumwalt was in a very tight spot in the early 70 ' s , he
change some of the priorities. And from his point of view,
certainly is explicable. He felt in the early 70's that the
rier force was pretty solid and would be for a while. The
ategic side seemed to be in very good shape and so that he
ht to devote his major emphasis on sea control and he argued
y strongly that with the power projection mission, the
ategic missions in pretty good shape, that the Navy ought to
n its attention and emphasis and he thought he could influence
i get better support in the budgetary process by emphasizing
I sea control side of the equation.
But he next important data point, I think, has to do with
i question of the roots of the 600 ship Navy. And I have a
'tty good quotation here. It says, 'where about 500 ships
'vides us with a slim margin of superiority now, it's my
>nion that we should have about 600 active ships by the mid
>0's in order to maintain this slim margin of superiority."
is comes from testimony, not by Admiral Watkins but by Earle
iloway in 1975. And the Secretary of the Navy said, "the
>y's solution to this critical issue of the size and the
ucture of the Navy is a balanced force objected level of 600
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active ships in the Navy by the mid-1980's.' This from the
Secretary of the Navy--not Lehrman , but Mi t tendor f - -and this was
in a 1976 article.
And on the question of the 15 carrier groups--the 15 has
kind of a magical quality actually as the number of capital
ships. It's the number of capital ships we came out of the
Washington Naval Conference with. Of course they were
battleships, but the United States had 15 battleships. If you
take a look at capital ships plotted over time, you find that for
aircraft carriers, for example, for the last 25 years, the number
has varied from 16 to 13 and it was only 13 for one year. The
number mostly is 15— I have some graphic plots to demonstrate
that. So 15 is not particularly an extraordinary or astounding
number. The forward to Jane's Fighting Ships, 1967-68 says,
"building to 15 aircraft carriers has long been considered the
minimum operational requirement for the United States Navy.'
"Fifteen aircraft carriers, the modern design, has been
determined as the minimum number needed for peacetime, for
limited engagements since World War II. Whether 15 carriers is
an adequate number under wartime conditions is open to question."
This was Admiral Thomas Moorer in 1970.
So the point I'm making here is that neither the 600 ship
Navy nor the 15 carrier battle group Navy nor any of the basic
war-fighting principles came out of the setting forth of the
maritime strategy in OPNAV in the early 60 ' s . Now as far as the
Pacific bias goes, this is a really tough one to prove, if you
take a look at any of the indicators. During the Second World
War and before the Second World War, it is absolutely clear that
the Navy had a very strong Pacific bias. After all, that's where
they figured that their primary enemy was going to be, in Japan.
After the Second World War, the fleet was essentially located in
the Atlantic. All the large aircraft carriers were located in
the Atlantic. The Midway-class aircraft carriers were all in the
Atlantic. As a matter of fact, we fought the entire Korean War
with all our large aircraft carriers - -our newest aircraft
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riers--in the Atlantic. They never went into the Pacific.
we fielded strategic forces— ballistic missile submarines—
went to the Atlantic. The Midway-class carrier made its
t deployment in the Pacific in 1958. If you take a look at
force levels, you will find that for the past 25 years, with
e exception of a very small blip during the height of the
e nam War, combatant ship force levels favor the Atlantic, all
e way across the board. And the disparity is becoming larger
time. And so it's very difficult to make the argument— if
x. take a look at what the Navy was doing with its ships. When
e battleships were reactivated at the time of the Korean War—
v didn't go to Korea, they went in the Atlantic. And I have
>e grateful for Pete Swartz for showing me some of these data
nts and making my search for them a little more pointed. So,
can wave your arms about the Navy's always having this great
fie focus. But if you take a look at what the Navy was doing
what it thought it was doing and where the forces were going,
d find that they were not going to the Pacific.
I'd like to close by saying that the maritime strategy—
e;.n the maritime s trategy- - the thing that's supposed to evoke
nthing in your mind— was conceived and takes its place as a
fining documen t - - no t an operational document. Clearly and
rectly and very sensitively, from the point of the view of the
ole who worked on this and are working on it— in the
i, agon— the unified commanders shoulder the responsibility for
national planning. The maritime strategy, in contrast, as it
ftes
,
considers the ideal - -given the forces, given expectations
<it how those forces will perform, given alliances functioning
they were designed, given domestic political will, given
vet force actions in accordance with intelligence estimates,
short, given that all the uncertainties that are specifically
iculated in the strategy, will turn out not to be wholly
ivorable, the strategy still offers only the direction in
ph U.S. maritime forces should be guided. And while we do owe
-eat deal to Admiral Forrest Sherman, the strategy and how
21




J.T. There's at least one other person in the world who agrees
with Roger, with the historical antecedents and that's a
fellow named Ginrich Truf amienko-- f rom the Institute for the
U.S.A. and Canada— he's a Soviet academician and he has just
recently published a book which is required reading for many
of my students, called The U.S. Military Doctrine . He does
cite the Mahon piece that Roger referred to--as the
antecedent
.
R.B. I don't quote from Trufamienko.
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Commander Cort Wagner, USN
CINCPACFLT Strategic Planning Officer
Well, good morning. I'm Commander Cort Wagner. I'm from
UPACFLT, not from CINCPAC, and Colonel Molyneaux is here from
MPAC--he'll be speaking later. I'd like to give you a real
f overview of CINCPACFLT concept of operations and a brief
at a war fighting strategy. This is real world now. I have
llusions to Mahon or Forrest Sherman. I'm going to have
t difficulty in my memo to Admiral Lyons, to let him know
he is not the architect of the Pacific maritime strategy,
afraid this conference has put me in a great deal of
o ardy .
What I'd like to do is take a very brief 1 ook- -unders tand ing
ourse that the strategy and the concept that I'll be briefing
rves both from considerations of geography and the Soviet
rat. So I'd like to spend a few minutes this morning looking
he real world considerations of the Pacific theater, followed
ith a brief overview of the Soviet threat. And of course we
v Sovietologists here and experts who can comment on those
tr. And then looking briefly at the Pacific Fleet and the
s ons 1 bi 1 i t 1 es of the fleet, a brief outline of a concept of
e|ations to take the war to the Soviets in the Pacific. And
e, finally, I hope to stimulate your interest with some slides
ecent operations of the last year that we've conducted in the
cfic Fl eet- - focus ing primarily on Exercise Colonel Potlatch,
ih was an amphibious operation in January of this year in the
e tians
.
We can look at the first slide, please. It's hard for me to
eit--how everyone in the back see them alright? Good. First
11, the size of the Pacific of course--I'm preaching to the
cr here, but it has a great deal of impact on the concept of
cations in terms of the fact that we clearly can't have our
res back in San Diego or Pearl Harbor. If we have to take the
r to the Soviets, we need to be forward placed. And I have
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slides later that show that. Of particular importance is thai
red blotch down on the bottom- - that ' s the parking area that's
reserved for conference participants here in Monterey- -no , it'<
not. That's what I felt like this morning when I left th«
parking lot. That's the actual size of the Medi terranean-- in its
longitude in the Paci f ic- -where it would fall. It gives you, a
hope, an appreciation of the shear size and the complexity o!
being able to support operations throughout the vastness of the
Pacific theater.
Some other considerations on this graph should come to viev
right away. Number one of primary importance is the fact that we
share a common border with the Soviet Union here in the Pacific--
2,000 mile border stretching from the Northern Tip of Okaido tc
the Bering Strait. The Soviets are vulnerable and exposed along
that border. It gives us a capability of being able to take the
fight to the Soviets early and if we are able to achieve some
offensive operations, make a strategic difference in terms of
global war. Last, but not least, is the importance of the
Pacific as reflected in the next viewgraph. These trade figures
at the bottom are in open j ournal s - - they ' re staggering to the
imagination. By 1986, our trade with the Paci f 1 c- - two- way trade
is now 467. greater than it is with Europe. This should not
reflect, necessarily, a refocus of s trategy- -on ly to point out
that we cannot neglect the Pacific in considerations of global
war .
Also depicted on here are those sea lines of communications
--that's just a few of them. One that is of increasing
importance to us is that slot between Valdez and the west coast
of the U.S. --one that is very critical for us to defend--as we
now inport far more oil from Valdez than we do from the Persian
Gulf. Next graphic please.
The importance of the Pacific hasn't been lost on the
Soviets either. The bottom line figure of 719 total surface
ships is readily acknowledged right up front--that the Soviets
have— about 95 major surface combatants- - fri gate size and larger.
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719 ships is only to point out that this is the largest of
4 Soviet fleets now. And it also contains, as you can see
y 100 ships in the Soviet Pacific Fleet alone than we'll have
we get to the 600 ship U.S. Navy. Also of significance in
graph- -because the introduction since 1984--of 2 Kiev-class
?iers. And since 1985, the Kirov cruiser--the Prunza--and
3 the Sobormeny and Utilod EDGs--so there's been not only a
ititative increase but a significant qualitative increase as
L . Next slide.
Soviets aren't keeping these ships in Vladivostok or Petter
bey're sortieing these sh i ps - - they ' re starting to use them
ie frequently in large scale exercises. As you can see,
He ' s been fully a 100% increase in out-of-area ship days
teen 1976 and 1985. There was a slight drop-off in 'Se-
rver the overall percentage in terms of Soviet Fleet worldwide
? at i ons - -remai n the same. And there was no drop off in that
"entage in the Pacific.
Looking now at the next graph i c- -Sovi et submarine threat--
?Soviets have 125 or so submarines in the Pacific. It's the
"tactical submarines depicted here that are of the greatest
" ern to us because these submarines represent the single
=test challenge to the execution of the CINCPACFLT war
[ting strategy. Of course the Okula and the Kilo submarines
: indigenous to the Pac i f i c- -bui 1 1 at Comsomo shipyard and then
:.ted down the river to Vladivostok. And it is, as I've said,
fle 100 submarines that we're vitally concerned about. Next
L
Soviet air threat. As you can see, the Soviet Far East
i
lander can draw on 1750 aircraf t- - that ' s a very large number.
: there's been a significant qualitative increase as well as
i large number of aircraft that we have to deal with--with the
"oduction of Backfires, since 1981, and the upgrading of the
' including the introduction of the Bear Hotel which routinely
-»s Alcam strike profile missions to the east of Dutch Harbor.
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And with the Bear Gulf which flies many strike missions agains
Alaskan targets in the Northern Pacific. Next graph.
Showing here the effective combat radius of some of thes
aircraft. As you can see, from Anidear--which is way up in th:
north here, in the Bering Sea, Bear Hotels can fly the entir
area and they can even reach targets in CONUS--from Anidea--an
you can see that in Hawaii, we're vulnerable to that Bear Hote
as well--that's the Aqua-equipped- -that ' s the Soviet long rang
air launch cruise missile, with a 1500 nautical mile range. Nex
one please
.
Soviet Far East ini t i at i ves- - the important of the Pacifi
hasn't been lost either. Starting first now, I'd like to briefly
review what they've done politically, economically am
militarily. I apologize for Foreign Minister Shevernadze ' s nam<
being misspelled. On the political side, the Vladivostok speed
of July 28, 1986 marked a benchmark. When Gorbachev announce!
the intentions and design of the Soviets to become a full Asiai
power. And what he's followed that up with was Foreigi
Minister's Shevernadze ' s mission significantly to Australia
Indonesia, Malaysia and then into Vietnam, espousing th<
peacefulness of the intentions of the Soviet Union, to become ar
Asian power. They've also very cynically supported the nuclear
free zone ini t i at i ves - -bo th the South Pacific nuclear free zone,
the Sean Fizz Southeast Asian nuclear free zone, and the zone oi
peace and freedom in navigation in the Indian Ocean. The
Soviets, as you will recall, have signed the protocols-- they have
not yet ratified those protocols for Spin Fizz. The Unitec
States made its decision not to sign those protocols. The
Soviets, in signing the protocols, very cynically said, however,
that if any of the signatories to the South Pacific nuclear free
zone, were to allow a nuclear armed or nuclear capable ship intc
their ports, the Soviets would reserve the right to refuse
ratification. As of yet, they have not, as I've said.
Economically, the Soviets have been attempting to expand in
numerous directions. Fishing agreements -- they have signed two
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sing agreements with South Pacific island nations. The first
ewith the island nation of Kurabas -- those of you who are not
nr, liar with Kurabas, because it's not really a household name--
r.bas contains, among other places, the Gilbert Islands where
ought a very nasty battle in World War II at Terrawa, and
r awa was the capital of that island nation. That treaty has
ne expired. However, the Soviets followed that up with a
sty with another non-household named nation of Boniwato.
n wato- -those of you will recall--was formerly the New Hebrides
l.nds where we had our largest fleet concentration in World War
So there are some geopolitical considerations with those
sing agreements. That fishing agreement with Boniwato, by the
M permits the Soviets shore access. The Kurabas agreement did
t And the Soviets have exercised that shore access on
rrous occasions this year.
The Soviets have also been attempting to expand their
nercial con tacts - -no t just with South Pacific nations--but
; nations in general--targeting primarily on Indonesian and
:N countries. And they've attempted to establish merchant
:lirs with Fulsako shipyard which is right next to Subic Bay in
lla and they've come in to the Philippine government and said
( want to repair our merchants in Fulsako, which cf course
J d give them an ideal intelligence collection platform against
: c Bay. As yet, Cory Aquino's government has refused that
: ss .
Finally, mi 1 1 tar 1 ly- - the Soviet Pacific Fleet agam--the
' est of their four fleets--as you can see, the numbers of
'Sions of the potent Soviet air force and Soviet naval
i.tion that we've seen--and a growing and impressive power
:ection capabilities. So in all three elements, it's clear to
n the Pacific Fleet, that the Soviets are making great
rdes toward becoming that Asian power. Next slide.
This is one that Admiral Lyons likes to portray and in fact,
this particular slide in his Congressional testimony in
h of this year to the Senate Armed Services Committee. And
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he likes to point out that from the ordinarily what we think of
in the Pacific or the Vladivostok and Pe tro . . . - - the standard
fleet operating bases--but what the Soviets have done over the:
last 10 or 15 years is--they've established a veritable ring of
bases, giving them the wherewithal to interdict the essential sea
lines of communications, stretching from Gaholik at the bottom
and D... in Ethiopia, eastward across to Sucottra which they
utilize as an anchorage- -wi th fleet operations throughout the
Indian Ocean- -carry ing on to Camp... song and then Cameron Bay.
Cameron Bay in 1975 had two piers--now have 7--the Soviets are
building the 8th. And the air facility at Cameron Bay, which is
the finest runway in Southeast Asia--10,000 feet--the best runway
probably that our air force and seabees built--now being utilized
by squadrons of MIG-23 ' s- -al so Bears and Badgers, routinely.
There's also 20-25 Soviet combatants in 3-5 submarines on any
given day, in Cameron Bay.
Continuing on, the fishing agreements there with Kurabas and
with Boniwato--no Soviet fleet operat i ons --however , their fishing
fleets are known intelligence collectors. And the fishing fleet
in Boniwato is operating with an oceanograph i c research vessel at
all times. Continuing on to Hawai i - -where the Soviets routinely
station a Soviet intelligence col 1 ector- - frequent ly operating
just at the three miles from the channel entrance to Pearl
Harbor--and then continuing on to the West Coast operations. So
the Soviets, as you can see, have definitely expanded their
mi 1 i tary reach
.
Turning now to the responsibilities of the Pacific Fleet. I
think the first and foremost element is that we need to enhance
deterrents. And so our operations are designed to do that. We
are attempting to demonstrate to the Soviets that we have a
capability of taking the fight to the Soviets early, if
necessary, if deterrence should fail.
The second sub-bullet here is exceptionally to the Pacific
war fighting strategy. And it is in close cooperation with our
sister services and allies. We're working extremely close with
28
air force, with the coast guard and the Marda Pact rule, and
: our allies, particularly with Japan--to continue to enhance
>|rrents and make sure we don't have to fight. And finally,
r.ver
,
if deterrence, to be prepared to engage the enemy and
Capabilities of the Pacific Fleet are growing. As you can
1981, we probably reached the bottom--227 3hips. We've
t up the force by 1986 to 278, building to 300. Significant
iers here to look at--first of all, we'll get our 7th carrier
990 and then, as you can see, there's a significant increase
1986-1990 in the number of cruisers. That'll be the
oduction of 7 Aegis cruisers, which give us not only a force
lplier capabi 1 l ty- -s igni f i cant protection for our carrier
le groups, allowing us to move closer to the Soviets,
ler. And last, but not least, an interesting fact--I think
a lot of people don't realize or recognize about the Aegis
sers
.
The standard missile shooter in the U.S. Navy- - there '
s
t 1000 moving parts on that above-deck surface to air
cher--it takes 12 gunner's mate and about $7, 000, 000 in spare
s to keep that missile launcher working. With the Bunker
which is now introduced into the Pacific Fleet, there's
e moving parts on its vertical launch sys tern- - three gunner's
s and about $300,000 worth of spare parts required to keep it
tioning. So this is a significant enhancement to our ability
ake the fight to the enemy. Next slide.
Concept of operations now-turning very briefly to it--fully
upport of the CINCPAC war fighting s trategy- -and Colonel
neaux will be giving us some insights on that--it's designed
he premise of taking the Soviets out of the Pacific. We feel
strongly at PACFLT , that on the political and economic side,
Soviets are going to strive very very hard and significantly,
increase their political and economical prestige in the
fie. But it's unlikely that they're going to have much
ess. Given that fact, the Soviets have only one means of
ly projecting power--of influencing events in the Pacific--
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and that's through their mi 1 i tary- - inherent in the Soviet Navy
and Soviet Air Force. So we're going to take that out of the
Pacific. We're going to remove that, if we go to war, and
therefore in the post-war considerations, the Soviets are going
to have no means of influencing events in that theater. By doing
so, and going on the offensive, we're going to carry out the
defense of the United States. It's the *1 priority of U.S.
CINCPAC. And last, but not least, we're going to complement the
capabilities of our fleet with our allies and our sister
servi ces
.
Looking now at some initial actions. This has got a lot of
arrows, but I think the point here is that we're trying to
demonstrate that we're going to be in position early to take the
fight to the Soviets, should deterrence fail. To do so, we need
to move our submarines forward- -we ' ve only got 42 SSN's in the
Pacific and two diesel subs--the Barbell and the Darter which
both go out in 1990. And the Soviets, as you saw, have over 100.
So we can't possibly count and track everyone of them. We must
be in position to know what the Soviets are going to do with
their submar mes - -whether they're going to operate in a bastion
or whether they're going to flush them--so the speed and timing
of the SSN deployments are critical. We're going to use some of
the new elements such as Surtas--the Tago ships - -c ivi 1 ian manned
military sealift charters. These ships give us extremely good
coverage against latest generation Soviet submarines. We're
going to have our carrier battle forces in pos i t ion- -bo th ready
to conduct strikes from the Northern Pacific if there happens to
be a carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean--we're going to try
to withdraw that after we're struck the Soviet Indian Ocean
squadrons. So that we can take care of the Soviet facilities in
Cameron Bay, because they lend our facilities in Subic and Clark,
vulnerable. So we need to take them out early. And we're going
to operate our carrier battle forces to secure our vital northern
flank along the Aleutians and to secure the defense of the United
States. Next slide.
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I mentioned before that the CINCPACFLT war fighting strategy
>r)lements the capabilities of the fleet with our allies. This
i slide from PACAV--from the Pacific air forces. Their *1
rity objective, as you can see, is to blunt Soviet naval
'^ition bases and Soviet power projection capabilities, by
,nking those bases—both in Vietnam and Cameron Bay, Soviet
l iland and along the Sakhalin Peninsula.
The third bul 1 e ts- -s i gni f i cant for U.S. Navy operations.
H/'re going to support offensive and defensive operations with
Us and RC-135 orbits. And the fourth one--sounds like a great
ii? plan--I certainly would want to do the same thmg--but it's
Iprtant to note here that we need to convince the National
unand Authority that we don't want to strike Vladivostok on Day
which is protected by 1000 fighters. That there are other
ret bases and facilities in the Pacific that are far more
nerable, and we're going to try to get them. So we're working
/ closely with PACAV to ensure that we can conduct these
I rat i ons
.
At the same time, looking at the Mardas Pact
pons i bi 1 1 t 1 es , maritime defense zone, they have to provide the
/ important operations listed there in the block, of port
ense and surve l 1 1 ance- -mi ne coun termeasures and port security,
ause we have to defend the United States. And so Mardas Pact,
i Coast Guard and naval f orces - -we ' re working very closely with
i m to ensure those operations as well.
Turning now to brief considerations of Pacific ASW--I
'tioned before that the Soviets have that 2:1 numerical
Vantages in submarines and we can't possibly track all of them.
o, we don't have that nice GIUK gap, with our fixed Sosa
'ays, with lots of allied submarines, and our own, that are
>e to plug that gap. And you can see, from Pe tro-Pavlas , that
i Soviets virtually can moved out in a fan-shaped fashion,
iwhere in the Pacific. So the Pacific ASW problem is critical.
Turning to the next cons iderati on- - looking at allied ASW
ces
, counting whether we're looking at air assets, surface
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assets, diesel or nuclear submarines, our allies bring more 'k
the fray in the Atlantic than they do in the Pacific. So the A:;
operations are critical. Ok.
What I'd like to do now is look very briefly at some of ov
recent operations. And let you know what some of the Sovi«,
reactions were to these. And then perhaps Rich Haver, late:
will have some comments on these as well. Just about 13 montt
ago--a little over 13 months— Long Beach was deployed in tl
Western Pacific and we took her up to the Aleutians. We fired
Tomahawk. This was the first Tomahawk ever launched off tH
instrumented range. You can see the flight profile of th
Tomahawk shot- -roughly 550 miles--71 nautical miles. And you a
also see the Soviet reaction--it was intense. We did thi
operation overtly because we wanted the Soviets to see th
capability of the Tomahawk. It came in on Canag Island--ju£
west of Adak--as depicted here in the v i ewgraph- -and the missic
was successful. Of particular significance again is the fac
that we demonstrated our capability of being able to launc
Tomahawk and the Tomahawk has demonstrated its capability c
doing the terrain contour matching profile.
Next operation, which is very significant, Vincent battl
group and deployment- -she left as you can see--from the 12th o
August--made an overt transit for four days to the west coast o
the United States and then made a covert transit, starting wit
the 16th--punched into the Bering Sea to become the first U . S,
carrier to operate in the Bering Sea--north of the Aleutian
since World War II--punched in on the 22nd and about 60 hour
later punched out--on the 23rd of August, she conducted tw
mirror image strikes. These strikes would have been mirro
imaged against either Anadear or Pe tro-Pavlas- - they were flown o
the same distance and contained the same amount of strik
aircraft as a normal strike profile would have been, agains
either one of those targe ts- -however , flown against Alaska. An
during that time, the Soviet surveillance effort was intense
However, all of the Soviet surveillance effort was directed sout
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'the Aleutians and the Vincent battle group remained undetected
loughout her entire transit until the 28th of August when she
i picked up by Bear aircraft southeast of the Kurils. Next
L'de.
About two weeks later, we search-deployed the Ranger. She
jit the 22nd of August--made a covert transit on her rhumb line
)the Segaro Straits. During that particular transit, until the
Jh of September- -so from the 22nd of August till the 12th of
itember--a period of roughly 17 days or so--she remained
letected. When she finally was detected on the 12th of
;t ember, she was 350 miles south of Beravesnik- - wh i ch is a very
nor tan t Soviet fighter base in the Kurils--one that we would
it to take out as a high priority target early in the war.
These carrier operations are very important because it
ionstrates to the Soviets that finding our carriers and
mating them is not quite as easy. It should also demonstrate
Mus that the carriers are not nearly as vulnerable as one might
id in the press. Next graphic.
This is very significant too, to note that in October of
56, we had six battle groups deployed in the Pac l f l c- - f our
arier battle groups, two battleship battle groups. The thing
it's of importance to us was the fact that each one of these
Jtle groups was fully furnished with weapons - -wi th its beams,
ih its bullets--to conduct operations as required against the
:iets. And again, I just think if you contrasted this with our
iability in 1981, you'll see that this is a significant
ancement of war fighting effectiveness. And perhaps more
lortantly, demonstrates to the Soviets that we have the
sability of putting those battle groups to sea. The Missouri
i go around the world. She set the nuclear movement back about
"years when she went to Sydney and 250,000 people lined up a
V, for three days, while she made her port visit there. The
fcent, as you can see--that's the same Vincent who had just





With the next viewgraph, you'll see Vincent again, coming
back around for Colonel Potlatch. That was quite a deployment
that Vincent had. During this particular exercise, the Vincent
battle group made another covert transit, remained undetected anc
unlocated. And Arg-alpha sortied with those ships, as you car
see--sortied from San Diego--made a covert transit north into the
Bering Sea--the two of them met up and conducted Colonel Potlach.
We landed 800 marines over the period 23-28 January. And I'v«
brought a few pictures this morning that I hope will whet youi
interest here and you can see what the situations were like.
There were about six lows rolling through the area during this
period--sea states were 4-6. Actually that slide [can you jusi
flip that one over, right]--it's the same--but it was backwards--
we conducted 307 tac air sorties for a total of 800 flight hour;
during this period, and that included the AB8 ' s off Bellow Wood
Next pi cture
.
These pictures are black and white, unretouched, day photos
These are not night photos. Next picture. The Sovie
surveillance effort during this exercise was intense. Needles:
to say, they were very very concerned about what we were doing
And of course we have demonstrated now our capability o
conducting an amphibious operation, in the dead of winter, in th'
Aleutians and that lesson cannot be lost on the Soviets. Than
you.
Just to summarize, then, the CINCPACFLT war fightin
strategy--br ief concept of ops and a look at our curren
campaigns, is designed to show that we are able to take the figh
to the enemy in the Pacific and to seize and hold the initiative
Essential elements of the maritime strategy. What we're tryin
to do is influence the global war, and the simultaneous conduc
of a global war--we're going to show the Soviets that we're goin
to cede no area by default and we're going to demonstrate to th
Soviets that we have the capability of removing their Navy an
Air Force--perhaps even seizing some Soviet territory throug
amphibious operations. By doing so we create a strong wa
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mination leveraged to the Soviets, compel them to reassess
ir global aspirations, and finally, in the last analysis, make
trategic difference. Thank you.
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Current Views from Washington and Elsewhere
Captain Peter Swartz, USN--U.S. Mission NATO
What I'm going to try to do is sort of give you an overview;
of where in the open literature, at least, I see we are, vis-a- :
vis the maritime strategy- -and where we're going. And the
primary audience--I mean, obviously the audience for this
presentation is all of you--but the primary target that I was
thinking of when I was scratching out the notes for this were
those folks who are sitting in the backs. Officers of the United
States Navy here in Monterey, studying in the National Security
Affairs curriculum- - 1 isten up. You guys are about to embark, and
you're in the process of embarking, in one of the most exciting
and important aspects of your naval career. Without trying to
take away anything from the absolutely fantastic fun and zest, as
Admiral Zurnwalt used to call it--of the operational Navy and the
really tremendous things that you can accomplish at sea, I'm here
to tell you that you're embarking in one of the finest sub-
specialties of the United States Navy and one in which the world
is going to be your oyster. You see, sitting up here in front of
you, actual practicing warriors who are on their shore tours--
like Commander Wagner--get involved in what you just saw and
getting involved in. As you get older and more seasoned in the
.
business, you can do such things as Roger Barnett when he was a
captain and on active duty--which is spearhead the effort to
rewrite the way the entire world thinks about maritime strategy. '
When you retire, after a full and successful Naval career, both
operational billets and in strategic planning, you'll join the
ranks of such illustrious people as Admiral Bob Hanks, who is
sitting in front of you down in the first row--who never stopped
for a minute, writing and speaking and thinking about new
maritime strategy. A Mark Helgason, sitting in the audience, who
is a graduate of your program, and who's had a full set of fine
operational tours and who is heading out right now to be CO of a
surface combatant-
- i s also, when he's ashore, doing the same
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rts of things that we've been talking about here. It's a
nderful aspect of being in the Navy and career— it's exciting
,'s very important to the Navy and it's exceedingly important to
e country. Well enough of that commercial on the political,
litary, strategic planning subspecialty.
The maritime s trategy- -where is it right now. Well, I'm
ing to talk about a variety of communities and where I see they
e, vis-a-vis the maritime strategy and where it's going. First
d foremost, I want to talk about the U.S. Navy. How's the Navy
el about the strategy in my view? Well the Navy is a pretty
g place and it's a conglomerate and in any office and certainly
any O-Club in the Navy, and in the mess decks of the ships
at are implementing the deterrent aspects of the maritime
rategy that Commander Wagner talked about, there are some views
the maritime strategy. And you can probably find them all.
t by and large, if you try and get your arms around the entire
stitution, and you tried to sum things up, I think you could
y that the U.S. Navy is satisfied with the effort that it's
de over the last half dozen years on maritime strategy. We're
tisfied to the extent that we've developed that which needed to
developed, coalesced and brought together the various strains,
th in terms of geography, in terms of the types of topics that
eded to be covered, and in terms of the history of both the
ople that came before us in the dim past, like Mahon and in the
t-so-dim past like Forrest Sherman and the people who came
fore us in the very, very recent past--like Admiral Heywood and
ptain Jim Patton. That we've done justice to their vision and
've tried very hard to provide a common vision and a common
cabulary for the Navy to use today and tomorrow. We've managed
revitalized the internal strategic debate of the Navy, which
,
as Dr. Barnett pointed out, one of the main reasons we were
ying to put pen to paper. So that when maritime strategy was
scussed
, naval officers, be they Its in submarines or captains
surface ships or admirals of the civil engineer corps, would
ve a certain vision of what it was that their Navy was being
37
asked to do and how all of these different pieces related. And
think by and large the Navy is satisfied that we've accomplishe
that .
You know, if you picked up--as I hope you all did, becaus
it was there and the most importantly, it was free--a copy of th
July Proceedings
,
you can see that. You turn to the title pag
of the Proceedings and the lead article is 'Acoustic Showdown fo
the SSN's" by Lt. Kevin Pepy . Now Kevin Pepy never met Pet'
Swartz or Roger Barnett or Admiral Heywood or any of these peopL
in white, and his world is bounded probably by things that ar<
labeled either for presidents or for fish. And that's what h<
knows. And yet he wrote an ar t i c 1 e- -never having met any of us-
and it's called "Acoustic Showdown for the SSN ' s "- -about quietin,:
in the future--and he wrote it and it's in the vocabulary of th'
maritime strategy. And it's in the vocabulary of the maritime
s trategy- - thereby making it useful for Lt . Winfield, also writing
in the same issue of the Proceedings , who was writing about th*
future of the F-14 as a Naval aircraft and where that's got t<
go, and the same vocabulary and the same concepts and the sam*
images, that Lt. Pepy was conjuring up in dealing with an<
debating and so on--were the very same ones that Lt . Winfield
who's got a famous, illustrious family name and who has jus -
stepped literally out of Top Gun--because that was his previous
assignment according to the blurb in the Proceedings , he's usinj
the same wording that he used.
And then when you get into the Pacific focus, which is th<
specific reason why this issue has been presented to this
conference for perusal and attention, you see an interview witl
Admiral Lyons and you see something "Special; The New Thirc
Fleet" by Vice Admiral D.E. Hernandez. What has happened witl
the Third Fleet over the last few years--for those of us thai
have been in the Navy for a while--is exceedingly exciting anc
exceedingly important. We now have four battle ready fleets ir
the United States Navy. And one of them--the Third Fleet--whicl
was for years either a fleet that was discussed with a slight
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rk, especially on the faces of the 7th Fleet mavens among us,
I then/or with a great deal of hand-ringing as to--my God, what





|>re and it's being used. And it is, in fact, our striking arm
the Northern Pacific. And you can read the interview with
liral Hernandez as to how he and Admiral Lyons and others have
)Ught this about.
What have we got? We've got rank from Lt to Admiral - -you ' ve
i surface, submarine and avi ators -
-communi ty representatives--
writing in one issue and an issue of a journal that
oughout all of our uniform career, it was always fashionable
deride as a journal that never had anything to do with
'thing you were really domg--that was nothing but the forum
• the retired community and a few people like Jim Tritten who
:ed to write a lot. And it's relevant and it's important now
I it relates to what we're doing in the active force. And it's
'W-casing the fact that all of us have got a vision that's
pful in enabling us to have internally, a strategic dialogue
ch can't help but help the Navy, the future of the Navy, the
ure of the country and can't help and 1 hope Mr. Haver will
.tion this later--can't help but drive the Soviets clear up a
l--which is certainly something we all had in mind also.
In addition to being satisfied, what else is the Navy'"'' Well
think-
-
in ternal ly in the Navy--the strategic debate is
tamly continuing. Right now, as we speak, revision 4 of the
ernal maritime strategy documentation, which is a classified
'lication, is either on Admiral Muston's desk, which is the
iht place for it to be--it's not up with the Secretary of the
y or up at the War College or whatever - -al 1 of those people
inputs certainly- -but it's with the Deputy Chief of Naval
rations for Plans, Policy and Operations for his perusal and
warding. Or, he's sent it back down to the action officers--
ing redo it again--it still doesn't accord with my vision. At
rate, it is being actively debated and revised in precisely
place where it ought to be- -OPNAV- - to come out again, in a
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revised form. The internal debate is continuing. We're still
trying to refine and hone it and make it relevant to the future.
It has certainly been helpful to the Navy on the hill--
unquestionably. One of the foremost experts of that whole
phenomenon is sitting in the audience here--Mr. Varner Ward, from
the Congressional Research Service--and he can certainly comment
on that--as to what has and hasn't happened. As a matter of
fact, he's already done that in varied publications. And how and
what ways has it helped us on the hill'' It's helped us on the
hill because, for years, the Navy was criticized as "not having
its act together
"
--of being this disparate, conglomerate of
surface and sub-surface and aviators--of Pacific-oriented mavens
and Atlantic-oriented peopl e- -mar ines that were doing their own
things--this group--no more. What do you hear now? Oh, the
Navy's a monolith--a juggernaut. Every time you turn around,
some admiral wants to preach the maritime strategy at you. We're
getting tired of this--all singing off the same sheet--what do
you guys do--go to the same school--this is the same Navy that
was berated not very long ago- -certain ly in the lifetime and
every day of the tour that Admiral Heywood experienced as CNO,
for not having its act together. Boy do we ever have our act
together now.
So we're feeling satisfied and internally, we're neverthe-
ess trying to pursue new directions up at the War College--as Dr.
Bernstein and others of you know--the CNO ' s regularly and people
south of the CNO--the recent ones- -Admiral Watkins and Admiral
Trout--regularly challenge CNA where Ken Weiss and the War
College and other places--to shoot holes in the strategy--to find
places where we haven't done it very well--find places where we
can do things a little better. So the internal mechanisms to
think about strategy, have been institutionalized. And
externally I think the Navy is satisfied to a point where I don't
think you're going to see a great deal of hub-thumping and white
papers and big documents and speaker's bureaus fanning out to the
four corners of the world on maritime strategy. We're there.
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Well, how about the civilian naval is ts- - the people like Bing
t who's sitting in the rear and other people who have written
reat deal about Navy and Naval power'' Well, I think, my
srvation is that they're pretty happy too. Jean Bremmer
,
er people—I'm not trying to slight people— I'm just looking
und— what's happened is— it's given them a way of actually
tributing to the way the blue suit Navy really thinks about
ir own problems. In a way that enables them to actually
luence the blue suit Navy. Because of the commonality of
ion and because of the common vocabulary, a thoughtful
ilian, writing in a journal such as the Institute Proceedings
Naval Forces
,
really can make, to coin a phrase, "the
ategic difference." In terms of writing something that an
lve duty officer can then read and say, "you know, he's right.
re not doing this particular end of it right. We've got to
ik more of it." And of course that has precisely been the
:k record of Bing over the last of the years and certain other
il writers as well— Colin Gray, Norman Friedman, Ronald Warp,
tainly. I think, by and large, civilian navalists are happy
luse it's giving them a way of contributing to what the Navy
actually and really doing. And we're happy, of course,
iuse we're able to better utilize their product.
Civilian ant 1 -Naval is ts are absolutely aghast. You can read
"sheimer or Jack Beatty in the At lant i c - - this month's Atlantic
tdentally has got rebuttals to Beatty's article by Bing West,
nan Friedman, Dick Best and Colin Gray— among other people,
can read Bill Kauffman from Brookings, Homer— and if you've
i them, you've read them, it's done. They haven't got much
|8 to say. They just keep being aghast and keep recycling the
i old stuff and the Navy that they used to have such fun
oting at--this faction-ridden Navy— just doesn't exist
nore
. There isn't an awful lot going on out there that seems




' s all been done. I don't think there's anything
ig on that's very exciting in the anti-world right now. Even
41
though that may change with things that are happening with
submarine warfare and some other areas where we're having
technological change--the allies. Well given the time lag of how
things kick in--serious writing on allied contributions to the
maritime strategy is just starting to kick right about now. And
if you look at the last two issues, for example, of Naval Forces
--I commend the two issues ago to you, especially. Geoffrey
Kill, who's the British writer and who's got probably today the
standard textbook that most people use on naval strategy- -has got
an excellent article in which he talks about how the European
navies all play in a global war with the Soviets. And this is
not a guy that's spent an awful lot of time with all of us and
yet he's got it just about right. And the complementarity of how
the European navies would work with the U.S. Navy in a war with
the Soviets- - 1 1 ' s not by accident that he's got it right. We
made sure that the maritime strategy discussed it in great
length. We were self-consciously allied--as Eric Grove likes to
say--and I think that bore fruit.
In the Far East and in the Pacific, a number of writers, in
Australia, Canada and Japan m par t i cular- -because these three
countries have had, over the last couple of years, very very
important strategic debates of their own- - internal ly . The
strategic debates in Japan is certainly ongoing. And in
Australia and in Canada, we've seen, over the last few months,
the issuance of white papers in which the government has finally
made it up its mind as to what it's going to do in terms of
strategy and both of those papers complement the concepts of the
maritime strategy quite nicely- -especial ly the one in Australia
which was a near thing because we didn't know how that was going
to come out. And yet it does. So by and large, I think the
allied 1 i terature-- the open literature anyway--is quite
supportive of the maritime strategy. In Norway, which is another
country that can be cited where there's an ongoing and active
debate on defense strategy-- what we've got in essence-- we've
managed to tie together the way the whole allied world thinks of
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itime strategy in a way that's enhanced clearly the trans-
lfic dialogue and the trans-Atlantic dialogue. And who knows,
be even the European-Japanese dialogue and the Japanese-
opean dialogue- -and that certainly wouldn't be too shabby at
--if we've done that. I think that some really exciting
ting on allied contributions to maritime strategy in general,
as Roger calls it, THE maritime strategy you're going to see
r the next couple of years.
The Russians, like the civilian ant 1 -naval is ts at home, are
id. The spl een- vent ing and ranting and raving in the open
erature
,
anyway, is quite exciting to read--some of this
iff. We particularly like, of course, the characterization by
Filene, who is a top-flight Soviet propagandist and one of
heavyweights of the current push- -propaganda push of the
iet Union right now--since he's a Gorbachev man--we loved his
.racter izat ion of the maritime strategy as being highly
tgerous and provocative and so on--the worst thing that could
sibly happen--was a phrase that we particularly love. That
tainly, and the phraseology that Dr. Barnett used when he
ned his presentation, certainly exceeded our wildest
•ectations of what we were going to be able to accomplish. To
e the Soviets feel that the maritime strategy is the worst
ng that could possibly happen--is just about, from the
.ndpoint of the uniformed officer corps, and we're thinking
re doing our bit and our job quite nicely right now, along
se lines. But I'm not going to say very much more about it--
absolutely excellent conference on the subject here in
.terey very recently. And should the Institute ever, in its
dom, get it out, you're going to be able to see the
ceedings of that and be able to write away and get the
nscripts for that which was quite a good discussion. And of
irse
, later on, Mr. Haver will be talking about the Soviets and
i can direct your questions to him. Few people know much more
ut the subject than he.
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Our sister services. Well, kind of a mixed bag. Certainly
we've got acceptance of the existence of the maritime strategy.
I mean, you don't have within the E-ring in the Pentagon, you
don't have people pretending that it doesn't exis t--discussing
the fact that it hasn't been approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. We certainly have enough public statements now by Admiral
Crowe praising the strategy-no ranting and raving about how
Secretary Weinberger doesn ' t- -Secretary Weinberger stated many
times publicly, his support, interest and in fact direction
concerning what he calls the President's Maritime Strategy. And
so on .
But you do have still a little too much bi tching- -especial ly
in the view of this officer, on the part of the Army. The
maritime strategy, did not, in fact--and here I think Eric
Grove's is ins truct i ve- - was self-consciously not designed to take
shots at any of the other services. I was present at a debate--a
very meaningful debate because it was an internal debate- -be tween
the three star officers of the Navy on one of the wickets we were
going through to approve the maritime strategy. And one of the
protagonists or the protagonist to the debate at this particular
moment was then Vice Admiral James Aloysius Lyons, Jr. , who was
then OP-06. And he was criticized by one of his colleagues for
the fact that the strategy had too much air force in it. And
Admiral Lyons stood up in his inimitable fashion--I will not
quote him d irec
t
ly- - th 1 s is a paraphrase- - those of you who know
Admiral Lyons will understand why the paraphrase. What he said
was--you know, I spend every day in this job going up and down
the passageways of the Pentagon--roving in, tieing in, putting
together the packages of Air Force and Army--to help influence
this strategy--and explaining how the Navy and I really
think that this is the way to go the Navy has,
in fact, been self-consciously in devising and figuring out how
to integrate the other services, without denigrating ... in
carrying out the global campaign against the Soviets and if you
don't believe me go take a look at Admiral
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Jtkins white paper and then take a look at Field Manual 100-5,
Army Operations Manual that has gotten so much press--and
an take a look at AFM- 1 of the Air Force
. . . and then you tell
i which document is more
That's a challenge there to you- -obvi ous ly I've already done
is drill and know the answer. Ok. So that's kind--I think the
ilp Force and certain elements of the Air Force, have in fact,
irked quite well with us over the last few years, both in the
ntagon and certainly in the fleet. And the kinds of operations
at Commander Wagner described are now absolutely teamed--B-
's, Air Force tankers, Air Force fighters, Air Force AWACs
, Air
rce MAC-wing, is integral to Navy exercises today in a way that
just rout i ne- - l t ' s as routine as making sure that you've got
rface forces for submarines now--that's real--that's how we
ercise--it's how we game. At Newport and at elsewhere. So if
erything's so hunky-dory, except in some of the services and
ong the Russians and so on--what more remains to be done 7 Well
ere are a number of challenges to the maritime strategy as I
e it,
The first challenge is one that's most important, I think,
,d one that the critics have rightly pointed out. And that is
at the strategy has got now dangers of having hardening of the
.teries. That the Navy has got the danger of having something
at rather than being the common vision, has now become the
hlieffen pi an- -some th i ng that is unchangeable, inflexible,
violate and something that's going to get us in a lot of
ouble when the Russians, instead of doing all the things that
've all sat at the knee of Mr. Haber and heard this--when the
ssians
, who have also sat at the knee of Mr. Haber, decide
stead to do that. And the answer--I really feel that there is
ry little danger of that. I think that the Navy understands
at full well and in terms of the internal debate, there are a
w things going on in the Navy more exciting right now than the
amination of the Russian threat. Updating the strategy is as
sti tut ional l zed as the strategy itself. A concept of
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constantly reviewing it and updating it--the concept of
constantly challenging and having a dialogue between OP-06 and
OP-009, of the War College consistently coming in from all its
disparate in and from the SSG that's up at the War Colleges as
well saying--wel 1 , we've been looking at this and we've beer
looking at that and we don't think such and such is right. Of
people occupying the chair of OP-06 who instinctively reach for
the telephone to call CNA--the Center for Naval Analysis--or the
War Col leges-- they will, toward their own people in OP-06,
seeking not only the school solution, but the non-school solution
as well. And I don't see the strategy- -again , I may be wrong--
but I don't see it as achieving that hardening of the arteries--
certainly not contemporaneous ly- -because as I said- -updat ing the
strategy is as institutionalized as the strategy itself.
I do see some aspects of the external debate becoming fairly
sterile. I think it's one of the reasons why the Navy isn't
going to be fashioned around screaming and yelling externally
about the strategy quite as much as it did before. I don't know
what more we've got to say 7 We've got the white paper on the
street--I'm using the Naval Institute's term, not the Navy's
term--that's a shorthand, that's not official. We've got, and
I've commend it to you--in part because I had a hand in the
drafting of it--but it's an excellent commentary and elaboration
of it--Admiral Pendley's letters in response to John Collin's
questions that appeared subsequently in the Proceedings . We've
got Linton Brook's excellent article on international security on
the strategy and we've got a few more items on the street.
You've got the current CNO who said what needed to be said about
continuity and the fact that he's supported the strategy and so
on--which is certainly obvious to any of us that worked it since
for three years, he was one of the approving authorities of the
drafts of the maritime strategy. And if you never got it through
Vice Admiral Troust, it wouldn't have gone forward to Admiral
Watkins. And now he's the CNO.
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I don't see--with the exception of the sister services and
allies--very much that's going to be very new and novel,
king around in the domestic literature. I may be wrong and I
be challenged on that by Dwight Bing or Ronald Work or people
,
among other things, make a living in the external domestic
erature--but that's how I see it.
Some problem areas. I see us being in danger of one thing
the maritime strategy that we've got to be careful of. The
itime strategy certainly does not slight the global war with
Soviets--af ter all, that's its centerpiece. And it doesn't
ght peacetime operations vis-a-vis the Soviets and the rest of
world, either--both in the unclas and the classified
sions, there's a very good, heal thy- -what we referred to in
rthand as the front end of the s trategy- - whi ch deals with
cetime uses of the Navy. There's a pretty good understanding
the literature of how you use the Navy in peacetime. The
al War College and CNA have been two institutions that have
n in the forefront over the last dozen years of how we think
that.
But I think we are going to have to watch out, in the case
limited wax the thing that's in the middle. The maritime
ategy was, in part, and Admiral Heywood and Captain Patton and
ers that worked in the late 70's on this probl em- -cer tai nly
erstood full well the maritime strategy came about in an era
which the Navy came out of a limited war, in which at least
itarily we were quite proud of the way we operated. We did
t the country asked us to do with what we had at hand--and we
it, militarily anyway, quite well. We used carrier aviation,
sent units in-country and at the same time we didn't shirk our
pons ibi 1 i t i es elsewhere in the world. What we had shirked and
t we had dropped, to some extent, was thinking about how the
/ is used in peacetime and in crises --but not limited war--and
iral Zumwalt and Admiral Stan Turner did a great deal for
Tging that in the early 70's. And we had shirked thinking
-it how the Navy would be used in fighting against the
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Russians, which you've got to keep your eye on the ball and
that's the ball to keep your eye on--in the words of Roger
Barnett. We had shirked that a bit. And that was the turnaround
of the late 70 ' s and the late 80's--the rediscovery of the same
principles that motivated Forrestal and Forrest Sherman and that
motivated Mahon when he was putting pen to paper in the problem
of Asia. We've got to be sure now that the pendulum hasn't swung
too far in both directions that we're proud of--keeping the
peacetime emphasis but now readdressing the problems of global
war and then forgetting the lessons of Vietnam or the lessons of
Korea and so on--and finding the country once again, who knows,
somewhere down the pike, engaged in a limited war again and
having people that are all steeped in maritime strategy and
peacetime presence. That's something to think about. It's
something that I had not thought about until it was pointed out
to me .
It may very well be that that's a false probl em- - that the
one thing that the Navy can't do and wouldn't do--because it's
the thing that the Navy does so well--that it's inarguable, it's
not something that you have to discuss or preach or anything--is
how we operate in limited war. The record is very clear for
Korea and Vietnam, and it's not something that you need an awful
lot of theory about. It's something that you just need to roll
up your sleeves and do. And that may be the answer to that. But
I throw that out to you as something to think about. And to
those of you in the back as something to write about.
My concerns about what we think about the Russian threat and
making sure we don't have hardening of the arteries there in
terms of how we view the Russ lans - - I ' ve already thrown enough
challenges at Rich Hager for later on, that I need not do that
again .
And then finally, one thing that I think that in my smug,
self-satisfied way that I've given this talk--one thing I don't
think we've done very well--this is a personal view, not an
official view of course--and it keys off something again--key ing
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things that Roger Barnett has said and that
to do with the . .
.
When the maritime strategy was first
,ten or drafted in final form, second version, third version
now in the fourth version, a very, very healthy part of
. .
.
would say that the most important part was the
-ion on research. One of the uncertainties inherent in
time strategy-- uncertainties on the Soviet threat
, if they don't do what we think? What if they've got the
ibility to ... What about warning time? What if we get lots
lots and lots of warning time or what if we don't get any?
• if On the other hand
What about the reserves? We've made great strides in
last half dozen years or so making the reserves a true
lent of the pointed end of the sphere, not just in the Navy
in the Army and the Air Force as well. What happens if, for
tical or other reasons, the reserve callup don't have
of these uncertainties and things that we know about--we
i about from the very start when we started. We knew how to
e the baseline and the strategy and we knew many of the
ications of some of these uncertainties. But we don't
rstand others which is why of course we exercise, which is
we game--to find out more. But the thing that we haven't
very well as a Navy, I feel--is to explain to the outside
d that these uncertainties are an integral part of the way we
uss the strategy so-called white paper . . . and other
gs--partly because of the audience that these things are
gned to inf luence--were not quite as forthcoming about all
work that we've done on uncertainties as we have been on all
work which was done on the baseline. Can I change that
ario to just as it is on internal issues in a way
hich we've gotten the baseline across in the past.
So that's in summary- -that ' s sort of my overview of where we
now, where I think the dialogue--a polyogue, whatever the
the word is --is going globally on the maritime strategy. I
k we in the Navy are satisfied with what we've done over
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time. I think the civilians who've worked with us so closely, so
many of you who are in the audience have great reason to be
satisfied with the contribution that you've made to us. And that
the Navy and the country--in terms of maritime strategy-- today in
1987, are in pretty damn good shape.
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Discussant: Robert W. Molyneaux, Jr. , USMC
USCINCPAC, Plans and Policy
What the maritime strategy has done within the services, the
it services— he indicated that all ranks and all specialties
writing but more importantly, thinking about maritime
itegy and what their particular contribution, be it from an
ilane cockpit, be it from a ship at sea, be it from a foxhole
,he ground, can be to that strategy, in the accomplishment of
national objectives. He mentioned a po 1 yogue- -and that name
go down quite well since there is a great deal of jointness
lived in burden-sharing and being able to do things. We've
:ed about the Air Force aerial refuelers, providing the longer
;es to TAC-air from carriers, to provide the kinds of things
, we need in the tactical venue. He also noticed a strategic
eness, among allies and friends, and their supportive nature
he maritime strategy. We can go back to Mike Palmer's
ion of the "ocean of destiny '--I think an awful lot of people
i mentioned the Pacific being an ocean of destiny. Cort
,er ' s facts and figures sheet shows where trade, Gorbachev's
:ivostok talk, Shevernadze ' s visits, the increase in maritime
r by the Soviets kind of support that particular view. That,
i that increase in trade and the burgeoning nations, it's
irai for our friends and allies within the Pacific to take a
er look at what maritime strategy really is and what, if
hing , their contributions can be.
The jointness of maritime strategy can't be overemphasized.
Army's reluctance to join in is simply a matter of economics.
you have to do is break out the Air Force journal or any of
other open publications and do a little calculated number of
entage of TOA and you're going to find out they're going to
something to substantiate what they need in order to
ecute land war. The Navy and the Air Force have done quite
as far as getting its share of the budget--and rightly so,
an articulated strategy such as the maritime strategy.
51
I think some of the problems that we are looking at or that
Pete brought up, will be overcome by the polyogue--by the fact
that there are so many young folks with fresh thoughts on thej
subject— thinking about it, learning lessons from the past and
doing something positively about it.
Let's turn to the other presenters. I think the debate as
to where the maritime strategy started, could go on forever. The
importance of the fact is that there is a maritime strategy.
What are the most important elements of it? The fact that the
Soviet Union has been recognized as the adversary, possibly from
as early as 1905, to the current time, is significant. The fact
as brought out, that the flanks provide the area that cause
restraint. If we take a look at Cort Wagner's map, we've got a
hell of a common border with the Soviet Union. We have sea
ingress where we can influence what they do. The fact that if we
have a confrontation with the Soviet Union, it is going to be
global and protracted. If it is in fact global, the engagement
in the Pacific and certainly to limit the activity of the Soviet
Union from focus in Europe and to piecemeal it by choosing their
advantage. We invoke then a comparative strategy.
Looking at the thread throughout these papers--the problem
areas are ASW and air defense. It was stated in the '46-'55 time
frame and just last year before Congress. Admiral Hayes brought
that out as our two significant problems. We've got to
concentrate on those particular areas--we've got to look at the
technology and we also have to invest the monies and the thought
as to what we're going to do, to overcome those two significant
problems
.
Without a great deal of time left, I think when people Say--
we are satisfied with the s trategy--yes we're satisfied with the
strategy as a point of focus. It is definitely a Significant
part of the PAYCOM's war fighting strategy, which simply put is
to deter and should deterrence fail--fight to win so that we can
conclude hostilities in a situation favorable to the United
States. The maritime strategy in the Pacific is an integral
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,
as Cort indicted--Admiral Lyons is working in his standard
mic way out there, to ensure cooperation. And there's an on-
g dialogue between PACAV and PACFLT to come up with the best
to implement the resources out there for a complementary
rgistic effect and contribution to our war fighting strategy.
I can guarantee you that with Cort's four-star action
cer , the dialogue and debate on maritime strategy in the
fie will be very very lively and very dynamic. That's all.
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James Tritten
Let me make some closing comments then on the presentations,,
by reminding you of the parallels of the current debate over the
maritime strategy and something that occurred in the inter-war
years following the writings of Mahon and ending with the final
revision to the war plan Orange on November 26, 1941. The Navy,
in that time frame, took the lead in a dynamic, strategic concept
for war in the Pacific. The Marine Corps, during those years,
was part of that team and developed concepts of operations for
amphibious warfare that were later to prove exceptionally
successful. There was lots of internal debate within the Navy.
War Plan Orange also was basically a three-phase operation.
There was a consolidation of forces--the transition to war. At
that time initially it was swinging forces from the Atlantic to
the Pacific, and then, finally, accounting for the new deployed
fleet in California and Hawaii.
A second phase wa s a decisive battle to defeat the enemy
fleet in the Philippines area. And thirdly was the securing of
bases to prosecute a successful conclusion of the war through the
use of Naval power and blockade. There was lots of involvement
during those years between war planners, the Naval War College,
war gamers, varying concepts were tested, different force sizing
was analyzed. It was very similar also today-there were
complaints that War Plan Orange was merely a justification for a
larger Navy budget. And there was similar opposition by the
Army. Most importantly for the students who are listening to all
of these papers, to understand that we have political goals and
our objective is to find ways to apply military force to achieve
those political goals. The war planning was done by active duty
Navy officers. It was not done by contractors, by civilians--
they were done by graduates of Naval War Colleges, they were done
by people like yourselves-
-students who will be rethinking the
maritime strategy in the future and preventing
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Peter points out is a possible hardening of the arteries
h I don't think will ever happen.
Now, on that note, I'd like to take a break and reform here
0:30 and get down to about an hour's worth of discussion.
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Question and Answer Session
I've got a few administrative things to announce first. For
those of you who are giving papers and were invitational travel
orders, would you please check with our secretary outside the1
door here, Brienda, she has to some things with your papers. The
chairs of each of these panels should turn in copies of all the
papers to Ed Olsen who, I think, all of you know.
There are a few things that are available to all of you for
free up there. First is the addendum to the Maritime Strategy
Bibliography by Captain Peter Swartz. Please feel free to take a
number of them if you need to. Secondly, you'll find copies of
the July Proceedings which were provided to you because they had
so many things about the Pacific in there, as well as the May-
June De f ense '87. A number of you have asked about the book I
referred to ear 1 i er- -Tr i f umi enko ' s U.S. Military Doctrine
,
sc
I'll hold it up here. It is written by a Soviet academic who--
the Russians did the translation. It's published by Progress
publishers in Moscow. I believe that all of the copies at Victor
Kempton's bookstore went about two months ago--Roger is that
right 9 Did you buy them all? This one was purchased at the
Stanford University Bookstore so I don't know where else to tell
you to try to get it. Although this does have an imported agency
in Chicago--you can try them--and I'll be glad to let anybody
look at this if you want to get a copy.
I'd like to start out the question and answer session by
first defining the terms. First we have microphones in three
different places and we'd like the person who's speaking from the
floor to use the microphones so that everyone can hear.
Secondly, to get it started I'm going to ask the first question.
And I'm going to do so by holding up something called the
National Security Strategy of the United States, dated January
1987 and signed by someone named Ronald Reagan. Now this is not
the maritime strategy-
-this is something that is the national
strategy. And I'll read a little portion of a letter that was
written to me from the fellow who sent it to me. "You will alsc
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ce some words on maritime superiority which, while not
rsing the military strategy, are generally consistent with
We have in our audience a Naval officer who is attached to
Office of Secretary of Defense who's had to wrestle with it.
been trying to figure out what is the relationship of our
onal strategy-arid for years we were able to say at the Naval
graduate School that we don't have on in writing, that's
assified that we can show you as students. Well we now have
And it's not the maritime strategy. Gerry Burke has kindly
ed to take the first question. And if you would, Gerry,
i you try to explain to us what is the relationship between
time strategy and national security strategy''
Gerry Burke
This serves me right for walking over to your office with
and asking the question. There are many, many very we 1 1
-
ified commentators in the audience who can wrestle with this
5. So I'm just going to pose it in a couple of questions
b would hopefully serve as a point of departure for later
jssion
.
The real issue I might assert is the relation of campaign
3 and concepts of operations are to the maritime strategy as
maritime strategy may be to a national military strategy. In
[" words, I think we would all recognize the great value of
maritime strategy to things naval and to the larger issues,
that is also an inductive value of the maritime strategy as
reuses its thinking on the larger issues of national military
tegy. Specifically, the question, however, while the
time strategy might well commend itself say to the war plans
strategies of the Pacific Commander and the Atlantic
inder
, how well does it apply itself to the war plans and
regies of the European Commander or the Central Commander'?
'-hat's a question. An assertion is that there are--just as
nternal debate of the U.S. Navy on the maritime strategy
;ed itself on competition for resources, the roles of allies,
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the danger of poring concrete on thinking, and the problems of
jointness, similarly, the difficulties in the specification of a
national military strategy elevate those concerns, difficulties
to an even larger level. I think that the President's document
as directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act to submit a national
strategy to the Congress was useful in setting out some broad
specifications but it did not generate, at least from my
perspective, the very valuable internal debate and discussion
that the maritime strategy did. Now why that was the case I
would only submit is that it was generated at the level of the
National Security Council who, at the time, might have been
focused on other issues. But it was not done in a seemingly
democratic fashion.
The alternative question for the group is--while the Navy
has a high degree of se 1 f -di sc ipl ine and cohesiveness and
rigorness in the application of intellectual skills to the
specification of the maritime strategy, the legislation on
jointness notwithstanding, does the larger national security
apparatus of the United States have the ability and internal
discipline to be able to go about the specification of a national
strategy 7 And I frankly am not sanguine that it does. But I'm
not also certain whether, in the context of our national security
objectives, that's necessary to have as specific specification as
the maritime strategy does.
Roger Barnett
As to the question of--define for me precisely where the
maritime strategy fits in with the national strategy, we could
probably, several of us sitting up here and many in the audience,
could write a book about that. I can give you an anecdote, a
personal anecdote, that I think might be somewhat instructive in
that regard. In 1983, I was invited to go the Army War College
at Carlisle and present the Navy's maritime strategy to the
benefit of those present in the audience. And a big semi-
circular theater at Carlisle for those of you who have been up
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e. The place was packed and I gave the Navy's version of the
time strategy-- the secret version I gave--with the assurance
,
everyone was cleared. And at the end of it, the first
!tion--a fellow in the back of the audience stood up and he
[--"Haven't had the blood coursing through my body since I
;ed in Pentagon. All you Navy guys want to do is try and
md your big deck carrier programs by going off and bashing up
he Russias up in the Northern parts of the world and going up
he GIUK gap and you're not going to defend the sea lanes or
hing. And I'm just fed up with all this"--so when he was
I said--if I understand the question, I'd like to make an
rtion in response to that. The United States Army is not
nding Texas. What do you mean the Army's not defending
s 9 Because it's in Germany, that's why.
The point being of course that the Navy intends to defend
sea lanes, not in the Central At 1 an t i c- -and it doesn't seem
e the best way to go. And it's historically war at sea and
the basic principles of war at sea are different from war on
I mean, we've been taught--we have a very long history of
ning from the land-based theor is ts - -C 1 auswi tz and others--who
that defense is the strongest form. That's never been true
ea. All the things that make defense the strongest form on
are absent at sea- - terrain , the ability to dig in,
enching, all this business about it takes an attacking of 3:1
:1 or however many to one to overcome an entrenched, strong
nse--all these things don't exist at sea. Historically the
nsive has been the stronger form of warfare at sea. And it's
cially true in such things as submarine warfare. And so, it
not made an awful lot of sense, nor does it seem to, in the
future at least, to do other than have a very forward
tegy which in effect does, and the Navy seems to believe and
ysis seems to support, is the better way to defend the sea
s and ensure that the reinforcement and resupply will in fact





As somebody who's somebody, once said: Go find out what the
national military strategy is and then write a naval strategy
that implements the national strategy. And we actually had to do
precisely the evolution that Gerry was talking about. We did it-
-my wife can attest--at hours that weren't quite as congenial as
the one we're in right now. But in staying up all night, trying
to figure out this, we discovered a few things. There is, in
fact, a national military strategy. And one can write a maritime
strategy to implement part of that national military strategy.
Mow, there's a very famous series of letters on this subject--
this is going back a few years— and I've forgotten the journal--
but I certainly remember the debate because I was in graduate
school at the t i me - - i n which Admiral Hanks wrote an article or a
letter saying that the problem is that we can't get the national
command authority to state its goals clearly enough for the
military planners can get about the business of planning
correctly. And Tom Edsold, who was up at the Naval War College,
wrote and said--this is an age-old problem with military
planners. Military planners need as firm and as strong and as
hard and as clear guidance as possible because of the nature of
their problem and the things that they have to carry out. And
the President never wants to do any of those things--he wants to
play his cards very close to his chest. He didn't want to tell
anybody what he was going to do until the last minute. And he
i
would just as soon not have any strategy at all. And the arch-
example of all of that would be Franklin Roosevelt. You know, a
man who--I mean, you could never find out what he was thinking.
And this was not by accident. It was how he wanted to handle his
military planners. And he drove his military planners absolutely
crazy. And since that time that's happened as well.
We're actually in much better shape as military planners,
from that standpoint than the guys who worked for Franklin
Roosevelt were--in that you can, in fact, discern aspects of the
national military strategy which enable a Navy planner to do his
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First of all, the national strategy does say--and it has
1 an advantage of more recent years compared to earlier years
le national strategy has in fact over the last few years been
'ly points on some points. First of all, the enemy. It's
f clear that the high command of the United States government
lat the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United
;es
,
President Reagan, thinks that the Soviet Union is the
>r enemy of the United States. He doesn't call it the enemy
ihe opposing power or forces inimitable to the country-he
.s it Russia. And we military guys then can go to a map and
ire out where the hell that place is and figure out how to go
them. So *1, the national military strategy does exist and
s us who the enemy is. First of all, it's Russia. And
>nd of it all, it's those guys who are lined up with the
lians and we have to sort of figure out who they are and that
imes a subject of some debate. I mean, is it Syria or isn't
a--is Poland or isn't Poland--you can go on and on like this,
it's pretty clear who the central enemy is. And
dentally, you say well I have this big vi ew- -contrast that
i the guidance of war planners of Ed Miller's era in the
trwar period when they were putting together War Plan Orange--
.
,
who is the clearly identified nationally articulated enemy
1 the President of the United States' Well, the President of
United States was going to be damned if he was going to say
/as Japan. That wasn't the policy of the country. And that
' it a lot harder for Forrest Sherman and other guys in the
rwar period.
Contrast that with the period that the guy whose feet I sat
• t Columbia Uni vers i ty- -Werner Shi 1
1
ing- -when he was writing
dissertat ion--as to Navy war planning before World War I.
Navy war plans--it was the Black Plans- -Orange was Japan,
:k was Germany. Where was the clear national guidance as to
the Navy was supposed to plan for future war there 9 Well it
non-existent--that was one of the major findings of
ling's di sser tat ion- - i t wasn't. And so the Navy tried to
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figure these things out for itself. And in one case we got
things pretty right--and that was War Plan Orange. And the
campaigns we planned in Pacific were the campaigns we carried out
in World War II. In the other place, the Navy got it quite!
wrong, and War Plan Black--you have never read--you might have'
read in the histories and political science literature, but
you've never read a history of how we fought the German Navy in
the Caribbean. Things didn't pan out that way. But one of the
major culprits of all of that wasn't the Navy--it was the
National Command Authority that couldn't give the guidance
because of the nature of the country at the time.
So there are some elements. First of all, we know--second
of all, we've been given very very clear and explicit guidance
that any war with the Soviets will be with allies. Again, you
say--what's the big deal 7 Well, the big deal is then the war
planner can sit and come up with divisions of labor vis-a-vis the
allies when we've got things to talk about with the Europeans.
This is a very topical issue today with mine warfare so everybody
who's reading the newspapers knows about the division of labor is
right, wrong, good, bad, we're planning for the right war, and so
on. But that's real. The war planner is given that as something
to do with--what are you going to do and what are they going to
do 7 Again, contrast that with War Plan Orange and War Plan
Black. The policy of the nation was very clear. We will do
everything alone--we don't have entangling alliances and
therefore you have to plan to do the whole thing by yourself.
And so there is then an element then that we've got to work with.
The enemy is the Russians and you're going to do this with
allies.
Third, the Navy is well aware--boy, are we well aware--that
we have to do things j oin t ly- -wi th the Air Force, with the Coast
Guard, with the Navy Marine Corps team of course--with the Army.
And so the Navy had to devise those ways in which we would all be
playing together, in accordance with existing concepts that the
Army and the Air Force had, as near as we could tell. The Navy
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-ned to fall in love with the Hawk battery. The Hawk battery
i wondrous creation that belongs to the United States Army and
air defense missiles. And those of you that think of the
r as being something that's infantry and that's something that
to be hauled across oceans unprotected by the Navy--should
is instead on what the Army can do for you. And the Army Hawk
:ery can do a lot for you in places like Iceland and the
*es and Aleutians and other places and I think Naval officers
ild become great officianados of the Hawk battery and its
sfully its improvements and things that are going to happen in
future. I certainly know Admiral Lyons is.
And we've been told that we might get involved in conflict
>ss an entire spectrum from little bitty things to nuclear
>causts and that we've got to figure out a way to contribute
across that spec trum- -boy
,
that keeps you busy. But that is
.onal guidance. And so the maritime strategy had to come to
>s with that. And of course the bottom line was--we had to
,ect not only the United States but because we are the United
,es of today and not the United States of 1900 or even of
), we are a global superpower with global interests damn near
•ywhere
. And we had to figure out how to do this thing
>ally. And with that guidance of global, allied and U.S.
crests and Russians are the enemi es - -spec trum of conflicts,
maritime strategy used those as building blocks to deal with
probl em.
If they had been more specific, it would have been more
>f ul
. It would be very nice to have a clear unequivocal
•ement from the National Command Authority that everybody in
country understands as to the role of China or the role of
.el or what date the reserves are going to mobile--and that of
se was the frustrations of those of us that worked these
'lems in the 70's when things weren't anywhere near as clear
as they are now--you weren't getting that at all. But




But given where we are right now, and even given that
document, you've got enough to go on and you can come up with a
maritime strategy. And we did.
[If you'd direct your questions to some one person,
otherwise I'll assign it.]
Question... Research Service
I have a comment and then a question that I'll direct to, I
guess, to three people. The first has to do with the external
debate on the maritime strategy which is what Captain Swartz
spoke about earlier. I think that Captain Swartz is right when
he says that the external debate at this point is largely
sterile. I think it has been for some time. There really aren't
very many new ideas --I think one exception to that would be the
quieting of Soviet submarines and what it may have to do for
things like the strategic ASW component. But on the whole I
think he's right. But, even if the arguments are old, that
doesn't mean they're not going to have influence on the minds of
people who read them and on the tenor of the external debate.
And my perception is that from where I sit, judging the external
debate- -whi ch is mostly I'm involved in-- is that at this point
I'm getting hints that the critics of the maritime strategy may
be regaining control over the debate on the merits of the
maritime strategy. I think the Navy published the white paper in
part to regain what they may have felt was lost control and I
think in 1986 they had some control over the debate. But I see
the situation reverting back now to what it was prior to that
time. And I see that really in two ways. First, there are hints
that the Navy really wants to focus more internally within the
Navy--in-house on developing the debate and not paying as much
attention to the external debate. And secondly, for a lot of
people, for good or bad, many people still associate the strategy
very closely with Secretary Lehrman
. And now that he's gone, and
now that saying things critical of Lehrman is in fashion very
much with many people, there is an atmosphere where you can throw
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what are perceived to be his things along with him. And the
tegy, I think, will get caught up a little bit in that. And
ly, I think there's still some confusion externally over the
r lack of a better term--the reality of the maritime
tegy, i.e., the question--is the Navy really going to do
? Is this a real strategy 7
I just returned from a conference across the other side of
country where there were some people who, only a week ago,
essed some very strong doubts about whether the Navy really
oing to go forward with the strategy--in this case in the
h Atlantic. And this comment came up again and again in the
se of this two-day strategy- -par t 1 cul ar ly in regard to the
nt of carrier days that are actually still not being spent in
Norwegian Sea. And they harped on that again and again, even
gh the Navy people present tried to explain why. And I can
see it in Congress, lastly, when earlier this year when the
te Armed Services Committee held a series of very widely
icized hearings on the national s trategy- -Admiral Crowe
ared and Captain Swartz is r
i
ght- -Admiral Crowe has said
gs supportive of the strategy- -but in the one hand, on this
took place before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he
asked about the reality of the maritime strategy. And he
,
and this is either a direct quote or something close to it
said--it is not a strategy at all. And this was in front of
Committee and in front of about 250 people packed into that
And they said--well, what is it then if it's not a
tegy? Well, he said, it's a concept for something or other.
you'll note that a strategy is a concept and you can resolve
discrepancy that way. But everybody in that room, I think,
that hearing much more confused about the reality of the
-ime strategy than they entered. So, the one thing I get out
eter Swartz's presentation is or, the one thing I would put
ard in my comment--I would be not so sanguine about the
-is of the external debate.
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My question is for Captain Swartz and for Dr. Barnett and to
a lesser extent also for Dr. Palmer- -which is to talk about how.
the allies were brought into the formation of the maritime
strategy. At what stage were they brought in, what were the
mechanisms that were used to get their views and to incorporate
them into the formation of the strategy? And if you could talk
in some detail about that, and Dr. Palmer, if you could put maybe
an historical perspective on that, how good or bad was the Navy
at doing this back in the 40's and 50 ' s . And finally, if you had
to do it again, would you have changed any of these mechanisms?
How might you have done it differently?
Michael Palmer
Obviously in 1946-47, we're beginning to have allies. But
other than Britain, they're allies without navies. Up through
the mid-50's, which is how far I got, the allies as they rearm,
say the Italians, and of course the British with their
continually diminishing fleet, are part of the maritime strategy.
And the few British documents read and sound just like our
strategic documents. Now, whether they're simply parroting what
we're going to do, whether they agreed with it in principle, I
can't say. But from what I've seen in say for Royal Navy plans,
forward offensive operations, there were joint U.S. -Royal Navy
exercises in the Norwegian Sea, '1952 or 1953--is the first one
that I found any way- -where they go up there with a carrier group
and the British send some stuff up and they're operating carrying
out an exercise, the assumption of which was that the Soviets had
invaded Northern Norway as part of their attack on Europe and the
Navy's up there then and the Royal Navy is up there with them
with some Norwegian forces. So they're tied in right from the
beginning. When Sherman's in the Mediterranean as Commander of
6th Task Flee t--having drawn up that strategic concept, '46-'47,
he's in the Mediterranean '48-'49, he's working closely with the
Italians and the Turks and the Greeks, and of course he was
already laying the foundations of a connection with Spain through
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son-in-law who was naval attache in Madrid, who was already
ing with Franco-- that ' s a connection that doesn't come to
fruition until Sherman's CNO. And of course he's in the
terranean visiting Spain and then he's in Italy when he dies
uly '51. So very early on, there's a connection with the
es
,
at least in Europe. Japan is a different story.
Roger Barnett
Ron, I think the best way to answer that is that way down
in our heart of hearts--when we set down and took pencil and
d to put this thing down on paper--and our predecess: 3 who
the same thing--we didn't feel like we were doing anything
And we scoured the war plans, we scoured the concept of
time operations, we both felt and believed and still believe,
there's nothing contrary in the maritime strategy to what
of the allied plans are. And for this reason, it didn't seem
any prior consultation was necessary.
On the back end of the process, I made a trip to France and
fed the French. And in every opportunity we got, and I'm
reed from the process now so I don't know wh ether it
inues and Admiral Schmidt can talk to this- -whenever there
visiting delegations from Navy to Navy staff talks, whenever
ting CNO from foreign navies came, they were always briefed
he current version of the maritime strategy. And there are
fundamental points that I want you to take away from that,
t of all, we didn't then, and I still don't see, any real
licts between the maritime strategy and the way the plans for
uct of war or in any other concepts, for the use of the U.S.
with allies— either the European or Pacific theaters— is in
kind of conflict. And secondly, in all the discussions that
i with the visiting delegations and the CNO from different
as, while they asked questions about the strategy, I still
't hear any sharp disagreement from any of them. Now you
to appreciate also that we were talking primarily— except in
-iple of cases— and the French is one— to military people.
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And you get very very different perceptions and very differen
reactions when you talk to civilians, even civilian defens
planners, than you do when you talk to purely military an!
especially when you talk to purely naval staffs from the allies:
And I think Pete can probably embellish on that a bit.
Pete Swartz
Sort of following up on some points on what Roger had to sa
and then to follow up on some points that Mike had to say. Thi,
is in the area in which I personally and particularly probabl;
was more deeply involved than any other in the maritime strategy
-and that was relations with the allies. My background, probabl;
largely thanks to the tasking that I got from Admiral Hanks whe;
I worked for him a Lt Commander- - 1 1 s ten up you guys in the back-
this is how strategists devel op- - large ly had to do with Navy t<
Navy talks and dealing with allies. My academic background, whe:
I went to graduate schoo 1 - -again I hope in the back you'r1 '
1 i
s
tening- -had a lot to do with looking at the problems o
history and allies so that the dissertation that I am perpetuall;
writing is about relations between U.S. Navy and allied navie;
during the period that Dr. Palmer is talking about. And so i
was an area that I was personally able to bring some expertise t«
bear. And that is not by accident. In other words, that wa.
precisely why I was in the Office and it was precisely why Dr
Barnett put those kinds of things in front of me to work on
Just as, people like himself. Jim Tritten, Linton Brooks an<
others, who are far more capable and competent in dealing wit!
the problems of global deterrents and nuclear equation and anti
SSBN operations and so on--played with that. I mean, we did, ii
fact, bring in those people who had expertise in certain areas
And it's my view, first of all, just to reiterate the fact tha
that's exactly what happened. We knew that what we had wai
something that was intermeshed very well with the allies already
There was simply no need to go check it out with the allies
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ause we knew what the answer was. We knew. I knew. I mean
had been talking to the allies for years.
There are two myths about— there are several myths about the
/--but there are two in particular that are very interesting.
is that the Navy is inherently Pacific-oriented and doesn't
e a damn about Europe or the Atlantic. Dr. Barnett, I think,
Mike Palmer, have done enough today to at least demolishing
the minds of those of you who subscribe to that myth--any
usions you have in that regard.
But the other myth is that the Navy is a go-it-alone service
always has been. And the things that are cited are very
ective--like the Pacific War with Japan--and it is also
ited in the case of the alleged Pacific bias of the Navy--in
cjj we largely fought the war ourselves, we resisted having the
tish come in with us--the British Pacific Fleet did come with
with Ernie King kicking and screaming about it--they did a
i job at second-rate operations and evolutions. They had no
istics trail. They were designed as a short-legged navy to
ht wars in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea and in the
tic and in the Mediterranean and they couldn't keep up with--
couldn't operate with the fast carrier task groups. They
Id not project power halfway around the world without an
rmous base structure that did not exist in the reaches of the
ific. There were very real reasons why we had problems
ling with the Royal Navy in the Pacific.
When you come to the road, however, today, dealing with the
tish and dealing with any of the allies--lots of those
trinal problems of the 40's and the early 50's, have gone
/ . Logis t ical ly , communications-wise and a lot of other
igs , we're in much better shape--not only than we were with
other navies of those days. But then, if the truth be known,
i the Army and the Air Force are in many cases in dealing with
Lr counterpart organization on the ground and in the air.
We've had a standard Navy Signal Book for use by the allies
:e about 1950. And that was no mean feat to put together in
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the late 40's--to get everybody just so that they knew what the
hell the signals were--we had different systems--one guy was
using mostly flashing light, the other guy was mostly using;
semaphore and the other guy was using flags and we are now at a
point where we have interoperabi 1 i ty--yes--and in some cases
they're hellacious. And they have a lot to do with technological
differences and with domestic industry and so on. But I would
submit to you that they're absolutely nothing like the problems
we had in World War II. You know, in World War II when the
British Pacific Fleet came out to work with the U.S. Fleet, they
could not operate unless there was U.S. Navy Lt on board each
ship of the British Pacific Fleet. And when we operated with the
British in the Med, there had to be a Royal Naval Detachment on
board each ship--we don't operate that way today--it isn't
necessary. So we have, in fact, been interoperable with the
allies both on the tactic level and at the strategic level in
terms of scrubbing the plans.
Now Dr. Barnett pointed out something interest ing--his
example was off on the French--this is a comment by me on Admiral
Leinhard- -and I'm certainly not pronouncing his name right--but
that's what happens when you've got a French CNO who's got a
Flemish name. He was the CNO of the French Navy in February-
March 1986 and did an article in NATO's 16 Nations--and my
comment on that which is in this bibliography is that--rowing to
the beat of a different drum. 'Authoritative statement by the
French CNO--heavy emphasis on nuclear deterrence, crisis
prevention and control and allied cooperation. Minimal
discussion relating to global or regional forward conventional
operations against the Soviets in contrast to U.S. maritime
strategy and other allied writers.' My experience was that we
were farthest apart in terms of thinking about large strategic
concepts of operations from the French than we were from any
other ally. That having been said, we had absolutely no problem
communicating, however, what it was we were trying to do, with
the French Navy--which is conceptually the one navy which worries
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ut concepts in a very different way than all the rest of us.
we had no problem talking to them. And, we got, as near as I
tell, and I've never any disagreement since--we got just
ut total agreement operating at the level that we were doing,
t we were addressing things just about right. But from their
ivpoint, we had things about right. But in view of their
ional policy, worrying about global conventional war with the
iets just isn't a core defense problem that drives French
ategy or French programming, as it is with us. So, in dealing
h the one ally who was farthest away from us conceptually, we
3 very close together and were able to conduct--we just didn't
i t as a pr ob 1 em
.
Now we listened very closely to the comments of the allied
's and the allied planners when we had Navy-to-Navy talks and
-to-CNO talk, but we never got comments as we would get from
2 other people--but we don't intend to do that or, we wouldn't
that- -because we knew what they were going to do. And we had
ioIq history of it, going back to the kinds of things that
s's talking about. 1953, we had our first big colossal NATO
Navy--it was called Mambreak. And it took place in the
wegian Sea. And it consisted of the strike fleet being
;ened and shielded and protected by the forces in EASTLANT
rh is largely a British and Dutch command. And then the
Lke fleet, which is composed largely of U.S. elements with
5 British and Dutch and Canadian contingents. Remember, in
3e days, Canada was the third largest allied navy in the
ld--and the strike fleet pract iced--guess what, making sure we
i ' t lose Norway, making sure we were capable if the National
nand Authority decided to do so, going around North Gate,
'ng sure it was protecting the amphibious operations that were
Lously going to take place in the area, making sure that we
i't lose Iceland, bottling up the Soviet Baltic Fleet which at
i time was the strong Soviet fleet, and making sure that it
^dn't break out of the Baltic ports. We've been doing this.
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In terms of complementarity, my favorite point on
complementarity of navies and how navies look at problems--Mike
Palmer pointed this out in his--a plug for Mike Palmer's book--
ha, in addition to articles that he wrote--also wrote a book
called Stoddard's Work and as he pointed out on page 56, "when we
went to war with France " --yes , we went to war with France once,
in the quasi-war in the late 18th century with France--where did
we fight the war with France? In the Chesapeake' Off the coast
of the United States? No, we fought it forward--we fought it in
the Caribbean. We fought it away from our shores. It was how we
wanted to f i ght- - forward . You know, we've been doing this for a
while and part of it is because that's how naval officers view
problems - -Mahon , 1905. It's not just us and it's not just that
problem. The thing that I was going to commend to you was any
discussion in the open literature by the Germans--on how they
plan on fighting their end of the war which is the Baltic, which
as we talked about. We don't envision, except in the more far
out of contingency planning that we have to do, or in the more
far out of war gaming that we have to do. But it isn't central
and it isn't core--I don't think it's any great secret to anybody
that it isn't a central part of the national strategy to operate
carrier battle groups in the Baltic. But the German Navy sure as.
hell is going to operate in the Baltic. And they know how
they're going to operate in the Baltic and they know what their
problem is in the Baltic. And in any article, in any quote,
anywhere you come up with--here's a quote from the German White
Paper--this is a joint document, this is the German MOD--you
know, the German Navy has already sanitized by the jointness that
permeates the German hierarchy and that largely means army--and
the German Ministry which is very attuned to their own political
set of peculiar political problems. This is a direct quote from
German White Paper 85 which I think is the latest German White
Paper that's been translated to English. And it says that the
German concept is "forward defense at sea." In accordance with
NAF0 Commanders, maritime concepts of operations, "countering the
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sat far from friendly sea routes and shores. Interdiction of
ny naval forces should be effective immediately in front of
.r own bases.' Sound familiar 9 We did not need to go, Ron,
ihe allies and have them check out every chapter and verse and
'ything because we've just been working with them for so long
we knew what the concepts were. And, as naval offices, both
ierms of all of us together as allied naval officers working
problem together and then looking back in time--all the way
c to Mahon--naval officers approach the world in a certain way
we know how to fight--! mean that's how we fight wars.
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Cort Wagner
I wanted to address Ron's questions from an operational
standpoint as well. From the standpoint that what I briefed this
morning as a concept as to whether it's a strategy or not, I do
wish to emphasize that it is a concept, above and beyond--it's
very threatened-scenario dependent. And the actual execution of
course is going to depend on the tactical situation at the time.
Having said that, I think it's important that we take away, from
our perspective at CINCPACFLT, the fact that we are, in fact,
training the way we expect to fight.
The focus is on the Northern Pacific, as it's never been
before. Historically, starting with FLEETEX 83-1, which had
three carrier battle groups operating in the Northern Pacific,
continuing up through the Vincent operations in the Bering Sea,
the Ranger Surge, the operations in October of '86, we've greatly
advanced our experience level. This has been complemented by a
number of recent exercises in the Aleutians, the details of which
I can't go into in this forum--but to include land-based carrier
tactical aviation in Adiak, operating with U.S. surface ships,
and with Air Force F-15's, to intercept Soviet strike aircraft,
Bear aircraft that have been coming off against the Alaskan
mainland. So our experience is increasing, to a great extent. I
can't quote you the number of ship days in the Northern Pacific,
but last year alone it was over 100 in 1986. That's a lot, for
us. Considering where we've been before.
Turning to the subject of allies--the allies in the Pacific
are very heavily involved. I've been fortunate to have attended
three staff talks in the last year as CINCPACFLT representative.
I went to Tokyo, Paris and to Sydney for Navy-Navy staff talks
with those three countries. And at each particular staff talks,
the OPNAV representative gave the current version of the maritime
strategy. And it was exceptionally well received by all three
countries. They are heavily involved- - they were involved in the
formulation as we've heard and they are currently being briefed
at those staff talks.
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In addition, we're undertaking measures to increase the
roperability in the Pacific because we're really ally-sparse
he Pacific. We don't have a lot of allies. Basically we've
Australia, we've got Japan, we're tied by treaties with the
ippines and Thailand. At the same time, though, just
ching out some of the exercises, we do the RIMPAC series
y other year--RIMPAC '86 was a banner exercise lasting six
s and involved the U.S. , U.K. , Canada, Australia, Japan, and
United Kingdom. Regrettably, in 1988, the United Kingdom
not be participating. But the exercise in 1988 looks to be
nner exercise, spanning about six weeks with operations
een Hawaii and the west coast, starting next summer.
With Japan, we undertake a number of bilateral exercises
ide the context of RIMPAC, including a series involving the
F and U.S. Navy operations only and also combined exercises,
onduct a number of significant exercises with Korea every
,
including Team Spirit, in the March-April time frame. The
a Gold series with Thailand, and we're increasing our
cise capability with the ASEAN nations, for example,
nesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. The net impact of all this
n increased operability with our friends and allies in the
fie. And it enhances our war fighting effectiveness, but
importantly, in the execution of a war fighting strategy,
e can build up that expertise with those allies, it allies
at CINCPACFLT, to focus on the Northern Pacific, where we
the genuine threat is.
Don Daniel --Question
I'd like to see if you can relate two things together. One
he things that you all haven't had time to deal with, and I m
dure you may have time--the amount which you have left--but
b talked in a sense about the fertile ground that may have
there for thinking about maritime strategy, going back even
ihon
,
going back to what was going on in the 30 ' s , what was
I on in the late 40*s and the early 50's. There was a
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period, however, somewhere in the 60 's and in the 70' s that we
haven't had a chance to really go into in much detail here. But
I would guess that that was not a part icular ly--at that time--;
fertile ground, for thinking in terms of development of maritime
strategy thinking. At least I'd like to see what you all have to
say about it. In other words, I think that there were people,
for instance, like Admiral Heywood over here, who were, in their
position, doing their best let's say to try to spike Naval
thinking, to try to spike Naval strategic thinking. But my
impression is that, because of the Vietnam War, because of the ;
drastic drawback of U.S. naval forces in the early 1970's, that
the Navy just simply had other things on its mind. And then
because also of the defense guidance that came out of the Carter
Administration in terms of talking about let's call it defensive
sea control, connotate a movement back in terms of what the Navy
was going to be doing. That also, let's say, in terms of
maritime strategy thinking, certainly cannot be considered to be
fertile ground for what was come out to be the maritime strategy.
So I was wondering if someone could comment on that. And I think
there's a relation to that, if I've gotten my history right, and
I'm willing to say that maybe I haven't gotten it completely
right, so you can inform me on that. But I'm willing to say that
there's a relation between that and how maybe the allies have
reacted to the maritime strategy. Because while we can say that
the maritime strategy is consistent with the NATO maritime
concept of operations, that type of thing--I think that many of
the allies were say ing--sure
,
the NATO maritime concept of
operations existed, but that's not what we saw you guys doing,
and in terms of your national debate, that's not what we Saw you
people saymg--for instance, in the period of the 70's. So that
you may be telling me that you've got this maritime strategy
that's going to do all of these things and it's consistent with
the past, but I don't happen to see it as consistent, not with
what you were saying, let's say in terms of a NATO doctrine, but
what we saw you actually doing. And that then relates to the
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cess of consultation. Whereas I think we can say that we
n't have to consult with the allies in terms of the strategy
ause we already knew what they were saying--I mean, I just
e back from the same meeting that Ronald Warp was at, and I've
a good number of meetings with various people who come from
Naval War College--and I think that they will argue that in
ms of what the Navy maritime strategy was about, there was
h there that took them by surprise. Partly because, again, of
framework they were coming from. You know, what we were
ing in the strategy- -no t what we were doing--if I can put it
t way. And it's a kind of pendulum effect kind of thing. As
atter of fact, I think when the maritime strategy came out,
y were saying--my God, you're not only doing what you said you
e going to do in Marcom ops and that kind of thing, but you're
ng even more of it than what you said you were going to do or
t we thought you were going to do, and you're causing us quite
it of concern
.
That relates to Pete--your point about being self-satisfied.
Duld think that from the perspective of the allies, you ought
to be. And I think that remains the case today. I think
're the one that made a very good point that is just coming on
5 in terms of the allies--you know, this kind of a lag-lead
slem. You know, the debate started up in the United States.
bakes a while let's say for it to flow across the oceans. I
Tk it has flowed across the oceans--it's there. And I think
jally that the more important debate, frankly, is not between
all and John Meersheimer, but I think it's between you all
the people who are running those particular countries. The
in Holts of the world. I think those are the people you have
worry about. And I don't think you have any sense of being
?uine at all .
Tr i tten
That's a rather extensive and very thought-provoking
stion which will lead us into the sessions this afternoon and
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tomorrow--where we are specifically going to discuss the regional
perspectives. Admiral Heywood is listed as a discussant, was
certainly a major player in that and there's a Jim Patton in the
room somewhere— he's gone--who I certainly would have liked to
address that. But Roger Barnett will try to give you the short
answer in a few minutes.
Roger Barnett
First of all, Don, I think you're right. There was a long
period of time, and I alluded to that in my talk--just had an
opportunity to flesh it out in any detail--we just became
mesmerized with two very important fundamental things. One was
the Vietnam War and the other was the terrible shrinkage of the
fleet. And superimposed on that, we had the McNamara approach to
strategy and budgeting. You know, McNamara is quoted as saying,
"in my mind, I equate planning and budgeting and consider the
terms almost synonymous.' And so we had to play on those terms.
And the Navy created a Systems Analysis Divi s 1 on- -somewhat
larger, Admiral Heywood hit it off. And it was in very severe
problems. In the period, for example, between 1966 and 1971,
which is a very important period of time. If you rank the U.S.
services in terms of their budget share, the Navy was last,
through that whole period. And that's the period of time when
the fleet's going away. The Navy was 3 of 3, through that whole
period. And prior to that, for a long period of time, it was
second in its budget share. And then it reached a long period of
time in which the Navy was first out of three. That extended
from *72-'83 and interestingly enough, in '83, is the maritime
strategy's star's rising--the Navy falls to second place. And
so, the whole notion that this is strictly a budgetary
publicizing kind of approach, I guess if you talk in terms of
service shares, it failed. But I think you're right--there
really were some serious problems here and it began to turn
around in Admiral Hollaway's time when he ordered some re-looks
and re-issuance of NMDP-1. And began to pull in the concepts,
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strategic concepts of the Navy and then this was further
lemented, perpetuated- -analytical work was done for a 15
rier, 600 ship in SEAPLAN 2000 which was the so-called "three
cent solution." Was a 15 carrier Navy. And all the
nciples were there in SEAPLAN 2000 but it was constrained and
ced to talk in budget levels and in ship levels because that
the language that was very important to deal with in those
es
.
And so, it dealt with 1%, 2%, 3% solutions in terms of
k and uncertainty and those sorts of things. But the 3%
ution , which was clearly the preferred one, was roughly 600
ps and a 15 carrier Navy--Battle SEAPLAN 2000.
And then along came Admiral Heywood with the background of
Stripe and he explicitly sought--and I know I'll get
rected if I'm wrong on this one - -expl i c 1 1 ly sought to reverse
Zumwalt approach. The Zumwalt approach was--let's pull back
defend the sea lanes and use sea control ships and that sorts
thing and perhaps deploy logistics types of things. But he
licitly wanted to go back to all the old original principles
t had driven the strategy from the time of Mahon through the
s, through War Plan Orange, through and with the very serious
e in the 60's when there were very some very flat spots in
ategic thinking--we were thinking about other things, you're
ht Don--to get it back. And Admiral Heywood published, in his
ture Statements, and in his testimony before the Congress, and
articles, his fundamental principles for the Navy, which
luded all these things. The Global View, the offensive
ward projection operations. I felt it was explicitly designed
get away from the McNamara, Carter, Zumwalt approach and to
things once again on a visionary strategic approach.
On the question of the allies, Don, I alluded to that also
saying that you've got to appreciate that we were talking to
itary people almost exclusively-- very few exceptions. And the
itary people were quite comfortable with them. And I
agnize the fact that the politicians are not nearly so
fortable with it and they may have been surprised because it
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does seem to them to be a change because maybe they hadn't been
keeping up with Admiral Heywood and things that had been said in
the late '70*s. The trends have been going that way since the
end of the Carter Administration.
Question— back to Don--Conf erence
At the conference that you alluded to, were the people who
were expressing this concern, were they dressed like you or were
they dressed like me'
Don Daniel
I said there were no uniforms at the meeting. They were a
combination of some military people and some civilian people. Ij
had a very very high ranking Norwegian officer who is now
retired--but extremely high ranking person, say--hey, you all
developed this maritime strategy and and that didn't
help in terms of what I was up to. And the process of
consultation is as important as anything else--at this particular
conf erence- -par t i cular ly when he's working in a system where he
has to worry--he knows that you're not going about their
politicians, he certainly has to. And I think that that was a
real problem. So you can say--hey we thought the allies were
really on board. Maybe the navies were really on board
as I say, I think the significant point of it today, is that I
would not at all feel self-satisfied. But I do think John
Meersheimer is not the problem- - that ' s not the part of the debate
that you ought to be concerned about. Where you ought to feel
not self-satisfied at all is in terms of people in other






I think we've got to be careful, however, and what you say
ibviously very s i gni f i cant- -no t to lay too much of a trip on
U.S. Navy and on us for what we can reasonably be expected to
This was, in fact, something that was devised by blue suit
il officers, ably supported by civilians who worked for, with
among us--to further the Navy and maritime section of the
il national picture. As such, we coordinated and continue to
•dinate, largely with allied naval officers, because that's
level at which we do things. You cannot have it both ways,
cannot accuse the Navy- -one - -no t you, but one cannot have it
i ways. One cannot accuse the Navy of coming up with a
:ept which is trying to drive the entire defense problem of
nation, which we in fact are not trying to do. We have tried
how how naval forces and other forces, working with the Navy,
y out its piece of the total problem. And then, at the same
,
berate the Navy for not having cut in the Minister of
nse of Norway or a high ranking Norwegian Army official. We
done what we do at our level and we've done it reasonably
And my suggestion would be--he might have gone, whoever he
-to SACLANT which probably never occurred to him in a million
'ping years- -spend ing most of his time going to SINCEUR--
ver he was--and asked him what the hell his plans were for
strike fleet. And he might have gone to the Norwegian Navy--
ver it was that he ever would have deigned to talk to in the
, because if you think inter-service problems are interesting
the U.S. , our brethren overseas have it--and he might have
d the Norwegian Navy on how they planned on dovetailing their
ations with the Royal Navy, the Dutch Navy and eventually the
Navy. That's why I asked about color of uniform because I
ght it was significant. And if we, in fact, have helped
ger , which we feel we have, the global dialogue, not only
g navies, which frankly wasn't a problem--but between navies
armies and navies and armies and MODs , then we've done a good
g. And among researchers too.
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Jim Tritten
Let met just have one final comment from Michael Palmer and
then that will it— we're only 10 minutes only.
Michael Palmer
I'd just like to just it at the higher level
strategies are devised within a context. And the context for
1946-47, the environment, strategies, the solution to the problem
posed by the environment. '46-'47, the war is going to be
primarily conventional, basically because we have a shortage of
nuclear weapons. China's an ally--that gives us, in the Pacific,
a very narrow focus, relative to the Pacific Theater later on.
What you see, after beginning in 1949 is an erosion of that
environment. Atomic weapons are becoming more available, we lose
China, the entire Pacific becomes a theater of operations, an
immense expansion of the problem for the Navy-- 1 ooking at and
searching for a strategic solution in the Pacific. And you have
the Korean War, Taiwan crises, continual problem in Indo-China
which again, just dilutes the Navy's view. They can't focus in
the Pacific and this is a Pacific Conference.
That changes again, after 1975. Vietnam War is over, China
becomes re-opened- -our ties with China- - that ' s not an ally, it's
at least the enemy of our enemy. The Navy is able to focus again
on the Northern Pacific. And yes we have lots of nuclear
weapons, but we are beginning to plan more and more for the
possibility that we won't use them and that, at least in the
initial war, hopefully the war will be conventional. So what
you're getting after 1975, when Admiral Heywood is out in the
Pacific, is a period where the environment begins to resemble
more and more that of 1946- 1947--so they come up with a similar
solution. What I think is just simply a maritime strategy. As
long as that environment stays the same, I think basically the
strategy will stay intact. If the environment starts to erode,
anything's likely. But even with technological problems--
somebody mentioned breakthroughs in submarine technol ogy- -even
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t, , I see it far from weakening the maritime strategy, would
lforce the kind of maritime strategy approach because if we
't find Soviet submarines out in the open ocean, then you have
let them at their bases, which is where they were in 1946.
/ couldn't find them, they couldn't destroy them. So maybe
more sanguine like you.
Jim Tritten
Well, as always, the historians have the last word. We'll
break for lunch which will be in the La Novia Room of Hermann
I at 12:00, reconvening here at 2 this afternoon to see if
se carrier operations that were described by Cort Wagner, are
lly driving the Soviets up the wall. Thank you.
83

Navy in the Pacific
Afternoon Sess 1 on- -Day One
13 August 1987
lRITIME STRATEGY AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Chair: Dr. Howard Hensel - Air War College
I trust everybody had a chance to have a good lunch. My
• is Howard Hensel, reflecting the joint focus of the Naval
graduate School--I'm from the Air War College. In any case,
be your chair for today. And I've been asked to make a
ie of announcements before we actually begin.
First of all, we have a signup sheet for the campus tours at
Registration Desk. Thus far--to use the Soviet term--we have
rfulfilled the plan regarding the number of people who've
ed up for the campus tour. So, if you are interested, please
up during the break. Second, after the break, there'll be a
of all participants in the conference. That is, who they
their institutional affiliation and so forth. So you may
to go ahead and pick that up.
My role as chair for this second panel, which of course as
can see from your program, is entitled, "Maritime Strategy
the Asia-Pacific Theater of Operations," is largely like that
small tugboat. My job is to pull the big ships up to the
get them to unload their cargo as expeditiously as
ible, pull them away from the dock when their time is up,
eby clearing the way for the next of our large ships to pull
Well, the first of our large ships to deliver its goods, as
ere, is Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin, from the faculty of the Naval
graduate School. Dr. Tsypkin was born in Moscow, came to the
ed States in 1977, received his Master's and Ph.D. m
tical science from Harvard University. And then, following
, he was a Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation in
ington. He currently, as I mentioned, is Assistant Professor
Coordinator of Soviet Studies here at the Naval Postgraduate
School. The title of his presentation will be, "The USSR and Its
Pacific Allies: The Effectiveness of Their Maritime
Correlation." Dr. Tsypkin.
USSR and Its Pacific Allies: Effectiveness of Their
Maritime Correlation
Dr. Mikhail Tsypkin
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Well thank you very much. If you look at the Asian-Pacific
ion from Moscow, it's very easy to grasp the immense
lificance of the area for the Soviets. This is the area where
two greatest, from the Soviet standpoint, geopolitical shifts
:he post World War II occur. First, the Smo-Soviet split,
:h changed from the Soviet standpoint the correlation of
res drastically. And secondly, the communist victory in the
)china War which again changed the correlational forces,
jced American influence m the Asian-Pacific region and pushed
United States and communist China, closer together. The
'ent leadership in the Kremlin, as represented by Mr.
)achev, obviously is interested in the Pacific Region. Last
1 Gorbachev went to the Far East and made a speech at the
livostok, where he said--the situation of the Far East as a
.e in Asia and adjacent ocean spaces, where we have been long
! permanent dwellers and seafarers, is of great national and
:.e interest. If you look at what the military analysts are
.ng, they see increasing importance of the Asian part of the
et Union in light of the decisions of the 27th Party Congress
>uild more manufacturing industries in Asian part of the
et Union. The Soviet military analysis is that that would
»w for greater redundancy and survivability of the Soviet
istrial base in case of war in Europe. The military
lificance of Asian part of the Soviet Union is increasing
r Gorbachev .
I will not discuss, in any detail, the Soviet military
oyments to the area, because this will be a job for another,
ently better qualified panelist here. One thing I would like
ote is that apparently the Soviets, although we have some
talk to the contrary, are still committed to growth of the blue
water Navy and an interesting political indicator here is that
Admiral Gorschkov, whose name, rightly or wrongly, is associated!
with the growth of Soviet maritime interests and naval;
capabilities, has consented to retirement which is very
honorable. It is unusual for the Soviet Union--his biography was
publ ished--he gets high profile interviews in newspapers and so
on and so forth. If the Soviets, if the idea of Soviet maritime
growth was coming under serious criticism, the first sign would
have been the complete disappearance of Admiral Gorschkov's name
from Soviet mass media.
Now, naturally relations with Soviet allies are very
important for the Soviet maritime policy in the region. The
naval base at Cameron Bay has enhanced Soviet naval capabilities
m the area and the Soviets also recently reactivated their
military cooperation with North Korea.
It's important to emphasize here the Soviets are seeking the
style of politics it such that they're seeking more than just
access to bases. They're seeking more than just real estate.
They're looking for military alliances where cooperation will
serve as a multiplier of individual allies contribution. The
Soviets, indeed, as far as we know, conducted some joint
exercises with North Vietnamese forces off communist Vietnam and
with North Korean forces, in the last 3-4 years. Again, military
cooperation is not enough for the Soviets. Soviet military
doctrine holds the view that the political viability of an
alliance is as important as concrete military arrangements. And
in the final analysis, the role of Soviet allies in the Asian-
Pacific region would depend on Soviet politics. The overall
Soviet political strategy in the Pacific will determine the ends
to which their naval power is to be used, and the Naval
requirements, including cooperation with allies, and the
Kremlin's ability to obtain the necessary degree of cooperation
from their allies in the Asian-Pacific region.
One thing we've learned about Gorbachev is that we cannot
longer count on repetitive insistence on every foreign policy
mula which the Soviets have used from the demise of Khrushchev
il the demise of Brezhnev. That Gorbachev and his supporters
in to relish a certain intellectual and political confusion in
West, brought about by his frequent contempt for several
national sacred cows of Brezhnev's policy. For that reason,
should not be ashamed to ask some basic questions about
itical framework in which Soviet decision making on national
urity, including the Soviet security in Asian-Pacific, will be
Bli. What I could say only is that the basic strategic
natives of Soviet foreign policy are still with us. Yes, the
lets still believe that the world is split irreversibly in two
ds- -capi tal i sm and socialism. That socialism should advance;
italism should retreat. And at some point, socialism should
5 final victory. Gorbachev said those things publicly and he
i them privately. We were lucky to learn about that, to
firm how sincere his belief in that dog ma is.
Again, the Soviets are still committed to global military
itical presence. They just fine-tune their language. They no
^er say, as did Mr. Gromyko--no important international issue
be decided without the Soviet Union. Now the language is
t of global political 1 n terdependency . But if you scratch
3 1 n terdependency
,
you recognize the old Soviet dictum--that
tet interests are global and the Soviets have the right to
«ect them and the obligation to further them, whenever
sible .
Another related question would be--how the Soviets look on
shift in correlation of forces which has occurred under
shnev , this immense military political expansion. A typical
wer is provided by a Pravda editorial on the case of
:hnev's 80th anniversary- -whi ch severely criticized his
istic politics, but had no bad words to say about Brezhnev's
.evements in the international arena- -par
t
i cul ar 1 y his
>evement of military strategic parity. And, across the
spectrum of statements by various Soviet officials, from military
to political branches, you can find that the commitment to
defending those geopolitical gains of Brezhnev and to further
them, is unwavering.
So the strategic imperatives of Soviet international conduct
remained unchanged. Just like the Soviet system itself, and it's
the realities of that system, which make the Soviet leadership
believe, in an apt phrase of Adam... --the Soviet leadership's
internal security is extricably bound up with advance of its
external power and authority.
At the same time, the Soviets, and Gorbachev himself, say
that they're in a very special period of their historical
development. Again, if you look through the rhetoric, the basic
issue is that the Soviets would like to have to rebuild much of
their industry, particularly to retool their defense industry.
For that, they need sort of a breathing space of unspecified
duration. And Gorbachev's very difficult job is to provide that
breathing space for Soviet economy, without giving up Soviet
geopolitical gams and without foreclosing an opportunity for
further advances. And this breathing space is to be achieved by
a combination of arms control measures aimed at preserving the
favorable correlation of f orces -- favorable from the Soviet point
of v 1 ew- -achi eved under Brezhnev, but perhaps at a lower level so
the Soviets have to pay less without losing any of their
geopolitical positions. And it also is to be achieved by very
active diplomacy, aimed at weakening opposing alliance systems
and strengthening Soviet alliances.
The Soviets are essentially looking for a different style of
foreign policy. Again, as an authoritative piece in Pravda said,
we have to learn the science of the art of being circumspect and
reserved in international arena. And I would posit that it's
easier to say than to do this, for the Soviets. There is a clear
contradiction between this unchanged Soviet strategic imperative,
and the attempts to gain a breathing space. This contradiction
.definitely be reflected in how the Soviets work on their
itionship with their allies of Asian-Pacific region.
If you're Gorbachev and you're trying to gain breathing
:e in Asian-Pacific region, the first thing to do would be to
jse the tensions in Sino-Soviet relations. But it's still the
.c conflict in the area and its novelty and explos i veness are
>. Trade and other contacts between the two communist powers
increasing. But ideological and geopolitical roots of the
lict remain. The Soviets s t i 1 1 - -ac t i on under Gorbachev, the
.ets have activated their attempts to relead the world
lunist movement again. And this has traditionally been a very
iiderable irritant, from the point of view of the Chinese, who
! always suspected the Soviets of a desire to control the
e world communist movement.
Again, even closer to doorstep of China, the Soviets, as
>ntly as last month, organized a conference of 21 Asian-
fic communist and leftist parties. And organizes Mongolia,
;e domination by the Soviet Union, has always been a thorn in
side of Beijing. And I would say that from the point of view
'hina, which is less susceptible to Soviet public relations
nicks than the west, this type of classical Soviet behavior is
I more important and speaks more about the real Soviet
sntions-- that all the talk about new talking which we hear
n Gorbachev
.
The Sino-Soviet conflict is directly related to the state of
.et alliance with Vietnam. Because the most intractable
)lem in Asian-Pacific region, as far as Soviet interests are
:erned , which poisons both Soviet relations with China and
.et relations with non-communist nations in the Pacific area,
:he Vietnam occupation of Cambodia. The Chinese, for one,
} conditioned any serious improvement in Sino-Soviet relations
Vietnam's pulling out of Cambodia. The Soviets, on the one
I, seem to appreciate the sensitivity of this issue. But,
•t Gorbachev, with all the talk about relaxation of tensions
new thinking, the Soviets have been giving indications that
they're prepared to draw Cambodia into the socialist
"commonwealth" whose defense and integrity the Soviet Union is
committed. For several years under Brezhnev, the Soviets were
;
reluctant Cambodia as a full-fledged socialist state. Now, under
Gorbachev, they started doing that. First the Secretary of
Central Committee, responsible for foreign policy, Anatoli
Dobryin, ranked Cambodia with other communist nations. Then,
General Secretary Gorbachev, speaking in Vladivostok, did the
same thing. And most recently, last March, a joint Soviet-
Cambodian communique, spoke about the relations between the two
nations based on principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism. This is a very clear signal as to where
Cambodia is heading. So apparently we have hardening of Soviet
pos i 1 1 on- -Cambod 1 a is consistently drawn into socialist common-
wealth. And the Soviets must realize that the chances of
improved relations with China and with non-communist Asian-
Pacific nations will suffer. But the importance of solidifying
an alliance, firmly controlled from Moscow, which is a
traditional strategic imperative for the Soviets, appears to
outweigh in practice the potential benefits of removing a major
irritant like Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, in Smo-Soviet
re 1 at i ons
.
One reason the Soviets do it is the operational style of
their foreign policy, which gives preference to a course of
action certain to bring positive results, over any uncertain,
benefits. And given the turbulent history of Sino-Soviet
relations, and the scale of differences between the two communist,
superpowers, the Soviets might suspect that if they make one,
concession to China, that'll be a prelude to more request^:
As far as the position of the United States and her friends
on the Cambodian issue, the Soviets probably hope that if they
resist the demands from the west and from the west's allies in
the Pacific, to pull out from Cambodia, long enough, the United
States and other critics of Soviet policy, would simply walk away
n the issue, as has happened many times with examples of
Let expansion
.
Another important thing about Sovi e t- Vie tnamese relations is
political significance that Vietnam has acquired for
jachev personally. It has become the unlikely laboratory for
attempt of Gorbachev's style restructuring outside the Soviet
)n. Vietnam is the first pro-Soviet communist country, to
»rgo a top leadership change since Gorbachev came to power.
Gorbachev's restructuring has not been greeted too much
where among any of its allies. And now he's emphasizing how
se the Soviet and Vietnamese communists are, how they have a
non goal of restructuring and apparently what's happening m
:nam is strengthening his domestic legitimacy which is
>rtant for him and reduces even further, any Soviet desire to
;s Vietnam to move out of Cambodia.
And the Soviet position on the Cambodian issue exemplifies
> contradiction between Soviet strategic imperatives, when
> need and the need to expand and to consolidate the expansion
to expand further and at the same time, to show flexibility
|am this breathing space. But that flexibility is mostly
>al
. On one occasion they would drop the reference to
,ecting Vietnam's interests in any dealing with China. At
iher occasion, they'll resurrect the reference. But it
;n't go any further than that. As far as I'm concerned, the
et's relations with Vietnam will continue to move in the
:ent direction to get closer. That, in its own turn, will
'ease tensions in the Asian-Pacific region and increase both
lirements for Soviet naval presence there and will give the
.ets greater possibilities for their naval presence.
Relations with the other Soviet ally, North Korea, are quite
erent. North Korea has for years maneuvered between China
the Soviet Union. From 1984 on, the pendulum has swung into
direction of cooperation with the Soviet Union. There's
tary cooperation, there's increased economic aid from the
et Union, and the Soviets, interestingly, are building a
direct rail link between the Soviet Far East and North Korea,
which will not go through China's territory. It's all quite
interes ting.
But there are certain problems in the effectiveness— certain
obstacles toward the effectiveness of Soviet-Korean military
cooperation. First of all, the Soviets do not share their
concern about China, with North Korea. North Korea does not have
a history of hostility with China. At the same time, the Soviets
have no interest in any North Korean designs of military action
against South Korea. For the time being, Gorbachev's policy is
to avoid any major confrontation with the United States. And
underwriting any North Korean ventures in that are would be very
unlikely for the Soviets. So that, again, is another obstacle
toward genuine military alliance.
The greatest opportunity for the Soviets will be once the
North Korean leader, Kim el Sung, dies and there will be a
succession struggle in Korea. And that is the moment when they
will try to move in and to gain a firmer foothold in Korean
policies. In the meanwhile, the Soviets will proceed to move
caut 1 ous
.
Now just let me discuss one last question and be over with.
What about another opt ion- -Gorbachev ' s grand scheme in the
Pacific 9 The one he proposed during his speech in Vladivostok.
End to military alliances, pull out of foreign troops, naval arms
control, creation of a system of common security. The problem
with that proposal is that it's both unrealistic and self-
serving. It's a classical combination characteristic of foreign
policy. On the unrealistic side, it ignores the role of Sino-
Soviet conflict and how profound it is. The Soviet leaders are
intellectually unequipped because of the Marxist-Leninist dogma,
to confront squarely the issue of a profound conflict between two
communist states. And they're not going to address the roots of
that conflict as long as they remain communist.
Another reality they ignore is that the Sovi e ts - - they ' 1 1 try
to ignore--is the reality that any regional security arrangement
10
ires political status quo and protection. As long as the
ets are committed to promoting political change in the Asian-
fic region, and benefitting from it--as long as they organize
ffair such as this meeting of 21 communist and leftist
ies from the region--as long as they serve as mentors to
tical forces, opposition political forces in other countries,
regional security arrangement would collapse sooner or the
r .
As for their naval arms control proposals, they're clearly
-serving. First of all, they serve to drive the wedge
een the United States and China, Whipping up of China's fear
superpower condominium at their expense. To do the same in
relations between the United States and her other friends and
es in the Pac i f 1 c
.
As for the He 1 s 1 nk 1 - type security system in the area, the
ets would use it to manipulate American friends, again by
ping up their fears about their possible beh md- the -back
ings with the United States. And secondly, the Soviets
ly have a considerable advantage because of the asymmetry in
tical systems. The West needs formal, legal structure for
alliances. The Soviets can do it quite well--for 7 years
controlled Warsaw Pact countries without any Warsaw Pact and
rolled it very effectively. If we have a security
ngement like Gorbachev proposed in the Pacific, it will
ent the United States from activating its alliances and will
interfere with what the Soviets are doing.
Just to warp up--and I've taken too much time already--I'd
to say that the Soviets are working on their alliances to
e their maritime interests. That there is no reason to think
there is going to be any significant change which will
"inly reduce Soviet commitment to expanding their naval power
he Pacific and that we'll have to live and deal with it for
foreseeable future. Thank you.
1 1
Dr . Hensel
Second of our large ships to unload here at our dock is Reai
Admiral Robert Hanks. Admiral Hanks retired from the Unitec
States Navy in 1977, after 35 years of very distinguished
service. Since then, he has served as senior political militarj
analyst with the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. He has
written very extensively, as I'm sure a good many people in this
audience knows. Admiral Hanks* topic will be "U.S. and Pacific
Allies: Maritime Interdependence." Admiral Hanks.
U.S. and Its Pacific Allies: Maritime Interdependence
Rear Admiral Robert Hanks, USN (Ret.)
Admiral Heywood , Admiral Austin, distinguished guests,
ladies and gentleman. Prior to the conference, all of the
panelists were enjoyed by the director to think crisp, keep the
remarks to a minimum and I want to assure them that I plan to dc
that. My wife complained at one time that I was the only fellow
who ever went through flight training in Pensacola, Florida and
got sunburned on the roof of my mouth. At that time, I decided
to become to advocate of the school of public speaking, which I
believe was reputed to have been originated by Abraham Lincoln in
which he said there are three basic rules: stand up to be
recognized, speak up to be heard, and shut up to be appreciated.
That last injunction is going to be fairly easy to follow.
Because the final remarks that Mike Palmer made just before lunch
and Steve Jaurique's masterful presentation after lunch, to use a
new buzz word that is very popular in Washington, essentially
shredded my presentation. So as a result, I've had to put the
rudder hard right, do a Williamson turn which all you sailors
will understand, regroup and redo my notes. So I hope you'll
bear with me if it appears to be a bit disjointed. I'll try not
to repeat many of the things that were said and perhaps take some
others with a little different point of view.
First of all I must say that in all of my service in the
Navy and certainly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has
12
inced me that since 1945, the focus of U.S. national security
ning has been essentially centered in Western Europe, with
Pacific being neglected. That has been true, administration
r administration. However, in the past decade, certain new
ratives have emerged in the Pacific, primarily trade, which
attracted the attention of people in the United States. And
ink have finally focused strategic attention on this part of
world that it so richly deserves. You saw the figures on
e this morning. I would add to them the fact that the two
est GNP * s in the world today belong to the United States and
n. And I would make one argument with the map that you see
ront of you. And that is that it does not include the Indian
n. Those two great bodies of water are interconnected by the
ages through Indonesia, Torus Strait which Steve Jaurique
ribed to you at lunchtime, the passages around Australia.
are interconnected. The nations in the Far East are heavily
ndent on trade with the Indian Ocean just as we are in the
ed States. And I think they have to be taken as an entity
they have to be viewed in strategic terms in that fashion.
In addition to trade, I think the other great factor that we
to keep in mind in the problem of mutual security. And here
ould like to refer you to the Guam document which was
ciated by President Richard Nixon in 1969. After Henry
inger and his staff had energized the bureaucracy in
mgton, they came to the conclusion that the commitments the
ed States had undertaken around the world, were far greater
the military wherewithal to underwrite them. As a result,
President said--from now on, as far as the United States was
erned , defense of individual nations will be an individual
onsibility. You can no longer count on the United States to
rid your country for you.
Primarily that meant the manpower that was required, would
to be provided by the country who felt itself imperiled.
he went on to say that for those countries who could not
r'd to buy the necessary military equipment and training, the
13
United States would provide it, for free in many cases. And w€
have done so over the years. He further indicated that in the
event a country in which the United States' were involved, was
imperiled by some external force, that the United States would
consider committing the high technology end of the military, that
is, naval forces and air forces, to give them a hand. And
unspecified but certainly implied was the notion that ultimately
if the stakes were high enough, we might introduce ground troops.
That was the Guam Doctrine.
Despite the buildup in the United States Navy under the
Reagan Administration, the modernization that's gone on in the
other armed forces in the United States, the tenets of the Nixon
Doctrine, as its come to be known, still obtain. The United
States simply cannot police all the waters of the western Pacific
and Indian Ocean. That means it's got to be a mutual effort.
Now I won't bore you with a review of the changes that have
been made since 1945 because they were covered this morning. But
I would like to highlight a couple. I think the first profound
change was Mao Tse Tung's triumph on Mainland China. That
produced a profound shift in the balance of power in the Pacific
Far East. That was reversed, to an extent, following the
infamous Cultural Revolution and the Smo-Soviet split to the
point that China has now turned its face to the West and become,
if you will, somewhat of a force for stability in the region.
The abject U.S. retreat from Vietnam was followed by
immediate Soviet overtures to Vietnam and then the movement of
Soviet forces into former American bases in that country. And
that was also profound. For the first time, the Soviet Union has'
sizable military bases far from Soviet shores and believe me, as
you've heard this morning, they're using them. From Cameron Bay,
they can put all of Southeast Asia at risk. All you have to do
is draw a few bomber range curves, take a look at the ships and
submarines that they're operating out of those ports and you'll
recognize the extent of the problem. Particularly when you place
14
n in proximity, as they are, to the major trade lines that
lect the Indian Ocean with the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
So we've got a whole new ballgame. And that has been
bher complicated by what I choose to call an unraveling in
iitional Western solidarity which has obtained since 1945.
st of all, South Korea is presently undergoing serious turmoil
:h has two potential impacts in so far as the free world is
:erned. First of all, it is bound to weaken the Korean
>nses against their northern neighbor. And no one is quite
i what the aging Kim El Sung will do. Whether he, as one last
3 before he passes on to whatever reward he gets--he will try
i again with military force, to reunify the peninsula. The
3nd impact is that we don't know what kind of a government the
:h Koreans- -what they want, nor what kind are they ultimately
ig to get. It could be one that is hostile to the west. And
;, of course, would expose the western flank of Japan, which
i main linchpin, if you will, to mutual security in the
.fie.
And while we're talking about unraveling, I would move a
:le bit further south and talk about the Philippines for a
jte
. The rise to power of Corizano Aquino has cast a very,
f large cloud over the status of our two major military bases
vhat part of the world--Subic Bay, of course, and Clark Field.
)uld argue respectfully, with Steve, that there are no viable
;rnatives to those two bases. Now, Ul.... is a hell of a big
sor
. But the one thing he mentioned is not available there--
s not available in Guam, it's only available in Japan and
:.
' s the skilled work force. And I see no way at all of
;ing it even if you went in there and built the most enormous
il base and air base in the Western Pacific.
Further south of course we have our friends, the New
.anders , who apparently forgotten the lessons of 1941 and
5. At that time, as the Japanese juggernaut was rolling
-hward
, reaching for Port Morris... within striking distance
Australia and New Zealand, the New Zealander's troops were
15
fighting in the western desert against Rommel and they were
hollering like bloody murder to please get their troops home tc
defend them. Apparently, time erodes one's memory. They have
forgotten that it was Japanese sea power which cordoned off the
entire Asian continent from the Arctic to the Indian subcontinent
and very nearly moved on south to take those lands down under.
The Soviet Union, with their move into Indochina, with a vastly
expanded reach and increased technology of their naval and air
forces today, have far more capability with the exception of the
amphibious landing capability, which the Japanese had, and was
present during those troublesome years. The Australians, still
adhering to the ANZA's pact, apparently remember. Obviously the
New Zealanders do not and it may well be that we'll have tc
remind them of that. However, gently it be done, Steve.
So, where's all this leave us? First of all, I think
there's absolutely no question that this is a maritime region.
It's as maritime as the North Atlantic from which NATO takes its
name. The distances are incredibly greater, the trade now is
much much greater, and that which is important to the economic
and political well-being of a country in peacetime, could well
become critically important in time of war. And if those sea
lanes which traverse those waters in that part of the world, were
to severed by the Soviet Union in its advanced reach, it could
mark the end of some of the countries in Southeast Asia. So
while I agree with Steve that we can do an awful lot with port
visits, with helping hands, with talking to our friends down
there, in the right manner, we have to realistic. We live in a
power-political world. And we must never forget that. We have
to convince the Australians and the New Zealanders and the
nations of ASEAN and the Philippines and the Japanese in
particular, that there is a threat, that the United States can
not be depended upon to go it alone, and that the only way that
we're going to survive is to do it together. Now none of those
countries have navies that are capable of mounting the kinds of
defenses which are necessary. But they do have ports, they do
16
air fields and they have other facilities which they can
available to countries who do have that power. And it's
kind of cooperation which can go a long way toward ensuring
deterrence of Soviet ambitions in that part of the world are
inued
.
At the signing of the U.S. Declaration of Independence,
amin Franklin told his cohorts--we all must hang together or
ly we will hang separately. And I would suggest that that
se ought to hang in the office of every political leader in
Pacific Far East. Thank you very much.
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Dr. Hensel
The third speaker this afternoon will be Mr. Andrew
Marshall, Director of Net Assessment for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Mr. Marshall received his advanced degree'
from the University of Chicago and served with Rand Corporation
from 1949 to 1972. Following that, he was the National Security
Council and, of course, since late 1973, he's been with the
Office of Net Assessment. Mr. Marshall's topic today will "USSR
vs. the United States Maritime Capabilities in the Pacific."
U.S. vs. USSR Maritime Capabilities in the Pacific
Mr. Andrew Marshall
Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary
of De f ense
What I wanted to talk to you about in some ways diverges a
little bit from the announced topic. I want to come back to
that. But I also, before doing that, wanted to talk about two
other things. One is to talk some about the way in which you
might try and structure a look at the comparative capabilities--
just to highlight, I think, the complexity of that, and also how
different the situation in the Pacific and Asia is from that in
Europe, where most people have focused their attention. The.
second thing I really want to talk to you about is how different
I think the future is going to be and therefore it also serves as
a qualifier to what I am going to say about, I think, what one
would currently assess the balance of forces there. But I think
also raises questions about essentially everything you've heard
thus far in the meeting in the following sense. Asia is probably
going to remain the area of strongest economic growth--I mean the
key countries there. And if you're looking 15 or 20 years ahead,
the cumulative effect of these differential rates of growth can
have— it's hard to say, will have--but could have just enormous
effects. Admiral Hanks, I think, already mentioned that the
Soviet Union is no longer the second biggest economy in the
world. The Japanese are. According to some work that Charlie
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and I--Charlie Wolf at Rand--and I are doing, looking at the
re security environment, it seems likely that by the year
the Soviet's will be the fourth with China probably
assing them. And it's indeed plausibly be 407. bigger than
by that time. Now, there are a lot of uncertainties in
Not only the projections, but in my view, we don't even
the relative size of the Soviet economy to U.S. economy at
current time, with any exact i tude- - I mean the CIA view is
it is about 55%. But speaking for myself, it's more like
And if you speak to or have various emigre Soviet
omists, a look at some of the things that have been coming
of the Soviet Union written by very good economists, going
over the historical record and correcting the past claims of
th
,
you find that if you believe them--and again talking to
ous Soviet emigres, who feel that these people are very very
,
competent technical people in the Soviet Union--that
cally the Soviet Union has not grown relative to the United
es from 1950 to the present. And if you believe that, then
much more credible that the real size of the Soviet economy
be about 40%, maybe as low as 35%. It's an economy that
cates its resources dramatically differently than we do, with
t more going into the military area. So it doesn't mean that
're weak. What it means is that over time, the situation may
ge. And in any case, along with this matter that I mentioned
ou about the Chinese probably passing them in the early part
he next century and beginning to grow significantly beyond
, if you assume that the Chinese beginning in the latter part
his century, follow what appears to be their strategy of
ng finally to the modernization of the military establishment
moving back to putting say 10% of GNP into defense, I mean
quickly, sort of around 2000, are spending 45% as much as we
the Soviet Union are, on defenses. And by 2010, about 3/4
the Soviets might be projected to be spending then. And
's just going to be a different world out there. One doesn't
what--if only in reaction to this Chinese growth, what the
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Japanese might do, the Indians, I mean I think that we have tc
have real questions about what that region of the world is going
to look like. And the potential for fairly sizable military
capabi 1 i t ies
.
Another, I think important thing, to think about- -especial iy
about the future, is if you read Soviet military literature at
the moment, in fact you can trace it back to the late 70's--I
mean, they are foreseeing essentially a revolution in military
affairs that will take place in a serious way, beginning perhaps
around '95, but in a more dramatic and fuller way in the early
part of the next century, due to a wave of new technologies. Now
the things they talk most about are the technologies that affect
theater warfare. But presumably they are thinking also in the'
naval area and again, you know, I think that may have a dramatic
effect on the kind of strategies and concepts of operat i ons - - they
certainly feel that is what they are going to have to do and
indeed, probably already are hard at work thinking about it in
some of the areas they focus more on--such as theater warfare,
ground force combined arms, warfare in that connection.
So I'm not sure what all the implications of this are. But
I'm saying I have, in the background- - 1 want you to have in the
background of your thinking--I think the next 20 years or so is
going to be a period of very, very significant change with the
shifting of the rankings of various countries in terms of size,
their GNP
,
perhaps military expenditures, this wave of technology
that may transform things. Although it's very likely that while
the world will be one where there appears to be movement of many
more countries, moving into armament manufactures- - f or this new
wave of technology, probably that will be much narrower.
Probably only initially ourselves and the Soviet Union. The
Japanese if they move in that direction.
So with those two kinds of things as forewords, let's go
back and talk about the main subject of the talk. If you're
thinking about the comparative U.S. capabilities in any region,
it seems to me that you need to try to understand what the game
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,n the region. And one of the things that's distinctive about






And again, if you're talking about these
ections, it's going to be even more so. The other players
going to get stronger relative to the U.S. and the Soviet
m
.
In Europe, where most people are accustomed to thinking
it it, it's like two teams--I mean there's problems about
,her the teams hang together and so on, but nonetheless it's
of like two teams. Asia isn't like that. Right from the
nning, it's a much more complicated situation. And because
that, you can begin to look at the situation, the
ingencies within which you want to assess the forces — into
her this is one of the fronts in a global war or whether
e are regional conflicts into which the U.S. and the Soviet
n are drawn or have some influence on. And it makes a big
erence in judging things. If you're looking at the second
t, or seeing it as another front, it was suggested this
ing by Michael Palmer, and others--they do a very fascinating
ory as to what that front looks like, to the Soviets, to
elves, because of the changing nature of the situation. And
see it again on the Soviet side where you can only make rough
mates--but say around 1965, perhaps 15% of their military
rt was going to Asia and the Pacific region. It's more like
now. If you remove the Vietnam bulge, ours has been almost
steady decline and the issue is--I think before us--will be
her we turn up as Admiral Hanks was saying, because of the
gnition of the trade and the general economic importance of
area
.
I would add one other thing to that which people have tended
or our country has tended to neglect--and that is, one of the
oducts of this rapid technological, economic growth in Asia,
been sort of a migration of part of the American
nological base, supply of components for our military forces
to Asia. Now people haven't worried so much about it,
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because I think in the past, because we've sort of gone out oi
the worrying about mobilizations that are fought with whatever
you had. But now, it was suggested earlier, both we and the
Soviets and very definitely in the Soviet view of things, aH
increasingly focusing on wars in which they either may never gc
nuclear, or that have a very extended— several weeks, several
months— conventional phase, before there's some transition tc
nuclear warfare. In that circumstance, given stockpiles and sc
on, you're going to want to maintain your access to the supply of
these components. How are you going to do that 7 That's going tc
have to interact very strongly with your war plans or you're
going to have to have a different, better base here domestically
that can be turned on in circumstances of this sort. So that
poses a major problem.
So let me then run quickly over the situation in the
Pacific. It's been mentioned by several of the speakers - -the
great transit distances, the s i ze- -Manchur ia is the size of
Western Europe--I mean, just the whole scale is big. And I think
one of the reflections that I feel of the fact of this Europe-
orientation has been that we've tended to build aircraf t- -much
better tailored to the European theater than in the Pacific. And
when you get out there, one of the other things you see is a kind
of mi smatch -
-
one of the asymmetries between ourselves and the
Soviet Union--that they have adequate range of their weapons to
reach most targets. We have problems. And in order to bring tc
bear our forces, we have to fight our way in. Have a naval
campaign--ASW campaign— to move and bring our forces in. We
don't have, in our inventories, the medium-range type of bomber
type of weaponry. What we have is really allocated to other
theaters and CINCPAC has been trying to get some of the F- Ill's
out there for a long time. But I mean, it's a big struggle.
There's a kind of tendency to have a kind of mismatch.
Another major kind of asymmetry, the U.S. bases are on a few
key islands widely separated. The Soviets are mainly continental
bases, with much of the infrastructure dispersed well inland.
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t I'm referring to here is obviously not the naval bases and
5n, but bomber bases. One of the main instruments of the
Lets are pursuing in naval warfare are cruise missiles
iched from long range land-based aircraft. So if we're going
:ake them on there, you've got to go after those bases. And
;'s one of the reasons or one of the things that leads to this
jlem of the requirement for range.
If you look at the key operations in a war, one is the air
Ae over Northeast Asia. Second--this naval campaign, which
: say, is an ASw" effort and other naval operations, to move
carrier task forces close enough to use our weapons
actively against Soviet targets.
Another thing that we, at least, speculate about, is the
lihood given the nature of cur basing system, and the limited
>er of headquarters--of a Soviet C 3 I campaign, probably being
>od bet, as part of their operations there. The thing is,
; the Soviets, on the C 3 I area, have a lot more s 1 tes - - they ' re
I, difficult to disrupt, probably as compared with ourselves,
lave a number of opportunities for improvements. Things are
iady happening. The TLAM deployments provide more survivable
ibilities, increase our conventional strike options, air
mse upgrades, both we and the Japanese are doing some things
-hat area that are very helpful. And then, as we say, more
;er range aircraf t- - 1 ' ve already talked to that. We don't
; enough in our general inventory to deploy out there. Maybe
let so me --so me thing to thing about for the next generation of
>onry--I mean, how do we get longer range weaponry into that
iter'?
Let me close with just a few words which I think are very
Ttant , in making any assessment which really is on the Soviet
pective of the situation. My own guess, for the reasons that
mtioned earlier, about the differential economic growth, and
technological capabilities of a number of the Asian
tries, I think they have to be very concerned over the longer
-as to how they're going to manage that situation. It's
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clear that the Chinese and from '65, have become a focus of a lot
of their military attenti on- -movement of all the forces out
there. And so I think that this is actually one of the parts of!
the world where, in an overall sense, the trends are
fundamentally favorable. I mean, there are all these problems
that have been talked about in terms of our own position and the
difficulties of the diplomacy of the area and the maintenance of
alliances. But the fundamental situation--I mean, if you see it
fundamentally as a U.S. -Soviet competition in the region,
probably the fundamental situation is going much more against
them than against us.
Now because of the points I made at the beginning, I mean,
the whole nature of what we think the problem out there is, might
change. And people need begin thinking a little bit more about
the longer term future and considering alternative worlds that




The final speaker for the chaired portion of our panel here
afternoon is Mr. Richard Haver, Deputy Director of Naval
lligence. Mr. Haver received his degree from Johns Hopkins
ersity, served with the Navy for five years, three of which
as a naval aviator. And since 1973, he has been with the
ce of Naval Intelligence. Mr. Haver will be offering his
lents on the remarks you've just heard, as well as hopefully
ng his own twist to it all too.
Richard Haver
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence
Thank you. I'm not sure which briefing to give--either the
on these or the one that was promised in the morning session,
really just an intelligence analyst, which I find in the
mgton area is as highly revered as lawyers, stockbrokers and
untants
.
And I'm reminded of the convention of intelligence
ysts that went out on a fishing trip in the Atlantic a few
s ago and sighted a school of sharks and rushed to see this
p. One of the analysts fell overboard and was promptly
wn back aboard- -pro f ess i onal courtesy being offered by the
ks . Of course, you can use that for lawyers or anybody else
hold in high esteem.
In trying to summarize what I heard from Misha and the
ral and Andy Marshall, it seems to me that the first
entation tried to take a look at the Asian situation, the
fie basin from the point of view of Moscow- -be ing in Monterey
aps . But still a lot closer to Moscow than most of us will
get. And what I heard was essentially a series of problems,
lenges , things that obviously, unless the Soviets try to take
specific action, could go against them. Whether it's their
ation in Vietnam, fraught with opportunity but also peril, in
s of the Sino-Soviet situation, as well as their attempt to
ate the U.S.
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And I heard almost the reverse of that from Admiral Hanks--
that , if you will, the view from Alexandria, Virginia or
Washington. Again fraught with problems, pitfalls, many
conflicting objectives and a serious concern about whether our'
allies and those in the Pacific region, share our concerns and
whether we can pull that coalition together.
And then I think, what Andy came across with, was an
interesting view of many of these present problems are only going
to grow significantly more complicated. And it seemed to me that
Andy laid out what the complicating factors were, and admitted,
as I'm sure almost all of us would, that we don't understand how
those problems will turn out over the course of the next 20
years. Probably the one thing that's certain is that anything we
estimate today, as to what will be the prevailing reality 20
years from now, is unlikely to be correct. There is more likely
to be things unanticipated in terms of both the politics and
economic situation, as well as perhaps the military balance in
Asia than any other area. Europe seems to be reasonably stable,
has been for 40 some odd years, and there seems to be a great
deal of factors working in favor of s tabi 1 i ty- -you could call it
stagnation perhaps, if you're not a European interested
individual. But the change that everyone seems to think will
come over the course of the next two decades, is believed to
focus here in Asia. There will be change in Africa and other
locations, perhaps South America. But the most dynamic change,
from just about everyone- -no t only here today, but many other
folks who are not--seems to be a consensus that it will be in the
Pacific region. Of course, presenting us all with a series of
chal lenges .
It seems to me, also, hearing the comments this morning and
then this af ternoon- -we really are talking, when we talk about
our maritime strategy in relationship to this area, about four
different conditions, all clearly interlocked, all difficult to
concern, one from the other, at least as they begin to unfold,
but distinctly different. One is the clear peacef . situation
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t exists today-call it violent peace, whatever term you
3ise--but obviously the open warfare on any large scale, is not
sently evident in Pacific area. Of course, if you sweep in,
I agree with Admiral Hanks you should sweep in the Indian
m
,
the situation in the Persian Gulf is about as close to a
3r limited war as you'd like to get.
The next phase is clearly that limited war, whether it's
bher Vietnam, or another Korean War or a major open civil
jation in the Philippines. Obviously, that's a stage of
flict that might not necessarily involve the U.S. and the
Let Union in a direct confrontation, might not necessarily
lire those coalitions that we would, both sides seem to be
iving to create, to be brought in their full weight to bear on
si tuat i on- -but will obviously cause a realignment of the
Ltical situation.
The third one is one that Andy just alluded to and is
irly a major concern in the Washington area right now. And I
ame
, in one respect, it's a concern in Washington because it's
l a concern in Moscow for perhaps even longer--is the notion
; we could have, and in fact a belief perhaps that it is now
more likely of the serious consequences of the present East-
; struggle, a third world war that does not necessarily go
.ear in a very short period of time, and is not decisively
.ded by conventional arms in a similarly short period of time.
is rather--as the Soviets would put it--a protracted
Jggle. One that turns more into the World War I or World War
conditions than is the one that was apparently prevalent in
.et military thinking for about 30 years or so, and that is
: the only way the West would compensate the Soviet
/entional superiority was with nuclear weapons--and that's
i retaliation, etc. And that would drive us. That the U.S.
its allies were deliberately allowing themselves to be
'entionally weak, and sitting behind a cheaper nuclear hammer.
Soviets seem to believe, and this has been articulated in
' forms by them, that nuclear parity and improvement in the
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West's political and military solidarity makes it more likelj
that war will last longer, be more violent and more destructive
in terms of conventional munitions, and not necessarily cause j
nuclear trigger to be reached.
And then of course the last one, which, despite all that
optimistic thinking--if you can talk about Third World War as ar
optimistic thought--of course is that it will not go into a
nuclear phase. If it does, obviously everyone has to be prepared
for that, because if one is not prepared, one invites it. It
seems to me from what we've said there are at least three major
factors that influence how these four various forms of conflict
could manifest themselves. One is the basic economic strength of
the member states of any particular coalition or those sitting or
the sidelines, and how well those alliances and coalitions work.
The second is the military balance itself. You can't get
away from the pure calculation of who has the upper hand.
Despite Glasnost and all the rest of it, I, for one, firmly
believe that the Soviets still go to bed each night weighing what
the correlation of forces is in the world. Who does have the
upper hand 9 If the situation obtains where military force has tc
be brought to bear, who is likely to prevail in that encounter 7
It still, it seems to me, drives a great deal of their
procurement, drives the way resources are allocated within the
Soviet State. I don't doubt that Mr. Gorbachev would like tc
alter it. Would like to, as Misha put it, defuse that--buy time
--give the Soviet economy a chance to catch its breath and
modernize and rebuild itself. But that doesn't change the
imperative to be strong today and to continue to be strong.
And lastly, and it was discussed this morning, I think is
the quality of the strategy. Not simply the quality of the
armament, or even the training that the people receive—but
whether the strategy is executable, whether it's sound and
whether it can, in effect, be used to the other side's
disadvantage. I, for one, believe that the Soviets are not lying
in that little book that was held up today--the maritime strategy
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all it the U.S. military force and how it would be used— does
er the Soviets. I, for one, believe the Soviets ascribe that
tegy to us long before Roger articulated it and the CNO's
ed it up. I believe that, in effect, the Soviets have always
ined our capabilities first and then, in the absence of any
rcut strategy, took a look at what would be the worst thing
could be done with it and that became the strategy. I think
they view today as unfortunate, is that we are now
alizing that openly and starting to address the issue of not
the procurement of weapon systems, but also, as was also
hed on this morning, the arrangements of our alliances and
itions, to fit in to a strategy more directly.
What bothers the Soviets in the Far East the most, I believe
out ques 1 1 on- - the Soviets believe that their situation in the
East is precarious. I believe that the Soviets hold that for
e fundamental reasons. One is China and the fact that any
r conflict in which the Chinese cannot be ruled out, in terms
belligerent against the Soviet Union, will tie down Soviet
urces . The Soviets cannot afford to denude themselves in the
East, if the Chinese pose a present threat. And when I say
a, I think from the Soviet viewpoint, they see China and
n and Korea in almost the same sentence- -not necessarily as a
ed alliance, not necessarily a group of people who are in
with one another, but people who may be united against the
et Union. And if you will, their more Western orientation in
s of the Far East. That is first and foremost. And as a
It, anything that we do--and this was one of the essences of
ral Heywood's sea strike issue some 10 years ago- -any thing
makes it appear as though the U.S. is going to stay in the
fie, that the U.S. is going to fight in the Pacific, that the
is going to back up whatever resolve exists in this loose
elate--coal i t ion as Admiral Hanks put it--is bad for the
st Union
.
The second major factor is that the Soviets themselves are
in the Far East--not necessarily with troops in the field
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and airplanes as was shown in Pacwheat's graphics which are
absolutely correct— but it is a logistics nightmare in the Far
East. It's a come-as-you-are party for the Soviet Union. There
is no strong industrial base and it will take Mr. Gorbachev 20
years, if he really follows through on his Vladivostok
pronouncements, to make the Pacific a viable economic entity that
can support indigenous military forces. Otherwise, everything
comes from the Western USSR and the more that influences the
Soviets, the more it constrains their strategy. Particularly in
a protracted struggle. If the Soviets truly believe that the war
will not be over in a matter of weeks, but will last months or
even years, this problem is compounded manyfold. In addition to
that, the Soviets not only have a serious problem moving supplies
from the west to the east, but then they have a colossal
distribution problem once it gets to the Far East. Look at the
Trans-Siberian railroad or BAM--that terminates basically in one
area. You can count the number of railroad ties on the Kamchatka
Peninsula, on the hands in this room. It is a logistics
disaster, caused by huge distances and a lack of a base to
establish anything else. If you want to put up a credible
defense for Kamchatka Peninsula, if you want to defend the Kuril
Islands, if you want to make your situation on Sakhalin Island
viable, if you want to protect all of Siberia, you're going to
have to have naval forces to protect your naval lines of
communication. They are essential. A good deal of what you see
out here on that list of hardware the Soviets have in the Far
East, is very much defensive, in that sense.
I think the third problem is one that ties in all of the
things that have been said, and it relates to how well the U.S.
can manage its advantages. Admiral Hanks talked about the
challenges, but he also mentioned the advantages. Misha talked
about the problems, reverse them and see them as our advantage.
In many respects, Japan is the world's largest aircraft carrier-
stuck right underneath Ivan's nose. He can't move it, he really
can't damage it severely unless he resorts to massive weapons, he
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a nation that is an economic colossus, and a military problem
,erms of its po ten t ial - - i ts military reality today is very
.ted, through Constitutional means and through the nation's
lack of interest in getting offensive. But it has incredible
intial. I believe the Soviets see themselves as politically
,he disadvantage in the Far East. And the trend is negative.
dn't hear anyone yet today talk about the economic miracle
, is South Korea. I assume many of you have visited there. I
there during the riots a few months ago. It was upsetting,
>e is political disruption in South Korea. But there is also
ipulation that is well-fed, well-clothed, driving around in
idai's. I believe that there are the ingredients for a
lendous amount of political stability in South Korea. And if
.s sitting in Pyongyang, I'd be very nervous about my long
1 future. There is a situation developing where there will be
'lossal power imbalance between the South and the North. A
1 agrarian, backward country pouring way too much into
.merit, and not nearly enough into an economy, switching back
forth between the Soviet Union and the PRC in terms of its
tical leaning, with no stable prospects for the replacement
im El Sung in terms of its political internal order, facing a
try whose Gross National Product is increasing faster than
other nation in the world, to its south. Whether it's guns
utter or whatever, South Korea is developing into a major
omic force in the Far East. And the Soviets, and their North
an friends, are truly troubled by that.
I think these factors weigh on why our strategy, the U.S.
onal strategy, and why the Navy is an important part of this
why we have a Conference on the Navy in the Pacific, is so
rtant. As has been said or implied in this morning's
fings and this afternoon, U.S. policy in the Pacific is
ntially Navy. The Army and the Air Force are important,
ve heard about Admiral Lyons efforts to include them and they
rly are--but they are an adjunct to the Navy. If the Navy
tc Europe to fight the war, there is no Air Force or Army
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presence in the Far East that will make any sense at all. It is
essentially where the Navy holds the upper cards in terms of the
U.S. establishment. And our maritime strategy has to be
(
articulated in such a way as to defend and articulate why the
Navy needs to stay in the Pacific and what its purpose is. And I
believe what occurred this morning tells you that and tells you
what the Soviet reaction is. Yes, they have come out looking for
the Ranger, they're out looking for the Ranger today. Unless
something's happened in the last 24 hours, they haven't found her
again, despite flying all over the Philippine Sea in the last 72
hours with Bears, Bear-F's and G's--the Soviets have force
deficiencies out here. If I could list what I believe are the
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's principal force
deficiencies, they are as follows: Inadequate attack submarines
--he doesn't have enough attack submarines to put up a credible
defense as well as a credible offensive. There aren't enough
Victor-3's, there aren't enough Akula's, there isn't a
sufficiency of offensive power to adopt anything but a defensive
pos ture
.
Secondly, he is terribly disadvantaged by tactical aviation.
As I said, Japan, as a stationary aircraft carrier to its South,
the Aleutians are a stationary carrier to the North, and then he
has, depending on what the order of battle happens to be on any
given afternoon, 4-6 carriers facing him across a broad range of
opportunities. He is still wedded to land-based aviation. And
as pointed out, that land-based aviation that the Soviets built,
has the same range limitations, because it was built for the
Central European campaign also. They can't cover the whole
breadth of the Far East. First problem, attack submarines.
Second problem, tactical aviation. Third problem--he i3
faced with a serious ASW capability. I believe, if I was writing
this brief in Vladivostok, the thing that I would be most
bothered by over the last two years, is what was mentioned in
very quick passing this morning--the resurgence of the third
fleet--the resurgence of the capability in the Far East to
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duct credible far ranging anti-submarine warfare. The Soviets
't like that. You can see them pulling in their horns, you
see their exercises reflecting a concern for first and
emost, defeating our most forward naval arm. We have a
dency to view that, of course, in carrier terms. But if you
e in Vladivostok, you would see it first in terms of the
ack submarine fleet of COMSUBPAC- - that ' s the first cutting
e. If you can't defeat that, he has no chance against the
piers. It turns into an air defense battle exclusively
ause the cutting edge against the carriers is his own
marine fleet. If he can't defeat our submarine fleet, his
marine fleet can't survive against ours. It's a pure and
pie step by step basis. So in terms of Soviet deficiencies,
ch are governing their whole addressing their strategy, those
the three basic elements. You can go into the others in
ms of logistics, but in terms of war fighting potential, those
m to be the three that are the most serious deficiencies we're
ing. And with that, I'd like to turn it back to you, sir.
Dr . Hensel
Certainly ought to give everybody something to think about
the next 15 minutes because we're going to take a 15 minute
ak
,
get some coffee, come back at quarter to the hour and
11 begin the questions and answers.
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Dr. Hensel
One quick announcement before we begin, regarding the campus
tour. I'm tour that there is still only one person signed up for 1
the campus tour. However, since that individual is a flag
officer, the tour will definitely continue. Be sure and ask
about the ghost of the Del Monte Hotel.
Ok, Harlan, I guess you're first.
Dr. Harlan Jencks
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
.... of National Security Affairs here at NPS , and I was
sitting down here in a small gaggle of professional Asia watchers
while Mr. Marshall was telling us about the growth of the Chinese
economy and defense budget. And some very funny looks were
exchanged down there, sir. And either we're all wrong or you're
wrong. Let me just give you a few o f f - the- top-of - the-head
f i gures
.
China's population right now is a little over a billion. If
the one family policy works, best possible scenario, it may
stabilize around 1.2 billion by 2020. That means that the
overwhelming majority of their effort is going to have to
continue to be where it is right now--in agriculture. That will
all count in a growing GNP , but it won't go into military
spend i ng
.
Now the announced budget for 1978, and I recognize the
problem with announced budgets, but they give us some basis for
compar ison--was about 20 billion Yuan, RNB . The next year, 1979,
they went to war and it jumped all the war to 24 and the next
year it dropped all the war down to 19. And Since then, it's
been gradually working its way back up. Today, in Remnen B'
figures, it's a little higher than it wag in 1978= But the
Chinese do have inflation, despite their controls. So that in
real figures, it's actually less. Moreover, they're spending a
small but significant portion of that now in foreign exchange--
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i currency— which means that it's costing them even more. As
jrcentage of the gigantically expanding GNP, over the last few
"S
,
and the GNP ' s been going up because of economic reform,
itary spending has dropped from around 15 7. of GNP to about 6.
the projections for the rest of the century are that it's
sly to continue that way. So overall, in terms of either
rentage of GNP growing, it's very unlikely and in terms of the
iese GNP becoming the third in the world, I think that's
-ageously unlikely, although I suppose it's barely conceivable
3ly because you've got all those people that have to be fed.
To change to another subject, I would like to underline and
:>e go beyond some things that Richard Haver said, about the
Let Far East. I had the occasion, about 7 months ago, to
?nd a Conference in Kuala Lumpur, and one of the Soviet
•esentat l ves to that conference, was Henry Trofimienko, the
lor of the book that Jim Tritten held up earlier today. And
i had a conversation going on--it was about Sovi e t- Amer l can
petition in the Pacific, and after about an hour of
:ussion, Trofimienko being the official Soviet rapporteur and
molding up the American side, Trofimienko, somewhat agitated,
irrupted -- these are virtually his exact words in English--
c, you people keep talking about these sea lanes of
nunications as though they're some kind of an American
iway
. We depend on them too. We can't keep the Soviet Far
; going without those sea lanes through to Southeast Asia
lg open. And from everything I know from my studies, that is
:e literally true. The Trans-Siberian railroad, even with the
completion, can't support i t--certainly not in time of war.
sea lane across the top through the Arctic is very chancy and
Jonal and periodically they have a ship crushed because it
3 caught there too late in the season. They need the sea
?s as much as we do. And all of this just goes to underline
J of the things Mr. Haver was saying, about the vulnerability
-he Soviet strategic establishment in the Far East. Thank
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Andy Marshall
On the Chinese economy what I was reporting to you from what
the people are doing, which involves first a review of the
current GNP is in China and coming up with a significant upward
adjustment by trying to put things on a purchasing power parity
basis, which is the basis on which most of the better comparisons
of GNPs are done, but previously has not been done for China. So
there's some chance that the estimates that are currently around,
what Chinese GNP is today, are significantly low.
The other thing is really the consequence of after talking
ourselves with experts, assuming essentially a 4-5% rate of
increase per year for Chinese GNP and I forget what they assume
for the Soviets, but it's probably down around 2% and just that
difference of rate of growth leads, over 20 years, to some very
big shifts. Now, it's true that the Ch i nese- - the ir allocation of
resources and so on--but none the 1 ess -- frankly I don't know the
details of it--I'm just saying that people have done this and
have come up with these kinds of numbers. We're still reviewing
them. But the fact that the Chinese might pass the Russians
sometime in the next century, is not at all, I think, incredible,
personally. We'll see.
June Dreyer
My name if June Dreyer and I'm from the University of Miami
and I would like to second what Harlan said. The Chinese, the
proportion of the budget being devoted to the military, is
actually declining, if you take inflation into account. And
furthermore, I think it should be made more explicit, that
although the Chinese GNP is growing, if it does surpass the
Soviet GNP, which is probl emat ical -- that depends very much on a
best case analysis ... and you will still have to divide that by
whatever the Chinese population is in 2010, The one child policy
which Harlan mentioned, has been running into a lot of problems.
And in just the last couple of months, the government has come
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and publicly admitted that it is out of their grasp at this
t. And they're now talking about 1.3 billion as opposed to
billion which is the figure that they had used earlier,
lation growth has gone up by a significant percentage in the
coupl e of years
.
The other comment is really a question for Professor
kin. I found your remarks fascinating. If I could just give
a little perspective on the Chinese side of the Sino-Soviet
ysis and ask you whether you've noticed that in the Soviet
ces too, I'd be very interested in your answer. Those of us
do deal with the Chinese have noticed--sort of a standing
--that the Chinese are the ultimate triangular analysts.
spend a lot of time talking about playmg--they don't talk
t playing the Soviet card versus the United States card--but
is in essence what they are doing. And you mentioned the
d and most important condition that the Chinese had set
h, which is the Cambodia issue. I think it is important to
ion that only became the most important condition after
achev , making concessions on the first two conditions. And
t that point, the Chinese said--uh uh, this is our bottom
, it's the most important condition, it's more important than
anistan, it's more important than true m Mongolia. And
e are some China analysts who think that this is a balance of
r, a political ploy by the Chinese. In other words, they say
he United States, don't worry about our bettering relations
the Soviet Union because they haven't given in on our
ltions. And then to the Soviet Union, they're say 1 ng- -don '
t
y about our relations with the United States, because we
t get the United States to give in on Taiwan. And so
efore, there's just no hope that we'll ever be truly friends
them. And I'm finally getting around to my ques 1 1 on - -have
noticed this kind of analysis of Chinese behavior, from the
et side and do they feel they've been manipulated in this way
if so, have they made any contingency plans about it?
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Mikhail Tsypkin
I cannot guarantee that I've seen and read everything that
the Soviets have said about China. But since Gorbachev came to
power, they've been extremely reticent about saying anything;
negative about China whatsoever. All the members of the great
triangle are courting each other, saying nice things, but not
changing their basic position. At this point, the Chinese are
saying that the main condition is Cambodia. But if I were
sitting in Moscow, I'd never, as I said, the Soviets are probably
very suspicious that if they settle one issue, then something
else will come up. Because it's not a bargaining where the
Chinese are saying, well we'll give up this if you move out of
Camtodia. In essence, it's a precondition for further dialogue.
And the Soviets are loath, ever, to give up an ounce of influence
for promises of paradise in the future. Because they precisely
know that this is their tactics in dealing with the West. For
the last nearly 30 years, the Chinese have been doing on the
Soviet Uni on- - they ' ve been playing that kind of a game and they
know exactly what they suspect is in store for them if they force
Vietnam out of Cambodia. And the basic problem I tried to
underline and probably talked too much, is that the Soviets have
a certain defense burden in the area--defense burden is to
support certain missions, and missions are dictated and
determined by political goals. The Soviets would definitely like
to reduce their defense burden. But that's very theoretical.
But you cannot reduce your defense burden without changing the
missions. And you cannot change the missions without somehow
rearranging the political goals those missions support. And the
Soviets are in a way a trap—it's a threatening trap from our
perspective. But in a sense, it's the same stalemate they have
in their domestic politics. It's such a rigid system that you
simply cannot as ... puts it--pull in your horns and concentrate
on domestic affairs--as in The New York Times and other places.'
It's simply impossible. Because the realities of Soviet politics
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such that they cannot get out of it. But one thing they've
^--they've stopped talking and saying anything nasty about
->a--practical ly anything. You do not even hear the old story
the U . S . -Japan-China triangle any more. Now it's the U.S.-
m-South Korea triangle. Of course, the Soviets probably
ik--God forbid, it might be a rectangle. But they're not






the allocation of Chinese to military around '95
switch back and begin to implement this postponed
jrnization of the military forces.
Andy Marshal 1
I don't know--some various talks with some of the Chinese
|ests that that's what they have in mind. Whether it'll work
I think the other thing I would say
June Dreyer
... we might talk some more about this— this sounds crazy tc
Andy Marshal 1
Yes - -air i ght - -we need to talk some more. The other thing I
Id just say --while the number I mentioned to you was sort of
? the base case people have been running, which assumes that
Soviet Union economy is sort of relative to us and therefore
ative to the Chinese. You know, official current estimates
,
which put the Soviet Union at about 557. or so. I just want
"epeat again how uncertain I think that figure itself is.
t the Soviet Union's economy is probably significantly smaller
'' that. And a lot of the stuff coming out of the Soviet Union
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now suggests that that's right. So if it's confining it to the
issue of who's going to be ahead--the Soviet Union or the Chinese
in 2010--if you take these lower figures for the Russians, that
becomes even more of the case. So I'm just telling you
personally I wouldn't at all bet against it. In terms of GNP.I
How rapidly they move into--
June Dreyer
What about per capita GNP?
Andy Marshal 1
It's still, of course, low, but of course the Soviets remain
low. I mean, the Soviets get stuck at about 6-8,000 per capital
income and we and in the West and the Japanese, by that time, are
up around 30. I forget, I don't have the figures I guess with
me, but it's low--there's no doubt that it's low.
Admiral Hanks
Yes, I'd like to return to the comments that your Russian
colleagues made to you about the vital dependence on merchant
traffic through the Indian Ocean in order to sustain their forces
in the Far East. Now let me preface that by saying that it's
apparent to Western shipping operators around the world--the
United States, Western European and Japan--that the Soviet Union
has mounted a very very strong campaign to capture trade in the
liner trades throughout the world. They've gone very heavily
into container ships and they have managed through some of the
tactics they have used, like grade cutting, with their fully
subsidized ships and to put some American and some European
shipping companies out of business. Now that's a preface to what
I'm about to say.
4
If memory serves, not more than maybe 5-6-87. of the input to
Soviet Far Eastern forces comes through the Indian Ocean. At
same time, while they double-track the Trans-Siberian
Lroad and the other extensions they've got--they build a huge
vainer port in the Soviet Pacific Far East. And the trains
t are traveling across the USSR today, are heavily loaded with
nercial containers that are loaded with their cargo in Western
>pe
,
shipped across by railroad, put on Soviet container ships
then travel from there to the United States, Hawaii, South
'ica and Central America, and thereby undercut each further
only the time but the cost of the European shipping. And
;'re terribly worried about it. And I would suggest that in
v of the way the Soviet government works, in the event of a
lis, those containers would stop flowing immediately and that
•e would be taken up by military sustenance for their forces i
Far East. So I would treat those worries with a great deal
•aut 1 on .
Mikhail Tsypkm
I want to make another --one mere comment about Soviet
•eptiens or my perception of Soviet's perceptions of China's
nse spending. I think that the Chinese relatively low
•nse spending or relatively low defense spending, is no cause
any relief in Moscow. Because they sit there, biting their
s, and getting mad that the Chinese have built for themselves
nvenient, a comfortable geo-political reach in which they can
ect their security and not spend too much on defense,
.tive to the Soviet Union. And what the Soviets have seen--
I'm sure although I have no proof of it whatsoever- - that a
of attempts by Gorbachev to revive Soviet economy, is related
what's been happening in China. God, they have economic
'th there. Nevermind what it is per capita, but the picture
i the Soviet Union is threatening. They think the Chinese are
ing--trying to squeeze between the United States and the
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Soviet Union--the Soviet Union exhausting itself in its defense
efforts. The Chinese can cut their defense spending even more,
it will favor modernization, to favor long term growth. While
the Soviets cannot cut. And again, the Chinese always present
those problems to the Soviets for which the Soviets don't knowi
what to do. Because the Chinese start spending much on defense'
tomorrow, that's bad, that's an immediate threat. If they don't'
spend, that's threatful for 20 years from now. When it comes to
China, the Soviets can't win either way.
Sheldon Simon
My name is Sheldon Simon your discussion of the
Vietnam situation and Soviet policy with respect to that. The
new General Secretary, Nuin von Lin, has reaffirmed Vietnam's
target of 1990 for pulling its forces out of Cambodia. Now I
realize that's a very controversial promise, and many analysts
argue that by the time 1990 comes, Vietnam will find some
loophole and not pull out. But for the sake of discussion, let's
take General Secretary's Lin promise at his work and look at the
implications of that. It's been identified as the primary
obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations. It's also the primary
obstacle in the S ino- Vie tnamese relations. If the withdrawal
occurs, it seems to me that there are interesting implications'
which may, in fact, be contradictory depending on which side you
jump to. On the one hand, if the withdrawal occurred, the
Vietnamese could then pressure the Soviets in such a way that
there might be a withdrawal or reduction of Soviet forces in
Vietnam unless the Soviets came through with certain political
concessions or greater economic support for the Vietnamese.
On the other hand, there could be a Sino-Soviet- Vie tnamese
rapprochement as a result of these developments. *1, do you
think the 1990 promise is realistic and *2, which projection do
you see, if it is'
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Mikhai 1 Tsypkin
I hesitate to go too much into the intricacies of politics
he area of which I only know what I read about and in Pravda .
look through Moscow's eyes. One thing I would say about
1990 promise- - that I would tend to interpret it as one of
achev's steps to calm down the waters for the time being,
e are still three years. One advantage that Gorbachev has is
he's relatively young, he's energetic, who knows what will
en in three years 9 He needs now some--the Chinese, the
icans, the Asian nations to get off his back, for the time
g. He'll come up--he's a little bit like Khrushchev- - by
,
if they cannot pull up, he'll come up with something else,
on see, it's a style different than wh a t we saw for the last
years. People in the Kremlin who, with their ultimatums,
d drive themselves into a corner. This guy's net going tc
himself into a corner. A politician of that type is like a
urer. He'll come up with a new trick. That's where his
1 is. And for the time being, he wants to sound conciliatory
he issue. At the same time, he sees state me nts--the kind of
ements which are not meant for Western consumpt i on-- that
etarian internationalism and that kind of stuff--the
akable unity of the three and the Chinese nations. I think
Soviets are really tc fool the West, because the West or the
n nations do not read what the Soviets say tc themselves. I
t think the Soviet camp, for one second, they can really fool
Chinese. For the Chinese know where to look for the answers
they definitely notice statements of that sort, from the
ets . At least my limited contacts with Moscow watchers and
he Chinese Embassy in Washington, indicated to me that they
ly watch everything the Soviets say--not only what is
aged for consumption.





couple of elements this afternoon. ... I've never
needed a microphone in my life. Dealing with the subject of
Cambodia and Southeast Asia and Trimifienko, etc., Trimifienko
did a good job. I think that if I were Trimifienko right now,;
the knowledge of the fact that the seeds that I laid at a
conference in Malaysia, had just gotten passed to the United
States Navy--that there was something exceedingly important about
the sea lines of communication in Southeast Asia. Not too bad
Trimifienko, it was worth the TAD price of whatever it was that
who paid it. If I could, in any way, ensure that even one U.S.
warship, that was otherwise necessary, for prosecuting a war that
really mattered, in some place like Northeast Asia, or
Northwestern Europe or the Med or some place, was instead down
around Lompoc , worrying about the Soviet PACFLT ' s swap--not toe
shabby. I'd love the U.S. Fleet to be down in Southeast Asia
when the war started. Great place to be. ... can put up his
time lines as to how long it takes to get around the vast
distances of East Asia. I'm sure it's important. We must
always, I think as strategists, recognize the fact that while ...
of military, esoterica of the four corners of the wor Id
we've got to look for baselines and base cases and focus on them.
And then look at what happens if you change the subject. Kind oi
what we wound up doing with American strategy. Rather than chase
will-c-wisps all over the world and when the balloon goes up,
have the capability then to focus on what's really important.
I would submit--not too far--Soviet Far East bloc--that's a
there are lots of things to worry about in the world,
But I am much more worried as is Commander Wagner and the boss,
about Trimi
f
ienko--and then secondarily, but secondarily, about
what's happening in Cameron.
The second is more of a question relating to Southeast Asia
and has to do with the Vietnamese and Cambodia. Again, it comes
from, however, this desire to make sure that I've got my base
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e nailed down, before I go into the esoteric. To me, I don't
anything in 2000 years of Vietnamese history to indicate that
Vietnamese in power--any North Vietnamese in power because
t's what's in power--has gotten any desire, even thinks about
it even crosses his field of vision, that he would get out of
bodia once he got in--for any particular reason whatsoever. I
Id say that the basic underlying dynamic of Vietnamese history
simply too strong. And I don't care whether these Vietnamese
communists, republicans, democrats, monarchists, Wig--or
use me-- --but that having been said, therefore, what
s:ble capacity or leverage do the Soviets have to get the
tnamese out of Cambodia'' What could they do? My view is that
/'re kind of s tuck-
-
they ' ve got an ally. And it's a good
t£ to have this ally because one of the things that it gives
is Cameron Bay--that has sort of tied all of us in knots
re that happened. But what can they do to get them out? What
anybody do to get them out? The dynamic in Vietnamese
tory seems to be me to be pretty strong. And I don't know
t pressure the Soviets can bring to bear on the Vietnamese to
them out. That's just an albatross around Soviet foreign
icy necks, it would seem to me. So that's my question for
Mikhail Tsypkm
Basically, it's both an albatross and a useful output. As I
i, it doesn't look like they're trying to get the Vietnamese
because even an attempt to do so would be very costly. They
? a lot to lose and the Vietnamese still probably will not go
As I said, again, all the dynamics of Sov i e t-Vi e tnamese
it ions now indicates that the Soviets are not even pressuring
Vietnamese. The only thing they're do ing- - they ' re trying to
these Vietnamese up a little bit. Don't talk about Chinese
JIDC ny- - ;, us t be quiet for the time being. At least when N£ 1 i m
Lin went to Moscow, he didn't talk about he evil Chinese
designs as his predecessor did a year ago. So they got a little
bit more quiet which is very much in line with the Soviet
strategy. Well in theory the Soviets could cut off the military
economic pipeline to Vietnam. But knowing what the Vietnamese
are like, the Soviets would definitely ask--is it going to do the
job with those guys? They'll still be stuck in Cambodia. And
that's one of the reasons--probably the main reason-- i t ' 1 1 be
costly to the Soviets to try to dislodge Vietnam. I don't
pretend I'm an expert on Vietnam, but from the Soviet standpoint,
I don't see any serious effort going on, to get Vietnam out.
What I see is a serious effort of papering it over with all kinds
of nice words. And that's what the Soviets do very well when
there is no serious action forthcoming.
7
- Question
I would like to give some support to the comment made by
June Durea about the Chinese situation and ask a question in that
connection. It seems to me that her question was what the
Soviets are trying to tell us the Chinese are really not giving
in on one point. And the Chinese tell us the Soviets are net
giving in. So the issue is--to what degree can the two get
together? And that is, to me, a very real possibility, at least
what the Soviets want clearly. Net get together as a dependency
or as a satellite or something like that--but get together in the
larger communist framework and this is my questi on- -China ' s
economy after all is in disarray. And despite all that is said
here--in agriculture, you have a temporary great relief by having
giving up communism. And in industry, 90% is still government
backed industry and is in poor shape. And the three types of
industry-- the government part of industry-is not interrelated
with the joint enterprises nor with the Chinese small enterprises
in the cities. So there is a problem. And it's a real problem.
And if a crisis occurs in China, the possibility that the Chinese
communist leadership will turn to Moscow, after all, is not to be
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ly discarded out of hand. And the question there is, the
tion mentioned before, that the Soviets are to give in--but
do the Chinese have to offer' This is my question.
Mikhail Tsypkin
I think the problem with any rapprochement between the
et Union and China is--what course will it take' What the
have talked about are only adjustments of the current
lict. Probably get rid of this problem, get rid of that
lem. But there is absolutely no framework which the Soviets,
east, have developed. How to deal with a communist power
h is not directly subordinate to Moscow' It's the same
al and intellectual and philosophical obstacle the Soviets
when they try to introduce freedom of expression. Yes we
to have freedom of expression under Glasnost. But when you
t it, looking at how they define it, it's not freedom of
ession--it's just a couple of screws made less tight. And
the same thing with their approach to dealing with China.
we recognize that China is independent. It's an independent
alist country. What this independence means --does it mean
Chinese have the right to resist Soviet policies anywhere'
it mean they have the obligation to follow the Soviet Union'
see, the Soviets talk about all kinds of attractive, nice
£s and they don't have the first idea of how to implement
e things within the realities of their political system. And
Chinese know that. Both the Russians are nationalists and
Chinese are nationalists. And the way the Soviets deal with
r allies is not very encouraging. The Chinese know it. The
objective of the Chinese, as far as I as a sovietologist,
rstand--and they've always had since the communists came to
r--is not to let the Soviets meddle in their internal
irs. And this is exactly how the Soviets define their
ance with another communist power- -abi 1 1 ty to meddle in
nn a 1 affairs--ability to control personnel—ability tc
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control the cadres there- -communi st obsession. The Chinese ar<
not going to let them do that.
As for the possibility of economic collapse of China, Chirw
is not Vietnam, it's not Cambodia, it's not Poland. If it's <
collapse of China, what can the Soviets, who are notoriously
stingy in economic aid--what can they do but occupy Beiminjurj
and Sinkiang or do one of those crazy military things and try t<
partition China. They're not going to feed Chinese-- there is nc
chance for that. That again underscores how difficult it is foi
the Soviets to deal with China. Whatever happens, they stil]
don't have a clue to dealing with China.
Dr . Hense
1
One of the best parts about being a chair is, I get to com*
to Monterey and I don't have to write a paper. The unpieasarr
part, however, is to have to gradually pull m the reins her<
regarding our discussion. I think we have time for one mor<
question and then that's going to have to be it. Yes sir.
Peter Door
I'm Peter Door, with ... Associates, one-time Admira
Foley's strategist. I'd like to ask Rich Haver the question I'v<
asked him time and time agam--and never been answered yet--orn
of this morning's speakers said that our strategy was basically <
tactical offensive within strategic defenses. One of the thing:
that Rich said this afternoon was that that is basically a Sovie
Pacific strategy as well. I would like to ask Rich to elaborate
a little bit on the range of Soviet actions in the Pacific tha




I don't think there's any question that the Soviets will
mp t - - i f the correlation of forces is correct— that's a major
g that has to be understood from the beginning. That they
eve there is a possibility of gaining the specific objective
wish. If they weigh the correlation of forces and find that
ny possible calculation, they'll come out losing, don't count
hem doing this sort of thing. But if the calculation, the
ation permits, I believe they will try to use certain
lents of their submarine force in what we would describe as an
essive, forward manner. Alright 7 I believe you can see the
ous locations where they would want to send those forces--
the Eastern North -Pacific, where they would sit astride (1)
Trident Patrol Zone, (2) the major path that any West Coast-
d U.S. naval presence would have to transfer through, and
ly, astride the principal Valdez-U.S. on into the Western
fie sea line of communications. Their objectives out there I
eve would fall into those areas. They would be looking for
pport unity to interdict strategic forces that might be found
e. I don't think they would hold that as a high probability
uccess of mission, but one that they might stumble into and
dn't turn aside the opportunity. It would give them a
ard position, at least from the point of view of monitoring,
king if you will, the transshipment of major naval forces,
lastly, it would give them an opportunity to take on some
of, if not severing the sea lines of communicati ons - -because
n't believe there's sufficient assets to sever. Certainly
upt--cause us to fall back. Anything that they can do that
es us to be de f ens
i
ve- -c 1 ear ly is to their advantage - -s i nee
etracts from our offensive capacity. And in many respects,
was the essence of this morning's discussion. We don't want
gnore the need to defend ourselves, but we believe the most
uctive way to defend ourselves is to be offensive. Well, if
Soviets can do anything that will necessitate a reexamination
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and a reallocation of resources toward the defense, that would b<
considered by them to be a major plus.
I also believe that Cameron Bay fits into the same sort o:
construction in their mind. Not in terms of its politica
influence versus the Chinese right now, and the leverage it give:
them--that has all sorts of peacetime and even limited wai
appl ication--but in the East-West-Third World War sort o
situation, Cameron Bay, at least to us, appears though t<
constitute two things. One, there is sufficient firepower there
either in residence or probably intended to be in residence whe;
the particular threshold is reached. So in effect, t.
successfully confront one major battle group element, opposin;
it. If we overwhelmed it with multiple battle groups, I believ'
the Soviets would, in effect, realize that Cameron Bay was a;
untenable position but then again, those battle groups would b<
down there instead of where they could do the greatest amount o
damage to the Soviet interest, which is to the North. It wo u 1 >
buy them time if nothing else. And if they were able either t>
get particularly fortunate in their attrition on our forces, o
if our forces, in effect, were so tied up that it bought the:
more time--that would be advantageous. If we don't take tha
bait, if we move to the other side, then I think you car, take
look at the map and then see the opportunity that would affor,
then-, in two ways. One, again, to go after those lines o
communications so important to the stability of our Western Asia
forces and allies and then secondly, in terms of movement--!
does sit not far from the forces in the Philippines and if we ' r
moving forces from the Philippines north, then can be movin
forces from Vietnam into the Northern end of the Philippines! Sea
And it's certainly the sort of exercise routine you see ru
through down there
.
So I believe you would see two e 1 emen ts - -you ' d see tha
Cameron Bay element, either withdrawn or held there and try t
tie us up and secondly, I think you'd see the submarine fleet,
also believe, personally, that the Soviets bifurcate the:
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ining into the initial action which is essentially a defensive
and then an examination of the situation. And I believe that
Soviets have a path towards more aggressive use of their
:es or more defensive use. A consequence process. If they
i that initial battle--if they are decimated in the battle of
North-west Pacific, then obviously the next action for them
,he battle for the Sea of Okask--the battle of the Northern
of Japan, the battle of the Western Bering Sea. If, on the
ir hand, they achieve striking success - -unexpected success--in
battle of the Northwest Pacific, then I believe you would see
\ become more ad venturous - -us 1 ng primarily submarine resources
whatever else could be mobilized and moved. They clearly
: air field structure. Unless they get Leonid Brezhnev's and
icient at-sea tactical air, where their surface fleet goes
be heavily dependent on how much tactical air they can bring
.;r. And of course the converse, how much tactical air they
ct to be facing. I think that's how it will manifest itself,
initial action, submarines forward and that base structure
they have--stuck with forces in the Indian Ocean, etc.
,
ance forces in many respects. And then the consequence
ess— falling ou'- of the first phase of the campaign. And
could be quite aggressive, from our point of view.
Andy Marshall 7
I'll give you two opinions. I believe that the Soviet
•ral staff, alright, and the Soviet Far East Command, plans on
m being an enemy. And they have sized their forces and
ictured their war plans and organized themselves on the
umption that Japan is a full-fledged partner in whatever
acious activity their enemies are up to. Ok 7 I believe, on
other hand, the political masters of Moscow have a different
oach to the problem--one of neutralizing Japan politically
economically in an attempt to, in effect, get a great force
i p i l e r out of the resultant Japar. , if nothing else,
1
neutrality. So I believe that what we see, visibly, are twc
entirely different things. We see a military process which is
very heavily oriented along the lines of smashing Japan as
quickly and as efficiently as they can. And you see over here a
political process which is designed, in effect, to negate the|
necessity to take that military action, and to gain the advantage
that force would allow. And I think that's the process that we
see .
I'd like to ask Andy Marsha 11 a question and a short
follow up by Rich Haver. Going back to the issue on the Soviet
Union and China, Andy, you were saying that you believe that
China would become more militarily capable. From the Soviet and
then again from the Chinese perspective, how much effort dc yoi
think the Chinese are going to put into acquiring a credible,
survivable nuclear strike capability against the Soviet Unions
And what systems should they be putting their money into 7 If
they can choose between intermediate range missile systems, if
they can choose long range Cruise missiles, if they could choose
going to sea--they have a selection of a menu they can choose
from. Where would they be well advised if they wanted to have a
secure second strike capability 9 And a second follow-on question
is, would you amplify for us - - 1 think I know the answer--but why
is it that the United States won't help with that kind of a
capability^ And Rich, from the Soviet point of view, at what
point would the Soviets actually become worried against the
Chinese, if they believe the Chinese had a Secure second strike
capability, what would they do to prevent that from taking the
place in the foreseeable future 7
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Andy Marshall
Frankly, I don't know what the Chinese--how much of the
urces they'd put into that. I mean they clearly have put a
in already, going down that road. What the next generation
t look like--I think he's right, there are lots of options
might have. I would think, given the way in which they've
about it, things like Cruise missiles should have some real
al for them, because of the flexibility in basing and
ibilities for hiding, preventing in effect the target of
e systems. As to whether we will help them or not, I don't
That's something that would depend on some sort of
tegic choice we would make later on and which is the kind of
g on the whole that we have not wanted to do thus far.
Richard Haver
As far as the Soviet response, my guess is that it will fail
probably three forms of action. The first will be
pitation --sever the central nervous system from the
rumen ts that could be used in that second strike against
In terms of it not slowing them down, certainly disrupting
coherent action it could take.
I think, depending on wh ether the Chinese achieve this
nd strike capability through mobility or through hardenmg--
t wa s hardening, I believe the Soviets wo uld try the over-
sure approach- -mass 1 ve layout of weapons, we 1 1 - targe ted by
rior intelligence and locating information. I believe if the
e is dispersed through mobility, then once again excellent
eting information, but a combination of--I wouldn't use the
surgical strikes, because that doesn't really fit the Soviet
l--but a more careful approach to it, using a combination of,
you will, retaliatory means. They love the concept of
mptive retaliation. They'd get good information that was
i tc be used, then they justify taking it out. I think their
biggest concern is the mobility process. China's a large nation,
with plenty of room to get things like Cruise missiles and other
weapons, lost inside of them. And I believe that will probably
be the more serious of the two--if the Chinese dug it into the
tundra, I think the Soviets could see their way clear to the
over-pressure approach. I think the mobility one would be more
vexing for them. Of course, if it was ballistic or Cruise would
determine how the other part, the third part of the defense,
would be and that would be to take it out on its way in. Once
the actual executional launch occurred, as there has always beer
with Soviet air defense and the like, and to attempt tc
compensate through civil defense and other means, for the effect
of it. And I think a lot of that would depend on the size of the
Chinese threat. If it was small, I think the Soviets could work
the numbers out, that an adequate defense could be constructed in
that classic sense of defense, rather than preemptive offense.
If it was a very large capability, my suspicion is that the
Soviets would never come up with numbers that would make the
defense satisfactory. Then it would be the combination of all
three things that they would seek, to give themselves
satisfaction that they handled the problem.
Dr . Hense 1
One procedural note before we break up. For those students
who are only interested in food for thought, but not food for the
stomach, I would call their attention to the little note at the
bottom of our program here which notes that if they don't want tc
attend the banquet, but do want to attend Dr. Buss' speech, there
will be a row of seats in the back of the ballroom:
I'm going to take advantage of my prerogative as chairman tc
ask one last brief question. And that is directed to Dr.
Tsypkm, Why did the Heritage Foundation select red for its tie'
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Mikhail Tsypkin
I don't know. I think it's surprise and deception
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. . . the show on the road--I was going to say--the ship under
or whatever the appropriate phrase would be. I hope today is
g to be a little less earth jerking than yesterday. For
e of you who didn't know what that was yesterday morning- -I
't know it was an earthquake. I was on the phone to somebody
and they said it was Fort Ord shooting again. But it was an
hquake and evidently it was literally the Navy's fault. If
saw the paper this morning--! didn't know there was a fault
ed the Navy Fault. So there's a Navy Fault that runs under
and the Navy Fault shook yesterday. So I hope that San
eas doesn't do anything to us today.
Two panelists today--both are likely to be as provocative as
erday's--there may be a bit more, I'm not sure-- we' 11 have to
and see. The first panel is the most focused of the four or.
And I'm sure will stimulate some active debate. The
nd panel this afternoon, and I'll be back to see you then,
;ses or. alternatives in the future as they relate to the
time strategy. And then later in the afternoon, we'll have a
up session and I wanted to encourage people, even though it
late in the afternoon because it's not as formal a wrapup
ion as you might think--we will have audience interaction.
?e do want to have an audience--so don't cut out at the end of
second panel. Let me turn it over to Harlan Jencks , the
rman for the first panel.
Chair: Dr. Harlan Jencks
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Well this morning, we have a panel which is focused a littl^
more closely on the regional actors. And we have a marvelousljl
well qualified and diverse panel. One way of looking at it is
that we have three Americans, one Japanese and one Australian.
Or, another way to look at it is that we have two academics, twc
military men and one journalist. So any way you cut it, it
should be a fairly lively exchange of ideas. I'm not going tc
spend a great deal of time introducing these individuals, because
they have limited time to spend on their presentations.
I will simply say that our first speaker, Professor Sheldor.
Simon, is the Director of the Center for Asian Studies at Arizona
State University and is a very well-known and widely noted author
and observer on the Asian scene, especially security affairs.
So, Shell--15 minutes and at minute 16 I start throwing things, I
promi se
.
The Maritime Strategy: The Role of Pacific Alliances
Dr. Sheldon Simon
Director, Center for Asian Studies,
Arizona State University
Thank you, Harlan, You know, I was taken yesterday by the
number of illusions to the technological developments that are
going to occur in warfare m the next century. And it reminded
me of a story I heard at a Conference on Soviet Security Policy--
a story that a Soviet allegedly tells on the Soviet Union. And
it goes on this. There's an American walking down the streets of
Moscow. And he realizes that he forgot his watch, back in his
hotel room. And he sees a Muscovite walking toward him, carrying
two very heavy suitcases. He goes up to him and he says--excuse
me, sir, do you have the time"'' The Muscovite puts down these
heavy suitcases and says--of course--and he pulls out his watch.
There's this beautiful chronometer on the man's wrist, with
iple functions, and he says--do you want the time here in
ow or in Vladivostok or perhaps wherever you come from--
re an American I presume. And he starts giving him the time
Washington, D.C., New York, Irkutsk--he punches up another
lay and it tells the weather forecast in these various
tions. Oh, the American is absolutely flabbergasted and he





-absolute ly not--that's not a Japanese watch-
's a Russian watch. We made that with our technology. The
ican says--you mean, you made that here in the Soviet Union,
the man say s - -abso 1 ute 1 y . We have very modern watch making
cries here. Now if we can only find a more efficient power
ce .
Well, that's to wake everybody up. Now to my topic. I feel
my role today is a little bit like Cassandra's in the famous
sical drama. When she raised awkward questions in front of
ecu] d presumably be a hostile audience. That is, from the
pectives of America's friends and allies in the Pacific,
e are problems that affect U.S. Naval strategy, which should
aken into account, because they impact upon our political
tions with such important countries as Japan, South Korea,
Philippines, and Aus tra 1 i a- -as well as the ASEAN states more
rally. Dr. Jaurique raised these, to a certain extent, at
luncheon address yesterday, as did Admiral Hanks, and of
se last evening, Professor Buss.
I propose to look in a little more detail at some of these
lems , as well as the roles that America's friends and allies
he Pacific could perform, to facilitate coastal and sea lane
ection and surveillance of the Soviet fleet, away from its
ports. Tasks that the maritime strategy appears to divulge
allies.
Because the maritime strategy requires a concentration of
ard deployed U.S. Naval forces in the North Pacific and Sea
apan
, Naval strategists have alsc emphasized the impertar. *
America's Pacific allies should play in implementing that
strategy. That role would be two-fold. First of all, the
provision of bases for American Naval and Air Forces, anc
secondly, direct cooperation through their own Naval and air
assets, to monitor regions adjacent to their territories, and if
need be, escort and fight alongside U.S. forces. Therein lurks
one of the unresolved issues of the maritime strategy. Although
it requires allied cooperation to be fully effective, in both the
deterrent and war fighting mode, it is essentially unilateralist.
Decisions ranging from probing Soviet defenses in the Sea of
Japan and the Sea of Orkutsk to actual hostilities, would be made
by the United States. Allies would be expected to fall in line
behind these decisions, regardless of their own foreign and
security policies.
Exacerbating the prospect of differing policy interests for
Washington's Asian allies is former Secretary of the Navy
Lehman's concept of horizontal escalation. Because the maritime
strategy is directed primarily to the Central European front,
Asia is seen as a secondary battlefield, which would be opened to
force the Soviets to contemplate a two -front war. U.S. allies
presumably would provide bases and logistics centers in exchange
for American protection.
According to U.S. strategic thinking, horizontal escalation
would be not be as threatening to the Pacific allies, as it
initially appears, however. Because the Soviet Navy would be
primarily concerned with protecting its SSBN's, the bulk of its
air and naval forces would be concentrated around Vladivostok and
Petro-Pavl sk
.
A prompt deployment of American antisubmarine
forces would also precipitate a Soviet submarine retreat to home
waters to protect the SSBN's. This would leave only residual;
Soviet forces in Southeast Asia and the Eastern Indian Ocean,
which could be neutralized at choke points such as the Strait of
Malacca by American and allied forces. Besides, the Navy argues,
the enhanced threat of a two-front war strengthens deterrence and
thereby reduces the probability of war's occurrence in the first
place
.
Let's look a bit at the notion of this kind of burden-
ing. High technology warfare has driven the costs of modern
es and air forces so high that alliances between major powers
smaller allies, are in the process of being reassessed. The
tary guarantees of 20 years ago are no longer absolute. They
become limited and conditional, reflecting the economic
ens they entail. As Bob Scalapino has noted, it is more
opriate in the 1980's to speak of alignments rather than
ances
.
The former are vastly more complex. The reciprocal
fits more fluid and open to regular renegotiation. This
s a shift away from unilaterism in the determination of
ance policies. Critics of U.S. defense burdens inherent in
ance arrangements, point to this country's unprecedented
al indebtedness which, by 1990, is expected to be half a
lion dollars. They note that by that time, Washington will
paying tens of billions to foreign creditors merely in
icing costs. Because these creditors are also American
es--Japan and South Korea--the following questions arise.
Can the Un
1
te< tates continue to lead allies to which it
owes a huge debt 7
If the United States tries to control that debt through
protectionism, will the allies continue to rely on American
for security when Washington is disrupting the economic
system on which their prosperity is based 7 And,
Will American public opinion support paying for the defense
of countries richer than the United States 7
Allies with even modest naval and air forces, can assist the
in the naval strategy. They can engage, for example, in
nsive sea control, as distinct from offensive force
ection. Indeed, with a declaration of 200 mile exclusive
oraic zones, the EEZ ' s in the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, most
oral states have begun to acquire ships for the purpose of
rcing their jurisdictions. In the Asian Pacific, these
ude attach submarines, land-based patrol aircraft, fast
?k craft, destroyers and frigates. These systems can engage,
and are beginning to engage, in straits control, convoying, and
ASW operations. The question arises: will states which are
developing capabilities to defend their territorial waters and
economic zones, view cooperation with the U.S. Navy as a means ofj
enhancing their own security? Or conversely, and more ominously,!
for both the United States and interestingly, also, the Soviet
Union--will those states which signed the Law of the Sea Treaty,
increasingly oppose the deployment of all war ships as
incompatible with the peaceful purposes language of that treaty''
While the latter interpretation need not inhibit U.S.
deployments, it could still obstruct the kind of allied
cooperation necessary for a truly effective U.S. naval strategy.
What I'd like to do now in the small amount of time
remaining to me - - 1 s to look briefly at Japan, Southeast Asia,
particularly the Philippines, and the Australia. While the
Japanese Archipelago is a natural barrier constraining Soviet
Pacific Fleet operations, Japan's cooperation is essential to
control the apertures in that barrier in the event of a
confrontation. Japanese military planners, however, display a
certain reticence over the prospect of closing the straits. A
Soviet belief that Japan wa s about to blockade or mine those
straits, from Japan's point of view, could well trigger a
:
,
preemptive strike against Japanese bases and the occupation ofj
Northern Okaido. Indeed, until the 1979 Soviet invasion ofj
Afghanistan, Japanese officials did not even develop scenarios in
which a military conflict would occur around the home islands.
That's less than 10 years ago.
The Japanese Straits, planners currently believe, in the
event of a crisis, would be either blockaded by the Americans and
the Japanese, or controlled by the Soviets. Thus recent U.S.-
Japanese joint exercises have focused on repelling a Soviet
attack on Okaido.
Washington's aims for Japan include the development of a
capability to control the sea lanes 1000 miles from Konchu and in
particular, the area south to the Boschi Channel and east to
This would require that the maritime self-defense force
.op capabilities against Soviet surface vessels and
mines as well as long range patrol aircraft.
Secondly, the United States wants Japan to develop a mining
blockading capability for the Japanese Straits. And thirdly,
establishment of an air defense screen around the home
ids that could inflict heavy losses on Soviet bombers and
lers and therefore facilitate Japanese-U . S . sea control. In
,
Japan possesses most of the systems necessary to implement
tasks, even though it doesn't possess enough of them. It
ntly lacks airborne refueling capability because the Diet
viewed the development of such capability as potentially
iding an offensive, as distinct from a defensive, capacity,
n, according to the government's current interpretation,
i be in violation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
policy must change if Japan is to truly be able to sustain
combat and patrol over time and space.
The United States has also pressed Japan to set up over-the-
:on radars which could provide early warning of aircraft
ig from Siberian bases toward the Pacific. Washington would
a Japanese system into a planned chain of O-T-H sites
:chmg from Alaska to the Philippines. America's hope, then,
3t that Japan becomes an independent regional power, anathema
3St of its neighbors — but that Tokyo develop the capacity to
ill its pledge tc defend the surrounding sea lanes. Japan
p not then stand in for the United States in this region.
?r
, its forces would augment the 7th Fleet by subjecting
m naval and air movements to close surveillance.
surance of America's Pacific allies, including Japan, that
f^SDF and MSDF will not be primarily responsible for Western
fie defense, is essential is an expanded role for these
2s is to be politically acceptable in Asia.
Finally, one mere point I wanted to make about Japan is that
<e NATO, the United States still has no joint command
:ture with Japan. Current plans state that in the even of an
imminent attack on Japan, the two governments will conduct closer
liaison but no joint command, even for air defense, where rapid
task coordination would be essential. The reason for this
anomaly is, again, Article 9's prohibition on collective self-
defense. Thus joint defense beyond territorial waters and air,
space, is problematical. Within Japanese air and sea space,
however, the government interprets the Constitution in a manner
that permits Japan to respond to an attack on U.S. forces.
Arguing that such a response falls within individual or national
self-defense, and is not therefore, collective self-defense. A
nice legal splitting of hairs, but that's what attorneys are paid
for. Thus Japanese ships can protect U.S. ships within Japanese
waters, though the chain of command would be through the MSDF and
not through the U.S. Fleet.
I've been notified that I have only a minimal amount of time
left--let me jump over to Southeast Asia very rapidly. Unlike
Japan and Korea, whose armed forces provide an active
contribution to the U.S. maritime presence, the Philippines is a
politically more difficult situation. It is a passive provider
of strategic location. Neither its small coastal defense navyl
nor minimal air force possess a capacity for sustained sea lane
patrol. The bulk of the country's military budget is committed
to the army in order to fight Southeast Asia's only significant
communist and Muslim insurgencies. Because the Philippines is
not actively involved in regional defense, and because the bases
are so important for both U.S. conventional and nuclear support,:
they have become a focus of controversy for the Aquino government
and a rallying cry for those groups who see the bases as an
affront to Philippine autonomy. U.S. officials insist that the
bases are crucial for operations in the Asian Pacific. They
demonstrate America's commitment to regional naval preeminence,
particularly in the light of Soviet deployments at Cameron Bay.
All other U.S. Pacific allies, including the rest of the ASEAN
states, and even China, have indicated to U.S. authorities,
publicly and sometimes privately, that they would prefer to see
8
7th Fleet and 13th Air Force remain in the Philippines,
gh none of them has offered to provide substitute facilities,
Id the United States be asked to leave. The Aquino
rnment is keeping its options open with respect to the
wal of the bases agreement in 1991. It does not want to give
anti-bases opposition political grist before the negotiations
n next year. Nevertheless, most observers believe a new
ement will be reached because the economic benefits to the
ippines are so great. The bases employ 40,000 Filipinos
ctly and contribute directly over 57. of the Philippines GNP
.
total is further enhanced by the spending of 60,000 U.S.
tary and civilian personnel and their 25,000 dependents.
A new treaty will undoubtedly cost the United States
iderabiy more than the current $900 million and will be
ect to more stringent criteria of Philippine use, to
nstrate that the bases are more than just nominally owned by
la. In all probability, a new treaty will be submitted to a
lar re f erendum- -as Dr. Jaurique pointed out and also
essor Buss--the approval of which will serve to solidify
-Philippine security ties. At the same time, the United
es must be prepared to see the bases become targets fcr
ilia attack after 1991. If the communists's New Fecple's
can rally nationalist sentiment against this continued
erialist encroachment." Even if the bases are renewed -- and
hings now stand. I think they will be--problems concerning
presence of nuclear weapons could arise. As the 7th Fleet
oys
, more vessels with such dual-capable systems as the
hawk, anti-nuclear concerns in the Philippines could become a
t i cal i ssue
.
Soviet concern about Philippine bases is regularly
essed. General Secretary Gorbachev, in his wide-ranging
ivostok speech of last year, hinted at the possibility of
cing the size of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in exchange for an
ican military exit from the Philippines. That offer will
ably resurface when the base's negotiations begin next year.
Subsequent high level Soviet visitors to the Philippines have
warned that the bases put the country at-risk, and could involve
it in war. On balance, however, I think cautious optimism over
the future of the bases appears warranted. Their continuec
importance for monitoring and protecting the sea lanes through!
the straits of Southeast Asia, makes the facilities a net asset
for regional security. That asset could be further enhanced, in
the author's view, if the United States and the Philippines
expanded the multilateral use of these f aci 1 i ties - -such as the
Crow Valley Gunnery Range for ASEAN navies and air forces. Joint
use would facilitate the development of common doctrine among
friendly armed services and help dissipate the negative image of
the bases as exclusively an American strategic interest.
I see I've run out of time so I won't have the chance tc
look at Australia and the other sea lanes, but I know that my




Professor June Dreyer is one of a small co-fraternity with
of people who spend their time looking at the Chinese
tary. She is Director of the Department of Politics and
ic Affairs at the University of Miami and will speak to us
morning on the Chinese perspective on the maritime strategy.
Chinese Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
Dr. June Teufel Dreyer
Department of Politics and Public Affairs
University of Miami
Thank you very much. When Ed Olsen first called me about
conference quite a months ago actually and asked me to give
per on Chinese attitudes toward the maritime strategy, I did
thing unusual and that is--I did not wait until the last
te--it struck me as very interesting. And I was probably
ng to put off grading final exams. And I thought--my God,
sounds interesting, so I went through my collection of
..., the Liberation Ar my Daily and the Remner... People's
y and JPRS and FBIS and so on, for January and February, the
hs of '86 --the months where the maritime strategy was being
rously debated in the United States. And I came up with the
resting conclusion that the Chinese had said nothing at all
he maritime strategy. Well I also asked some of the Chinese
tary attaches, who I occasionally see in Washington and New
,
and I asked my friends who see them even more often--please
to these people about this. And I got answers like--
time strategy, what maritime strategy 9 Or, alternatively,
time strategy- -whose maritime strategy 9 And occasionally I
the all-purpose comment, which makes all of us grind our
h--China's principal stand is non-interference in the affairs
other countries, and we believe in peaceful co-existence
rd mg to the Five Principals. And I though t - - we I 1 , by the
1 1
way there was just one exception to that which I'll get to that
in a minute or two. Well, after all, Chairman Olsen had told us
to be crisp and concise in our comments. I've spent so long in
graduate school that I can rationalize anything. So I had
visions of standing up here--after Harlan had introduced me--and
saying, ladies and gentlemen, the Chinese government has no
position on the maritime strategy, and thank you for your
attention and then, in the best principles of Abraham Lincoln's 3
rules of public speaking as enunciated by Admiral Hanks
yesterday, I would then shut up in order to be appreciated.
Well, then of course, years of academic training took over
and I began to think-- my God, this is really very interesting.
Why haven't the Chinese commented on the maritime strategy'
Certainly it couldn't be because they lacked information about
U.S. military activities, or because they were reluctant to
comment. Because in those same two months I looked very
carefully at, I noticed that the Chinese had lambasted the United
States and Israel for threatening military action against this
poor sovereign Arab country- -Libya- -under the pretext of
combatting terrorism. And they also accused Caspar Weinberger of
exaggerating the threat frcm Soviet SS-25's in order to get a
larger Defense Department budget. And they also commemorated
Martin Luther King's birthday by presenting a lengthy commentary,
on the disparity between income levels and blacks and whites inj
the United States. So I figure lack of information or shyness
about commenting about U.S. domestic affairs, is probably not the
reason
.
Obviously, if it's not shyness and it's not lack of
information, could it be because they don't comment on strategy
or they're not interested in it or something like that? And
again, the answer is no. The Chinese have, for the last three
years, enthusiastically encouraged the holding of a military
salon where the up and coming--this is not for senior level
officers— this is for the bright young men--the Cort Wagner's and
the Peter Swartz's of the PLA--are supposed to get together and
12
»ent on strategy. And not a word had come out of this. Then,
n, we know for sure that they know about the air-land battle,
use a number of delegations that have gone over, have been
d to comment in detail about the air-land battle. And
,rly this is not for a bunch of people who don't know anything
it it—it's for people who have read the standard sources and
intelligent questions to ask about it.
Well, then, let me come to the one exception I mentioned
re. And that is--this is a senior Chinese official,
lenting to an NSA staffer who, given the recent perceived need
greater secrecy at the NSC, does not want his name mentioned
does he want the Chinese official's name mentioned. But at
rate, the Chinese official commented that he thought that the
time strategy's plan to pursue SSBN's into the Sea of Okutsk
risky and dangerously provocative. It was likely to escalate
nuclear war and of course, more importantly, nuclear war in
a's backyard. And he was told the various counter-arguments
his--I read Linton Brooks and so did you all--so you know
they are--and his reply was an elegant shrug of the
Iders and a lock that said--and if you believe that, I have a
bridge in Brooklyn that you might be interested in taking a
at .
Weil, ok, now the question then arises--is this official's
standard for the Chinese leadership or is it simply his own
ession of his own views 7 And I cannot give an answer to
My hunch is that there is not a great deal of descensus in
Chinese leadership on this. But they do probably consider it
y •
Now, there is, of course, something that gets the Chinese
the hook on this. And that is--if you look at Admiral
ins statement of the maritime strategy, it mentions Asia, I
eve, twice and China not at all. And so why take a chance
comment on something that you don't really feel you have to 7
I next turned my attention to thinking about what it is that
Chinese probably think about the maritime strategy And
really, there are only two countries that the Chmese--in fact,
only two countries in the world probably, that the Chinese have
apprehensions about. The first is, obviously, the Soviet Union
and the second is Japan. And clearly, they are more worried
about the Soviet Union than they are about Japan.
China knows that it could not beat the Soviet Union in any
reasonable scenario of confrontation. I think it's the standard
line that you saw, for years--let them come, we'll drown them in
a sea of people's war--is pretty much making a virtue out of
necessity in a situation where they know they can't do anything
much. The Soviets are unlikely to be stupid enough to allow the
Chinese to engage in people's war.
It is also necessary to note that China has important and
growing commercial and trade relations with Asia and the Pacific
and of course also elsewhere. And it is very important to the
Chinese that this locks be kept open. The People's Liberation
Army's navy cannot do that and it will not be able to do it in
the foreseeable future. The Chinese are worried about the
expansion of Soviet power m the Pacific. They have commented on
this privately on numerous occasions. They have commented on it
publicly, although gently, numerous other occasions. The
countries that Cert Wagner mentioned yesterday, which are not
exactly household words, are indeed household words in the
Chinese Foreign Ministry. They worry a lot about this. A couple
of years ago, they assigned one of their very best diplo ma t s - -
1
won't go into his bio--as Ambassador to Fuji. And those of us
who look carefully at diplomatic appointments m China, were
quite surprised at this. And there were two currents of opinion
at the time. One of them is that Chi Chou Jou had done something
absolutely horrible and this was the Chinese equivalent of
Siberia for him. And the other one is that the Chinese had
decided to pay a lot more attention to the situation down there.
And I think very shortly, people became convinced that it was the
latter explanation rather than the former.
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The Chinese, however, are concerned that they need peace and
want to buy time for their Four Modernizations program.
have no wish to pick fights with the Soviet Union. What
have chosen to do, recently, is a foreign policy of nominal
-distance between the United States and the Soviet Union.
itually, I think they are quite a bit closer to the United
es , but nonetheless they profess a policy of equi -di stance
.
Therefore, to the extent that the American maritime strategy
contain Soviet expansionism and keep the locks open for
ese commerce, the PRC can only be in favor of it. But why
ent when it will make the Soviets angry if you do. Eut to
extent that the maritime strategy's forward aspects seem
ocative and that its plans to pursue Soviet SSBN's into
rs near the Chinese mainland seem apt to bring nuclear war to
PRC, and to the extent that the maritime strategy's Pacific
ario threaten to involve China in a U.S. -Soviet
rontation, the Chinese will be profoundly distrustful of the
time strategy.
Ok. What about Japan 7 Sino-Soviet relations have been
e poor lately. There are a lot of reasons for this, which I
t have time to go into. Some of this was, I think,
entable from the Japanese side. Prime Minster Nakasone
ably didn't need to go to the Asa-Knie Shrine on the 40th
versary of the end of World War II. The other thing is, I
t think the Japanese Ministry of Education really did need to
to change those textbooks or to assert that it was really the
ese that provoked the rape of Nanching- - the Japanese had
ing to do with it, it was strictly retaliation. This, I
, was provocative to the Chinese. Then, on the other hand,
e are things that the Japanese certainly could not have
ed
. They didn't build one of the world's greatest machines
aking silly investments. China is, in many reasons, not a
good place to invest. Americans have not been exactly hard-
ed about it. The Japanese have proved more shrewd customers.
And the Chinese are annoyed. Why can't they get better terms
from the Japanese.
Other things perhaps were not easily preventable by the
Japanese either. They have been pushed for many years to break
that 1% barrier of GNP in terms of defense spending. They have
been pushed by the United States for many years to take a greater
part in Northeast Asian security and defense. Chinese were very
upset at the Japanese decision to spend more than 17. on defense
spending and they were also very annoyed at the United States for
pushing Japan into a more active military role.
Now, to the extent that the PRC ' s leaders perceive the
maritime strategy as encouraging the growth of Japanese military
capat 1 1 1 1 i es - - wh 1 ch at least publicly they appear unwilling to,
distinguish from a growth in Japanese mi 1 i tar i sm- - in other words,
there's military and mi 1 i tar i sm- - they will find the strategy
distasteful. And it is certainly possible to argue that the
issue of the maritime strategy is quite separate from the issue
of strengthening Japanese military capabilities. But the Chinese
do not appear to accept this argument.
Well, to cone 1 ude - - 1 ' ve just been passed my 5 minute notice
here--Chma has said nothing about the maritime s trategy- -perhaps
because the Chinese leadership has concluded that any statement
on it might damage China's carefully crafted attempts at
establishing a policy of nominal equi -di stance between the United
States and the Soviet Union. The decision to avoid overt
commentary on the strategy has been made easier by the fact that
the maritime strategy seems to concentrate on the European
theater, saying little, explicitly, about Asia. Obviously it
says a great deal implicitly. And nothing at all about China,
Now implicitly, of course, Asia looms much larger in the
maritime strategy and one must assume that the Chinese leadership
has thought very carefully about these aspects. The Chinese have
important commercial activities going on in Asia and the Pacific,
as well as strategic concerns in the area. It's own navy is
presently unable to defend these interests to any significant
16
ee . And despite a force modernization program, this is
ly to remain the case for the foreseeable future.
Now, to the extent that the maritime strategy keeps these
s open for Chinese vessels, and contains the growth of Soviet
uence in Asia and the Pacific, the Chinese are likely to
r it. To the extent that they consider it provocative, it is
ly to escalate into nuclear war in Asia or lend encouragement
he growth of militarism in Japan--they will tend to oppose
Thank you very much for your attention.
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Dr . Jencks
Well, thank you June. We're slightly ahead of schedule.
Every we 1 1 -equipped chairman--I have a five minute note, a one
minute note, a stop note and a water paper to throw--so I'm in'
good shape
.
Our next speaker is Professor Yoshihisa Nakamura from the
Japanese Defense Academy. He is a truly unique individual in
that he is a professional official and a professional academic,
teaches at the Japanese National Defense Academy. He has been a
Research Fellow at Stanford and at the U.S. National Defense
University and is currently a Research Fellow at the University
of California at Berkeley. He is the author of two books in
Japanese--one or. their armed forces in society toward the 21st
century. And another one due out in September called Strategic
Thinking for a New Generation . He and one other individual
within the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, are largely responsible
for virtually the only deep thinking, it seems to this American,
that's being done about strategy within the actual Japanese
defense establishment. So we're very fortunate to have him with
us. And he asked for three minutes in deference to his problems
with English. My officer-students should only have such problems
with English as well. Yoshi--18 minutes.
Japanese Perspectives on Maritime Strategy
Professor Yoshihisa Nakamura
Japanese Defense Academy
Before I forget, I'd like to mention about the Tosh
There are many American people who think that Tosh:,.,, and the
Toshiba Electric Company is the same, But this is a big mistake.
The Toshiba Electric Company is a completely different from the
Toshiba
.... Company. The custom was violated not by Toshiba
Electric Company but by Toshiba .... Company. I would like to
emphasize this fact because I bought several stock of the Toshiba
Electric Company a few weeks ago.
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Similarly, the Ground Self-Defense Force and the Maritime
Defense Forces have a completely different view of the U.S.
.time strategy. And the purpose of my presentation is--if
re interested in the U.S. maritime strategy, you encourage
'Ground Self Defense Force ideas and educate our navv '
s
.cers much more about the maritime strategy.
In the first several years, Japanese defense policy makers
a heated debate about the Japan defense forces in 1990's.
; debate was provoked by the Ground Self Defense Force
,iative in which the Ground Self Defense Force insisted that
Japan defense strategy in 1990's must be integrated with the
maritime strategy. However, presently, this initiative are
ronted with several difficulties. The first, the strategic
iking up between our national defense program outlined,
.blished in 1976, and the U.S. maritime strategy.
The second, the different interpretation of the U.S.
time strategy among our sister services. And finally, the
.nese public apprehension of so-called to be involved 1 r. the
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
So I will try to clarify those three difficulties in my
entation. What is the Ground Self Defense Force initiative 9
r the careful research on the U.S. maritime strategy, the
ind Self Defense Force decided to take an initiative of making
new military strategy in the 1990's, along with the maritime
tegy. The first initiative is to get the consensus on the
et motives to attack Japan. The pending Ground Self Defense
e initiative estimated that Japanese island process political
i and strategically threaten the Soviet Union. The initiative
•ulated that the Soviet s trateg i cs- -so-cal led bashing for the
--will leave Okaido to be a threat against the Soviet Union.
Soviets looked upon Okaido as an unsinkable aircraft carrier
the U.S. offensive operations in his home water--the Sea of
Sk . Furthermore, they are stuck in and around the bashing,
c be cut easily by the U.S. -Japan offensive operations after
:- £ +. t> » • + c
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The second initiative was to draw the most likely
(
international situation under which Japan would be attacked by
the Soviet military forces. An initiative supported the global
congressional war scenario. According to the initiative, once
the war between the United States and the Soviet Union break out
in other areas such as the NATO theater, European theater, or the
Middle East theater, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would have two
kinds of military goals. One is to secure the bashing for the
SSBN--the Sea of Okutsk--and second, to interdict the slot
between the U.S. content and the Middle East.
In order to achieve these two goals, it is very logical that
the Soviets should be induced to occupy Okaido, at least the
coastal area of Sawyer Strait and Togorro Strait and to ensure
the free passage through these two straits.
And the final initiative was to emphasize the role of the
Self Defense Forces under crisis situations. According to the
Ground Self Defense Force initiatives, a war would arise out of
the crisis rather than surprise attack. Although this role of
the United States military force is a very important aspect oi
the maritime strategy, the Japanese Navy and Air Force would like
to neglect those goals of crises. During the crisis, the Ground
Self Defense Forces will change and develop a deployment of its
forces from all over Japan into the northern part of Japan,
especially at the south of the Sawyer and both sides of Togorro
Straits. Two-thirds of all Japanese Ground Self Defense Force
troops would be redeployed in the northern part of Japan, during
a crisis. The initiative would expect that Japan's Self Defense
Force would possess the capability of strait blockage, which
would enable to button up the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the
capability of escorting the U.S. 7th Fleet aircraft carriers,
which would move rapidly to the forward position during a crisis,
especially the escort of the U.S. carrier, would be more
important than the so- cal 1 ed - - the protection of 1000 miles sea
lane, because such a movement of aircraft carrier battle group
would enable at the crisis, to force the Soviets to move their
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i's into Bascham in the Sea of Okutsk and protect them with
and other conventional forces.
In addition to these defensive capabilities provided by
.elves and the offensive nature of the U.S. Pacific forces,
contribute toward a deterrent in the northern Pacific.
jcially the Ground Self Defense Forces expect that the Soviet
power in the Far East will be defused by the amphibious
'ations and not only demonstrate but also further against the
.1 Islands and the Kamchatka Peninsula. Therefore, the Ground
Defense Force can gain the air superiority, at least for a
.e, over the norther part of Japan, particularly over Okaido.
.s often said that our Air Self Defense Force is planning to
idraw our base in Okaido to the Honchu when the Soviet Union
, 1 a t e s invasion of Japan.
The Japan Ground Self Defense Force initiatives were a bolt
n the blue for the national defense program outlined
::> o n e n t s . Indeed, there were several strategic thinking
veen our national defense program outline and the maritime
itegy. One of the gap is how to evaluate the strategic ratio
wfeen Japan and NATO. The national defense program outline is
-d upon the assumption that any Soviet attack would be carried
against Japan alone--no thing to do with conflict in other
is such as in the European theater.
On the contrary, the maritime strategy is based upon the
pal conventional war scenario. The second strategic thinking
ites to the difference m perception of Soviet motives to
lck Japan. According to our national defense program outline,
Soviet motives for attacking Japan may be political. That
to crush Japan into restraining from the United States--for
nple, don't participate in the strategic defense initiative
;ram. According to the scenario of the U.S. maritime
-tegy , the aim of Soviet conventional attack against Japan may
:c establish geographic foothold with a guaranteed strategic
tab tag e . If the Soviet Union could occupy Okaido, the Soviet
East force could possess a free hand to develop its forces in
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the Northern Pacific. The high maneuverability of its navy anc
air force in the northwest Pacific would strengthen the bashing
for the bear in the Sea of Okutsk.
Second, maneuverability would also contribute to the
interdiction of the slot between the United States content and
the Middle East in wartime. The third strategic thinking is iri
respect to so-called 1000 nautical mile sea lane protection.





the convoy protection such as escort of Japanese cargo ships or
the protection of corridor within which merchant marine can
safely and freely sail because of our navy's defend them from the
Soviet submarine threat.
On the contrary, the U.S. looks upon the sea lanes
protection strategy as a deterrent, rather than solely for war
fighting. It is a deterrent strategy because the U.S. Navy tries
to protect the slot through the military threat against the
Soviet Navy. To attack the Soviet military bases, to blockade
the strategic important straits and to detect, pursue and destroy
the Soviet submarine. It is a deterrent strategy because the
U.S. Navy plays a very important role during crisis. The
movement of U.S. carrier battle group to the forward position
during crisis, moves the Soviet SSN and other forces to the
defensive position of Bashing.
Other difficulties which depends on the Self Defense Force
initiatives have met, is a different interpretation of the U.S.
maritime strategy among its sister services. Japan's Maritime
Self-Defense Force does not estimate the Soviet military strategy
in the same way as you. The primary mission of the Soviet Navy
in the Far East, according to its view, still may be to interdict
the sea lanes of Japan, not to defend the Bashing Bear with other
conventional services. Moreover, the Japanese Maritime Self
Defense Forces regard that maritime strategy as the traditional
U.S. strategy, rather than a unique product of the Reagan
Administration. In other words, the maritime strategy is to
reassert the presence of the U.S. Navy as the senior service ini
i with the ... As a result, the Japan Maritime Self Defense
:e insists that its primary mission is and will be the
section of the 1000 nautical miles sea lanes, not the Straits
.... not the escort of the U.S. 7th Fleet. Even if the
itime strategy is not a maritime strategy which the U.S. has
I
had, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force want to be
inese Navy, rather than anti-submarine forces which serves the
Fleet. Once the Soviet initiates attack on Okaido, our
narines pass through the Sawyer and Togorro Straits and
lima Straits and assault the Soviet amphibious subs or even
ill of Vladivostok and other Soviet military bases and the
.time province. What will we do? They would like to have our
rraft carriers'' No. They are going to have ship to ship
;ile like a bomb which will mount on the submarine. So they
going to have a very small ejection which will admit by the
,ed States .
Furthermore, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces
iot declare that the escort of the U.S. aircraft carrier is
mission during crisis. Indeed, as Prime Minister Nakasone
said at the National Diet, that the escort of the U.S. fleet
be carrier out only at the wartime s 1 tuat 1 on- - such as a
tary attack against Japan territory and/or against Japanese
lanes. As for the strategic blockade missions, if you want
•ontrol the straits with a combination of submarine and
ace ships, rather than with laying the mines. It points out
reasons why our navy does not want the mine operations. One
hem is that laying the mines at the strait is unrealistic
ation. It is true that Japan could not lay the mines at the
it during crisis. Because it is a Japanese former policy
the strait blockade must be carrier out only after Japan
d be invaded militarily. Therefore, our navy will lay the
s after all Soviet submarines pass through the strait and
our subs
.
The other reason is that once the mines are laid, the
nese fleet cannot enter the Sea of Japan to assault the
Soviets amphibious ships and Vladivostok.
Also, three services, however, of Japan's Self Defense
Forces support the U.S. global conventional war scenario. It is
not surprising that Japanese public will be reluctant to accept a
war scenario because of being involved into the war between the
Soviet Union and the United States other than on Japanese soil.'
Since the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951, the
Japanese public has been very sensitive to be involved in any
type of U.S. -Soviet military confrontation which breaks out on
the Japanese soil. The Japanese public is very sensitive to the
second front strategy or its own strategy and so on. Therefore,
they are afraid of the strategic integration with United States
strategy, especially with regard to the global war scenario.
In addition to Japanese apprehension of horizontal
escalation, I must mention the vertical escalation issue briefly.
Although many U.S. security experts are criticizing the operation
against Soviet SSBN's as a means of changing the nuclear balance
through the conventional forces, conventional men, it is not a
controversial issue among Japanese public and even defense policy
matters so far in Japan. I don't have time to explain why. On
the contrary, the issue of the straits blockage is very
controversial. As long as the straits blockage is the pillar of
the maritime strategy in the Pacific, it seems to the Japanese
public that this strategy is too provocative to the Soviet Union,
as my colleagues spoke already. The Japanese public seems to
support the argument that the Soviet military commander will
determine to invade Okaido mainly if his forces were to be
buttoned up in the Sea of Japan.
There's another problem highlighted by a recent elaboration
of their maritime strategy in the Pacific. That is, proposal to
occupy the Kuril Islands and use them as a bargaining chip of
wartime ... These islands are not worth, even a part of Okaido,
from the Japanese viewpoint. It is worth noting that most
Japanese people have re-regarded General MacArthur's refusal of
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Soviet demand--Staring's demand-
-access 1 on of the northern
, of Okaido, as his greatest contribution to Japan.
The Japanese Ground Defense Force initiative vehemently and
lusias t 1 cal ly supports the integration between the Japanese
>nse strategy and the U.S. maritime strategy. It is not clear
ar how much impact of these three difficulties which I spoke,
damage the Ground Self Defense Force initiative. It will
be surprising that the Japanese public demands to revise
>al conventional war scenario. Our navy all of a sudden may
,inue to exploit the public image about the sea lane
,ection, either as a convoy or courier protection, to get as
;
e an appropriation as possible for its services. Therefore
regarded the Ground Self Defense Force initiative as more
tically sound than the national defense program outline,
rtheless, if the maritime strategy is appropriately explained
,he Japanese public and Japanese defense experts, especially
' officers, its defense strategy in the 1990 's must be
itegically sound than 1980. Thank you very much.
Dr . Jencks
Admiral Hayward has a brief comment.
Admiral Tom Hayward
Mr. Chairman, if I might just point out that we have just
I privileged to hear something that is extremely rare
:andor in expressing his point of view of the Japanese
>rpretation of their own strategy and keep the information
- of m-house--use it for our own benefit, but recognize where
I coming from and the sensitivity of it.
Dr . Jencks
i
Our last paper presenter is Mr. Owen Harries, who is the
Editor if The National Interest . He works in Washington but
asked me to emphasize that he is, in fact, Australian and I think
we're going to get still another very different perspective on
the maritime strategy. Owen--
Dr . Owen Harries
E d 1 tor , The National Interest
Thank you. I am going to use the time I have merely to talk
about the Southwest Pacific. I shall have little or nothing to
say about Southeast Asia. Yesterday the Southwest Pacific came
up several times m discussion. And generally the situation
there was described in very optimistic terms. We were told, for
example, that Australia's strategic posture complements the
American maritime strategy very nicely. We were told that the
visit of The Missouri to Sydney, recently, set back the anti-
nuclear movement pretty decisively. We were told at lunch
yesterday that a little patience and politeness would get New-
Zealand back on track. Today I will try to spread a little
compensatory pessimism and gloom. Since World War II, the United
States has been the dominant military and political presence in
the Southwest Pacific and this certainly continues to be true.
However, the trends in the region, over the last 4-5 years, have
been very adverse to the United States. Although it's still in
an advantageous position, the extent of this advantage or
superiority has, I believe, seriously deteriorated in the 1980's
during Ronald Reagan's watch. As recently as 5-6 years ago, this;
seemed a stable, trouble-free region. The backwater that
represented no serious problems-- that could be safely taken for
granted. The sort of place you could send a Texas rancher or a
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.fornia cadillac dealer as ambassador in return for services
lered
.
Whose pro-American orientation could simply be
imed . This is no longer true.
In the space of a few years, the following had happened— and
just mention them briefly--you know them. Several of them
> been talked about already. First, what seemed to the most
lble-free American alliance, ANZAS
, has come apart. The
•ican-New Zealand leg of it is no longer operative. The
et Union, hitherto successfully excluded from the region, has
!
quite significant progress in legitimizing its presence
e with these fisheries agreements. In addition, and this
i't been mentioned as much--both Cuba and Libya are quite
ve in the region.
Third, the countries of the region have declared the South
fie to be a nuclear-free zone. And while some have claimed
to be strategically innocuous and that it doesn't prevent
passage of ships or basing, I think its symbolic significance
leariy very considerable. Again, New Caledonia has become
of the festering sore in the region, involving continuous
scale violence and becoming a focus for "anti-imperialists'
is, anti-Western sentiment throughout the region.
Events m Fiji earlier this year--first, the election of a
ralis t government, followed very quickly by a coup, show that
what seemed the most stable and pro-Western country, is not
.ne from what is happening.
I think it needs stressing that underlying all these
icular developments and contributing to many of them, there
pparent throughout the region, I believe, a significant
ngthening of an 1 1 - Amer i can , neutralist sentiments,
icularly among the elites of the region. To some extent,
is a spontaneous or natural thing. To some extent, it's
rived and deliberate. Among its causes, there are such
gs as generational changes in leadership, the fact that a
e generation which is used to working with the United Stater
remembers World War II in the past- -I think insensitivity ot,
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the part of the United States and neglect have also contributed
to this. But to some extent, it's been very deliberately
contrived. Since the late 1970's, in particular, the Australian
and New Zealand left have made very sustained efforts, both in
their own countries and in the island states, to get their views
accepted, to propagate those views among key groups, and to :
create organizations that reflect them. They concentrated
particularly on labor, the media, church groups, and disaffected
ethnic minor i t i es- - the aborigines in Australia, the Mowri's in
New Zealand and, to some extent, the indians in Fiji. In some
cases they worked essentially on their own. In others, for
example, in the case of New Zealand trade unionists, they've
worked very closely with Moscow and this is well documented by
now
.
The causes they've been selling are peace, neutrality, anti-
imperialism, and independence And they've had considerable
success. I think the model for what is happen 1 ng- - the most
significant things that are happening in this region--are not
Lenin or Marx but the Italian, Antonio Gramschi, who believed
that the way to successful revolutionary movement was by
preparing the way thoroughly by cultural penetration and
pr eparat i on - - 1 ead 1 ng to what he called a new cultural hegemony.
And I think--! don't want to exaggerate thi s- - there ' s been,
considerable among the elites of this region, including the
elites of New Zealand and Aus tral ia- - i n creating a sort of
successful counter-culture in this way.
If I can put it a different way, the saying associated with
Richard Nixon, to the fact that if you have a firm grip on a
certain part of a person's anatomy, his heart and mind will
follow. Gramschi reverses this and says--if you get control of a
person's heart and mind, he will follow you willingly and from
conviction and the coercion involved in the anatomical imperative
will not be necessary. And also, the danger involved in the
Nixonian formula that once you let go, you might be thumped. On
the whole, Gramschi 's view seems to me sounder than Nixon's.
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Now I turn to Aus tral ia- - f ar and away the largest and most
rtant country in the region. In my experience, among
icans, there's a widespread view that while New Zealand might
gone bad, there's not much to worry about in Aus tral ia- - the
e is essentially sound and reliable. And I guess Bob Hawkes
s close to being everybody's favorite socialist prime
ster. Now there is something in all this. Australia is
ainly in better state than New Zealand-
-which is a very
nge state--a mixture of paranoia, delusions of importance and
ant moral ism.
The Hawke insists on its faithfulness to the American
ance and its acceptance of deterrence. And Hawke certainly
ers no illusions, personally, about the Soviet Union. But
having been said, I think it's also true that Australia is
from healthy politically. The left has made considerable
ress in its attempt to establish the kind of cultural
mony that I've spoken about. And while the ordinary
ralian is still predominantly sound--the sort of Australian
went down to see The Missouri in large numbers- - those of the
llectual community, I think, are much less so. And this, in
,
has its effect on the behavior of the community at large--
sort of trendy businessman and politician who wants to be
it--is affected by this atmosphere and so is Hawke himself.
way he reneged on his promise to help the U.S. with the
ing of the MX, for example, the gratuitous criticism of
ican policy on SDI , on Central Amen ca- - these reflect some of
I'm talking about.
Well, this is essentially background. I'd now like to turn
ustralia's strategic outlook, particularly. Traditionally,
ralia's strategic outlook has been dominated by two related
ies . The f 1 rs t- -dependence on a very close relationship with
es--with powerful allies. In the 1 940 ' s
-
-Great Britain,
e then, the United States. And second, a belief in forward
nse. Defense as far from Australia's shores as feasible,
e are constant themes in Australia's history. We've
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proceeded on the assumption that her security as a large, rich,
white country, with a small population, situated thousands of
miles from the major Western powers- -ul timate ly depends on the
ability of those Western powers to retain a favorable balance of
power in the world, generally, and in the region in particular.
And that the most effective contribution Australia can made tc
its own security, is to assist, to the best of its capacity, in
maintaining that balance. And consistent with this view, through
the 1950's, 60 ' s , as the Cold War developed, Australia committed
itself to a forward defense policy.
Fundamental doubts as to the continuing viability of that
strategy emerged in the late 1960's with the deterioration in the
Vietnam War--Nixon's Grand Doc tr 1 ne - -and the withdrawal of the
British from Eastern Suez. But the traditional Australian habits
of thought were very deepset and not easily displaced. And
throughout the 70's, there was great reluctance to shift away
from traditional positions. And ironically, it wasn't until
1980's, when, under the Reagan Administration, the United States
was starting to reassert itself in the Pacific, that Australians
begar. to react seriously to the dilemmas of the 1970's.
Current Australian strategic thinking is set out in two
documents. The Dibb Report, prepared for the Minister of Defense
by Paul Dibb, a friend of mine, in March 1986 and the official
Department of Defense White Paper, published earlier this year.
The essential theme of both documents, in my view, and of the ne*
strategic out 1 ook- - they represent the essential theme of
withdrawal. Withdrawal from primary dependence on alliances and
withdrawal from forward defense, to a more parochial perspective
of Australia's defense needs.
The strength of the first theme is indicated by the fact
that on the first page of text in the Defense White paper alone,
the term self-reliance and self-reliant are used no less than 12
times. The other distinctive theme of both papers, on the
restrictive nature of what the defense of Australia involves, is
underpinned conceptually by something that hasn't been emphasized
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> before, in the case of Australia— a distinction between the
i of primary strategic interest and the interest of direct
.tary interest. The f ormer- -primary strategic interest--
.udes Southwest Asia, Eastern Indian Ocean, the Southwest
.fic--the wider area. The latter is a much more circumscribed
^--essential ly embracing only Australia itself, its offshore
.tions, and the sea and air approaches to a distance of
;hly 1000 miles. And the message of both documents is that
i,ralia's defense effort in the future should be heavily
:entrated in this second, restricted area. It's the need to
?nd that immediate area that should determine the country's
re structure and strategy- -no t , it is stated quite explicitly
)t the prospect of involvement in the wider area, and not any
L gation to render assistance to allies, either in that area or
>nd i t .
There are some important differences between Dibb and the
:.e Paper. In the main, Dibb, as a sort of intellectual, is
i honest and direct and doesn't measure the political effect
Yords as closely as The White Paper does. But I would say
: the basic thrust of both documents is essentially similar
Mr. Beasley, the Minister of Defense, has really just
reeded with more caution.
As far as ANZAS is concerned, Dibb says this: "There is no
urement for Australia to become involved in ANZAS contingency
ining for global war. Neither this possibility nor other
-te possibilities for calls of assistance under ANZAS should
Luence the structure and equipment of the Australian Defense
:e
,
apart from the need to maintain a degree of interopera-
ity in key areas such as common communication. " That is about
5gative and grudging an assessment of the Aus tral 1 a-U . S
.
itionship, I think, as has ever been contained in an official
iralian document. Unfortunately, what The White Paper says is
all that better. Options will always be available, it says,
Australian governments, for assistance to allies--even though
assistance of itself will not be a force structure
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determinant. Again, a very unenthus ias t ic interpretation of
Australia's obligations under the ANZAS Treaty.
Last year in a speech that he gave to the Council on Foreign
Relations, Minister Beasley recognized the possibilities of
discordance between Australia and the U. S . --detected some concern
in the U.S. about the directions of Australia's defense policy
and some--what he called "rather ongoing awkwardness." However,
he was at pains to reject the charges of isolationism and
Fortress Australia. He insisted that Australia continued to be
concerned about the stability of the wider region, though he
could think of nothing more tangible and convincing that a Good
Neighbor policy, a la Franklin Delano Rooseve 1 1- - to give
expression to that concern.
If I can have one minute to make two final points. What's
one to make of all this'' It seems to me that Australia's
position, is at present, extremely incoherent and that it
reflects more a change in basic political orientation in an early
stage, perhaps, than it does to strategic calculation.
On the one hand, the likelihood of direct threats to
Australia is rated very low, but the force structure is to be
shaped almost exclusively to meet such threats. Considerable
concern is expressed about the wider area about Cameron Bay and
the Philippines and so on. But nothing more substantive and
concrete than a Good Neighbor Policy, is proposed to cope with
those developments. Its insisted that Australia is a good ally
of the United States, but at the same time, there's a conspicuous
drawing back from traditional commitments to the alliance. It
seems to me, however, that all this is dressed up what is
happening in terms of Australia's strategic posture, marks a
major break with its past. Whatever the protestations about
continued loyalty to ANZAS, however sincere they may be, and
whatever the qualifications attached to the new policy, I believe
is consciously, or unconsciously, beginning to set itself on a




We've all heard the words of our next speaker- -needs no
'oduction. And that's usually followed by a long, flowery
'Oduction. Admiral Hayward ' s name has come up in most of the
cussions yesterday already. And he may wish to respond to
L But there's certainly nothing more that I really need to
to this audience than to say--ladies and gent 1 emen--please
; your full attention to Admiral Tom Hayward . And he can't
anything to that.
Discussant- -Admiral Tom Hayward
, USN (Ret.)
Thank you, Mr. Chai rman- -but I knew this was going to
>en
.
We have 10 minutes left and I've got two pages of notes
a yesterday and I stopped taking great ideas to pass on to
knowing that I would be squeezed out of opportunities for--
.
,
I had a feeling that an Army Captain wouldn't throw
.balls at me, anyway. Major, I meant.
I was thinking of Bob Hanks' reference to Abe Lincoln and
: doesn't apply to me, unfortunately. I think more of Cal
.idge and what Will Rogers said about him--when asked, he
i, said--Cal Coolidge, he don't say. But when he does talk,
ion ' t say much. Actually he meant that in a flattering way.
>n ' t say much, but it's going to take me a long time to do it.
sally tried to filter down an awful lot that is of obvious
irest to somebody like me. My position in life now is as a
.onal Security Advisor to the Mayor of Pearl City. It's
.ly been quite a while since I've had an opportunity to get
5 subject which is so dear to our hearts--and certainly to
;--and to see what your thinking is, where it's going, where
; been
.
Yesterday I thought was very stimulating, certainly of
nendous interest to me, particularly in the morning--tc listen
ihese hotshots get up here and really lay it out and excite us
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all with the kind of thinking that's going on, the quality of the
people that are involved, the dynamism of the process itself, the
recognition of what's been accomplished. And I, for one, was
very pleased with that and excited with that. And I congratulate
you for what you've done to this point. And now let me shoot
some holes in it. I'm not to shoot too much at the strategy
itself, but the process that recognizes the process as a dynamic
one and needs to be .
I wasn't too taken with the historical review of who
invented the maritime strategy and so forth. I think that the
principles of Mahon and Forrest Sherman and others, are well
established and will stand long beyond all of us. I have
somewhat of a concern as to how much we carry over from one
generation to another. For instance, most of Forrest Sherman's
post-World War II discussion yesterday as an environment when the
power projection concepts and how to use the carrier forces and
the like against the Soviets or against the Soviet Navy that
didn't exist in any reasonable way. And I can distinctively Jim
Halloway, when he was 7th Fleet, saymg--the Soviet Navy, who the
hell are they 9 And we fought the Vietnam War without any concern
about a Soviet naval threat. And we established sea control
instantly in the region by overwhelming power while the North
Vietnamese had a Navy--they didn't use it for perfectly obvious
reasons. I mean, they were completely overwhelmed. And our
strategy was clearly unaffected by all of the major
considerations we take into account today. So let's be somewhat
careful about how much we poke in the past. Which then says-
let's be awfully intuitive as we look into the future and how we
apply those. And the lessons of Korea and Vietnam may be
applicable and they also may be worth junking. So that's what I
got out of yesterday and would simply pass on to you--I listened
to Michael Barnett with great interest as he got his orders from
the Vice Chief and the Commanders and Captains and raced off and
wrote up the maritime strategy. That wasn't just an incidental
question that came along from the Vice Chief. There had been at
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It 2-3 years of continual dialogue among the 3 and 4 stars in
Navy--not that they are the font of all wisdom but that's
?e the responsibility resides to pull together the strategic
iking and reviewing it and assessing it. And that was done in
late 70's, looking back at a time when the Navy had pulled
of Vietnam and gone from 900 ships down through 500 and was
11 headed south. A Navy that didn't have a retention rate
bh a damn. Drugs were beginning to be serious; a minority
slem that was upsetting the commands of ships in units
"mously. We had a hell of a lot of trouble. And somebody
snted a stinking 1200 pound steam plant that drove us wild.
that was the Navy that needed some fresh thinking. And going
< to Mahon wasn't one of the factors that entered our minds.
That was a Navy that had a whole new Soviet fleet come
"ging on the scene that had been built up in the 1960's and
Ly '70s--with their money that had been set aside while we
* blowing our money in Vietnam. And so the factors have to be
;n into account that influenced naval strategy. And that's
b we tried to do and then said--hey, the staff's got to help
And they did a tremendous job. And the evolution of that
* the last let's say 5-10 years, has been certainly impressive
lot spectacular. And the only admonition I would say is keep
dynamic. Keep it dynamic.
The second thought 1 would then go on, with respect to our
:ussion here of the maritime strategy in the Pac l
f
i c- - thi
s
bicular panel I think has been very good at focusing on the
itime strategy as it affects some of our allies. But I
?n't heard yet what the maritime strategy of the Pacific is.
>n't think I've heard it. We had a super presentation of the
ific concept of naval operations. Some of the problem is
ause it's classi f ied--should be classified. We can't really
:uss all the proper factors that need to be taken into account
1 we think about a maritime strategy, but I haven't yet heard
b today's Pacific maritime strategy is. Somehow, the Japanese
ind Defense Force has a sense for it. The Japanese Maritime
35
Self Defense Force wants to know more about it. Mr. Dibb and Mr.
Beasley didn't take it into account at all when they wrote up the
new White Paper in Australia. And we didn't hear it. So it
seems to me that maybe in this afternoon's session, we can
somehow come to grips with a little better definition of what isj
today's maritime strategy and then how maybe it should be changed
if it should be changed and what deficiencies do they have. I
think that yesterday that Pete Swartz ended up his preliminary
remarks by properly highlighting some of the obvious problems
that remain and need to be focused on. And they do. So let me
then drift into some of those.
Without myself trying to answer what is the maritime
strategy of the Pacific, at least it is understood to be part of
our global national strategy. It is a piece of, a function of,
the national global requirements and it is focused on the Soviet
Union and fundamentally nobody else. And just as m--when we
look at the maritime strategy in the NATO area in the Atlantic,
that maritime strategy is really oriented toward trying to make
people recognize that the flanks of NATO are vital to a NATO land
ibattle and that naval forces play a key role in that and don't
forget it. But even that strategy has plenty of work to dc
because it's fundamentally focused almost entirely on the GIUK
gap and north. And you don't really hear a whole lot of talk
about the Mediterranean and the importance of a maritime strategy'
in the Med and the vitality of the southern flank of NATO and how
that spills over into the Mid-East and the criticality of our
national strategy in the Middle East which the Carter Document
helped to focus us on. But where is the Carter Doctrine in this;
maritime strategy 7 It isn't in the Atlantic's maritime Strategy.
Which then says it really highlights one of the major
deficiencies in our discussion so far. The maritime strategy of
the Pacific is not the Paci f i c- - 1 1 ' s the Pacific and the Indian
Ocean and all of the other littorals around. And if we haven't
taken that onboard, it's way overdue. Pulling in all of the
Indian Ocean's problems into the Paci f 1 c- -despi te the fact that
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lave a CENCOM--a CENCOM ain't to focus on a maritime strategy.
5 going to be the Pacific Command and the Atlantic Command are
ig to pull these maritime strategies together and if we are
lessing anything of importance today--and I think we are--of
i's going on in the Persian Gulf--it really highlights the
jrtance of understanding the Indian Ocean's problems and the
ited war aspects. If our maritime strategy has been focused
ihe Soviet Union, it's been focused on that because of the
'etary fight that goes on that is focused on the central
iing of. And we have to be practical enough to recognize
i. There are really two maritime strategies. There's the
lington maritime strategy that is essential to dealing with
the Washington pressures and then there's the real maritime
itegy that's essential to the way naval officers and army
Leers and air force officers and senior politicians visualize
real way in which strategic forces are going to be applied,
we out here got to take limited wars into account and it's a
:>r challenge to OP-06 and the rest of them, to stay on top of
; issue because we aren't doing that very well. We certainly
not paying attention to--let's take the Pacific where we've
*ht two major limited wars. The longest war in our history
where we have totally failed to take into account the linkage
ween what's going on in the Middle East today and what is
;ly to happen somewhere in our theater of operations.
Why are we so insistent that Japan build up its military
?ngth? It's more because of our concern that the naval forces
I be somewhere else than because we're dissatisfied with
inese military investment. The more likely war to start isn't
ng to be the Central Front of Europe, textbook Warsaw Pact-
)--it's going to be some outgrowth of some other scenario. If
maritime strategy vis-a-vis the Soviets has meaning, it has
ning because of some derivative of the way in which the war
"ts elsewhere. And that war--I've thought about the last 2-3
<s--if I were trying to write up a scenario for a war game
it now, and I wrote up the present one, you'd all throw me out
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of the room as being too wild. The potential of this situation
drifting over into something out of control, is high. The
potential still, of the Korean Peninsula causing an escalation of
events that is significantly different than the war we've fought
before--that would involve ourselves with the Soviets, not the.
Chinese. So the limited war aspects of our maritime strategy,:
are terribly important and it highlights some deficiencies, like:
mine warfare, which I really want to hammer to this crowd. We,
the U.S. Navy are getting bludgeoned by the press and the
congress. I don't even know if it's fair- -because I've been out
of it too long. I do know that when I became CNO, it was one of
a half a dozen major priorities to try to get it spinning back up
again because our kind of strategic thinking that is clearly
evident in our maritime strategy, will continue to relegate mine
warfare to the back alleys. We don't put money on it, we don't
put emphasis on it, we are not experts in mine warfare. And the
leverage of naval warfare that comes out of being experts in mine
warfare is enormous. And I'm thinking of offensive mine warfare
as well as defensive mine warfare. And the Japanese concern
about our mining the straits is because they see us putting in a
bunch of mines that we don't have any way of talking to--
technology today gives us the ability to talk to mines. We
aren't using that. We're not investing in it. . . . maritime
s trategy
.
So let me finish up then with thoughts about our major,
adversaries and the allies a little bit. Going first to Korea.
Korea is different. It's different because we've got a huge navy
in the Sea of Japan, owned by the Soviets. We still have the
very significant problem of keeping the harbors open, Anybody
that's looked at the war plans--we're not talking in a classified
sense at all. The amount of war materials that has to flow into
Korea to contain the adversary and to meet our own war plans, is
enormous. We can not take any interdiction to that. And yet,
our maritime strategy prevents us from thinking about the
necessary investment into sensible harbor defense and real
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rol out to 50-100 miles or more so that we can keep that
f flowing in there, against a North Korean adversary that now
20 or so submarines that are pretty darn good, that now has a
warfare capability that's pretty darn good and a Soviet
e that, if they're willing to help the Iranians, they sure as
are going to help the Koreans.
There's a linkage between limited wars and a maritime
tegy that's being underemphas
i
zed . With respect to Japan, I
t think I have too much more to say. I think the Japanese,
icularly the MSDF and the 7th Fleet--the maturing of their
ating procedures is impressive, it's important, it's
coming not only cultural differences but certainly structural
erences . It is necessary for the Japanese to interact with
7th Fleet, hopefully it is not necessary for them to escort
battle groups. They've got other problems. But it is
rtant that they recogn i ze— and they do--that the traditional
Fleet battle group presence just may not be there. But it's
important that they recognize the strategy, I hope, is one
is of the U.S. --it's one that's undertaken the initiative,
on the offense, it's looking for ways to keep the Soviets on
defense, it's being employed that way and that we're thinking
t how to use the Japanese capability— that includes the
nese air capability—in a maritime context. If you're not
g to do that, then give the navy some air capability.
With respect to China, I just want to highlight a point. It
brought out last night by Claude Buss and I really stress it
have instituted a policy of normalization with C > i a that
major strategic implications or foundations to it. They are
ably irrefutable. I don't take issue with those. In the
ess of instituting all kinds of economic and political
cies that enhance that relationship, we are also enhancing
military buildup. And that one needs constant assessment.
Claude pointed out— and I think properly so— China is still
unist. China still has tens and thousands if not millions of
-trained guys whc have not yet been convinced that Dung is
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entirely correct. Dung Chou Ping is not young. We are foolish
should we think that this situation is locked into place and will
never change. Our policy should be reinforcing the current
direction. But our investment into Chinese military buildup
needs to be very intelligently applied. I don't believe the;
Soviets put their 54 divisions along the northern border because
they were afraid of the U.S. 7th Fleet. And if I listened
yesterday to the discussion, we made the case that the Soviets
are really confused-- they
'
re perplexed about how to deal with
China. The Chinese can draw down their military and they're
still confused. So it isn't all that important that we help the
Chinese get very strong very fast.
The third point is--there's another China- -Taiwan- - that has
completely left the U.S. maritime strategy. We might as well
erase it from the chart. And those of you who are involved in
the strategic thinking--in the white suits and blue suits--hey,
it's time to get them back in the act. If we're really concerned
about the Soviets and how to deal with the slot control , we talk
about Japan being an unsinkable aircraft carrier, I can guarantee
you that that strategic location of Taiwan is every bit as
important, if not mere so, in the slot to Japan and Korea and
China and can be employed very very intelligently, and we've cut
them out. We've cut them out politically-- we wiped them out oi
our strategic mmds--they don't play. And that's wrong. We've
totally forgotten about the patrol of the Bashing Channel.
There're all kinds of ways that they should be brought in. And
while I'm thinking of an island out there we've forgotten about,
when you look at the Indian Ocean, we're to be congratulated for
what we've done in Diego Garcia against everybody's better
judgment. Tom Moore and Bud Zumwalt foresaw that and a lowly 2-
star named Bill Crow understood the vitality of the U.S. getting
involved in the Indian Ocean. But there's another island over
there called Madagascar that used to be a linkup with the United
States and the free world. And now is entrenched with the North
Koreans and Buss i ans - -but is looking for a way out. Some
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ghtened policies toward Madagascar would go a long war toward
.ritime strategy in the Indian Ocean.
I'm not going to say anything about the Philippines. It is
ical
.
It is vital. It is important to a maritime strategy.
e's tons of things we have to do. I'm not happy with the
s I hear about concern over rent and all that. We understand
issue left and right and up and down. And it is not a
using point. If the United States does not have an
gation to see to it that Corey Aquino survives and that
em comes up--by whatever investment is necessary- - that ' s my
tion on the point. It is our vital interests. I understand
was in Taiwan last week and read in the China news that the
ese--the PRC Ch i nese - -have just discovered a major find of
and oil on the Sprattlee's. If somebody here can reinforce
,
I'd sure like to know. It was in the open press. And if
's so, that's one of those kinds of unexpected things that
s along and what do we do next, guys 7 How do we integrate
into our maritime strategy 7
The last thought is Indonesia. You just cannot look at that
t and not recognize the strategic importance of Indonesia to
Pacific strategy --any global or local or regional or whatever
have- - 1 ndones i a is vital to that. We are doing some
lligent things within Indones 1 a- -navy to navy-- Indonesia '
s
• is growing. It's growing as fast as it can afford it. It
:n ' t look anything like our navy. I don't think that there's
ece of gear on it that comes from the U.S. Navy. All the
ce comes from someplace else. We're totally cut out of it
;ely because of our basic policies. Hopefully, our command of
rol and our strategic thinking will be such that at least the
•nesian Navy and our Navy are talking together, working
•ther , overcoming the fact that the systems can't talk to each
r , and they can't work together.
There are some challenges left on the table, it strikes me.
me just list off 2-3 that I wrote down so that the guys m-
•an still have something to do next year. Tac nukes--we
4
:
haven't talked about tactical nuclear warfare. We've got to be
able to survive for some period of time in tactical nuclear
warfare. I think the U.S. Navy stinks in its understanding of
it, its training in it, its integration of it in its thinking.
We run up for a peek for a short period of time and it drifts
back down again. I don't know why. It is too hard to whatever.'
But we really haven't got it. And it's badly required.
Integrating the effects of SDI , CDI
,
potential arms control
outcomes and space--that dimension, space--the U.S. Navy is
employing space systems and doing a fair job of that--but
integrating space into the maritime strategy strikes me as
something that still requires some real expertise. We can use
some people who really have a handle on that and bring new light.
Thank you.
Dr . Jencks
By my watch we're at 10:30
10:45 after a break. Thank you.
So let's reassemble here at
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Dr . Jencks
We certainly had some thought provoking ideas put forward
ing our session. So I'll now open the floor to questions or
nents. Yes sir, Right here.
Ronald Rourke - -Congress i onal Research Service
I have two comments and three ques t i ons - -at least I outlined
The first comment is about horizontal escalation, which came
a couple of times this morning, I think maybe also yesterday.
a little ill at ease when I hear references to horizontal
ilation m the discussions of the maritime strategy. Because
i large extent, that's really a dead letter. That was kind of
up the flagpole by the administration about five years ago.
was rapidly shot full of holes and then about a year later, it
taken down the flagpole again. There ma y still be people wh o
:epts of horizontal escalation in their thinking on the
itime strategy, but it's not really an actively articulated
Donent of it. And I think the literature and thinking should
rh up with that fact a little bit.
More to the point though. Even if the war starts elsewhere,
5 not going to be so much horizontal escalation that's going
involve the Pacific and particularly Japan. There's a certain
jmaticity to it for three different reasons. The first is
t you can't expect fleets to fight in one region and yet not
another where they're also intermixed.
The second is that even if the Soviets have their focus in
tern Europe, they're still going to throw up a large defensive
imeter in East Asia that's going to include Japan. And the
"d is that if we're talking about a protracted conventional
,
you have to start thinking about your mobilization base and
industrial base. And Japan is now part--a very important
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part--of the Western industrial base. And if we're going tt
fight a protracted conventional war in Europe, a lot of the hel]
for waging that war is going to have to come from Japan, which b;
the way points up the importance of the trans-Pacific slots, no-
going to Japan, but also going back to the United States. That'j
my first comment.
Second comment has to do with Canada and the Canadiai
defense review. We haven't heard much of Canada as a major actoi
in the Pac i f i c- -perhaps it never will be. But, in listening t<
the talk about the Australian defense review, it occurred to mi
that the Canadians have also come up with something fairl;
similar in the broad path to what the Australians have--a defensi
review that was the first in 16-17 years and which also focuset
very much more on self-defense. The implications of what was ii
that review, for the Cass brigade and so forth, mostly or mor<
concerned the Atlantic, but I think we should also think abou'
the Canadian role in the Pacific, particularly next to th<
Alaskan oil slots. Those are my two comments. My thre<
questions are the following.
The first is for Dr. Simon. You didn't quite have time t<
go through the full outline of your presentation. So I wa n t e d t
<
ask you is you needed to boil down the main points or the mai;
conclusions of your work here and in your paper--what would the;
be-
And my second question is to Mr. Nakamura and it concern:
the issue of Japanese neutrality in a crisis. I've heard variou;
opinions on what the Japanese position will be in a crisis or i:
the early stages of the war. And any comments you may have o:
opinions of an equally frank nature from what you Said earlier
about the possibility of Japanese neutrality, would be very mucv
appreci ated
.
And the third question to Dr. Hames--I was going to as:
you on the similarities between the Dibb Report and th
Australian defense review, because I've heard various opinions
You've hit that nail right on the head for me. But I still woul'
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to hear any other comments you might have, that you felt
you didn't have enough time to fully go into that issue
ng your presentation.
Dr. Sheldon Simon
I wanted to thank Dr. Rourke for giving me an opportunity to
sh the conclusions of my paper. I promise that we did not
ult together during the break. This was not a put-up job.
I would say one of the major things I tried to emphasize at
end of the paper, after reviewing the situation with respect
apan ' s strategy, the ROK , the Antipedes and the ASEAN states-
to go back to the distinction, from an allied perspective and
iendly country perspective--the distinction between active
passive contributions to an alliance relationship. And we've
d throughout this conference, the concerns that are
loping in various regions throughout the Pacific that reflect
ing an t i - Amer i can sentiment, growing neutralist or non-
ned sentiment. The fear of being drawn into a superpower
lict without a country's direct and voluntary assistance or
ement to this. And my conclusion, in this study, is that
much more likely to get political voluntarism or political
eration in U.S. alliance relationships in Asia if the
ribution from the very beginning is active. If there are
t plans, if there is a feeling on the part of the allied
e that it is contributing and hence its interests are being
n into account in U.S. naval strategy.
Where the nationalist and an t 1 -Amer i can flag rises most, in
pinion, is in those countries and those regions where U.S.
cy seems to be imposed and the contribution being made by the
es is essentially passive. That is logistics, bases, etc.
,
er than a direct contribution of forces and plans.
Professor Nakamura
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Thank you. First of all, I would like to say today':
situation in terms of Japanese neutrality is very improving. It:
meanwhile once upon a time or several years ago, many people ar<
afraid not to be involved in U.S. -Soviet conflict. But todaj
some people insist--we should be involved into U.S. strategy an<
U.S. military defense commi tments- -we should be. However, tc
some extent, still the neutrality is very controversial. Foi
example, if today you ask the Japanese government to blockade th<
strait, maybe our Prime Minister Nakasone, even Nakasone, ...
much more safe--no. Because we're very afraid once we blockacU
the straits, the Soviet Union will attack Okaido and we'll los<
Okaido before the United States comes to the defense of Japan--
within a couple of weeks. Therefore, the Prime Minister will saj
no. That is neutrality if you mean--or, we are very afraic
there's a high possibility. But in the 1990's, if we strengther
our defense capabilities according to the Ground Self Defense
initiative, both initiatives, maybe we will sustain Okaido anc
therefore the next Prime Minister in the 1990's will say--ok
we'll follow your ad v 1 ce - - we ' re going tc blockade or we'll fighi
the Soviet Umon--we are capable of blockade our straits--are yoi
ok 9 We will say to Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. That is
crisis management. So my answer is- -now our situation in the
respect of neutrality is improving but as for wartime military
operations, especially the straits blockade operations, we are
going to neutral operations now but in 1990 will be improving.
Dr . Harr i es
White Paper . . . already, but let me add a couple o>
others. Dibb emphasizes much more consistently the purel;
defensive nature of Australia's defense posture- -strategic
posture. And the need to, as he says, "shed or reduce thos<
capabilities inherited from the era of forward defense that an
no longer relevant.' The White Paper, on the other hand, tend:
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e rat -r more robust in speaking of possible retaliation and
rdiction in the case of hostilities and rather less passive,
n, Dibb bruskly dismisses Australia's military presence and
litments in Malaysia and Singapore under the Five Power
nse Agreement as reflecting 'the concern of a previous era."
White Paper, on the other hand, commits Australia to the
inuation of this presence and commitment and describes it as
gnificant contribution to the enhancement of Malaysia's and
apore ' s air defense capability.
The main difference is probably in relation to ANZAS where
is much less sympathetic to the commitments and
onsibilities under the ANZAS Pact and just says flatly that
should not in any way be determinants of Australia's force
icture . There's more hedging in The White Paper. It says
things of a traditional kind about Australia's obligations
,NZAS but in the last resort, it too, comes down on that ANZAS
ild not determine Australia's force structure. So the
erence there is much more of the language of politicians as
sed to the language of an intellectual and academic as Dibb
eas t part 1 y is.
Admiral Hayward
I would like to just make on two brief comments in relation
our question. It's obvious that in Asia and the Pacific, the
time forces are all U.S. Navy--in the context of our naval
.tegy. There isn't an allied navy that can any longer go to
and wherever we want and integrate itself--so we use them as
lligently as possible and integrate them with our strategy-
Japanese having the greatest role to play at the present
The largest navies are Ch inese- - we ' re nowhere near as
y to try to figure out how to deal with that. And our
itional ally--we've heard from Aus tral i a- -we see a navy
's declining in size. Its strategy is improvmg--that is to
it's now a two-ocean navy. That's a major breakthrough and
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maybe that'll bring force structure with it. But it takes bucks
and that's the problem. But I would suggest that the Indiar
Ocean navy c' India is one that is underemphas i zed and we're no1
paying enough attention to it and the Australians sure aren't
paying enough attention to it. But by virtue of their finding
themselves now really using the Coburn sound structure, why i\
leads me to some comfort that we're going to see better awareness
of the maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean.
With respect to Japan's neutrality, when Jim Patton and ]
were working the problem together at the Pacific Fleet, that was
one of the drivers behind our maritime strategy. I don't thint
that's changed. I think the concern over Japan's--of a realistic
option for Japan to go neutral--is surely there today and I don't
see it disappearing from the near term. We're moving in the
right d irect i en- - there ' s more interlocking; there's a greater
willingness to talk about these issues. But when we really get
down to the kinds of tensions that are involved- -when you really
the potential threat that can be imposed upon Japan, there are
plenty of reasons why Japan would think seriously about the
option of going neutral. And our maritime strategy has got tc
contribute to a Pacific strategy that reinforces the resolve of
Japan to stick with us. Because without it, it really changes
the equation enormously. It sure affects our maritime strategy
enormously. And the outcome of a war becomes very unfathomable.
My question is for Professor Nakamura.
constitutional limits on your military, assume the defense
responsibilities that should go along with having the second





more than 90*/. of Japanese people do not want to revise
cle 9. We are going to choose another article, the so-
ed Flexible In terpre tat 1 on- -so it is ok ... supports now the
titution. So, to the 21st Century, our Japanese Constitution
never revise--we are going under the Flexible
rpretations. However, as Jim Maurer says--yes that's a good
You should take the same line in respect with the national
nse program outline- the Flexible Interpretation is a very
way. I totally disagree. In the case of the Constitution,
ible Interpretation is ok, but the national defense program
ine case is co mp letely different. This is a good answer to
I'm sorry, I'm not an economic expert--therefore I don't
what the relationship between the economic issue and Article
If you have some questions to me, please speak more slowly.
Jim Patton
I'm Jim Patton and I think I'd be less than grateful if I
't say how much I appreciated the opportunity to attend what
or me an emotional milestone. It's exactly 10 years age that
ral Hayward commissioned this undertaking in Pearl Harbor.
arrive now to find that this process is both alive and
essful. Makes my heart leap. I know it's alive because
liant young officers like the ones you've heard here, are
uring it every day. Professional lawyers like Edmund
chin are practicing it every day and defense intellectuals
scholars are refining it all the time. And I know it's
essful because it has passed at least my three criteria for
ess--it is not an orphan, it has now at least 100 fathers and
emerging all the time --all the right people hate it and all
right people love it. The scriveners and analysts of the
nse department's PA&E hate it; the trendy armchair
tegists hate it; most important, the Russians hate it. The
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Fleet loves it, our friends, allies, would-be friends love it
That's very important. But probably the best criterion is the
it has retrieved a desperate situation. Those of you who weren'
in Pearl Harbor 10 years ago are simply unaware that we have
shambles on our hands. The admiral recognized that early ori
Our dialogue with Japan was limited to polite ambiguity. We ha
absolutely no defense plan for the critical real estate in th
Aleutians. Our Fleet's ammunition and spare parts and othe
wherewithal were scattered east of the Mississippi River and ox.
strategy, such as it was, would have neutralized half the Unite
States Navy for the 1st 30 days of any war with the Soviet Unic
as it wound its way slowly around South America.
It's now all completely re tr 1 eved- - we ' re not all there yet
But we've come a long way fast, in my view, in 10 years. I'm ou
of uniform now but I haven't forgotten how to salute. Thank you
admiral, for everything you've done for us.
Jim .
.
.--President's former Chief Negotiator
for the Law of the Sea
I really want to address an observation to Professor Si mo
on a couple of observations that he made in his remarks. Becaus
I don't quite agree with them, although I can well see how h
raised them. And that is in connection with the possibl
deleterious effect that some of the provisions of the treaty
which is of course is not in force and may never come into fore
--specifically the EEZ situation and the peaceful purpose
situation on the high seas in Article 88--you didn't refer t
that but that's what it is--would have on the maritime strategy
Now it is true, during the negotiations, that there wer
considerations about demilitarization. I think those were prett
well deflected. That language on peaceful purposes was put in-
Some cross? references to the U.Ni charter was put in--but what w
got out of that was essentially, I think, a good situation wit
regard to navigational rights. And I don't think that we ar
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ig to be disadvantaged by states in the Pacific Basin really
:ing those issues, if we continue to do the fol lowing- -and I
ik this is absolutely critical. If we keep an assertion of
its program going that will assert the rights that we think we
> es tabl ished-- they are customary law r i gh ts- - they ' re in the
of the Sea Treaty but they're customary law rights. If we
»rt those vigorously, I think that we will essentially achieve
purpose there of keeping down the possible raising of
Jtions by these countries with regard to the naval strategy as
as the navigational aspects are concerned. I do feel that we
; must keep that program going and we must keep it going very
irously because if we start to back away from that, we're
lg to have trouble. We haven't had trouble so far. We
> n ' t had any real challenges tc the navigational portions of
text. Lots of challenges to the sea-bed mining portions, and
,'s another question. And that's another issue. But I don't
ik probably that will be the case if we really look to our
-els with regard to our assertions program.
Pro f es sor 1 mon
My remarks on the Law of the Sea were drawn heavily from . .
.
discussion of some of the political possibilities growing out
the EEZ and the peaceful purposes language in the draft
ity. But I also, and I didn't have a chance to get into this
:he discussion, look at it in a way as kind of opportunity in
ns of U.S. naval s trategy- -espec i al ly the EEZ ' s . Because, at
it in Asia, a number of the littoral countries are now looking
^heir navies in terms of the EEZ. That is, what kinds of
res do they need to develop NEC protection and exploitation.
it seems to me that the United States might be able to work
collaboration with these navies for mutual benefit.
Followup comment - Jim r>
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I agree with your latter comment. I do not agree with th
source that you draw your remarks from- -because , although there'
been a lot of conjecture, just like there's been a lot c
conjecture that the United States is going to be in terribl
trouble since we did not accept the whole "package" as it were
But we haven't gotten into that trouble. I don't think we '
r
going to get into that trouble, if we are really vigorous on thi
thing. And I think it is going to be important to work closel
with the navies in this area and it's going to be absolutel
fundamentally important because it falls to us, the Unite,
States, and really no one else, to assert those rights that ar
codified in the navigation portions of the text, to assure thaj
we have these - -because these, by customary international law
it's by state practice that this develops and that's the only wa
we can really do it. Thank you.
First of all, one of the things that you've seen in actic
over the last two days--those of you who haven't worked in th
Pentagon--is you've sort of seen a very good facsimile of how th
maritime strategy was developed and reapproved and continues t
be in Washmgton. You've heard action officers wh o are actio,
officer equivalents, stand up and very enthusiastically peddl
their wares. And then various llluminaries and people muc
smarter than the action officers in various areas - -yourselves -
commented on all of that. And then when that was all over, in
very quiet, very deliberate statesman-like way, the Statesman
the CNO gave about 150 scenarios as to how the thing now ought t
happen and this all happened on a Friday. And that is, in fact
no doubt--I mean that literally be what's happening today wit:
maritime strategy revision 4 in the Pentagon. It is, and ha.
been, a dynamic process, and it is very d 1 f f 1 cul t - - 1 1 is frankl;
impossible to take issue with any of the points that have bee:
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sed- -certainly today's panel--with regard to Australia, Japan
the various war fighting and other points that Admiral
ward raised. A couple of comments on them though.
The problem of identifying where the war starts and the
lications of that, for the maritime strategy, which has come
a couple of times today. This is one of those areas where
e decisions had to be made when the maritime strategy was
ated and deliberately the maritime strategy does not tell you
n its classified or unclassified or whatever vers ion- -where
war starts. I mean it starts on the planet earth but it
sn't tell you where the war starts. That is unfortunate in
'y wa ys because it prevents you from doing certain things but
iwas very fortunate in another sense in that it enabled you to
past that problem into the wherever the war starts--what is
'that you're trying to do 7 And one of the th ings -- those of you
have played war games, those of you who plan war games have
advantage here--one of the very very difficult things to do,
rly 1 mposs 1 b 1 e - - 1 s to come up with scenarios that are credible
to the war starts. Anybody who's read Tom Clancy's book, Red
rm Rising
,
has got a view as to wh ether or not they find how
war started, credible or incredible. Wh a t wa s interesting in
ncy's book is the first of couple of chapters on the actions
Central Asia but what then happened when the war finally
rted, in Clancy's view. And so we did, in fact, deliberately,
we included people with several starts on their shoulders--
just action o f f l cers
-
-de 1 i berate ly down-played the role of
re the war starts so that we could get into the how we would
ually intend to use naval forces and other maritime forces--
forces in a maritime role and so on--in war fighting and
ntually in war termination. Nevertheless, the problem of--
t do you do if the war s tar ts - -Har Ian ' s point--what do you do
the war did start in Southeast Asia 9 What would you do if the
et wound up starting off located in various straits in
theast Asia or in the Indian Ocean--this is a very real
Diem that the war planners have to address and one that the
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war colleges and other places are concern with. And maybe th<
Postgraduate School--I would hope most definitely.
Another point has to do wi th- -Admiral Hayward rai sed- -Tai wai
and that's an important point, both in and of itself but als<
because of the larger principle. The maritime strategy, as th<
Navy enunciates it, and as the nation enunciates it, has to tak«
national policy as a given. The national policy of the Unitec
States--it's hard to take issue with the way it was character izec
by Admiral Hayward and therefore that's how the maritime strategy
must treat Taiwan. Which is not to say that educational
institutions or planners themselves, option papers, other things
going on, everything that Admiral Smith's people do--may wind up
doing things that are much different than what the national
policy say s - - cer ta 1 n 1 y our recommendation before that policy gets
made may differ--but the strategy itself self-consciously toot
national policy as a given--in terms of allies, in terms of man>
other things .
Then the last was--and this is both a comment and a
question. In terms of --and for Dr. Harries- -in looking at the
Dibb Report and looking at The White Paper, for a navy strategist
in looking at problems of division of labor and working with
allies, there was m fact a very big difference for us, I felt--
Cort doesn't hold this as fondly as I do--between the Dibb Report
and the Australian White Paper. To me, the Dibb Report
explicitly rejected our continuation of the Radf ord-Co 1 1 ins
Agreement The Rad f ord -Co 1 1 i ns Agreement is an agreement that was
initially set up by Admiral Radford and Collins, American and
Australian navy admirals, respectively, back in the early '50's
on how we would divide up the navy control and protection of
shipping responsibilities between Australia and the United
States, in the Southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean. That has
become part of a global interlocking cons tant ly--s 1 lghtly
shifting, but nevertheless very real, network of navy-controlled
and protection of shipping responsibilities worldwide. So that
never again, in time of war, do we have happen what happened on
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east coast of the United States in 1942 in which we were
ply unready for all of the various things that had to take
ce in terms of protecting our shipping.
The White Paper clearly came out and favored the
tinuation of Radf ord-Col 1 ins , which meant that the major thing
t we thought the Australian and American navies were going to
together, and division of labor as we understood them, was
ng to continue. And so, for that reason, I thought they were
y different and that The White Paper came out very salutary.
The other thing that The White Paper said explicitly that
Dibb Report rejected was that Australia would develop naval
ces which, if necessary, could keep up with and interoperate
h and operate with, far forward U.S. Navy task groups. And
t was very important because it meant, not in American terms
certainly in Australian terms--that Australia would continue
ommitment to heimichC) ships in Australian terms that would
able to--shou!d the situation ar i se- -opera te with U.S. forces
U.S. battle groups. And so for that reason, I thought it was
y different from the Dibb Report.
Dr . Harr i es
I think ... level of generality which one looks at this,
tainly there are real differences between the two and the
ferences are, as I said, and as you've emphasized with the
ford-Collins Agreement, in the direction that The White Paper
es a somewhat more expansive view than the Dibb Report did.
point is, that if you compared both of them to Australia's
ditional role and position and strategic posture, then they
e much more in common with each other and much more in
tinction to that traditional posture, than they have
ferences .
On the second point of difference about the operability, I
nk that's less of a difference than you make out, because both
hink say that the force structure should be determined by this
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restricted notion, but that this will result in a fore
structurer that will allow interoperability and cooperation i
the decision should be taken to engage in that. But what worrie
me is the reluctance of both documents to go anywhere, even i
the most general terms, to a commitment to such cooperatioi
outside the sphere of the immediate defense of Australia and it
environment, which is quite at variance with the traditiona
attitude that Australia's taken on these matters.
^ - Dr . Hayward?
On how the war starts--as an aspect of whatever the Pacifi-
policy is, of which the maritime strategy is obviously the ke;
and it's been acknowledged that it's a maritime zone and th<
maritime strategy is bound to dominate the way you go at that
The real issue in a national strategy is deterrence of the wa:
and how the war starts--is preventing it from starting. Up t<
now we have seen great reluctance on the part of both superpower:
from getting involved in situations that even put us to where i'
could get out of control. Hopefully that situation will continue
to prevail. But it's not altogether clear and it would be pool
to plan that way. But the maritime strategy, as I understand th<
Pacific strategy-is designed to try to highlight the two-frorv
prospect of the Soviets. And have that as a dominant feature o:
it to make sure that the Soviets acknowledge that they'r<
entrapped in a two-front situation. Now if they want to withdraw
and consider the Chinese to be no longer a threat anc
decommission 25-45 divisions and defuse the situation, maybe
there'd be a change of our strategy. But for the present, it'i
in our best interest to make sure that whatever they're lookinj
at is of concern. Therefore, when words like provocat 1 ve-- i
i
U.S. mining is great, let's make it as provocative in theii
perception as possible. Whether we do it or not is a differed
issue. But the strategy should present those kinds of problems
to the Soviet planner and decision maker. And in that sense.
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.ed support is important. That's why it's so critical that we
b pressing Japan to keep moderni zing- -because the Soviets are
cing at a tough Japan today that wasn't tough 10-15 years ago.
that's what's so bad about even little New Zealand backing
v from ANZAS . Their contribution isn't all much but it's part
the perception issue that keeps that two-front problem in
t of the Sovi e ts .
Just a remark about the Australian Navy. It is of concern
t the new combatant which they have an RFP out on the street
are getting responses back from--have no U.S. bitters and
lever it's going to be, it'll be smaller than the FFT-7. It
it be as capat 1 e - -whatever that means. The U.S.S. Stark is an
-7 and we bought it and built it and it's a low-mix ship--sure
't a high-mix--and it's going to be tough to think that this
3 is to interface very well with the 7th Fleet.
Professor Nakamura
I would like to comment on--where will the war start' 1 Our
league wrote up the Ground Self Defense Force initiative
Dugh the Undersecretary of Defense in the Defense Agency. And
Undersecretary asked my colleague where the war starts He
i--well, in Eur ope - -European theater, that's first. And now
?rsecretary said--oh, no, we cannot accept such kind of
nario 9 Why 9 It will to be involved with the U.S. -Soviet
s, so we cannot accept. How about if the war will occur at
st in Asia, especially at first the Soviet Union attack Okaido
spillover effect in Europe or the Soviet Union and back to
ope--that's ok--but you need some kind of testimony from
hington. Now the .... to us is very critical to our strategy.
said--well, we cannot point where the war starts--it's very
tical to the Ground Self Defense Force--we really such
arks. Thank you very much.
Dr. Jencks
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If there are no questions, we have a couple of minutes lef
over .
Lt . Scott Sage--Space Systems Engineering Student
Naval Postgraduate School
Forgive me if I'm a little bit off your general area--thi
conference has been for me personally. But I've been used t
looking, in the last year and a half, at building satellites an
silicon and gal imarsen i te and things like that--and it's given m-
a pretty global view of the world. And my perception of ou:
problems of the Navy in the Pacific is getting agreements to ge
everybody to realize just how interrelated we all are. And it':
amazing to me to hear people talk about them focusing on thei:
own borders. In today's technology, that just boggles me - - 1 ' i
used to looking at a global level. In fact, I would each tak<
issue with the captain assuming that the war starts on the plane-
earth. Accidental, on-purpose interruption of a spact
communications--! guess my comment and observation was - -yes terda;
I noticed several times we were talking about the Russians ant
their kind of holding the olive branch to the Chinese and saying
maybe they can come to space with us. I still have a very vivic
picture in my mind of the Syrians going up and millions o:
Syrians slaughtering sleep in front of their T.V. sets. Whj
couldn't we do something in getting our allies more involved u
space. For one thing, as one of my students mentioned, they'd b<
a national hero in their own country. That's a big political
gain in itself. As well as showing that country and the peopH
in that country just how small this planet are and hov




I'd like to give Owen Harries just a few minutes to make a
comments on Southeast Asia which he had been forced to
tail because I was making threatening gestures here.
Dr. Owen Harries
conference generally. I'd just like to make two
y general points about Southeast Asia. First of all, it seems
me that to an unrealistic extent, one image of Southeast Asia
replaced another very quickly. Twenty years of age, it would
about the most volatile and most unstable region in the world,
1 of semi - f 1 c 1 1 t : ous states--full of conflict and very weak
ernments. To an extraordinary extent, and very quickly, the
nomic success of the ASEAN countries has replaced that image
h one of countries that are a model for the Third World--which
k very stable and extraordinarily prosperous. I think it's
ring in mind, to some extent, the earlier image and the
sibility that should the prosperity falter or should a quite
lly imaginable conjunction of political circumstances develop,
rould, I think, very easily be back with the Southeast Asia of
early '60's. And I think this is particularly true of
onesia which seems to me such a vast complicated country. If
superimpose Indonesia on Europe, it reaches from Ireland to
Caspian Sea. There's a New Zealand instability as well as a
t of darkness about Indonesian politics that could go wrong.
The other thing about the region as it currently is
stituted--it consists of a number of countries which are equal
nomic success stories, but are militarily weak, existing
ngside a country which is an economic disaster area but which
militarily very strong. And that is inherently a recipe for
itical instability. That's all I wanted to say.
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Dr . Simon
Could I just reinforce Dr. Harries' comments by a couple o
sentences on the political and economic situation. All of th
ASEAN states have committed themselves over the past decade o
I
more, to export-led growth. And they've achieved remarkabl!
results with the exception of the Philippines and there's a grea
possibility that the Philippines, in the next 5 years, can tur:
around in a remarkable way--if internal stability develops withii
the country. If, however, the United States, Japan and Wester:
Europe, institute protectionist policies, all of that coulc
become unraveled within a matter of 3-4 years and the political
implications would be devastating.
Dr . Jencks
I'm feeling a little guilty about Lt . Sage's comments whicl
I think were very excellent and appreciated. We just didn't hav<
any comments tc make down here--didn't mean to give you short
shrift. I too wondered about the assumption of it starting or
p 1 ane t ear th
.
Well I think our time is just about right. We will assemble
here at 1:30. Lunch will be in the La Novia room which is the
same place it was yesterday. Thank you for your attention.
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Good afternoon. Thank you for your presence at our final
sion--The Navy in the Pacific Conference. I'm Tom Grassey
m the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval
tgraduate School. Yesterday, you'll recall Professor Hensel
m the Air War College likened the job of chairing one of these
sions to being a tugboat - -pushing the big guys into the
ition to dump their cargo, pushing them out of the way so the
t major figure could unload. This seems an amiable chore.
ever, I have alsc been assigned to be the discussant of this
sion. Which means that I am not your regular little tugboat.
an armed tugboat. After helping to push all these major
ures to unload their ideas, I'm supposed to take a few shots
them
.
Considering the composition of our panel, I know a kamikaze
sion when I see one. And since a little tugboat -- even an
ed one - - obv 1 ous ly can't actually harm these giants, but merely
oy them--I hope to do my nominal duty quickly and get out of
way, so our panelists can themselves discuss one another's
as
.
I'm very privileged to introduce three Speakers for whom an
roduction is unnecessary for most of you. John Collins, at my
re me right, your left, retired as a colonel in 197 2 after 3
rs of service in the army, including duty in Europe, Korea,
Vietnam. He continues to serve our country in the
gressional Research Service, where he's a senior analyst on
national defense and is best known for his authoritative annua
study of the U.S. -USSR military balance. When John Collins pose
a series of questions about the maritime strategy in the Nava
Institute Proceedings
,
quite a few people realized that if th
maritime strategy was worthy of John Collins* attention, i
certainly was worthy of ours as well. His topic today is "Th
Maritime Strategy Under Alternative Assumptions."
Dr. Ed Olsen is a Professor and Associate Chairman of th
National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate
School. As you know, he is the coordinator and chief architec
of this conference- -the most impressive measure of its success,
think, is found in the roster of names of you who have attende;
our conference. Professor Olsen will address "The Pacific Rim a:
an Economic Dynamo: Implications for the Maritime Strategy."
Our third panelist, looking at the future of the maritirru
strategy in the Pacific, is Professor Al Bernstein, Chairman o 1.
the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College. A fe;
summers ago, I was having lunch in Newport at the O-Club when 3
overheard many people at a nearby large table addressing this,
distinguished figure as Mr. President. I asked a person at th«
table, what country is he a president of And at the same
instant that this person replied--the United States - -Bernsteir
exclaimed, "But I want to go nuclear, let them fly." Professor,
Bernstein will be speaking on "Strategy in the Pacific:
Offensive or Defensive. " And if his students in that war game a)
few years ago were right, I think I know which direction Crazy
Al
, or the Mad Bomber as he was known, will recommend.
We'll start with Mr. John Collins.
The Maritime Strategy Under Alternative Assumptions
Colonel John Collins, USA (Ret.),
Congressional Research Service
Present U.S. maritime strategy developed in a near vacuum
two reasons. The Navy's supervisors sat on the sidelines and
Navy excluded most outsiders. No national military strategy
ws the Navy where it fits into the big picture, according to
cepts of operation promulgated by the Secretary of Defense
h advice and assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
e that responsibility by law. Guidance from the Secretary of
ense and the JCS was, and remains, too general to be very
ful . The Navy's inner circle in those circumstances,
cocted the strategy with little assistance of any sort. And
Naval Institute Proceedings published an unclassified product
a supplement in January, 1986. There have been a few
inements since then but no fundamental changes. Answers to
questions I have posed in The Proceedings apparently
isfied most of the Navy's leaders but they leave me a
firmed skeptic. And if you want to review the exchange of
respondence , it was in March, June and August of 1986 and in
: 1 of 19 8 7. My mission, at this minute, is to point the
ger very politely at prominent imperfections and to furnish a
framework of assumptions in 15 minutes or less--which I can
1 you doesn't leave very much time for nuances.
Now, I'm not well-known for my humility. But I feel it
ht now, because my credentials on this subject are nearly nil.
ever wore a Navy uniform, I never served as a Navy civilian,
only combat experience at sea was as a passenger aboard a
op transport under submarine under submarine attack in the
th Atlantic in 1943. Certainly, I am not a maritime
ate gist or tactician. So, who do I have to offer"7 Fresh
wpoints I hope. As a friend of the Navy, as a friend of the
y
-
- a n d free a d v i c e - - t h a t you can accept or scuttle as you see
Now the purposes of strategy are good starting points fo:
praising the merits of the maritime strategy. Strategy is a fori
of intellectual judo, that makes the enemy the way you want hii
to move, whether he wants to go there or not. It matches ends
with means--which is a measure of effectiveness— while minimizing
waste--which is a measure of ef f iciency--despi te threats and
despite political, economic, social, geographic, technological!
military constraints. Team play is very important. The U.S.
maritime strategy falls short on every count. It is high risk,
high cost, inflexible. It plays the enemy's game. We take or
the Soviet Navy in its own backyard under circumstances most
favorable to them and least favorable to us. It slights serious
problems like nuclear combat and chemical warfare at sea, which
could happen. You can't assume it away. It depends almost as
much on deterrence as mutual assured destruction, which has bad-
mouthed now for years and years.
Resources, in my opinion, are insufficient. Combatant ships
insufficient for horizontal escalation, that we hear a lot about.
Amphibious ships insufficient for forcible entry--we can't go
anywhere without being invited. The Marine Corps has a forcible
entry capability equivalent to about one Marine amphibious
brigade, if you want to be real kind. And that's not going to
improve a whole hell of a lot over the next 10 years. Mine
war f ar e - - 1 1 ' s a disgrace. We're making ourselves look like the
Keystone Cops in the Persian Gulf. And the pity of it all is--if
deterrence is the big name of the game, our performance in the
Persian Gulf could undercut deterrence because other fifth rate
powers are watching what's happening there and they're going to
say--if Iran can get away with it, why can't we. Cargo ships--we
just talked about them--we ain't got any.
Now my list of alternative assumptions that might improve
the present maritime strategy, is limited to six, in the
interests of time. But you could double or triple that number if
you had 15 more minutes, I'm sure. All I'm going to talk about
are very broad and very long-term. I'm leaving the short-term
itical low-level strategy kind of stuff to the Navy planners,
it am I going to talk about 7 I'm going to talk about team
.y, service priorities, flexibility, threat appraisals,
ication and research. Those are my topics.
I
Present assumption one. The Navy is a self-sufficient semi-
onomous service that has its own land, sea and air force. The
y lives in its own world. It is not tolerant of outsiders who
't understand. It is not tolerant of participation in joint
anizations. It never joined strike commands which were
sponsible for all of Africa south of the Sahara. Did not
ticipate in readiness command, is not participating in the new
cial ops command just inaugurated on the 1st of June 1987, is
ginally a participant with central commands. Navy leaders,
h few exceptions, like Vice Admiral Thor Hansen, stood
ulder to should and fought any kind of defense reform that wa
s
rig to undercut their power and authority. Now, poor
rdination of the maritime strategy is inevitable in that kind
an environment. We were told yes terday- -don ' t talk to SACEUR
,
:k to SACLANT. I d 1 d - - S ACLANT was Wes McDonald who was a
ident at the National War College when I was on the faculty. I
4t him well. He was a speaker at Jacksonville, Florida, 29 May
I?-
-just a few days after he took off his suit. What did Wed
i or, aid say 9 He said--the maritime strategy had very, very
uted input by other services, by the CINCS or by the allies.
said--he wasn't consulted anywhere near to his satisfaction,
alternative assumption *1 is diametrically opposed. It
:tulates that the Navy is part of a joint U.S. -allied team.
liral Hanks reminded us yesterday that we hang together or we
1 g separately. I've heard a lot of "we" vs. "they" right here
this auditorium over the last two days. Well, "we" ought to
the United States vs. adversaries. It shouldn't be the Navy
everybody else. Maritime strategy architects should replace
iCurrence after the fact with prior consultation. Briefings to
'vices and visiting dignitaries are no substitute at all for
opportunity by those services and by those allies to staff
proposals completely before they reply.
Present assumption two. What's good for the Navy is good
for the United States. It sounds like indian Charlie Wilson--
what's good for General Motors is good for the United States.
Clear ly- -clear ly , if we lose a war at sea--a major war with the'
Soviet Union --or we're even stalemated, we lost the whole war.
You can't even be stalemated at sea and win. But let me remind
you--if you lose on land, you still lose the war. Now we've got
a policy called forward deployment, which I think is just bully.
We haven't fought a war on U.S. soil against a foreign foe since
the War of 1812 and I don't know anybody who is anxious to do it
again. But the forces on the far shores cannot even survive,
much less accomplish assigned missions, unless they are
reinforced rapidly and resupplied in a rush if we go to war with
the Russians. Maritime strategy doesn't have any time line for
controlling those slots. The best estimate that I can get is a
matter of months and the poor bastards on the far shore are going
to be in body bags long before then, because ends and means don't
match. The maritime strategy does not mesh well at all with the
needs of the Army and Air Force who are over there on the far
shore. So my alternative assumption *2 is the flip side of that
present assumption. What's good for the United States is good'
for the Navy. You can't put too many eggs in the Navy's
budgetary basket because if you do, then you can't modernize the
Army and the Air Force and repeat--if they lose the war ashore,
we lost the whole war. We've got a balanced force problem that
the Soviets don't share at all. And I would also suggest that it
would be helpful if the Navy really got out front and fought for
items that are not in the Navy's budget but which are essential
to the success of the maritime strategy.
For example, if I was a Soviet strategist, you'd never find
me horsing around out in the middle of the Atlantic and the
Pacific, trying to sink individual ships to control those slots.
What I'd do is knock out the terminals. And it doesn't matter
difference how good the U.S. Navy is at controlling the seas
those terminals are gone--the reinforcements and the
upplies never get where they're needed. And so, I'd love to
the Navy fight like hell for tactical ballistic missile
ense and air defense. I'd like to see the Navy fighting in a
that it's not now- -al though , sir, I agree, it has improved--
the merchant marine, which has been a bastard stepchild on a
mhill slide since World War II. It's in a disastrous
'di t i on .
Present assumption three. One strategy, like one size, fits
I'm a real admirer of retired rear admiral J.C. Wiley, who
'te the little book on military strategy. And Wiley says--
.nning for certitude is the worst of all military mistakes.
maritime strategy stresses the least likely threat, which is
lobai war with the Soviet Union. It assumes that any regional
with the Soviets is going to go g 1 obal - -al though I can give
i 25 reasons why both sides might want to keep it limited. And
• maritime strategy disregards lew intensity conflict, although
lost everybody I know agrees that that is the most likely
eat. So my alternative assumption *3 is that a spectrum of
fategies is essential. One size does not fit all. There can't
one maritime strategy any more than there can be one theater
ategy that's useful for Europe and at the same time for East
a. There is a requirement for separate strategies that deal
h deterrence in combat- - that ' s peacetime and war t ime- -nucl ear
; convent 1 onal -
-g 1 obal and regi onal - -h i gh intensity conflict
I low intensity conflict. And, finally, the maritime
•ategy--one of them, surely must prepare for the future. The
'Id is changing like Andy Marshall said yesterday. The world
it Michael Paimer described long since disappeared.
Present assumption four. Net assessment is dangerous. John
iman disbanded the Navy Net Assessment early in tenure because
told him things he didn't want to hear, and because he was
'aid that its findings would reach Capital Hill. So he sunk
assessment, which never amounted to a whole hell of a lot
anyway because there were about three copies of the Net
Assessment published, and the man who was in charge of the
operation, told me the reason for this--one went to the CNO--if I
recall correctly, one went to the Vice Chief and one went to the
guy who was handling the purse strings. They never showed the
results to the staff that had to provide the input because they
were afraid, if they did, and it said we don't need this many
submarines, we need more of something else--that the staff was
going to start cooking the input. I was flabbergasted when I
heard this, because all I could think of was--if I found somebody
cooking that input, his head was going to roll down the E-Ring
and so was everybody else's who was involved with him. My
alternative assumption *4--Net Assessment is indispensable. You
can't even start to prepare a sound strategy without full
appreciation for the imminence and the intensity of threats. And
you're not going to get that out of Naval Intelligence, and
you're not going to get it out of DIA and you're not going to get
it out of CIA. They cannot give you the significance of enemy
capabilities. They can only say--the enemy can attack with
umpty-ump number of forces at a particular time at a particular
place or they can defend or they can withdraw or they can do
something else. But you don't know what the significance of
those capabilities are until you're playing Blue against Red--
that ' s a Net Assessment process. The Soviets understand it.
Apparently we don't. We heard yesterday from Haver that these
guys, everyday practically, are replaying the correlation of
forces. And they're doing that Blue against Red. I can tell you
they ain't doing it in any vacuum- -pi ay mg one side by itself.
Present assumption five. Progressive education is too
expensive for the Navy, in terms of time. The Navy is the only
service I know that thinks so. The Naval War College is touted
as the best of the senior service colleges in a lot of things I
see m open print. My evaluation is that it is the poorest.
What's the problem 9 A time constraint. Has nothing to do with
the quality of the faculty. It has nothing to do with the
ilities. It has to do with time. The Naval War College has
schools--it has a lower half and it has an upper half. If
go to the lower course, you do not go to the upper course.
you go to the upper course as a Navy officer, all the Marines
the Army and the Air Force in that class stand at parade rest
six months while we try to bring the Navy officers up to
ed because they never through a command and staff college.
if time is the critical constraint to begin with, and you
itrarily cut it in half, there is no way in the world to even
sably introduce your student bodies to maritime strategy in
of its multifold ramifications. So my alternative assumption
is that progressive education has to underpin the maritime
ategy. The people coming out of those wa r colleges are the
ure leaders of the U.S. Navy. And if you are not preparing
m to develop sensible maritime strategies that mesh well with
other services, then we're never going to make it. And it's
just bad for the Navy, it's bad for the United States. We
d to change the system and that cannot be done by the
sident of the Naval War College. This is a job for the CNO.
Present assumption six--my last assumption- Naval research
sufficiently rigorous. Basic Naval research in the field of
ategy is abysmal. There is no Center for Maritime Strategy m
United States Navy. There are no giants anywhere like Alfred
yer Mahon . A few years ago I went up to the Naval War College
I was invited to speak to a brandnew group of maritime
ategy researchers who had been handpicked by the CNO and I
d--when we sat down around the table--would you please
roduce yourselves. And the first guy said--I'm Captain
ever- the-he 1 1 and I just commanded an aircraft carrier. And
next guy was a Marine colonel who had commanded an F-14 Wing
I said--stop, come back to the head of the table and tell me
t is your expertise and experience in the field of maritime
ategy and there was a dead silence. And my comment to them
--if you accomplish anything useful during your year here,
5 going to be an accident. They were handpicked by the CNO,
who had picked fast burners on their way to the top, who were
going to be great. But they were totally unprepared and unsuited
for the job they had been given, which was creative thinking.
And you cannot command anybody to be a creative thinker. You've
got to be very careful about who you pick. The Center for Naval
Analyses responds to a Navy staff that knows what it wants but
doesn't know what it needs. They're not tasked to tackle tough
problems. Their output is not influential in this field. My
alternative assumption *6--Navy research needs revi tal ization .
The Navy needs to develop and retain new giants in the field of
maritime strategy. The Navy needs to exploit the widest possible
spectrum of opinion. Don't be worried about Comer, don't be
worried about Weirsheimer. If you go clear out to the lunatic
left or over to the radical right, you'll find that nobody is all
wrong. There's something there for you if you will look through
objective glasses at it. And nobody is all right. And that
means certainly-self-satisfied Navy planners. They're not all
right. You need a spectrum of opinion. You should go out and
solicit it. End of sermon.
My last comment. I couldn't care less whether anybody,
anywhere ever agrees with anything I have to say, because it's
not important. But it is critically important that you think for
yourselves about maritime s trategy- - that you challenge all of the
assumptions, all of the shibboleths and make up your own mind,
where common sense lies, because baby buddy, that's where it
ought to be. Thank you very much.
Tom Grassey
I sat next to John at lunch and he commented on how good the
lunch was. I just wonder what would have happened if we hadn't
had a good lunch.
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The Pacific Rim as an Economic Dynamo: Implications
for the Maritime Strategy
Dr. Edward A. Olsen
National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Let me give you a quick overview of what my paper deals with
then I'd like to present some of the key sections of the
er--much too long to try to present the whole thing.
The paper does three things. One is to give some background
the roles of what I kind of loosely call generic maritime
ategy and the maritime strategy in Asia. I started to say--my
er does three things. One is to give some background on the
es of maritime strategy in a generic sense and of "maritime
ategy" m Asia, past and present. And how they differ. I'm
going to spend any time this afternoon on that because other
pie have dealt on that and there's no need to elaborate.
The other two things my paper does is to assess Soviet
poses and options m the Pacific and how the U.S. and others
ceive them. The third is to evaluate the potential impact of
an economic dynamism on both of the superpowers and their
ategic presence in the Pacific region.
The paper identifies two key problem areas with the U.S.
of them--which some people have touched on--is how to get
ies to see threats the way we do or conversely, how to get
ricans to accept the need to see the threats the way allies
them. You can go either direction. But something of that
t has to be done.
The second is, learning along with the Soviets--and I think
t ' s crucial, along with the SovietS--how to cope with an
>nomically resurgent Asia that challenges both superpowers to
ipete. It's not just the U.S.
In recent years two things have altered relatively cavalier
. attitudes towards the Asia-Pacific region. The most basic
a belated recognition by the U.S. of the intrinsic 1 mp ortance
certain countries in the reg i on- -no tabl y Japan--but also the
1 1
New Japan or gangs of four--which clearly are as important as the
U.S.'s European allies. The shift in U.S. world trade patterns
from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the '70's, underscored these
new realities. More narrowly, the U.S. found itself facing a
newly reoriented Soviet Union that was shifting its emphasis
economically and strategically toward Asia. Despite the far more
profound significance of the shift towards a Pacific century, it
was the Soviet response to these emergent realities that sparked
the U.S. strategic reassessment. The wisdom of these U.S.
priorities may have been questionable, but I think the results
were positive nonetheless, because they lead the U.S. to pay--
what I consider to be proper attention--to an increasingly
crucial region of the world.
If the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific produces an
active effort to secure Soviet far-flung interests in that region
of the world, the U.S. and its allies in the western Pacific may
be in for a tough new round of tensions. Clearly the Pacific is
no longer an American lake, if it ever really was. To date, the
expanded Soviet naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region hasn't
been used in an overt military fashion. At most, it's been used
as a relatively discrete form of gunboat diplomacy, hoping to
influence states in the region in Moscow's favor. However, the
naval potentials for active intimidation, intervention, and
interdiction are very real. While all of this has proved
upsetting to U.S. strategists and helped cause a reappraisal of
U.S. policy, U.S. allies and unaligned states have accepted the
changes in the area with greater equanimity. Unlike American
leaders, who often have short historical memories, most Asian
leaders have never assumed that the Soviet Union deserves no
legitimate place in Asian affairs. As the U.S. tries to cope
with the Soviet Union in Asia, there are always some U.S.
assumptions about the ability and willingness of allies to either
lend a helping hand or at least not to impeded U.S. actions.
The problem associated with getting allies to help is the
same problem that causes a political dilemma for forward deployed
12
.
forces, with an assertive strategic mission, such as the
itime strategy. Namely, U.S. and allied threat perceptions do
necessarily coincide or even overlap, to a significant
ree . Compounding this problem is the trouble caused by
eign confusion over precisely what an assertive strategy, such
the maritime strategy, really means. Given the wide array of
. opinion about the maritime strategy that's been partially
lected at this conference, it's no surprise that allied and
endly states might not be certain about what the U.S. intends
do and what such actions might mean to them. Consequently,
strategic planners in war games, often make some decidedly
ky assumptions that allies will see adversaries the way
ncans do and will react the way we expect them to. Their
umptions may be most seriously flawed in terms of unwarranted
ectations that allies granting access to their territories for
use or transit in actions against the Soviet Union. There
a number of examples of such divergence of views. But the
e of Japan provides some egregious instances of unrealistic
umptions as Yoshi Nakamura candidly suggested this morning.
There's no intrinsic reason that the maritime strategy--
tever iteration of it--cannot obtain allied understanding and
port if it is properiy explained to those allies. Much more
ort should be expended in that regard. However, that effort
not be relegated solely to a strategic sales pitch by the U.S.
ause the product almost certainly would not sell, if handled
t way. The U.S. is engaged in a diversified competition with
Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region. And the U.S.
ategic message must be integrated into a broader context if it
to be believable and persuasive. If the U.S. does not
levably mess its strategic message into a broader context and
Soviet Union does so, Washington's policies may appear more
eatening than Moscow's, to states in the region.
The pos t- VI ad i vos tok speech era in Asia has opened a new
nd of peace offensives, from a more sophisticated Gorbachev
i.me , S: no -Soviet ties are improving in fits and starts. But
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the trends are upbeat. U.S. naval access to PRC ports--which in
some circles seems the graphic symbol of improved U.S.-PRC
strategic cooperat i on- -real ly needs to be kept in perspective.
None of that cooperation means that Beijing is necessarily in any
greater harmony with Washington's views of the Soviet Union's
threat potential, than is Tokyo. We should not--as we are prone
to--make premature assumptions about the existence of "common"
security interests in the either the U.S.-PRC or U.S. -Japan
strategic relations. They will not come into existence merely
because they are logical or because some Americans desire them.
If the U.S. has problems in convincing its major ally,
Japan, and its major de factor quasi-ally, the PRC, that
Washington's view of Soviet intentions in Asia and the Pacific,
is a sound and prudent viewpoint, that is even greater problems
in southeast Asia and Oceania. When Washington tries to stress
strategic affairs with east Asian states, it gets a somewhat
sympathetic hearing--if one that is tinged with overt displays of
tolerances for American ideological preoccupation with Moscow's
sinister qualities. These states can grasp that the Soviet Union,
might do what Washington suggests it is preparing to do. But
they often do not see the threat as quite so 1 mmmerit. In
effect, our allies often humor us.
The non-communist states of southeast Asia and Oceania,
generally are even less disposed to see the world as Washington
does. And both sub-reg 1 ons- -and I would throw in the Indian
Ocean in that regard--the U.S. is engaged in a far more complex
and nuance-contest with the Soviet Union. In southeast Asia,
pointedly, Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo and Washington are all seen as
major influences that need to be kept in some sort of rough
balance. Most pointedly, Washington is not considered any more
virtuous than Moscow. Both are seen in terms of assets and
liabilities that should be balanced to local advantages.
That's what I've said about the levels of understanding and
cooperation with the maritime strategy among the Asia-Pacific
states— be seer, as uniquely poor. One should recall that West
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opean enthusiasm for U.S. strategic assert 1 veness toward the
iet Union has been markedly restrained. The concept of
anticism has been shaken severely in recent years, putting
into some jeopardy from within. In my opinion, if it wasn't
the full reach of the fears among the NATO allies about a
.
policy shift that could leave Western Europe less protected
m the Soviet Union than it is accustomed to being--NATO
bably would be in more trouble today than it is.
In the Asia-Pacific region, however, Washington starts from
h further back. There is no Pacificism to equate to
anticism. Even a weakened Atlanticism is way ahead of its
if ic counterpart. Hence the U.S. can only hope to explain its
ategic purposes in the Western Pacific or Asia, whether it's
the maritime strategy or anything else, if it first builds a
e cohesive set of common perceptions of shared interests and
iet threats to those interests. Such perceptions are what are
uired for Pacificism to emerge. Without it, U.S. assumptions
ut allies, friends and neutrals will remain flawed by a large
ree of unreality and wishful thinking.
If the U.S. has problems today in fashioning a coordinated
roach to Pacific defense, with which its friends and allies
wholeheartedly subscribe, the future is even more uncertain.
ricans tend to see the future of the Pacific region and the
role in that area as on a linear continuum with the present.
terms of economic growth, political development and a
er power rivalry, the future seems likely to be rather like
ay, somehow just more intense. If the future of the Soviet
on in the Asia-Pacific region is, indeed, one marked by
frontation and hostility with the U.S. , and with the area's
-communist states, then much of the contemporary prognostica-
ns about a more intense version of the contemporary status
, are likely to be realized.
Today it's easiest, and I think most comforting for
ricans, to assume that economic growth and progress will bring
U i S : and its allies closer together and increase the chances
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that our allies will become more capable of assisting the U.S. as
it copes with the Soviet Union.
The country which looms largest in that regard is Asia's,
and the world's, new economic superpower- -Japan . It clearly has
great geo-political potentials. Other Asian-Pacific states,
notably the PRC and the RK , are often seen as also possessing 1
geo-political growth potentials because of the economic
accomplishments. If the strategic future does become a more
intense version of the present, then the realization of those
allied potentials will become part of the process. Changes of
that sort almost certainly will have to be predicated on two
things. One is the Soviet Union persisting as a threatening
power and the other is on our allies' share U.S. perceptions of
that threat or, as I suggested before, vice versa-- we perceiving
the threat as they see it. If neither thing occurs, the
intensity factor could easily be nullifier. The economic
progress now anticipated for the Asia-Pacific region clearly
would be affected by such an error of less intention. Though
forecasting precisely how would require a crystal ball which I
don't have and I don't know anybody who does.
Far less problematical is an assertion that the renowned
economic dynamism of Asia could create conditions drawing the
Soviet Union into a non- threaten ing relationship with its Asia-
Pacific neighbors. The notion that the Soviet Union might become
neighborly to the Asian states which encircle it, undoubtedly is
as unsettling for Western forecasters than a more linear bent.
Moreover, there are many issues that hinder these geographic and
ethnic neighbors from behaving neighborly. Despite all that, the ;
winds of reformist change that are blowing through the Soviet
Union under Gorbachev make it far more likely today than a few
years ago, that Moscow is capable of improving its relations in
the Asia-Pacific region.
The prudence dictates waiting to see whether Gorbachev can
deliver results to match his words. Should this convergence
actually happen, Moscow's relations with the Asia-Pacific region
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be in for a sea change. One can imagine what goes through
minds of Kremlin leaders as they see the United States and
tern Europe being challenged, and often overtaken by Asian
nomic leaders. Even as the Soviet Union struggles to catch up
the West, the West is being outcompeted by the other East.
If the Soviet Union does not get its act together rapidly,
risks falling into third place among global centers of power,
hink in economic terms, it's already there. If, as the Soviet
on faces its future in the Asia-Pacific region, I think there
three basic alternatives that loom. It can, one, remain at
's length as a minimal participant, seen as an adversary of
h the U.S. and many of its allies; two, re ma in a strategic
ersary of the U.S., but not its ailies--not the U.S. allies;
three, become an important trade partner of the Asia-Pacific
tes - -pr obab 1 y excluding the U.S. The worst choice for the
let Union is the first one because it leaves the Soviet Union
entially behind the curve of progress. Moscow, I think, hopes
can achieve the second op 1 1 on - - app ly ing a decoupling of the
. from its strategic ties in Asia. The Double Zero approach
t was announced last month is partially aimed at that end.
ievmg the second option is dependent on how successful
cow's diplomacy can be and, conversely, how inept the U.S. may
as it copes with Soviet diplomatic campaigns in Asia that have
eady begun in earnest.
Achieving this goal will be difficult but not impossible for
Soviet Union because there exists a reservoir of sentiment in
region to treat the Soviet Union on a rough par with the
ted States. Least controllable by Washington is Moscow's
spects for ingratiating the Soviet Union into Pacific economic
amism. The Soviet Union is thereby, has resources Asia needs,
market needs Asians could fulfill, and under Gorbachev,
ears ready to mesh all three criteria into packages that are
lable to Asia. If the leading states of Asia perceive the
iet Union as a willing and dependable trade partner, and not
essarily a threat to the vital interests of Asia-Pacific
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states, there is little the U.S. could do to block such rapport,
without appearing to be disruptive to regional peace and harmony.
In short, no one in the West can safely assume that the Soviet
Union will play into the United States' hands by perpetuating an
over-ogre-ous image. If Soviet reality seriously starts to
converge with a softened image, the U.S. will confront a
different superpower challenge in the Asia-Pacific area.
The U.S. would be compelled to compete with the Soviet Union
under far more equal circumstances for influence in the region
than it has to since post-War superpower tensions emerged. As if
that prospect were not troubling enough for Washington, Americans
also need to reconsider the changing nature of U.S. relations
with its Asian Pacific trade partners. American officials
routinely stress the positive side of greatly enhanced U.S.
economic relations with Asia. Ste mmmg from these relations, the
American public is routinely told that U.S. economic, political
and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific area are every more
vital. While true, this doesn't tell the whole story. Trade
frictions have become rampant. U.S. economic nationalism arises
to question the wisdom of Asian financial, investment and trade
practices. Though U.S. economic interests in the region are much
more important than formerly, the region is also seen as a
c o rr.p etitive threat.
Also in a negative regard, the danger of a 1920's style
economic crash precipitated by events in Asia--most notably in
Tokyo--could be disastrous for the entire West, including the
U.S. These two sides of the coin also have implications for U.S.
strategic policy toward the region. Persuasive arguments can be
made that U.S. strategic interests, which developed while the
region was not very important in economic terms, are growing
apace with its economic interests in the region. But a counter
argument also holds that the wealthy estates in the region no
longer require as much armed assistance from the United States.
Those states should be able to fend for themselves and to help
the U.S. preserve regional security. Is it wise for the U.S. to
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erwrite the economic competition from the region, which
eatens certain facets of U.S. economic we 1 1 -be ing- -by
viding a defense subsidy to those same competitors 7 There's
easy answer to this dilemma. But posing it suggests the sorts
problems Washington must address in the future.
As Americans contemplate that future and the possible role
may ask our armed forces--and for present purposes, especially
Navy--to play in the Asia-Pacific region, we need to remain
xible and adaptable. The meaning of security in the region
ht well be altered by the changing relationships between the
. ,
the Soviet Union and Asia, with Japan in the forefront. It
legitimate to ask whether the U.S. can adjust m time and
ectively. If the economic dynamism of Asia makes the economic
ts of the superpower arms race too high for either the U.S. or
Soviet Union to bear, and still keep up with the Asian
1 1 enges - - that clause is cruc i al - - what policy mechanisms can be
ised to compensate 9 Can the U.S. adapt to Asia while the
let Union persists in adhering to older policies'' Conversely,
the Soviet Union adapt to Asia while the U.S. does not?
Clearly, continued Soviet "socialist imperialism" would
petuate lineal thinking about the future and U.S. problems.
if Moscow is able to adapt its brand of Marxi s t-Len l ni sm to
future, being shaped by the Asian Pacific economic dynamism--
this regard, I think it's important to note that collectivism,
iet-style, may be better attuned to the group orientation of
fucian-based economic growth models than a lot of what
i vidual i s t i c- or i en ted Western value systems are. In any
nt
, if the Soviet Union can integrate that into their system,
iet policy in the region will pose a very different style of
h broader challenge to U.S. interests. Should this future
erialize, the nature of U.S. maritime Strategy in the region
Id change significantly, tending toward the maritime
entat ions, interestingly enough, of the 19th century, which




The United States' strategic interests in the Pacific,
growing up in the late 40's and the 50's, 60's and 70's, which in
many senses are almost independent of economic interes ts--may
well be overcome by the commercial factors of the 21st century,
redefining why and how the U.S. will stay involved in the Asia-
Pacific region. In these terms, the period from 1945 through 1
sometime in the 1970's or 80's--hard to put a date to this-- :
during which Asia quietly reemerged as the economic magnet and
model it once was for an earlier generation of Wes terners--may be
seen as an aberration in the long continuum in which the fleet
and the flag follow trade instead of setting the pace. Because
this second wave of Western attraction to Asia--this is a 19th
century wave --proved to be such a disappointment, that historical
legacy, I believe, tends to obscure the potential for today's
third wave of Asian attraction for Wes terners - - to be just as real
and far, far more pervasive than the first wave--this is the 16th
century wave
.
Though contemporary Americans, who often have a poor
understanding of the United States' earlier attraction and minor
status in the Asia-Pacific region, are likely to see this
transition phase I think we're now entering as an unsettling
setback. The U.S. actually may be on the verge on settling back
into a normal condition--a more normal condition in its
relationships with Asia. If so, I think our most prudent option
will be to develop mutually beneficial and cooperative
par tnershi ps- - 1 mean real partnerships, not just one-way
partnerships- - in Asia, to secure U.S. economic, political and
strategic interests. Thank you.
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Strategy in the Pacific: Offensive or Defensive
Dr. Alvin Bernstein
Chairman, Department of Strategy
Naval War College
I think better on my feet. When Dr. Olsen called me up
ut 3-4 days ago and informed me that Colin Gray wasn't going
be able to make it--at that stage incidentally, I was the
cussant--I was meant to be a critic--and asked me if I could
together a paper--I had not idea that I was going to be
ated to such a laudatory fulsome introduction. And that my
utation as the War College's "Mad Bomber" was going to precede
I'm going tc dc something I've never done before--! ' m going
charge you two minutes to do this. I'm going to tell you the
1 story about what Tom alluded to. I'd been at the War
lege for two years and the Operations Department, which runs
officer war games, called me in and asked me to be President
they informed me, after I'd already consented -- they wanted
game to go nuclear. And they wanted the game to go nuclear
y early on because they very quickly explained that what
ally happens is that the game goes and goes and then at the
y last stage it goes nuclear and everybody goes out and has a
burger for lunch. They wanted the officers to--they wanted
War College's rigidly thinking officers to consider the
lications of nuclear war. So on the second or third day--I
get which--I drove the war nuclear. I, in fact, dropped a
tie nuke on Cameron Bay. I had an enormous amount of
istance
.
And I'd never quite lived that down. Let me explain
least two unhappy things that happened to me as a result, that
now about. And I want only those of you, incidentally, who
cleared through interoffice gossip, to listen to what I'm
ut to say--becauge I've never told anybody at the Naval War
lege that I had been put up to this.
But about two weeks later the students did their normal
annual roast--what they call The Gaieties of the Naval War
College— and one of the skits was a Marine officer dressed up as
Johnny Carson dressed up as whatever it is--Mandrake the
Magician- -wi th the envelopes-- the answer was read out. The
answer was--Ida Amin, Adolf Hitler and Al Bernstein— and the!
hermetically sealed envelope was opened. And the question was--
name two liberals and a conservative. And one day there appeared
mysteriously in my office—I've allowed it to continue to hang
there— this plaque which was clearly made by the students. And
on the plaque there was a very uncanny reproduction of a human
eye. And on the other side of the plaque, there was— I learned
later— a human mo 1 ar - - t oo th- -and at the top of the plaque, which
was labeled "Bernstein's Law" and underneath it was— "an eye for
a tooth .
Now I say that because the truth is— the reason I took that'
time to tell you the story— the truth is, I'm going to disappoint
you, a little bit I think— in dealing with this question of--
should the maritime strategy in the Pacific be offensive or
defensive. Because I'm going to do a little fence sitting and
argue on behalf of both. I was reminded of one of the better
throw-away lines on the first morning by Captain Wagner— was
that, indeed the maritime strategy is not ipso facto a strategy--
lf I get you wrong, you can correct me later. But it really is a
broad concept of operations which is, again to use his phrase,
good phrase, "scenario dependent. " And I think, contrary to what
we've heard, what the commander was saying was that the maritime
strategy is in fact a flexible concept and it can ad j us t— indeed
,
it's designed to adjust to varying scenarios.
So what I'd like to do in the 20 minutes allotted to me this
afternoon is to talk about possible scenarios and how the
maritime strategy would play. I am also reminded of Admiral
Hay ward ' s remark this morning, that we haven't really spoken
directly to the maritime strategy and what it would look like if
it were exercised in the Pacific. Because I do think that it is
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nano dependent and there is a fundamental question about how
would come to the Pacific. And I think that we have to match
options of the maritime strategy to specific scenarios.
Let me say, broadly speaking, that I think that war between
United States and the Soviet Union could come to the Pacific
one of two forms: obviously, either a local conf
1
ict--not yet
olving the superpowers would begin there and escalate the
erpower conf rontat ion-- that ' s one possibility. And I think
other broad general possibility is that a war between the
ted States and the Soviet Union would originate some place
e and then one or the other of the two superpowers, would
ide for strategic reasons, to bring that war into the Pacific.
Now on the precinct level, there are any number of conflicts
could anticipate. We could envision breaking out in the
ific, obviously, we could have a second iteration of the
ean War, in which the North had another crack at the South. I
nk that would be--well , let me go through all of them and then
1 come back. I think there is a vague possibility that there
id be a Sino-Soviet confrontation; I think there's more than a
be possibility that Vietnam might go into Thailand; and I
nk there are possibilities that the NPA will grow stronger and
onger in the Philippines, and we may be tempted to become
oived in the insurgency or in the counter- 1 ns urgency and the
iets are already showing signs of indirectly trying to back
New People's Army there. And of course, there's also the
sibility that an insurgency will arise some place else,
haps in a place like Indonesia.
And I think in all of these cases, the probability of
erpower confrontation is relatively low. Obviously, we would
directly involved in a Korean War, but I think the Soviets
Id keep their involvement, if indeed they had any, indirect,
think a Sino-Soviet war obviously would have direct Soviet
olvement. I think at best our involvement would be very
irect. Vietnam-Thailand is hard to read--we certainly would
ome indirectly involved, perhaps directly involved. Again, I
23
think the Soviets would keep their involvement indirect. And,
it's hard for me to envisage a serious insurgency in the
Philippines leading to direct superpower confrontation. I don't
want to suggest that these things couldn't happen, but I do want
to suggest that I think the probabilities are low. And part of
the reason I may this assessment— past Soviet behavior--we ' ve
fought two serious wars with Soviet surrogates in the past
without a direct confrontation. Past history is only a partial
guide to future contingencies, but I don't see anything that's
changed that would alter that.
The Soviets, secondly I think, simply do not have the vital
interests in any of these areas--with the possible exception of
something on the Mainland itself--that would drive them to risk
superpower confrontation over them. And if you look--as we did
look very thor ough 1 y - -at the nature of the Soviet forces,
yesterday mornmg--we find that those forces are fundamentally
naval and nuclear. That is to say, they're intimidatory forces,
they're not forces pri marily designed for invasion, they're
forces designed for coercive diplomacy, to coerce the regional
powers. Certainly forces that, if they were used, would be used
to keep- us at bay. But as I say, they don't seem to me the sorts
of forces the Soviets would use.
The only exception to that rule are the 57 divisions that
the Scviets have sitting on the Chinese border. They seem to me
to be primarily China's problem. I think they're not sufficient
enough for a full-scale invasion of China. I think probably
China would fight some version of a People's War into the Soviet
Union, as they would understand it would turn into a kind of
Afghanistan in spades. They're there for intimidatory purposes
as well—unless they happen to be there for some kind of limited
war with the Chmese--say ... off of Manchuria.
That leaves the other alternative. That is to say, that a
war between the Soviet Union and the United States begins some
place else and the two some place elses that I think would be
candidates for this would be Europe and more possibly, the
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sian Gulf. So that the superpowers are already at war and
n the question--I think the essential question to ask is--
er those circumstances, who would bring it to the Pacific 7
again I think the answer is that the Soviets would be
ikely to do this--they might. But first of all, we have their
torical and traditional distaste for involving themselves in a
-front war. I think the Soviets--and the logic of the power
amies in the reg i on- -means that they would much prefer to
uence their operations. And as the maritime strategy makes
ar , to defeat us in a single theater before turning their
ces to take us on in yet another theater.
I think that part of their objective in a global war with
would be to minimize the threat from China. And I think, for
most part, as regards both China and Japan, there would be a
ies of threats and blandishments to keep them out. And it's
d for me to see how initiating hostilities in the Pacific
Id serve those purposes. And it's worth pointing out that the
net Union really has no serious territorial claims, nor do
y have the means to enforce those claims. They might, at some
ge , I think into a war --which had already come to the Pacific
nvisage as we've heard--ar, attack on Okaidc. But that would
very, very risky and I think it's unlikely to be something
t'li happen very early on.
But should the Soviets initiate hostilities in the Pacific,
n I think we could expect them to take advantage of the
ressive job that they've done in modernizing their tactical
and in using the Blackjacks which are currently being
loyed into the theater. I think the targets would be
iousiy high value nuclear ones - -carri er battle groups,
ategic warning and C 3 I facilities and possibly American forces
Japanese and Korean territory, and possibly even Clark and
ic. The Navy, I think we understand, would stay in port and
tever operations it carried out, it wo uld carry out those
rations under the cover of land-based air. The submarines
•Id flush the SSBN's to the Bastions. Some, if not all, of
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their attach submarines, would go there for defensive purposes tc
defend the SSBN's. Again, some mi ght- -depending on circumstances
--be used against U.S. naval forces for purposes of slot
interdict ion-- 1 want to return to that in a minute.
The major question, I think, for U.S. strategic planners and
even more so, for American politicians under those circumstances,
would be--should we--what this talk is all about- -should we
initiate offensive operations or should we go on the defense in
the Pacific 7 Should we, in effect, preempt or go on to some kind
of high defensive alert--the latter which would have us avoid
attacking, but tying down Soviet forces in the theater and have,
as our major objective, the protection of our Asian allies. And
there may be variations on these two themes. For example, I
could envisage us in the Facific, treating Soviet territory
itself as sacrosanct- -espec i al ly if we hadn't hit Russia in the
European theater yet--but attacking Soviet air and naval forces
which had already been deployed international water and air
space
.
Let me talk a little bit about what offensive operations,
under the rubric of the maritime strategy, might look like. I
think we would use land- and sea-based tactical air against their
air bases, against their ships, against submarines which were
still in port, against their C 3 I facilities, against logical
logistical supply depots, against land lines of communication,
against POL, electrical generation equipment, their industrial
infrastructure— with the highest priority being given to the
destruction of their long range strike aircraft.
I think we would want to use naval forces against Soviet
ships and subs caught outside home waters and especially not to
return to a Zorro theme but I think especially to destroy their
facilities in Vietnam.
I think the most valuable offensive campaign that we could
carry out would, in fact be, to attack--to send our attack
submarines against their SSBN's, almost half of which are
deployed with the Pacific Fleet. A happy side-effect of doing
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s, I think, and I think we want to think about this in the
,text of Mr. Collin's remarks--I think a happy side-effect of
s would be to keep Soviet SSN's deep in Soviet waters, unable
carry out anti-carrier operations and slot interdiction. And
re would be substantial operational advantages if we decided
employ an operational variation of the maritime strategy. We
ild not just tie down Soviet forces, but we would destroy
-iet air and naval forces. And I think it's better to destroy
\n to tie down--especially since when you destroy them, you
.lly do keep them from being shifted--a te mp tation that I think
the Soviets, will grow stronger as the conventional
'tracted war proceeds. And as they begin to suffer attrition
other theaters in the Persian Gulf and in Europe.
I could envisage circumstances in which U.S. air power wculd
lply strip bare Soviet air defenses in the Far East with a pre-
itive attack, expose their industrial infrastructure to
iventional strategic bombardment. And I think the SSBN
lpaign is an excellent idea. I think it is, in fact, not all
.t dangerous. I think, to be frank--it's the wave of the
ure for war planners for World War III--the simple use of
iventional forces tc deplete the other side's nuclear arsenal,
hink that under those circumstances the Soviets would do one
two things--frankly, I think they would either decide that
•ir reserve force was in jeopardy and it was putting them m a
[ position, in which case they would talk. Or, I think,
>ending on what was happening in Europe at the time, they would
iply ignore what was happening to their SSBN's and continue to
;ht. I think that the least likely option would be for them to
inch a nuclear attack, thereby committing suicide.
And I think that such early successes on our part would
>bably have a felicitous effect on the position of the PRC . I
i't expect the PRC to come in on our side in any active way.
there are lots of ways that we could be helped out there and
it did as though we were making substantial progress in the
'ific, we would--! '11 stand corrected on this- -but we might
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expect some indirect help. I think China will certainly, unde
these circumstances, sit and weigh alternatives and see the wa
the war is going. Indeed, if we're losing big, I can imagin
them even being tempted to accommodate with Moscow, thereb
freeing up divisions to use in other theaters.
And also, the Pacific really is the only theater where v^
could seize and hold any Soviet territory at all. I have in mini
Sakhalin and the Kurils. Whatever strategic importance the;
have, they might be an important bargaining chip during wa.
termination- -especial ly if the Soviets came out of the wa:
sitting on large chunks of Western Germany.
And those are the operational advantages to an offensiv«
interpretation of the maritime strategy. But operations aren' r
the only thing we're about, as maybe someday Col. North wil]
admi t- -extreme ly neat operational ideas can sometimes b<
politically catastrophic. And I think therefore it's worth u;
thinking very seriously about an alternate defensive strategy--
how it would play. And what sorts of political pressures, whai
sorts of political direction the military can expect in the kinds
of conflicts that I'm describing.
On a defensive strategy, presumably, we'd use tactical an
along with the Japanese Air Self Defense Forces and the Republic
of Korea's Air Forces to establish a kind of defensive barrier
against Soviet strike aircraft over the Japanese archipelago anc
over South Korea itself . Apparently, what we would do would be
to neutralize Soviet attack submarines by mining the three
Japanese straits. This will depend, of course, largely on the
Japanese and the success of it will depend on which side makes
better use of strategic warning. And again, I think a defensive
strategy would be designed not to destroy Soviet forces but tc
keep them in theater and to keep them from being shifted.
What are the pros and cons 7 Clearly, any military planner
is going to prefer the offensive option--the chance to seize the
initiative. The operational downside of that-- and just the
operational downside of that--is that these offensive operations
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uld require flying or sailing into some of the most heavily
fended of Soviet territory. But political priority, and
litical authority, as I've suggested, may well push towards a
fensive variation of the maritime strategy. [ok, that's I need
5 minutes] If those political priorities are what I expect
em to be
.
Assume a global war. Assume a global war which has not yet
•ne to the Pacific and assume a global war in which China has
rained neutral - -al 1 , I think, reasonable assumptions. I think
litical authority will have five basic political ob j ect i ves- - to
fend U.S. territory and forces, to protect our NATO allies, to
:>tect our Asian allies, to end the war on as favorable terms as
ssible, and despite our declared first-strike strategy, I think
avoid going nuclear in the war.
Opening a second front in the Pacific under those
ncums tances , whi le serving some of these objectives, would
rtainly run counter to the third obj ect 1 ve- -name ly , protecting
» Asian allies and might, under some circumstances, be seen as
ining to f our- -name 1 y , ending the war on a favorable footing,
fending Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and our other Asian
lies, would in fact be best served with a defensive variation
the maritime strategy. And of course, I don't need to go into
is in some detail
,
but we may want to discuss it during the
;stion and answer period--the allies will be extremely
luctant to see us use based on their territory for attacks
ainst the Soviet Union. So, indeed, all of this will indeed be
Jnar i o-dependen t , as our allies weight the possibilities for
rvival--of survival per iod- -against the possibility of Soviet
gemony in their region, on the other hand.
A lot will depend, on their perceptions of Soviet intentions
i the origins of the war itself. If the war is clearly
"ceived by the Asian allies as the product of Soviet
Session, then I think our chances for using our defensive
?ategy--for using an offensive opti on- -wi 1 1 be much greater, at
ist as far as they're concerned, then if those origins are
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muddy, obscure and if they seem to be Eurocentric. And I think
much of Washington's view of what it will authorize, will depend
very much on what is happening in Europe.
Let me suggest there are three possibilities of what could
be happening in Europe--to tell you how I think that would affect
what does, in fact, get authorized and then bring this to an end;
First poss ibi 1
i
ty--not a happy possibi 1 i ty--but first possibility
would be that the Warsaw Pact forces cut through our NATO forces
as a knife cuts through butter. Under those circumstances, I
think the Soviets will have very little incentive to swing forces
into the Pacific theater. And we and our European allies, I
think, will be knee-deep in a debate over nuclear first-use, and
not be thinking very much about horizontal escalation.
The second possibility is that NATO holds. If NATO holds,
the Soviets may then have some incentive to swing their forces,
but will not need, will not require the leverage that opening a
second front in the Pacific might give it.
The third possibility would be the following: a slow but
steady Warsaw Pact advance. In that case, I think it might make
some sense for us to bring war to the Pacific, but I think
political pressure en the President will be, in fact, under those
circumstances, to wind down the conflict. And he's un likely-
-
it's conceivable but I think he'll be unlikely to be searching
for new ways of hurting the Soviets, by further escalating the
war .
For all its drawbacks, then, I think that the safest
strategy, the plan most likely to receive political
authorization, would encompass attacks in the Pacific, probably
only against Soviet-deployed forces - -against the competence and
aircraft on the high seas, against neutralizing the bases in
Vietnam, and against a vigorous prosecution of the anti-Soviet
SSBN campai gn
.
Let me just leave you with these concluding remarks, because
again I want to return to where we began with the scenario
dependence of our activities there. Let me just say that these
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ngs are hard to gauge--this is not an exhaustive analysis,
of my favorite Scottish poets once told me that the best laid
ns of mice and strategists may oft times go awry. But I would
|t leave you with Bismarck's wisdom, as he once advised Molke,
t whatever strategy you eventually plan to execute, always
n on having at least two response. Thank you.
Tom Grassey - Discussant
As promised, I'd like to keep my comments to a minimum to
ow the panelists to discuss among themselves the issues that
y've raised, which are obvious, I think, to all of us.
eral things, though, that I feel are worthy of our attention,
first, and I stole this from a person that I spoke to this
ning--what are the United States' goals in the Pacific'? We've
rd relatively little about our national beginning orientation
ow we began. Peter Swartz said that that is the fundamental
ponsibility of the military o f f i cer- -mak 1 ng strategic plans
the United States--our national interest. I think we've
ten a much better appreciation of how the world looks from
er latlons ( ? ) but still, as military people, our fundamental
ponsibility is to our own country. That leads to interesting
dicaments and problems in how you look at alliances, which Ed
en invited our attention to. Should we treat alliances as
ost integral to our national interests' Or should we
tually ignore them? Two extremes. And where do we put the
ance on alliances?
Second issue that I think is of interest is--where are the
al nodes at which the United States and other nations'
erests diverge in ways that will be critical to the U.S.
ional and the United States Navy's maritime Strategy 7 The
ing
,
for instance, of straits in Japan--Al Bernstein has
tched in one scenario, would be critical. This morning the
anese perspective on that suggests we may not get what we
nk is critical, if that scenario developed.
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And the question I guess I would like to pose--to start the
discussion--i f anyone feels like picking this up, on the
panel is ts--what is the most dangerous scenario for us? Where are
we presently weakest in capabilities and what should we sacrifice
in order to compensate for those weaknesses-- that weakness or
those weaknesses 7 People who work in Washington know that things'
are trade-offs. John Collins emphasized that for us this
afternoon. That if you want to remedy a certain defect, you have
to buy that from some place else. Where are our weaknesses and
what are you willing to buy from somewhere else to remedy that?
If we want to talk minesweepers, what should we buy less of in
order to buy more minesweepers, for instance 7 If we're going to
rely on allies for minesweepers, then what does that impose on us
m terms of how we view the world and U.S. military action, in
terms of unilateral activity.




You all know what the biggest deficiency is--the biggest
force deficiency in support of the strategy is the All Volunteer
Force. If you listen to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, they will all tell you that the All Volunteer
Force is qualitatively better it's ever been in its history--
which is absolutely correct and absolutely misses the whole
point. Because the problem is not basically qualitative, it is
basically quantitative. If you fill the All Volunteer Force tc
its authorized, legal limit, and everybody in there is a Ph.D.
from M. I . T . --you ' ve got exactly the quality you want--and you can
retain them all because they all reenl ist--you can't even
remotely cover the objectives and the commitments that national
leaders tell us are essential to the security of the United
States of America.
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Now you either take a look at those objectives and
imitments and decide that some of them never made any sense to
in with--or that they've been overtaken by events, or that in
ie other way, you can shave requirements because if you can't,
n it seems to me that there is an obligation on the part of
top leaders in the Department of Defense, to notify the
sident and the Congress and the American people that there is
erious requirement to restore conscription. You can't begin
support the maritime strategy that's on paper now with the
ce you've got. And by the time you have all the ships that
i want, the problem is going to get worse. So I would say that
t's a fundamental force defect, in relationship to the
ategic requirements of the maritime strategy.
Ed Olsen
somebody look out with 20-20--I hope I did
with something close to 20-20 vision. But in any event, I do
nk there's a two-way partnership. The only other comment I
--maybe it'll stimulate some discussion in the question and
wer sess 1 on- -your comments about U.S. national interests. And
»ebody looks at this. One phrase that we ought to borrow, I
nk , from Ma j or ... from Japan is I don't think you can
e one without the other. You can't have strong forces if you
It have a good, healthy strong country and a strong economy,
the kind of directions we're going today, I'm not sure we can
both .
Al Bernstein
What the Soviet Union has been doing there since the fall of
gon is taking that one theater in which we traditionally have
a substantial military advantage and closing the gap as much
possible, so widely outgunned in Europe, we don't have very
h in the Persian Gulf--the one theater of traditional
advantage has, in fact, been the Pacific and I think a lot of
their activity there is simply designed to neutralize those
forces. The long term would be, in fact, deprive them of any
sort of strategic response or at least to make those who are
contemplating a military response, in the United States, ever
more reluctant to do anything, because they would feel ever more
constrained. And I think, from the point of view of people like
us, it's to sculpt the forces and shape the strategies to deprive
the Soviets from gaining military superiority in the Pacific. I
take that as our prime interest.
Tom Grassey
Let's take as brief a 15 minute break as we have taken thus
far in the conference so that we can nudge back toward--I know
that many of you have travel plans that require that--
[Break
]
... at one of the microphones before we call on you and to
identify yourself when you ask your question. I'm just going tc
bounce to each of the different mi crophones - -whoever happens to
be up at one of them. So, Professor Jaurika please.
Steve Jaurika
My name is Steve Jaurika--I have three points I'd like to
make. For those of you who may not have been around when this
book came out, there is an American Assembly book, a paperback,
called The National Interest . In my lexicon, it's the finest
book that's ever been put together on that single subject.
Second, I'm asking the panel if they can find a relationship
between the Truman Doctrine and what happened in Europe' The
Eisenhower Doctrine and the emergence of the Soviets into the
Med 9 And the Nixon Doctrine and the emergence of the Soviets
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the Pacific? Lastly, I have a comment on the maritime
tegy. And if there are any of the real authors here, please
ive me. I have read it at least 150 times. I've got 19
»s of it. I find it ambiguous; I find it wordy; and I find
words and jargon used and the same words don't mean the same
gs in the same context all the way through. And I think
b should be a consistency.
I have about 5 JCS dictionaries of terms. And I don't
half the terms in th i s- - they ' re missing from the JCS I. And
like very much to have a later copy of this, and if anybody
sally i n teres ted- - o i those 19, I've edited 3. I happen to be
iitor. I'm not saying in my edition of it is any better, but
ertainly gets rid of a great many 900 words--m the first 4
3. Would anybody care to comment on the relationship between
Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Nixon
fine and the emergence of the Soviets into those particular
Al Bernstein
By the Nixon Doctrine, I assume you mean the substitution of
onal surrogates for failing U.S. power after the Vietnam War.
as far as Soviet progress in the Pacific and the Nixon
Pine and what the Soviets have done since the fall of Saigon,
great tribute to the failure of the Nixon Doctrine--at least
Dutheast Asia. I'm not quite sure how the other two would
into that. But it does seem fairly clear that, with the
ible exception of the China card, which I think has been
played, that regional powers are not going to contain the
st forces in the Pacific without us.
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John Collins
Let me give you a partial answer. Probably the worst
document ever published by the Department of Defense is the JCS
Dictionary of terms. If you're down at the Ensign level, you can
find all kinds of useful things in that document. Almost without
exception, when I pick it up and look for a definition of a term
that I need at the national strategy level, it's not there.
There's no definition of net assessment, for example. Part of
the problem--! guess most of the problem is--that in order to add
a definition or change a definition is an interminable process
that goes through all of the services and it's just almost
impossible to make changes. And so that document, if it were
revised properly, could serve a very useful purpose. And this is
one of the reasons, incidentally, that every single thing I write
for Congress ends up with a glossary so that at least for that
document, everybody's on the same sheet of music and they know
what we're talking about. They may not agree with it but at
least they know what the terms mean in that document.
Tom Grassey
I'd like our two--and perhaps one of them is still in
uniform and can therefore be tasked to respond- -about the
pleasantries of ambiguities in the maritime strategy- -The
maritime strategy.
Peter Swartz
I guess my only comment is that the maritime strategy
document that appeared as a supplement in The Naval Institute
Proceedings - -and again not an expert--if it comes out
that way I apologize. . . . was in fact written by a group of
operators - -s ince it was written by Naval o f f i cers - -many of them
were engineers and trained as engineers initially
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it was in fact contributed to by political scientists,
lligence analysts, historians and other folks in uniform--and
e's a lot better stuff written than that supplement. It was
shed, it was smooth, it was refined and rewritten several
s by the Chief of Naval Operat i ons- -Admiral wa'tkins. And
ral Watkins wasn't an English major either. So, in part, the
onse is--it didn't go through the kind of smooth, slick,
shed editing job that The Flight of the Intruder or Red Storm
ng were. It was simply the best we could do, under the
umstances, given the fact that we were a bunch of naval
cers working with the kind of knowledge and kinds of
itions that we work in--trying to get something out to help
CNO get his word out--largely to other naval officers, most
horn frankly could figure out what the hell was meant when he
--war fighting instead of fighting or combat instead of war
ting.
Tom Grassey
Peter, this is the first time I've heard somebody recently
ng--the buck s tops -- there .
?
for commercial use. There is now a maritime
tegy document, now in its 4th edition. It's not in prose,
in strategy kinds of language, and it's tidier and
I'm think about the maritime strategy, I'm thinking about
official version in its two applications and not about Naval
itute things .
Steve Jaurika
Unfortunately I have to defend this in public in large




And I'm replying now to the maritime strategy as perhaps an
historian. I would like to address my comments to Col. Collins.
Listening to his comments, it's sort of obvious to me that ...
was right--maybe the Navy ought to come up with a new name for
maritime strategy, if they ever want to get it accepted by other
services. And probably something German like or
something along those 1 ines - -pardon my German. It just seems
somewhat incredible to me that someone who's from a service like
the Army, would dismiss an approach that uses history only 40
years o Id- -obv i ous ly my presentation yesterday. And to try to
find something in that for the Navy today in situations that I
don't think are all that much di f f erent- -we still have an ASW
problem, we still have an air threat - -when that service itself
worships at the feet of Germans, dead for centuries, who managed
to lose two world wars--what's wrong with Forrest Sherman who's
not even dead--he died the year I was born--he's 35 years dead.
What I should have done was, I guess, use Turpit's or Clauswitz
or something like that.
Also, you mentioned Admiral Wiley. I happened to talk with
Admiral Wiley about three weeks ago--he's still alive and well.
He was listening to the Iran Hearings when I called. He was kind
enough to talk to me for about 20 minutes. And in addition to
the book on strategy that he wrote, he also wrote several
articles, two--one of which was an honorable mention in The Naval
Institute Prize Essay contests in 1953, which was termed
appropriately enough, "On Maritime Strategy," in which he
outlines essentially the maritime strategy. And then in 1957,
there was "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor," in which he again
outlined the maritime s trategy
-
-how you use the Navy in war and
peace against a land power. How you apply naval power--war and
peace assured diplomatic forms, economic forms and that was the
Navy's strategy 40 years ago. Wiley was a Captain then. Wiley
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doing the kinds of things then that I assume that Captain
bz has been doing today. Wiley was up at the Naval War
age between 1950-1953, running a strategy and policy force in
hi he was trying to enunciate what the Navy's policy was then
Dme type of form that could be passed out to naval officers--
the maritime strategy document- -no t the Naval Institute
3 thing--but that little blue book that's floating around
h we have in our files at the Center. Those are the kinds of
gs Wiley was doing. And to use Wiley as an example to attack
maritime strategy I think is absurd. Because if he were
,
I'm sure that he'd be standing up here right now, because
y was a maritime strategist--he was one of the proponents of
maritime strategy, if you will. You could even say he coined
term in 1953. And that's a comment certainly, not a
t i on .
John Collins
I got a message out of your presentation yesterday which I
yed a great deal. The message, to me, was that the world has
ged a whole lot since Admiral Sherman was around. We had
s nuclear superiority at that time. The Soviet Navy was
1 a coastal defense force. The options open to the United
es , in terms of a maritime strategy, were immensely broader
they are in the 1980's and so the message to me was--that
rstand that you can't take a strategy out of that context and
spose it intact into the 1980's because it's not going to
That was the message that I got, which you, as a
orian, helped me think the problem through very well. So I
t understand what your differences with me now, on that.
As far as Wiley is concerned, I have no idea what Admiral
y's views of the maritime strategy as presently promulgated,
What I do know is that I really agree with a lot of the
g3 that he said in his little book. And that if he applied
quote out of his book that I used, which says that "planning
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for certitude is the worst of all military mistakes," that he
might possibly have some second thoughts himself. I wrote a
couple of notes down here a little while ago--just before the
break--I've heard several times during the last two days, that
the present strategy is flexible enough that you don't need
optional strategies which I was suggesting. I really don't
believe that. I believe that if you look at a high intensity,
perhaps nuclear, maritime conflict and compare it with a low
intensity conflict, your objectives can't be the same, the policy
guidelines can't be the same, the forces that suit one are not
suitable in many instances for another. And therefore, I have a
lot of trouble trying to digest that if I take the strategy as
written, t h a
'
can use that as the benchmark from which to
adjust, because the adjustments are enormous. This is where I'm
coming from.
Captain, Naval Reserve, Ret.
Planning Research Corporation
I want to subscribe to what John Collins is saying. He said
so much about what's been a burden on what I've been listening to
for the last two days--it's been on my mind--I think that the
maritime strategy, as it is stated, is defective and it does not
address the full spectrum of the conflict. And therefore that
the force structure of the United States Navy of today, cannot
support that maritime strategy, if it is spelled out in its full
dimensions. By this, I mean our force structure is based upon 15
carrier battle groups. It does not address those points that Mr.
Collins brought out. So I think it should be changed.
I would like to talk to the authors of this strategy and
advise them--don't shoot the messenger, he made some very
critical and, I think, very pertinent points and so you should
think very seriously about that.
The point that Dr. Kresey made was--what do you do to meet
this full spectrum 9 In 1960 I believe it was, we had a big
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erence here at the PG School and it was called "The Advanced
rrenceC) Study." The result of that conference was to
mmend that the number of Polaris boats be cut in half because
the ANZA advent of technology and that we should go to
edo-tube launched ballistic missiles. You know what
ened 9 That was thrown out as a recommendation. So there are
,
if we just took one carrier battle group, and converted it,
spent some money on some other ships. We've got 15 carrier
le groups and 3 minesweepers.
Tom Grassey
Who would like to respond to that 9 I'm almost tempted to
te Peter or both of the authors that we have present on the
time strategy, to join us on the front, because there seems
e so many arrows going in their direction. They're getting
n the back right now.
John Collins
Incidentally, let me make it clear to everybody here that I
aud the Navy effort to put together a maritime strategy. I
asked, as the only individual to come to this conference and
icize it. And so I did so in a very straightforward fashion.
this mean that we should take the baby and throw it out with
bath 9 Of course not. All I'm doing is suggesting to the
le in this auditorium that there are possible ways to improve
product that we started with. And that maybe these are some




Let me just take on that question ... I won't belabor it a
lot and that applies to some of your criticism and I
know that you are serving a role. It would be a waste of our
time if we are here . . . maritime strategy is great. In fact I
had my turn at telling these guys about all the things that have
to be done--and I don't think I told them anything they didn't
know. There's a lot of work to be done on this maritime
strategy. What is missing is a framework in which it is going to
be applied. And the framework is at least two- fold- - 1 1 ' s got to
be three-fold or four-fold or five-fold. One of them that's
terribly important is that the operators are guys out there who
are going to fight. And that's the most important, by a long
shot, you would think.
But at the other end is the House and Senate Appropriation
Committee and that's where the rubber really meets the road. And
between the two of those, there are all kinds of iterations that
take place. Now we've all heard the term- -s trategy force
mismatch-- ti 1 1 we're sick of hearing it. And there is a strategy
force mismatch today and there will be tomorrow and it'll be
forever. This country is never going to pay enough money to meet
the objectives of the service chief s--I don't care how you
restructure the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You can create a general
staff guide there and whatever else-- what he thinks he needs to
meet the obligations that are specifically laid out in clear-cut
English by the President of the United States--that force
structure will never be applicable. Sam Nunn says change the
strategy-he's said it over and over again. If we don't have
enough, then let's change the strategy. If Sam Nunn were
President, I'd guarantee you he won't change the strategy. It's
easy to sit over there where he is and take potshots at the
Secretary of Defense who may not be of his party or whatever.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a documentary system--I don't
happen to think it's perfect by a long shot--but it provides for
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the ... to make an input. It gets assessed every year
oughly and it comes up with 28 carriers. You don't like 15.
ays--it used to say, at least 28. I fought it down to 18 and
eve me that was hard.
Getting it from 12 to 15 was also hard. The tradeoffs that
n day in and day out among the services to try to meet the
onal strategy, are intolerable. And there's one hell of a
of super civilians and Navy guys who work the tradeoffs over
over and over again and do a super job of it. And I'll bet
that if I took boatswains among the blue suiters, you'd get
i than 507. that want 15 battle groups
I haven't seen very many submarines play any role at all in
ted war. I know they're not going to help us in Central
•ica. And there are all kinds of balances that we have to
[i at this game --and they're tough. And this kind of a session
Excellent, to force us to keep going over and over on our
.nee and to assess the threat --we 're now talking about the
fic--the focus is on the Pacific, and all the obligations we
We 've heard a lot of criticism about wh ether the national
•tegy is evident. That document that somebody held up
erday--the President's — that's a disgrace. Not that it's
.ten wrong or anything else--it's a disgrace that he has to do
---for whom 7 No for the Joint Chiefs here are n a
'
na.
si on documents that are very, very clear--that have been
:ed very hard. The Chiefs don't have any trouble--the CINCS
t have any trouble understanding what their objectives are.
- damn thing is out there for the public, not you and me--I
i for the media and the Congress and, regrettably, all the
- of the world will look at us tear ourselves apart--we're
ig to criticize ourselves over what a lousy strategy the
sident has--most of the Democrats are going to say--the next
s around, the Republicans will say how lousy it is. The best
ig we ought to is junk it. And it's unfortunate we have so
i argument over what the maritime strategy says. The guys
; are working this thing know what the hell they're doing.
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And I'm very proud of what they're doing--as long as they keep it




I'd like to ask Col. Collins if he could expound a little
bit more about what I thought you said about the risks implied in
executing this and if you will--the do-ability of it. What are
the major features that you think drive the risks to an
unacceptable level in terms of zhe other side's capabilities
Colonel John Collins
Somebody said yesterday that there is no such thing as a
strategy without risk. And of course that's true. There are
degrees of risk. And I prefaced my comments today by saying that
a basic purpose of strategy is to play intellectual judo with the
opponent. And if you lake your power and place it directly
against his power, that's not ;udo, that's a head-on collision
that is a higher risk strategy for a nation which dees not have
the forces that it needs to implement the concept and the Admiral
is absolutely true that the JCS consistently comes up with at
least 10 more carriers than we have m the plans. But if you are
in a force posture like that, where you cannot tolerate
attrition, and where according to the strategy, if you have 15
carrier battle groups or 15 carriers, that in fact it is
certainly desirable that those carriers operate as pairs.
Suddenly you're down to seven pair3 floating around in two
oceans. And if by any chance the other side does conduct a
surprise attack, and go nuclear with its cruise missiles and so
forth, and you do start losing aircraft carriers, you got a
really serious problem. And so what I'm suggesting is--that from
my standpoint, going up into their sanctuaries where they have
land-based air and they have their power already concentrated, is
44
angerous high risk strategy that at least in my judgment,
d require some reevaluation to determine whether or not there
alternative ways of doing this that might be less costly and
risky. And this is why I'm a real believer that there is a
:irement for much more effective strategic research than there
.t the present time.
Let me give you an example. Everywhere I go as a speaker, I
people that strategy- -whether it's maritime strategy or
I tary strategy-is like research and development. It's got a
|c side and it's got an applied side. Now, in the R&D field,
:.n ' t imagine any technologist doing very well unless there was
nor mo us and solid scientific base behind them feeding them
[intellectual ideas, theories and concepts to work with.
5'ybody I know m the Pentagon who believes that he or she is a
Ltegist, is on the applied side and they're working with
>ries and concepts that were developed in many cases 15-20-25
•s ago to suit an environment that's disappeared. And so in
r to reduce the risk, I would like to see some additional
Lis tic options. And the options aren't going to show up very
ly without an improved research capability to ferret them
Am I going through to you at all 7
Rich Haver
I'd like to make one point about that. I certainly agree
1 you that any amount of scientific research that can be added
^he process, is . . . I would say, however--at least from where
.t in the Pentagon . . . that the Navy appears to be somewhat
iue in comparison to its sister services in that we are in a
.-engaged status with the Soviets all the time. We don't have
)ps research to figure out how you move carriers across the
.hern Pacific and stay away from ... we go out and do it. We
a taste of Soviet anti-submarine every afternoon, every
ung, every night--in terms of ... operating against his
nannes and vice versa. So in effect, we have the best
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scientific research training area that exists. We have the real
world. Now that doesn't mean that we should be overconfident
about that. It doesn't mean that today's lessons apply to 1995.
But I do believe that there's more behind this than your remarks
would necessarily indicate, in terms of the people who wrote
these words and those who are working on these alternatives in
the real world, like Admiral Lyons and Admiral Kelso. They have
more than just the RAND Corporation to work with--they have the
crucible of how they conduct fleet operations today. Whether the
Russians intercepted us when we flew a strike against a
particular Soviet group--when they reacted--how they reacted--and
a far amount of decent evidence of that.
What I was looking for and I guess I got it in a sense of--
if we throw the carriers directly into the teeth of the Soviet
defense system, we run a high risk of losing them. I think we
would agree, if we go to the Soviet party the way they've set the
table, that's true. And I've never sensed that anyone who was
taking the documents that Roger and others draf ted -- enough to go
out and write the plan--are just stupidly going to send a message
--we'll be off the Laflotins on the 15th day--come to the party--
sort of tactics. Most of our routine is to apply pressure to
them, but apply pressure to them in a way that their forces are
not of the advantage state.
I guess the other thing I would say is that you project a
somewhat pessimistic view of what I would call the do-ability, to
put it in very simple terms. Yet I find in watching the Soviets
that they aren't nearly so confident about their ability to knock
us out. In fact, I sense, in watching the Soviets, that they are
very concerned that this is entirely executable. And that it is
a--if you will--a strategy or a concept or whatever term Suits
the particular speaker--it is something that is not only do-able
but entirely within the realm of the possible--in terms of this
force being used successfully against them. So I guess my only
response to your remarks is--and while--and I agree that all
strategies have to have a risk in order to be wor thwhi 1 e - - 1 ' m not
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;ure it's quite as pessimistic or as unaccompl i shab 1 e as your
irks indicated. That's all.
Col . Col 1 ins
I guess we're talking about the two personalities I
ly consider myself to be in the real worId--although I'm not
,he Navy, I think I'm in the real world. I have 30 years in
in the Army and I have been 15 years fighting these kinds of
>lems on Capital Hill, which is part of the real world. It
not be aboard an aircraft carrier or a cruiser or a
larine, but it's still part of the real world. And so we're
:ing at two personalities that have different views of what
risk happens to be. I'm seeing a risk that I believe is
ler than I would like to accept, if there were alternatives.
:e I have never seen any alternatives, these we re not
•essing the strategy--I don't know what the pros and cons were
,he options that were discarded. And so whether or not this
,he ultimate, best option is beyond my ability to identify.
given it in the context I have of nothing to the right or the
, of it, it gives me a queasy feeling in the pit of my
aach .
Professor Nakamura
Yoshi Nakamura from Japan National Defense Security. I
.d like to ask Dr. Berns te in- -my question is a little bit long
I would like to have a yes or no type answer right away--
ler than long and careful answer. Before I left Japan, I was
id by ray ... who's actually going to implement the Ground Self
>nse Force Initiative. He said--well, we are very worried
it the Bastion for the Bear alternative to the Sea of Okutsk.
; is the ... Sea of Japan. The reason is--as I mentioned in
;peech--2/3 of the Army will go to the north part of Japan,
neans that the southern part of Japan, there are no soldiers
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during crisis. So his worry is very natural. He worried about
the northern part of the Sea of Japan which becomes the Bastion
for the Bear. So my question is--do you have such a kind of
scenario in your list 9
Dr . Berns te in
Yes
Professor Nakamura
Thank you very much.
Al ... - long time planner for PACFLT
I would like to address Mr. Collins' comments about the
extent to which we are scientific and systematic in the way that
this kind of effort's been taking place. What PACFLT does in
this particular area is it ties together an annual net
assess me nt--both dynamic and static- -of the entire position in
the Fac i f 1 c- -So v i e t and American and allied. It games out
alternative campaign plans ln-house. It conducts twice annually
a major wargame to test specific subsets of the plan. It ensures
that every single fleet exercise involving more than 2-3 ships,
is involved in testing certain specific aspects of the various
campaign plans which are, in turn, various subsets of the overall
maritime strategy. It exposes these to the critique of people up
the hill in CINCPAC--the people down the hill at Hickom. It
exposes them to the critique of some fairly strong critics in the
Naval War College who have different views on how the Pacific
might go sometimes than the PACFLT has. It exposes them to the
views of the CNO and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and other people, during a wide variety of subsequent games and
conferences which are held--all of which strike me as being the
kind of applied science that strategy is. As opposed to a
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>retical science, which is what you seem to apply. And I
ik
,
quite frankly, that if there's anything systematic about
way this strategy has been developed and about the way in
;h the C I NCS- -Lan f 1 t as well and Eucom- -al though I can't speak
Eucom--there have been a lot of systematic, reasonably
jntific and fairly rigorous efforts to validate many aspects
.t, including when and how and under what circumstances what
:es will do what. Questions of pace, questions of relative
.ication of force, questions of dispersion vs. concentration,
mes of at tack- -whether they should be from the north or from
south. At what point you make an offensive push, how long an
msive push can last, how much you have to depend upon the
»pt:on and electronic warfare and how much you have to depend
i speed -- i nnumerab 1 e , uncounted I guess would be an easy word
lys of doing things differently, are tested everyday by the
it CI NCS. And that's, to me, not unscientific, not
'Stematic and includes hundreds of options, not just one or
Col. Collins
We specialize in the United States in what I call the
ler/or syndrome. We will either do this or we will do that.
apply this to a lot of different things. The Navy, for
aple, went through a period where it got rid of all of its
.-aircraft guns and it went missiles. The Army got rid of all
anti-tank guns, and it went missiles. And we got rid of all
anti-aircraft guns and we went missiles. And the Soviets
t have this syndrome. They say--we won't have either/or--
.1 have both. We won't have quality or quantity, we'll have
l, and so forth. And so I can apply that directly to what
re talking about--do I believe that there is enormous benefit
a the operational type research that you're talking about 9 Of
'se. Would I dispense 9 Of course I would not. Is there
) a requirement for--and I shouldn't sneer at this--for the
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scientific research 9 I think that there's a need for both. I
scratched so me things out on my notes before I delivered my
prepared comments. But I had a few representative topics that I
thought, perhaps, naval research could undertake with some
profit. One of them would be strategic centers of gravity for
the maritime strategy. What is a strategic center of gravity?
That, according to Clauswitz, who's got a bad name in this room,
is the point of decision. That's the point of dec 1 s 1 on- - that '
s
where you want to put your primary emphasis.
Now there is no such thing as a strategic center of gravity.
There are national centers of gravity, there are regional centers
of gravity, and there are functional centers of gravity.
Wouldn't it be nice for naval research to be doing some basic
examination of centers of gravity to determine what they are for
the Soviet Union and how we can best manipulate those in
peacetime and in war 9 Does this replace the operational research
you're talking about 9 Of course it does not. 1 would like to
see another topic--I would like to see an objective evaluation of
the value of peacetime naval presence for the crises deep inland.
Now, we've worn out ships and we've worn out people, running task
forces in and out of the Indian Ocean. And seme of the crises
that they were supposed to influence in my mind, probably were
influenced. But there were some others where my guess is that
the value of those naval task forces was about as close to zero
as you could possibly get. Would I like to some basic research
on the guidelines for using naval presence in these sorts of
circumstances 9 Now I could sit here for a long time, ticking off
scientific research that would provide intellectual tools for the
practical planner to use as he sees fit. That's all I would say.
Tom Grassey
I'm going to keep Roger for last. And he will be our last.
50
I'd like to direct my question to Ed Olsen. Ed, you
aoned something I found intriguing. Through much of this
"erence
,
when allies have been discussed, they've been
:ussed in terms of a problem for the United States with
ject to convincing allies to come on board our strategy. In
»ct
,
you turned that on its head and said that one alternative
iibility would be for the United States to associate itself
l the strategy of allies. Yet, at least in terms of my
larch in the As 1 a-Pac 1 f 1 c , and I'm thinking back to the trip
I you and I took together under USIA auspices, when one talked
1 allies, with the exception of Japan— the general response
that the Soviets are your problem, not ours. How do you
>ncile that with the idea of associating ourselves with allied
iteg 1 es ?
Ed Olsen
In the case of Japan if they don't see the
.et Union as a threat to them in Asia--is it possible for us
scale down our threat perception of the Soviet Union— seeing
Asian stake as being primary, not the U.S. stake. Obviously
: is a two-track relationship. Our relationship with the
.et Union is independent. It doesn't mean we change our view
-he Soviet Union, we just change our view of the Soviet Union
.t applies in Asia. If that's possible. I don't see any
it movement to do it in this country. But it's possible. And
could build a stronger relationship with allies and get
es to do more for themselves in that.
Since I don't think anybody else can ask me a question, let
.xpound on one thing that Col. Collins said, and I think it's
ited to yours. Col. Collins alleged, among several things,
l the Navy intends to inform other services and cause a
:ul tat ion- -or informs them after the fact. You referred to
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the antagonism this arouses in the other services. I'm not a
Navy o f f i cer- - I ' m not any kind of military of
f
icer--so I can't
really comment on that knowl edgeably--even if I could, I'm not
sure I would.
But in any event, I do know that the U.S. does tend to treat
allies in that manner- -consul ts with allies in that manner often
--not always, but often. Kind of tells people what we expect.
Here's the U.S. game plan or the U.S. bl ueprint- -here ' s what you
should do and here's what you should do. The reaction often--
certainly in Asia f requent ly- - why ? That's precisely the problem.
The Soviets are not a threat to us Asians, it's a threat to you.
So don't ask us to do what you can't do. You do it yourself.
But if you change your perception of this and start to view the
Soviet Union in Asia more the way some of the Asian states do--
and certainly in the case of a country like Japan, which is
becoming rapidly and probably will stay the *1 economic power in
the world. Shouldn't their views of the Soviet Union be heavily
factored into the joint strategy with Japan 7 I think so. I'm
probably in the minority on this. I find more empathy in Japan
than I do in this country--in terms of support for that, for
obvious reasons.
I think it's a legitimate thing for the future and probably
will be more legitimate 10-20 years down the road--as these
economic factors in Asia begin to dominate. I made a trip--I'll
just take one more mmute--last July, had a trip to Soviet Union.
Talking with some Soviet analyst on Japan and Korea and to me it
was an eye-opener. Have to be careful how I phrase this--it's
not that I learned--I don't want to sound like Jimmy Carter--it
wasn't that I learned something about the Soviet Union that I
didn't know, it's just that I learned the depths of their feeling
on this. There's a great deal of fear of Japan on the part of
the Soviet academic analysts and Soviet researchers. Wasn't fear
of military things at all. And they talk about that--but they
didn't seem to fear that. But they did fear the Japanese
economic power. And they were wonder mg -- in private
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rersat i ons- -not in the conference se t t 1 ngs - -why are Americans
:avalier about the Japanese economic challenge. If we Soviets
>d what you people face, we'd be much more upset about the
inese. I'm not upset about the Japanese. I think this is
it. I think we ought to have competition with the Japanese.
>ught to open up and trade with them. The Soviets couldn't
irstand that. And I think that puts them at a real
idvantage dealing with the Japanese in the future. It's a
,ake for us not to see how they see the Japanese and see the
inese view of the Soviets--! 'd love to see us integrate our
itegy with the Japanese and accept some of the Japanese ideas
t as they would accept some of our ideas. But it's not easy
lo .
Tom Grassey
Our final question is from Captain Roger Barnett.
Roger Barnett
I'd first of all like to thank my friend, John Collins, for
ig a stimulating foil for us. And also for refreshing my
>ry on who it was George Will was referring when he talked
it pyromaniacs in fields of straw men. And I'd like to make
;e observations, primarily in the interest of setting the
>rd straight. I'd like to extend on Rich Haver's remarks
it the fact that the Navy actually does work against Soviet
res. Which is unlike what the other services do. And on Pete
•'s remark that the Navy exercises, continuously, in both
intic and Pacific, and refines and works options and thinks
it--what happens if 7 But the Navy also has the best wargaming
ibility in the entire United States. Where the maritime
itegy and various pieces of it have been played hundreds of
ts by thousands of people. Now, if this isn't net assessment,
•ally don't know--and I recognize that JCS Pub 1 doesn't have
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a definition of it--that is the quintessential net assessment--
the best you can do short of war, it seems to me. And if John
has something else in mind, I'd like to hear that.
The second point is that he's left us with the impression
that SACLANT was not consulted in the preparation for the
maritime strategy because of something that Admiral MacDonald
said when he was SACLANT, that he was not consulted. In fact,
when the strategy was put together, Admiral MacDonald was Op-05
and Admiral Train was SACLANT and we did work very closely with
Admiral Train and his staff. And Admiral MacDonald, in the
normal course of events, would have been briefed because the
strategy was a CNO program analysis memorandum and would have
been briefed frequently on it . . . and at meetings with the CNO.
So it's true that Admiral MacDonald was not consulted as SACLANT.
But SACLANT was, throughout the process, as was CINCPAC, allies,
other services, and so forth.
The third point that I want to clarify and make absolutely
clear is that the United States Navy has continuously had anti-
aircraft guns on its ships but only since there were aircraft.
Tom Grassey
Professor Franz Michael, you were standing there--
Franz Michael
Let me just make one comment . . . which perhaps I take up in
person 7 I mean time is over--
John Collins
About two sentences. Wargames are heavily dependent on
scenarios, loss ratios, a lot of other variables that depend on
who's making the input. Is there value from wargames 7 Yes there
is. Are they a substitute for net assessment 7 I think not.
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rently successive Secretaries of Defense think net also or
Marshall would have been out of a job years ago.
But John, wargaming is the dynamic form of net assessment,
static form in order then to go into the dynamic form and
does a lot of wargammg--
John Collins
I understand. My faith in the outcome of wargames is
thing less than complete, let's put it that way.
Nobody believes in the outcome of war games. That's not why
war game. I mean, it's like a mule's sex life. It might be
it might be pleasurable, enjoyable, but there's no output,
t look at outcomes, look at the process--that's what's
're really doing in war games.
Tom Grassey
All sorts of thoughts cross my mind as to how now to
oduce my chairman. I know you want to break, but I've got
thing better. I've got Cmdr Jim Tritten for you.
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WRAP UP: Dr. Don Daniel, Moderator
Chairman, Campaign & Strategy Department,
Naval War College
Jim Tr i t ten
i
We will not have time to take a break. Our goal is to have
a wrap up completed by between 5 and 5: 15. So if you could all
stand down from the podium here, I'll introduce our wrap up
speaker
.
Dr. Don Daniel earned his Ph.D. from Georgetown University.
He is a former naval person. He joined the Naval Postgraduate
School faculty in 1972. He's currently on leave from the Naval
Postgraduate School as the Chairman of the Campaign and Strategy
Department at the Naval War College. He's the author :f a recent
book on Strategic ASW and articles in Sur v i v a 1 Magazine on
Tactical Nuclear War at Sea. Forthcoming for the International
Institute on Strategic Studies will be a small volume on naval
power and European Security. Don.
WRAP UP: Don Daniel, Moderator
Chairman, Campaign & Strategy Department
Naval War College
Thank you Jim. Admiral Hayward
, Ladies and Gentlemen--!
rather feel like having to wrap up a conference that's been, I
think, a very excellent conference - -a very good conference over
two days with lots and lots of issues. And I rather feel like
the Hungarian who is on a train together with a Erit, a Cuban and
a Russian. And as they're all sitting in the same compartment as
they were going along in the train, the Russian gets up, reaches
into his bag and pulls out a bottle of Stolyshnaya, pours himself
a shot, shoots it down and throws the rest of the bottle out the
window. And everybody says--my gosh, how can you do that, that's
just wonderful vodka, how can you just do that? He says--nah,
don't worry about it, I've got lots of that back home. Train
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s down the tracks a little bit longer--the Cuban gets up,
hes into his bag, pulls out a box of wonderful c 1 gars - - 1 1 ghts
up, you know, the aroma fills the room- -everybody just kind
alivating, smelling this, takes a few more puffs, takes that
r and the rest of the box and throws them out the window,
again, they say, my God, how can you do that--those are just
erful cigars. And he said--no, don't worry about it, I've
lots of those back home. The train keeps going down the road
n a while longer. As you can imagine, the Brit gets up,
hes into his kit, pulls out a bottle of single malt liquor,
s himself a shot, throws the rest the bottle out the
ow. Same reaction and same answer. Of course, now the
an an is really under pressure to come up something. He's
worried that the train is about to reach its destination and
' r e all going to get off and his honor will never have been
Id. So he sat down on the train and thought for a few
nds. But a smile broke across his face. He wa Iked about the
artment, picked up the Russian and threw him out the window.
Is there a Russian in the audience 9 Ok. Oh, my goodness,
a, I didn't mean it- -where is he.
I just want to start off by saying agam--I want to commend
Naval Postgraduate School for what I thought was an
tanding conference, as a matter of fact. I hope it's the
t of many and I think that you did a great job. Now I am
.king here for myself, I'm not speaking as a representative of
Naval War College or the Navy or anything else. I'm going to
to provocative and to some extent, try to offer some
•theses. I'm also going to try to be short because that was
dictum that I was given before I came up here.
So I'm going to deal with just one point about a question
, we've dealing with in terms of history and then I want to
a little bit with some questions about the development of
maritime strategy in general and then get into offering maybe
hypothesis about how we can think about the use of the Navy
•he Pacific, at least in a war with the Soviets. To some
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extent to pick up Admiral Hayward ' s point that--hey, we haven't
really heard what strategy in the Pacific is going to be. And
this is not to overshadow what Al Bernstein was saying in a sense
that it's going to be scenario dependent. It's just simply going
to try to develop some of those points a little bit more.
In terms of history, I really just want to make a couple of
points. One is that I think history was the right place to
start, in terms of what we did. I think you need some sense of
historical perspective in terms of what you're about. My only
concern is--and this is the second time at a conference that I've
closed out a conference wh ere I said the same thing about
historians, and when I did it the last time, I got even poison
letters from historians in the ma ll as a result of it. But I do
have a problem then which I have a problem now. And that is--if
you use history to make yourself feel good, then you deserve what
you're going to get. By that I mean, just because someone
advocated something in the past or just because somebody thought
that something was a good idea in the pas t
-
-doesn ' t mean that
it's a good idea today. I have never read Albert Thayer Mahon.
I have read Gil ma ny or those people. I don't find it
particularly relevant to do so, to be perfectly frank. Maybe
that's going to be a little bit too provocative in terms of some
of you that are here, but my goodness--in other words, we ought
to be worried about the parallels between what goes on in the
past and what goes on today. And if the parallels are there such
that there's something to be learned, we ought to learn it. But
we ought not to just simply go back to history so we can feel
good--so we can say, gee, I advocate something today and that
must be right because Mahon advocated it in 1905. Somehow or
other, that argument strikes me as turning history on its head,
in terms of what history ought to be about. So let me just get
on with that. And I'll give my address to those of you who don't
wa nt to send me poison pen letters.
Let's look at the question of the maritime strategy in terms
of its development. I thought that both Roger Barnett's point
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Pete Swartz's point about the aim of what was going on in
s of the development of this thing called a maritime
tegy , was kind of to help revitalize some thinking that was
g on in the Navy. As a matter of fact, I find that kind of
resting. Just one aside on that. But those of you who are
liar with the writings of Admiral Gorshkov know that he
ished in '72-'73 a series of 11 articles in Navy ' s At War and
e_. What some of you may not r emember - - 1 ' m certain that Rich
ably does--at the beginning of those articles, before he got
the substance of the articles themselves, there was a short,
of little two sentence or three sentence paragraph that
ntially said that he was publishing these things in order to
urage a unity of views among people in the Navy. And I find
kind of interesting that 5-6 years later, the U.S. Navy or
e it was a little bit later than that --starts to embark on a
ess or at least to start to generate how you think about
1 war fare- - that it seems to be happening in both navies. I'm
sure what there is to get out of that, but I just simply find
n interesting parallel set of developments.
Within that particular context, I want to emphasize is that
ar as I'm concerned- -again , I am speaking personal 1 y- -process
uch more important than substance in terms of this. And by
,
I mean in terms of getting people to think strategically-
much more important than actually the substance -he
time strategy itself. I would argue the case though--as a
er of fact as a young naval officer in the 1970's and
hing young naval officers after that--is that there was very
le strategic thinking going on among many people. I think
among very, very senior people, in terms of the Navy. And I
k that the great thing about the maritime strategy is--
her people agreed with it or not--was it got them thinking
it strategy. It said--think about something else other than
's going on in the engineroom or think about something else
r than what you're going to have to face in the Congress in
s of justifying this very specific program. There's more to
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the world than that. You guys might actually have to fight a war
one of these days. And you ought to think about that. And the
nice thing about the maritime strategy is that it has gotten
people to do exactly that.
I was really surprised by Mr. Collins today who argued about
rigorous research and so forth. Particularly in terms of his
comments about the Naval War College and talking about the
strategic studies group. I mean, he said he asked them, where do
you come from--and one of them said I was a CO of an aircraft
carrier and the other one was the--I don't know what- -the CAG for
the F-14 group or whatever it was that they were. And he was
appalled at the prospect that these guys were here and that they
didn't seem to know anything about strategy. The purpose of the
Strategic Studies Group was to bring these people--to put them
through a process of a year so that at the end of the process
they might know something about strategy. Collins happened to
talk to them at the beginning of the year. And it doesn't
surprise me that they didn't know anything about strategy. Up to
that point, most of them had horizons that didn't extend very far
beyond the decks of a ship. He caught those people at the
beginning of the process, not at the end of the process. What
did he expect 9 For someone who talks about rigorous research,
one would have thought that he would have thought about that
particular . .
. before throwing the point out.
I do have another issue in terms of--I don't think it ought
to be called maritime strategy. I do have a real problem with
the name. And as a matter of fact, I seem to remember a while
ago when we were told to come to this conference or asked to come
to this conference, that I think it had something to do with
maritime strategy in the Pac 1 f 1 c- - that was the name of the
conference. That has since changed to "The Navy in the Pacific,"
which I think is a better name for a number of reasons. Because
I have a problem with the term "strategy." Strategy implies that
somehow or other, there is some kind of a program- -m other
words, we talk about the application of resources to objectives
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terms of strategy, as if somehow or other you have a program
t's worked out. And maybe "cookbook" is almost too hard a
m. But you get--at least to my mind--the term strategy
jlies something more concrete than what the maritime strategy
L if I can put it that way. But that was wrapped up in a
pie of things.
Let me try to tell you what I mean. I would have called it
e like maybe a concept of operations or framework for thinking
ut how navies ought to be used. And it might have gotten us
und some of the problems that have arisen as a result of the
lication of the maritime strategy. And that is the
ntification of options mentioned in the strategy, with the
ategy itself. When I think the Navy has been wrapped around
t particular axle and has been buffered about by people who
e identified options within the strategy--with the strategy
elf
.
And I can understand why that should be the case because
hink--and as a matter of fact, I would argue however that what
been called the maritime strategy, has been caricatured, I
Id argue, by some of the very same people who pushed the
ategy. And in this particular case, I think maybe on the one
d, amcng other people, you had a very forceful Secretary of
Navy in terms of John Lehman. But Lehman, in terms of his
cefulness, did go out--and to my mind, did say things that
gested that the Navy had a strategy to go out, let's say and
h the koala--on day one of the war. And that's the strategy
t John Collins is saying he doesn't particularly like. And I
Id argue that even John Lehman backed off from that after he
ught about it. And other people in the Navy backed off from
t.
I would also argue that the Naval War College--you know,
n Collins talked about naval research- -he ' s never been to the
al War College and talked to me, at least, in terms of the
ey and research department out there. I don't think you know
t we're about--I don't think you know what we do. And within
context of strategy and strategy development, the war gaming
1
department, I think, has been terribly important here because
I've seen some box kicking admirals come in there and after about
3-4 war games where they thought the maritime strategy forced
them to bash the koala--and after about 3-4 war games they came
back and said--you know, I'm not sure I want to do that any more.
That sounded like a great idea because I thought it was
consistent with the strategy. And now I happen to think that
that's a pretty dumb idea. And there are still some of those box
kicking admirals around in the Navy right now. There are some
hard charging aggressive kind of admirals. But you ask them--
would you do this--and they came back and said--hey, I'm not sure
I want to do that. I'm not sure I like the idea of committing
suicide or sending a lot of good A-6 pilots to die at the face of
Soviet air defense without having properly prepared myself to do
it. Now that doesn't mean that at some particular point in the
war, if there were to be a war, that they wouldn't want to do
that kind of thing and that they wouldn't do it. But they're not
going to do it automatically. These guys are not spr 1 ng- 1 oaded
to go out and see a lot of good people die. And I think the
caricature of the maritime strategy, to my mind, has been
criticized more than what the strategy really ought to be about,
which is more of a process. And I've been surprised at some of
the . . . that thought it should have been better than that--in
terms of characterizing it that way.
What I am willing to say is that people who are involved
with the maritime strategy are more willing to entertain options
which may or may not be executed- -and those options may seem too
offensive for some--but at least one can argue that they're
looking at it--I think today at 1 eas t- - wi thin the context of a
philosophy that says be offensive where you can, but don't be
stupid. And I think that's what we have to be keeping in mind.
I was going to say more about the Naval War College but I'll
ju3t leave it at that--except to say that I think we have
contributed to the re vi tal i zat l on of the strategy to an emphasis
on option and we've done more than our share to bring about all
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s of people over at the Naval War College, both critics and
non-cr 1 1 i cs -
-
we 1 1 obviously the non-critics are going to be
e because they own the War College--but critics as well as
jcritics alike over at the War College.
That being said, let me spend a few minutes--let me skip
'--let me spend a few minutes on some questions about thinking
it maybe about the question of strategy in the Pacific. And
me just start too with a number of things that I think you
,t to keep in mind when you're thinking about strategy in the
fie. At least if you're going to deal with the issue of a
with the Soviet Union--maybe the least probable case but
, k if you're going to develop a strategy, that's wh ere you
, to start, I would argue --at least, that's where you want to
t. You want to move off from that base case and you want to
t dealing with other things. But I do think that that's the
.er place to start.
In terms of time lines--in terms of one issue which is that
ime lines--time lines in the Pacific are very different than
:e in other areas of the world. If you have a war that starts
in Europe, I would argue that that war is going to proceed
ly far down before maybe you have much of a war almost that
have in the Pacific. At least certainly from the point of
/ of the Navy as it was well shown by that chart that Cort
er put on --about that picture of the Med i terranean- - that
,ure of our parking lot in the midst of the Pacific here.
those distances involved means that things are probably
ig to go ahead more slowly.
Also, and I'll develop this in a little bit more detail in a
seconds, there are very good political reasons why war in the
fie is probably going to occur more slowly. And certainly
of the major ones--which I'll talk about in a few minutes--
>ens to be with the fact that if can't play with the Japanese
-he Pacific--or if they're not i nvol ved - -y our options are very
trely restricted. And I would think--for very good and
icient reasons--if I were Japanese, I would not be on the
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front lines on Day One, depending upon the circumstances. And I
don't think the Japanese are going to be. That's my own personal
opinion, but I don't think they are going to be. I think they
have very good and sufficient reasons not to be. That means
whatever you want to do in the Pacific is probably going to
proceed a heck of a lot more slowly than what's going on in the
other side of the world. As a matter of fact, Europe is going to
dominate it, and we're going to be sucked in to just simply a
focus, in terms of being dominated by Europe, I would argue.
Because you're going to be trying probably to save your tail in
Europe; thinking about the Pacific is definitely going to be
secondary. By the time the Pacific really cranks up for you to
do something, you're going to have to start wondering about
whether or not it's almost going to make any d i f f er ence - - or at
least you're going to have to start thinking about that
particular option.
Let's look at a couple of other things. In terms of the
U.S. Navy--in terms of thinking about what you ought to be doing
in the Pacific. I would argue within this particular case,
relative to the overall expenditure of U.S. Naval resources, the
U.S. Navy is probably in pretty good shape in the Pacific. Half,
or roughly more than half of the Navy, is out here. And I find
that particularly interesting since at least--and maybe some of
the people in the audience can correct me--but I don't think that
the division of resources m terms of the Navy as you find it
today, is based on any type of strategic thinking at all. I
think it's partly based on bureaucratic po 1 1 t ics- -you divide them
up roughly half in the Atlantic, roughly in the Pacific; I think
it's based partly on historical precedent. But I have never seen
anybody come down and say--we've got a strategy here and it says
that you ought to have roughly this much in the Atlantic and
roughly this much in the Pacific, if you're going to have a war
with the Soviet Union. That's not what it was based on. I would
argue that the U.S. Navy in the Pacific is probably, relative to
dealing with the Soviet Union, and again it depends upon all
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s of other factors which I can't deal with now, including
n, but it's probably in relatively better shape than the U.S.
in the Atlantic, in terms of dealing with the threat that's
g to be faced there. So that has to be a factor in mind when
think about what you want to do in the Pacific.
Essentially you may want to think in terms of the Pacific,
ome extent, being a source of forces that will be swung to
Atlantic. Or you may want to think of the Pacific, at least,
eing a source of forces that may serve as some kind of a
tegic reserve. And we'll get to that in a second. Now, you
going to face a problem if you do that. I suspect that
fie commanders will want to kind of get their forces engaged
re some of them are transferred out. That's going to be a
lem that's going to have to be dealt with. But let them at
t argue the case. If they've got a good case, that they can
ly make a d 1 f f erence - - then my God, let them make a
erence . If they don't have a case, if they can't argue the
that they can make a difference, then my God, don't let
i. Don't let them throw the forces away.
Within that particular context, I would argue that things
probably going to get worse rather than get better. In other
s, we've see a fair amount of budgetary successes in terms of
last several years. And I think to say that the U.S. Navy,
how or other because of its maritime strategy, has achieved
etary success and it ought to be flogged for that--I find
to be a very strange argument indeed. But that's a separate
le . The U.S. Navy has had budgetary successes over the course
he last few years. I think, however, it's going to run into
' very, very serious problems in the future. And I think
e going to have to be thinking about that. And to my mind,
fully though--that is going to drive some thinking about a
onal strategy--which I think is actually going on right now.
erms of how you think about the division of the forces that
have and how they're going to be developed and so forth.
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Within that particular context, there are some other factors
going on which I think do need to be kept in mind--at least in
the long term. One could make a case--at least it is not
i mposs ible- -one could make a case that sometime in the
foreseeable future, you're probably going to be drawing down in
terms of ground forces from Europe, and drawing down in terms of
ground forces in Korea. That may actually be the case. And if
that were true, you're going to want to think about strategic
lift— in other words, you're going to want to think about how
you're going to apply your resources. And the Navy and other
mobile forces, may turn out looking more important then than they
do today. And I can't predict what's going to happen there. But
it's at least worth thinking about, that within the context of
the fact that we're talking about 350,000 troops in Europe and
40,000 troops in Korea, what if we were to draw down seriously in
terms of the number of troops in Europe, what if we were to draw
out all the ground troops in Korea 9 What would the world look
like then 9 And what does that mean in terms of what the
budgetary expenditures would look like 9 And what would the
arguments be then 9
I suspect one of the arguments would be--you'd have to even
possibly build a stronger Navy rather than a less strong Navy, if
that were to be the case.
Let's look very quickly in terms of another factor in terms
of the USSR. We've seen a fairly significant buildup of Soviet
and naval and other military forces in the Soviet Union. But I
think Andy Marshall brought us very nicely to a nice point when
he said that hey--at least in terms of his pred i c t 1 ons- -we ' ve
seen this buildup. If you look at it long term, things don't
look so good for the Soviet Union. And I think that needs to be
the case. I am sympathetic with Paul Dibb's description of the
Soviet Union as the incomplete superpower. I think that is the
problem that the Soviet Union does have--not only in the Pacific,
but in others. And I found particularly interesting, actually,
Ed Olsen's point was that maybe what we're more afraid of in the
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Lfic is not another buildup of Soviet military forces, but
jally if the Soviets become more friendly in the Pacific. If
Soviets actually try to maintain the level of forces or
tever--get closer to the Japanese, get closer to the Chinese
whatever. Don't know if it'll all happen or not.
Rich Haver, I think, painted a picture where he talked about
Soviets having a number of force deficiencies in the Pacific,
terms of modern submarines, in terms of tactical aviation--
b they were going to face serious ASW problems. We've seen,
terms of Cort Wagner's presentation, about some difficulties
b they may have in terms of finding aircraft carriers. I
nk that Rich made an excellent point just a few minutes ago
jt dealing with the Soviets. on a day to day basis and having
e sense of what their strengths are and what their weaknesses
So I guess when I add it all up, I have a sense that maybe
on ' t happen to think that the world is going to hell m a
ibag in the Pacific, at least from a military perspective. In
er words, I think we can at least for the near future,
tainly hold our own and probably do pretty well.
Now within that context, there are going to be some
ertainties in terms of what the Soviets are going to do which
make a difference in terms of what we want to think about
ng. I think probably or possibly one of the major
ertainties has to do with this question of pro-SS3N. We've
ked a lot today, and yesterday also, about the fact that much
the Soviet general purpose navy would be devoted to protecting
ir ballistic missile submarines. And that may probably
tinue to be true in the future, but if the Soviets, let's say,
e to put in their ballistic missile submarines very far back,
ind mining barriers, underneath ice and so forth, are they
ng to start to feel that maybe they can better protect some of
ir ballistic missile submarines without having to devote such
arge proportion of the general purpose forces 9 That I don't
w. You might say that if they were to do that, that might
e up some general purpose forces which will then go out and
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raise havoc in some other places. That may be true. That would
be reinforced with the idea of the SS-24's and the SS-25's, if
you believe that the SSBN's are the strategic reserves. If the
Soviets build up a strategic reserve on land, it may make the
strategic reserve at sea relatively less impor tant--not
absolutely less important--but relatively less important for the
Soviets. So again, they might think about--well, gee, what are
some of the things that we can do.
I would argue, however, that possibly offsetting that would
be a Start Agreement and an INF Agreement, if they occur. If you
do away with a lot of your INF, all of your INF systems as a
matter of fact, the Soviets may be looking to the systems that
are in the submarines, to help make up for that- -par t 1 cular ly in
the old Golfs and Yankees. If you also have a Start Agreement
where the Start Agreement, at least in terms of the baseline
numbers that are being discussed now--5 ,000 , 1600, if you get
down to those baseline figures, that'd be kind of interesting--m
terms of the Soviets having roughly on a one time strike right
now-
- rough 1 y let's say 10,000 warheads and you're talking about
bringing it down to 6000. My question there would be--and I
don't have an answer--I mean it's just really much more of a
question --does that make the ballistic missile submarine that
much mere important again 9 Because now you have less baskets in
which to put your eggs, so what happens on that 7 There's a
Soviet tendency to want to protect those submar i nes - -actual ly
increase rather than decrease.
Also, if you did have an excess of forces--such that you
didn't feel that you needed to protect your ballistic missile
submarines and so forth, quite as much--what would you do with
them 7 Would you go after the Slots, for instance, is that what
you would do, if you were the Soviet 3 7 And that I'm not sure.
We seem to, I think there's a sense in which the Soviets are
really defensive minded. They'd probably want to build, I think,
a defensive perimeter in and around the homeland, anyway- -to keep
us out. And I suspect though, they must see that defense
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Lmeter being--when someone talks about a bastion, I think of a
id wal 1 - -some th 1 ng that you'd have to kind of climb over or
ik your way through. I suspect they see the maritime defense
Lmeter around the Soviet homeland more like Swiss cheese. So
: if you have additional forces, that might be freed up for
pro-SSBN task, do you try to use them to plug up holes
;ead, as opposed to going out and raising havoc. Again, I
't know what the answer is to that--I'm just raising the
stion, not providing an answer to that.
All those things being considered, I guess to my mmd--and
K I am trying to be provocative here in terms of wanting to
this thing on a bang, rather than a whimper --and that is, I
't think that in a war with the Soviet Union, there's probably
i you can do if there is a heavy war going on in Central
spe , that is really goin£ to significantly affect them. I
ik the Soviet attitude w. very much be-- we '11 get to that
?r . In other words, we have a big war going on in Europe, and
can try to do things and you can hurt them, and they may
Lize they're being hurt. It's not that they're going to
spt being hurt. But maybe they're going to very much adopt
attitude of--we'll get to that later--kind of thing. They
have set up a series of priorities in their minds.
Another f ac tor - - agai n when you think about the use of the
/ then in the Pac i f i c- -would be the question of the allies.
I think Claude Buss, Steve Jurika, and Ed Olsen and others,
? really done, I think, an excellent job of sensitizing us to
question of the allies. And within that particular problem,
d it is something we need to think about--I'm not sure how
h we can do about it--I would argue that public manifestations
the maritime strategy, while they may serve to deter the
iets or cause them concern- -wh i ch I happen to think is a good
.ig . Also, however, the down side of that--they seem to have
sed concern also among your allies. And there's a tradeoff
re and you have to think about that. You want to tell certain
ngs to the Soviets because you want to enhance deterrence.
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And I think that makes a lot of sense--to mind at least, it does.
But what you tell the Soviets in order to deter, does not always
reassure your allies. And may cause your allies to rethink,
sometimes--kind of where you're taking them or where you're
drawing them. Does that say something about your public
articulations of maritime strategy, I don't know. I happen to
think that Admiral Tross is right on when he says--hey, maybe
we've been too much oriented to options in previous discussions
of the maritime strategy. Maybe we need to make it more a
discussion of more general philosophical points. And I think
there may be some sense to that, from the point of view when we
think about the allies here.
Here within this particular context, I would think that one
ally that you'd just have to deal with, you have to look at--is
the question of Japan. And again, just speaking personally, I
would argue--let me make a general point. Having had the
occasion to travel some throughout Asia, and having gone on a
couple of US I A tours there among other things--one of the things
that really concerns me is--I see, to my mind, a real
generational gap in terms of the people in Asia. You speak to
the older people, you speak to what is called the establishment
people, and they're really very much, I think, generally pro-U.S.
and generally with you, if I can put it that way. You go speak
to classrooms, to college classrooms for ins tance- -and that kind
of thing. Boy, you find they're extremely skeptical. They're
not of the same generation. I mean I remember even just last
year when I was in Korea, when I was on a bus going up the DMZ,
and there was actually a very nice tour guide--about as nice a
tour guide as you can get--but on this bus, he really made it a
point where he was talking about going up to the DMZ and the
country was divided and so forth and he said--the reason why the
country is di vided-
- i t ' s not our fault, it's the superpowers
fault and he made a point of say ing- - inc luding the United States,
It's really her fault, you know, that we're doing this. And
there were really a good number of Americans on the bus. And I
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ight, in a sense, this guy has got some brass--to kind of just
it out. But here was a young man, I don't know--about 25, I
t know exactly what his age was and so forth--very articulate
I think as a matter of fact it was because the Americans were
he bus that he was really kind of making the point. Here we
going up to the DMZ and it's all your fault--kind of thing.
eas if you talked to other Koreans, they would have a
letely different point of view. So within that general
ext of saying--I think things are going to get worse rather
better--I would argue in terms of the allies. And here I
k Japan is the 1 1 nch -p i n- -Japan is the key.
And I'm going to be very pessimistic about Japan. My
a r i o is that--should there be the prospect of a major war,
that the Soviet Union wants a major war. As a ma' er of
,
I would argue she definitely does not. But if she somehow
ther reaches the conclusion that wa r is the lesser evil than
ever it is that's driving her to war--if she reaches that
icular conclusion, I suspect that one of the things that the
ets would do would be to send the Japanese a 1 e
t
ter- - 1 ook
,
is it, this is really serious, we're not playing games here,
e being driven to this--again, think of it from the Soviet
pective now. It's not that they wa n t wa r, they probably very
don't wa nt. It's just that, for whatever reason, they feel
're on a slippery slope going to war. This could be really
t. Within that particular context, I would think that I were
Soviet Union, I would send the Japanese a letter that says--
I don't want you to my ally in a way--but I simply cannot
lach the idea of the Americans operating out of Japan, should
e be a major war. That I cannot stomach. I'll get to you
or I'll get to you later, but I'll get to you. And you'd
er think about that. And the vaguer the threat the better,
again, if I were the Japanese- - the Japanese it seems to me--
d have to think about it in two ways. What's the prospect if
in up with the Americans now or don't join up with the
leans now. And what's the prospect if the Soviets win in the
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long run. In other ways, maybe it's better for me to join up
with the Americans now, to help the Soviets not win in the long
run. Possibly that may be better, if I were Japanese. But I
don't see how they can make those kinds of predictions. I would
think we really have a serious problem then.
I was going to make it longer--but let me cut it off there,
and just say that that leads me to offer, as a conclusion here,
the description that actually Rich Haver gave, of Soviet strategy
in the Pacific. If I understood Rich correct ly- -Rich said that
in the initial period of the war, the Soviets might very well go
defensive and then after the initial period was over, sit down
and decide what was best to do--whether you go offensive, whether
you continue to remain defensive, or whatever. And it seems to
me, in the light of the factors that I just presented--
particularly in terms of the division of the U.S. naval
resources, and marine resources and that kind of thing, maybe a
defensive strategy on the part of the U.S. ought to be the way to
go.
Within the context of an overall de f ens
i
ve- - we 1 1 , ok, an
offense defensive strategy--an offensive submarine strategy but
not, I should argue, not one that says--I'm going to take all of
whatever it is--my 40 SSBN's and send them up there. I think you
can send a small number- -doesn ' t have to be all of your SSN's,
and you want the Soviets to know that there is some up there so
that they don't get a free ride on that. But other than that, I
think we need to obviously worry about maintaining the sea lines
of communications through the continent of Asia including to
Japan, as much as the sea lines coming back, as well as the sea
lines going to. And I think we can do that--I think we can
secure those. And I think for Russ to think about doing much
more--part icular ly in terms of let's say-forward offensive power
projection strikes against the Soviet homeland--I don't happen to
think, myself, that that is necessarily a good idea. You risk
losing a lot of good aircraft and you risk losing possibly even
aircraft carriers, depending upon the circumstances.
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Again, it's a question if you do it right and do you do it
the right time and so forth. But you do face the risk. And I
nk that you might want to take that risk, actually, some time
the war, you might want to take that risk. And my point is,
do it on Day One 7 In other words, wait to see if you really
i to do it. Because, in the end, having those aircraft
riers in this case, having them in reserve, having them exist,
ing them in the palm of your hand, on Day 20 of a war, Day 30
a war, may be much more important than what you can accomplish
terms of early offensive strikes against the Soviet homeland
a way where the Soviets are really much more concerned about
t's going on in Europe frankly than what's going on in the
i f 1 c .
Finally, just one thing--and I don't think we'll have time
discuss it--one of the things which we didn't discuss in the
f erence , which might have been interesting for us to discuss--
that's the question of the eastern Pacific. We basically
ked about the western Pacific. We really didn't talk about
tral America, South American or, that matter, moving out
ards the Indian 0cean--some of those areas. We didn't talk
ut that very much. But I happen to think, for instance, that
in if we look in the long term--Andy was thinking in a long
m in terms of kind of how the Soviets were going to be
rating or how they were going to feel in the year 2010. I
p asking myself in my worst nightmares - -what is South America
Central America going to look like in the year 2010? Where's
U.S. Navy going to be and what's the U.S. Navy going to be
ng then' Thank you very much.
Jim Tr i t ten
I guess there is enough summing up for Don and everybody
a when you come to the end of a conference. Let me just
narize my thought in terms of the value to the school and
end, which I think is considerable--! wanted to express it the
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other day to Admiral Hayward and it's a fresh step for the
National Security Affairs--and I think we have the freshness of
that step.
To the participants, without naming all, I want to pass on
to you my very, very sincerest appreciation for a very
stimulating time, a very good time and I hope it was of as much
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